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Abstract 
This dissertation offers a critical and historical analysis of the myth of ubiquitous 
connectivity—a myth widely associated with the technological capabilities offered by 
“always on” Internet-enabled mobile devices like smartphones and tablets. This myth 
proclaims that work and social life are optimized, made more flexible, manageable, and 
productive, through the use of these devices and their related services. The prevalence of this 
myth—whether articulated as commercial strategy, organizational goal, or mode of social 
mediation—offers repeated claims that the experience and organization of daily life has 
passed a technological threshold. Its proponents champion the virtues of the invisible “last 
mile” tethering individuals (through their devices) primarily to commercial networks.  
The purpose of this dissertation is to uncover the interaction between the proliferation 
of media artifacts and the political economic forces and relations occluded by this myth. To 
do this, herein the development of the BlackBerry, as a specific brand of devices and 
services, is shown to be intimately interrelated with the myth of ubiquitous connectivity. It 
demonstrates that the BlackBerry is a technical artifact whose history sheds light on key 
characteristics of our media environment and the political economic dynamics shaping the 
development of other technologies, workforce composition and management, and more 
general consumption proclivities. By pointing to the analytic significance of the BlackBerry, 
this work does not intend to simply praise its creators for their technical and commercial 
achievements. Instead, it aims to show how these achievements express a synthesis that 
represents the motivations of economic actors and prevailing modes of thought most 
particularly as they are drawn together in and through the myth of ubiquitous connectivity. 
The narrative arc of this dissertation is anchored by moments of harmonization among 
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political economic interests as these shape (and are shaped by) prevailing modes of 
producing and relating through ubiquitous connectivity.  
Using the story of the BlackBerry as its case study and building on the analysis of 
myth and media history developed by Vincent Mosco and Armand Mattelart, this dissertation 
both critiques and employs myth as a concept to analyze the technical and commercial ascent 
of ubiquitous connectivity in three stages: 1) the commercialization of wireless data in North 
America, 2) the conceptualization of a mobile workforce and virtual enterprises, and finally, 
3) the consumerization of ubiquitous connectivity through the incorporation of web 2.0 
ideals. In order to accomplish this, it relies on critical approaches to media theory (including 
the works of Harold Innis and Marshall McLuhan) and political economy (drawing from Karl 
Marx, David Harvey, and others). This dissertation makes use of corporate communications, 
marketing and advertising, newspaper articles, and trade journals to explicate its analysis. It 
also utilizes a series of interviews with employees at Research In Motion involved in 
computer engineering, marketing and advertising, product development, and user-experience 
design.  
 
Keywords 
Political Economy, Myth, BlackBerry, Smartphone, Mobile Media, Media Theory, 
Ubiquitous Connectivity, Research In Motion, New Economy 
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Chapter 1 – Everywhere, Everything, Always: The Age of 
Ubiquitous Media 
 “Everywhere everything is ordered to stand by, to be immediately at hand, indeed to 
stand there just so that it may be on call for a further ordering.” (Heidegger, 1977, p. 17) 
1 Introduction: The BlackBerry as Technological Artifact 
A 2012 Financial Times special report on “The Connected Business” featured an 
article titled “Mobility ushers in a brave new world” warning businesses everywhere that 
“customers and employees expect to interact with them immediately, wherever they may 
be” (Taylor, 2012). The advice offered in the Financial Times—that organizations must 
adapt to this brave new “wireless” world1—is merely one expression of the conventional 
wisdom being embraced by some of the most significant media companies, ranging from 
Internet service providers (ISP),2 media conglomerates,3 telecommunications providers,4 
hardware manufacturers,5 and software developers.6 Even governments7 are being 
                                                
1 Although a common “go to” literary reference for technology journalists, references to a “brave new 
world” in the coverage of wireless devices and services regularly invoke the crossing of a crucial threshold. 
See for example Hall, 2010; Deloitte, 2008. In a 10 year retrospective of the BlackBerry, a Engadget 
blogger proclaimed that the device ushered in a “brave new world” by untethering corporate executives 
(Ziegler, 2009). More recently, the launch of the BlackBerry 10 line of devices was accompanied by a 
Globe and Mail headline announcing “BlackBerry’s brave new world” (Krashinsky, 2013). I will return to 
the irony of this usage in the conclusion. 
2 For example, Time Warner Cable’s Road Runner mobile hotspot service. See 
http://www.timewarnercable.com/East/about/inthenewsdetails.ashx?PRID=2951&MarketID=144 
3 For example, Rogers Communications' Anywhere TV. See http://www.rogersondemand.com/ 
4 For example, the creation of Everything Everywhere, a joint venture between European 
telecommunications providers T-Mobile and Orange. See http://everythingeverywhere.com/ 
5 For example, Qualcomm’s Internet of Everything initiatives. See 
http://www.qca.qualcomm.com/networking/technology.php?nav1=149 
6 For example, Microsoft’s push into cloud computing and storage with its SkyDrive service. See 
promotional video: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ImzKSd3cGrc&list=FLXt5xZ5g2ASyIrIEioNOjkg 
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affected. Predictably, marketing and advertising strategies have emerged to exploit new 
commercial opportunities associated with these buzzwords.8 This new rhetoric is marked 
by the prominence of the words “anywhere,” “anyplace,” “everything,” “everywhere,” 
“anytime,” and “always.” What these terms all express is the essential importance of 
ubiquitous connectivity (UC) as a media narrative with cultural, political, and economic 
significance. The prevalence of UC both as a commercial strategy and organizational 
goal implies that the experience and organization of daily life itself has passed a 
technological threshold. Such grand claims, however, are not particularly new or unique. 
In fact, myths of technological transcendence have a long history, and are particularly 
central to the advertising and marketing initiatives associated with new information and 
communication technologies (Mosco, 2004).  
To historicize UC and its claims of transcendence, I use the BlackBerry as a 
technological artifact whose history sheds light on key characteristics of our 
contemporary media environment. Beyond the superficial, often seductive, veneer of 
                                                                                                                                            
 
7 For example, the U.S. Government’s digital strategy that seeks to “deliver information and services to the 
American people anytime, anywhere and on any platform or device.” See https://cio.gov/building-a-21st-
century-government/digital-strategy/ 
8 For example, the expanding literature on “U-Commerce”: Richard T. Watson, Leyland F. Pitt, Pierre 
Berthon, George M. Zinkhan. “U-Commerce : Expanding the Universe of Marketing.”Journal of the 
Academy of Marketing Science 30(4): 333-347; H. Galanxhi-Janaqi and F.F. Nah. 2004. “U-commerce: 
emerging trends and research issues.” Industrial Management and Data Systems, 104: 744-755; G. 
Roussos. 2006. Ubiquitous and Pervasive Commerce: New Frontiers for Electronic Business. London: 
Springer; C. Evans and B. Hu. 2006. “E-commerce to U-business: A model for ubiquitous shopping mall,” 
International Symposium on Pervasive Computing and Applications 427-432; J. Seigneur and C.D. Jensen. 
2004. “Trust Enhanced Ubiquitous Payment without Too Much Privacy Loss,” Proceeding of the 19th 
Annual ACM Symposium on Applied Computing, 1593-1599; K.J. Lee and J. Ju. 2007. “Ubiquitous 
Commerce Business Models Based on Ubiquitous Media” in Business Information Systems.  
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capital’s institutional myth-makers, the roots of techno-utopian myths extend deeper into 
the history and political economy of advanced capitalism. The analytic significance of the 
BlackBerry is not intended to offer praise for its technical or commercial achievements, 
but instead to show how these achievements express a synthesis representing the 
motivations of economic actors and prevailing modes of thought as they are drawn 
together in and through the myth of UC. This myth is significant because it describes the 
“last mile” tethering individuals wirelessly to primarily commercial networks. The story 
of the BlackBerry that I will map is one wherein brand identity, including a tight 
integration of services and products, is precisely based upon the perception that a final 
technological and commercial threshold has been reached. 
While this threshold has only recently become a technical, economic, and cultural 
reality, it is the culmination of a much longer history—a history that stitches together the 
emancipatory values of the Enlightenment to the volatile permutations of capitalism and 
its restless dependence on technological change, animated by a dialectic between the 
forces and relations of capitalist production.9 More specifically, myths of a ubiquitously 
networked society have been documented extensively elsewhere (e.g., Burnett et al., 
2009, Carey, 1992; Mattelart, 2000, 2003). Contributing to this existing literature, this 
project examines the myth of UC as articulated by the development of specific branded 
products and services. The myth of UC, as this dissertation will demonstrate, offers a 
                                                
9 Following Harvey’s (2006, p. 99) explication of Marx’s concept, by productive forces I mean the power 
to transform nature through the development of new technologies (e.g., spectrum technologies); and by 
relations of production I mean the social organization and implications of the “what, how, and why of 
production” (e.g., wage labour) (p. 99). Thus what follows in this dissertation is, in part, an attempt to 
penetrate beneath the surface appearance [what I term “myth”] and understand why particular labour 
processes take on the specific technological forms that they do (p. 99). 
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contemporary expression of this process. While this dissertation gestures towards the 
“long-history” of the information technology revolution (Webster & Robins, 1999), both 
its goal and scope are more modest. This dissertation provides a critical analysis of how 
UC emerged from the interplay between political economic interests, technical 
advancements, and pre-existing myths.  
Given its waning commercial standing, it is easy to forget that the BlackBerry 
brand, for a time, inspired fanatical devotion, spawning various online fan, user, and 
support groups (Michaluk, 2011). The fanatical devotion to the BlackBerry brand, and its 
UC-enabled lifestyle, was rivaled only by those initiated into the “Cult of Mac.” As 
evidence, consider that in 2001 a USA Today cover story declared the BlackBerry to be 
“the heroin of mobile computing” (Maney, 2001). Yet despite what many of the manic 
technology “experts” may have said, the BlackBerry’s significance is not in its singular 
existence as a popular product, brand, or investment stock. Nor is its cultural, technical, 
or political economic importance. Rather, it is in the way that these all come to be tied 
together in a specific technical artifact. What follows is an attempt to untangle all of 
these, indeed, to map their interconnections through this case study in order to historicize 
the myth of UC.10  
In so doing, this dissertation frames the BlackBerry as a central case study that 
maps the historical factors underpinning the harmonization of political economic 
                                                
10 Following Frederic Jameson, by mapping I seek to demonstrate how the  “great global multinational and 
decentered communicational network in which we find ourselves caught as individual subjects” (Jameson, 
1998, p. 16) is mutually constituted by the “individual reflections on, and perceptions of, one’s relationship 
to the social world that oil the gears of everyday life” (Best, 2010, p. 57). 
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interests, technical advancements, and pre-existing myths. In mapping these factors, I 
also foreground important ways in which the drive towards UC has led to failure—
whether due to technical limitations, political economic conflicts, or lack of demand.11 It 
is important to note that the BlackBerry is also representative of a relatively new category 
of consumer electronics that I refer to as Internet-enabled mobile devices (IMD).12 The 
BlackBerry, however, is more than just another consumer device. It represents a total 
end-to-end system enabling UC, comprising the integration of devices, software, and 
networking infrastructure.   
The BlackBerry is an ideal object of analysis for engaging with the myth of UC as 
representative of a media condition precisely because it problematizes the concept of an 
artifact. The BlackBerry brand acts as an appropriate proxy for the myth of UC because 
its own brand identity is so closely connected to UC as a new way of life. It is thus a 
channel for the myth, but also the technical and commercial means by which individuals 
(and corporations) can realize (and reproduce) the myth. In the earliest stages, this was 
defined primarily by ubiquitous email, the push-based communication of data wirelessly, 
                                                
11 Arguably, RIM’s recent decline in North America is a reflection not only of limitations of technical 
capacities, but of the evolution of UC into more than just a set of consumer products and services; that is, 
into a platform for the expansion of virtual consumption. The influence of web 2.0 and prosumption on the 
BlackBerry’s final iteration of UC (discussed in Chapter 8), before its decline in the face of competitors 
Apple and Google, signaled the limitations of the myths that sustained RIM’s initial rise to prominence. I 
do briefly address RIM’s decline in the final chapter and point to future areas of research on the evolution 
of UC and its “re-mythologizing.” 
12 In this project, IMD refers primarily to smartphones and tablets, though industry-tracking firm IDC also 
includes laptops, netbooks, and other portable PC hybrids under the category of smart mobile devices. 
According to IDC, worldwide smart phone sales are projected to reach 686 million in 2012 (IDC, 2012a); 
tablet sales are expected to reach 117 million (IDC, 2012b).  Ovum, another prominent industry research 
firm, projects annual smart phone sales of 1.7 billion units by 2017 (Ovum, 2012). Perhaps more telling, 
according to the ITU, in 2011, globally there were 5.9 billion cellular subscriptions (versus 1.15 billion 
fixed telephone lines) and 1.2 billion mobile broadband subscriptions (versus 592 million fixed broadband 
subscription) (ITU, 2011). As 3G/4G network coverage expands and handset costs decline, the availability 
of UC will reach the vast majority of humanity, and for many, become a basic staple of everyday life. 
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and “always on” functionality. The BlackBerry brand, as this dissertation demonstrates, 
evolved to pitch UC as a part of sociality itself, an essential mediator of our identity and 
social networks—a sentiment given form in the 2010 BlackBerry slogan “take life with 
you.” The BlackBerry also affords an opportunity to see the constitution of a generally 
new category of devices and services built on the myth of UC and its technological 
infrastructure/components (i.e., IMD). Thus if we line up every BlackBerry model, from 
first to most recent, we see expressed in them the commercial impulses that have now 
seemingly enveloped the entire globe: the construction of UC not simply as a condition of 
work consonant with the networked organization or economy, but of a new lifestyle that 
reflects both a series of ruptures and continuities with the techno-mythology of capitalism 
itself. This is a story that is visually told in the physical evolution of the BlackBerry; that 
is, its morphology as a consumer device, outwardly expressed in a way not possessed by 
later technologies like the iPhone, in which one observes only relatively small outward 
differences amongst generations.13 However, the story is not only one of outer 
appearance, but also of internal operations, software, processing power, and 
miniaturization. As case study, the evolution of the Blackberry illustrates the 
colonization14 of everyday life by computer processing, arguably reaching a 
developmental finality begun with the popular deployment of the transistor, followed by 
the integrated circuit and finally the microchip.  
 Though the subject of this dissertation is connectivity (in myth, media, and power), 
                                                
13 A visual history of BlackBerry devices is available at http://crackberry.com/blackberry-timeline 
14 By “colonization” I mean both the proliferation of available digital devices and services as well as their 
seamless embedding into the rhythms of everyday life. 
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its analysis begins with the material object. I here take some inspiration from Marx’s 
opening chapters in Capital Volume 1 which strategically begins with an analysis of the 
commodity in order to set the stage for a more systemic imminent critique of bourgeois 
political economy. Social relations are (re)produced as lived experience, but artifacts 
offer the material trace of these experiences and their specific political economic pretexts, 
although fetishization, Marx explains, conceals these pretexts. As Marx wrote, “The 
hand-mill gives you society with the feudal lord; the steam mill, society with the 
industrial capitalist” (Marx, 1984, p. 102). One should not take Marx’s observation to be 
espousing a deterministic, causal relationship between social and technological change. 
Rather, as Barney suggests,  
What Marx appears to be saying in this aphorism is that certain technologies are 
indicative of, or significant to, particular productive relations. He may be going so 
far as to posit that these technologies facilitate particular relations, but, unlike the 
determinist reading, this is well within what is suggested by “giving.” (Barney, 
2000, p. 35) 
So too I argue that informational capitalism15 gives us the IMD, and for the purposes of 
analysis, in this case, the BlackBerry. This is not to make a deterministic and causal 
relationship, but rather to demonstrate how human capacities are organized and 
articulated by the prevailing mode of production and its specific technological 
                                                
15 By informational capitalism, I mean a version of capitalism whose dialectic between forces and relations 
of production revolves around technologies specifically designed (and marketed) to enhance, capture, 
transmit, and store human intellective capacities such as creativity, communication, co-operation, and 
cognition. I use the acronym CCC to refer to these capacities. For a detailed discussion of informational 
capitalism see Fuchs, 2009. 
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apparatus(es).  
As myth, UC refers to the championing of a radically new condition of mediation 
by a variety of commercial interests adapting to neoliberal policies and post-Fordist 
labour arrangements. This myth is embedded in the re-composition of the labour force 
away from comparatively inflexible unions and other contractual arrangement towards 
more flexible (and precarious) forms of work. As myth is made real through new devices 
and services, UC builds on a vision of a future workforce and culture, one requiring new 
tools to meet and manage their professional and social needs in order to make them more 
flexible, manageable, and productive. This belief in the future trajectory of both work and 
sociality, as this dissertation demonstrates, influenced the investment in research and 
development (R&D), the building of capacity in wireless data and component 
manufacturing, the search for new devices that could be paradigmatic of this forthcoming 
post-industrial workforce, and the development of related policies conducive to these 
processes. On the other side, the availability of these early devices and services, even 
though they were primitive, offered a blueprint upon which future workers could be both 
managed and empowered, to create a new type of organization (e.g., network or virtual 
organizations). As such, new techniques and conceptualizations emerge as the adoption 
of devices spreads. Similarly, UC is based on a belief in a future networked worker 
whose professional and social lives are inseparably intertwined. 
Thus the task at hand is to uncover and to map the interaction between the 
proliferation of media artifacts (and related services) and political economic interests. 
Whether individuals materially experience this condition or whether it exists solely in the 
realm of popular idealization, is, strictly speaking, beyond the scope of this dissertation. 
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However, in so far as commercial entities, experts, and consumers adopt UC, perhaps un-
reflexively, it gains a reality that can be reproduced and disseminated. My analysis of 
how the myth of UC is materialized—in marketing and advertising, corporate decision-
making, consumer demand, public policy—suggests that capitalism, in its informational 
form, is seeking a mode of stabilization partly dependent on the condition of mediation 
entailed by UC. For example, this condition of mediation is an essential component in 
mobilizing the intellective capacities of both workers and consumers. How these 
capacities are mobilized, and the extent to which this mobilization is successful, depends 
partly on the technical composition of the available media. An assessment of historically 
contingent factors characterizing the composition of technological artifacts, therefore, 
helps understand how and why they became what they are (and not something else). 
Moments of contingency and synchronization offer an opportunity to contextualize the 
interplay between the evolution of media artifacts and the lived conditions of mediation 
as both are bound together by specific political economic interests.  
As a point of clarification, by mediation I mean the organization of space and 
time that link the actions (and motivations) of people through broader social structures—
institutions like the state, religion, culture, and wage labour. To the extent that this 
condition is evident to social subjects depends on the prevailing myths that offer master 
signifiers or archetypes (to borrow terms from psychoanalysis) that are the wellspring of 
meaning and purpose for individuals, and undergird powerful justifications for the 
reproduction of dominant (and sometimes insurrectionary) political economic relations 
and structures. In this respect, the keywords (Williams, 1976) are terms such as 
“knowledge,” “creativity,” “innovation,” “information,” “flexibility,” and “networks.” As 
10 
 
Raymond Williams explains, keywords act as “binding words in certain activities and 
interpretations” as well as “indicative words in certain forms of thought” (1976, p. 15). 
Keywords are orienting terms that guide or bind the actions of disparate social actors (and 
their respective institutions and organizations) as well as frame the boundaries of thinking 
itself. In this sense, myths, as the repository of such keywords, shape what Williams 
referred to as the “practical consciousness” constitutive of the “living and interrelating 
continuity” of everyday life which are often “built into institutions and [cultural] 
formations” (Williams, 1977, p. 132).  
These terms are significant in guiding the behaviour of organizations (particularly 
employers like governments and corporations) as well as of individuals (workers and 
consumers). There is an intellectual link between the study of myth as lived culture and 
the goals of critical political economy, which I outline in chapter 2, since it is precisely 
the outcome of naturalization (of social relations, power structures, and technological 
change) that myth performs and which critical political economy seeks to expose. As 
such, this dissertation addresses the following research questions: 
a. How are political economic interests, technological change, and myth 
bound up in the rise of UC? That is, how does UC express changes in the 
forces and relations of production associated with the rise of a (global) 
networked society? 
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b. In what way does the rise of UC build upon and contribute to the 
proliferating mythos associated with post-industrialism?16 
c. How does the BlackBerry, as a once iconic technology of UC, offer a case 
study demonstrating the historical and material intertwining of political 
economic interests, technological change, and myth?  
To answer these questions, I demonstrate how the myth of UC is materialized in a 
particular consumer technology: the set of devices and services offered by Research in 
Motion.17 The narrative arc of this dissertation is anchored by moments of 
synchronization among political economic interests as these shape prevailing modes of 
producing and relating through UC. In order to accomplish this, I rely on key critical 
theoretical approaches to political economy and media theory, as well as on corporate 
communications, marketing and advertising, newspaper articles, and trade journals. I also 
draw upon content gleaned from a series of interviews with employees at RIM involved 
in areas such as computer engineering, marketing and advertising, product development, 
and user-experience design.  
                                                
16 My choice to emphasize post-industrial as a genre of myths reflects the formative significance of Daniel 
Bell (1973), among others (e.g., Masuda, 1981), in popularizing this term in both scholarly and public 
policy arenas. It is also a useful umbrella term by which to categorize the proliferation of subsequent names 
(e.g., “Information Society” or “Network Society”), each suggesting that the basic mode of production has 
changed in a purported shift away from manual/physical industrial production to one focusing on human 
intellective capacities as both inputs and outputs of the production process. What these all conceal is not a 
definitively new mode of production per se, but a capitalist re-orientation in light of changes in the dialectic 
between forces and relations of production (see Garnham, 1998).  
17 Research in Motion was re-branded as “BlackBerry” in January 2013 in conjunction with the launch of 
its new BB10 platform. Because this dissertation deals almost exclusively with the period preceding this I 
will refer to the company as Research in Motion or its acronym, RIM. 
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Using the BlackBerry as its case study, this dissertation demonstrates that the 
aforementioned political economic synchronization is evident in the myths associated 
with three necessary steps in the evolution of the myth of UC as a technical and 
commercial reality: the commercialization of wireless data (chapters 3 and 4), the 
development of mobile workers and virtual enterprises (chapters 5 and 6), and the ascent 
of web 2.0 and the online digital prosumer (chapters 7 and 8). It is important to note that 
the emphasis on historical contingency highlights the limitations of this dissertation’s 
analytic scope. While the focus on the BlackBerry affords a clearly delimited object with 
which to demonstrate the technical and commercial materialization of the myths 
associated with UC, it suggests a deeper theorization of the interaction between political 
economy, myth, and technics.18  
1.1 On the Appearance and Essence of Ubiquitous Connectivity: 
Ubiquity, Immediacy, and Personalization 
The research questions, purpose, and scope of this dissertation are framed by a 
media-centric analysis; meaning it uses media artifacts (e.g., objects, devices, texts, 
machines, and tools) in order to study media conditions (e.g., the mediation of social 
relations, power structures, and space and time) and the inter-relationship of such artifacts 
and conditions. It maintains that a proper analysis of the latter requires taking the factors 
contributing to the specific technical-composition of the former seriously —a technical 
                                                
18 Although I point toward such a theorization when the dissertation narrative affords such opportunity, I 
will leave a more nuanced development for future work. 
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composition that is shaped by political economic interests of informational capitalism, 
and more broadly, by dominant myths.  
In existential terms, mediation can be thought of as articulating the relationship 
between different modalities of human experience. The essence of modern technology, 
Heidegger writes, is not only a “mere means” to an end, but also a “way of revealing” 
and “enframing” human potential (Heidegger, 1977, pp. 13-29). Building on Heidegger’s 
concern with the essence of technology, Darin Barney reframes the “question concerning 
technology” to deal with mediation. Barney writes that,  
Heidegger understood the essence of technology to be located in its mediation 
between the ontic and the ontological—between the practices of existing beings 
and a thoughtful engagement with the Being of those beings. Technological 
practices, like all existential activities, are ontologically significant to the extent 
they express something at issue in terms of Being. (Barney, 2000, p. 204-205)  
In so far as Being is increasingly mediated by complex, capital-intensive 
technological apparatuses, media—as the ‘infrastructure of Being’—act as tethers to the 
dialectic of forces and relations of production that underpin historically contingent 
political economic structures (and interests). As I will discuss below, this mediation 
offers insights into the limits and barriers associated with the articulation of human 
capacities. 
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Three themes expressed through the myth of UC offer an opportunity to analyze 
the intertwining of appearance and essence19 in ubiquitous media: ubiquity, immediacy, 
and personalization.  
Ubiquity here refers to both the perceived and actual colonization of digital media 
devices and, in this case, the technical capacity to remain connected at all times in 
devices designed to be “always on” and “always on you.” The era of ubiquitous media, 
while the product of a specific set of historical forces that I will map in this dissertation, 
also poses new theoretical questions for the study of media generally.20 
Immediacy refers to a perceived instantaneity (or simultaneity) enabled by the 
devices and infrastructure of UC, tending toward real time, networked communication, 
and a collapsing of spatial distance. Connectivity (comprised primarily of both the 
transmission and reception of digital data) is relatively unencumbered by spatial and 
temporal constraints, effectively tied to the specific location of individuals. In spatial 
terms, immediacy refers to a perceived direct relation or connection, a proximal 
experience of “nearness” (Tomlinson, 2007, p. 74). In temporal terms, immediacy refers 
to something current or instant occurring without seeming delay or lapse in time 
(Tomlinson, 2007, p. 74).  More generally, immediacy highlights the tendency of 
                                                
19 Distinguishing between appearance and essence was a key element of Marx’s method in Capital. As 
G.A. Cohen writes, “Marx frequently pronounced his dictum on essence and appearance when he was at 
work on Capital, which he conceived as an attempt to lay bare the reality underlying and controlling the 
appearance of capitalist relations of production” (1972, p. 183). 
20 The theme of a recent special issue of Theory, Culture, and Society was precisely dedicated to theorizing 
“ubiquitous media” (Featherstone et al., 2009). Despite the contributions of many prominent theorists 
including Friedrich Kittler, N. Katherine Hayles, and Bernard Stiegler, the contributions lacked a clear link 
to political economy. This dissertation hopes to fill in this important gap by offering a focused case study 
illustrating the specific rise of a prospectively ubiquitous medium.  
15 
 
contemporary media to accelerate the circulation of information. It reflects the general 
condition of speed up that is experienced phenomenologically at the individual level as 
equal parts euphoria and anxiety (or as an experience of the technological sublime, as 
Leo Marx (1964) might characterize it). At the same time, it can also be expressed at the 
level of a political economic compulsion (as in David Harvey’s (1989) conception of 
space-time compression). John Tomlinson has referred to this pervasive technological 
milieu as an expression of the “condition of immediacy” (Tomlinson, 2007, pp. 72-93)—
as a relatively “new” narrative that encompasses culture, economy, and everyday life.21  
Personalization refers to the tendency of contemporary media to materially 
incorporate the identity, information, and relationships of a particular user. The identity 
of the user is deeply embedded both in the commercial development of digital media as 
well as in its technical composition (e.g. SIM cards, NFC chips, unique device 
identifiers). Indeed, personalization of digital media is implicit in concepts like “the filter 
bubble” (Pariser, 2011), “the daily you” (Turow, 2011), or “monadic communication 
clusters” (Gergen, 2008). Each of these terms attempts to capture how contemporary 
media customizes our content and services, for example, through the embedding of 
algorithms that learn the habits of particular users (Mager, 2012). At the level of myth, 
the personalization inherent in IMDs like the BlackBerry suggests an intensified 
transformation of public space into private space; an expansion from connected places to 
connected people to connected everything; and thereby privileging consumer-centric 
                                                
21 For Tomlinson, the “coming of immediacy” also reflects a perceived fulfillment of Modernity’s promise 
in which there are virtually no gaps between human desire and the fulfillment of that desire (2007, p. 74-
75). 
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market mechanisms that ensure access to connected technologies and services (e.g., 
through the use of spectrum auctions). 
Although each of these themes on their own is not entirely new or unprecedented, 
what is new is the scale of their configuration in the myth-making activities associated 
with a specific media artifact (the BlackBerry) and more broadly, as the combined 
appearance of a relatively new category of consumer technologies and services: IMD. 
Thus I focus on the BlackBerry as a case study, not to fetishize its significance, nor the 
brilliance and success of its corporate masters (RIM and its partners), but because it 
offers an ideal media artifact with which to historicize both the mythic dimensions and 
technological appearance of UC.22 
1.2 Technics, Capacity, and the Political Economy of UC 
In this dissertation, a political economy approach offers an opportunity to map 
interrelationships between the vested interests related to the creation of profitable 
commodities (and services) and the extraction and accumulation of surplus value. 
Furthermore, critical political economy helps place the development of ICTs within the 
productive and circulatory needs of capital. Discussing the development of wired 
                                                
22 Moreover, as this dissertation unfolds, these themes will offer an opportunity to signpost the connection 
between ontological and political economic questions related to the devices and services associated with 
the myth UC.  Ontological because these devices are reflections of personal identity, occupation, and 
class—they are prospectively ubiquitous because they are meant to be affixed to the body and seamlessly 
embedded into the life and the rhythms of daily existence; political economic because it is the volatility of 
capitalist innovation and labour management, focusing on the intellective capacities of paid and unpaid 
labour that has made such ubiquity a material reality. These questions are further raised by the fact that, as 
mass produced consumer devices (and expressions of the logic of commodification), the ideal user is 
already subsumed in the design of the devices and available services. “To invent a new technology,” writes 
Langdon Winner, “requires that (in some way or another) society also invents the kinds of people who will 
use it” (Winner, 1996, p. 64). 
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telephone and its changing user base in the early 20th century, Martin (1991) identified 
precisely this dialectic, linking it to passages in Marx’ later works (Grundrisse and the 
three volumes of Capital) wherein 
[Marx] relates the development of means of communication to the process of 
circulation/exchange of capital. For him, there is no accumulation of capital 
without communication. Not only do the means of communication reproduce 
capitalist relations of production, but ever more rapid systems of communication 
are at the basis of an accelerated circulation and, hence, accumulation of capital. 
On the other hand, the desire of capitalists in the sphere of communication to 
make profit contributes to accelerate the development of systems of 
communication. Thus there exists a dialectical relationship between the processes 
of production and consumption of communication. (Martin, 1991, p. 307-308) 
In a similar fashion, the evolution of IMD has evidenced a dialectical relationship 
between “the processes of production and consumption of communication” that is often 
punctuated by the real tensions and contradictions of the accumulation process. As I will 
describe in chapter 4, one of the primary early adopters of wireless connectivity and 
IMDs (and the BlackBerry specifically) was the financial industry (Cohn, 2002). Finance 
capital has always been an important economic category for capital, particularly as an 
area of activity associated with the creation and management of “fictional” capital 
formations (Harvey, 2010). However, with the creation of global digital networks, the 
expansion of multinational corporations (MNC), and the adoption of free trade policies 
allowing the expansion and acceleration of capital flows, finance capital is arguably the 
defining industry of post-Fordist capital (Harvey, 1989; McNally, 2011). Socializing 
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these early users in the finance and banking industries to work under—indeed embrace—
UC directly mirrored the specific spatial and temporal needs of this industry. Although 
the financial sector was a paradigmatic early adopter of IMD, the growing prominence of 
the “networked organization” as a strategic goal for policy makers, corporate executives, 
and management experts contributed to a broadening appeal of UC and the BlackBerry 
(discussed in chapter 6).  
 In waged labour (primarily non-unionized and/or “professional” designations), as 
technologies to maximize the intellective capacities—communicative, co-operative, 
cognitive (CCC)23—of paid labourers, these complex devices signify an increasingly 
precarious working arrangement. Not only are contracts shorter, requiring workers to be 
more flexible in terms of their scheduling and skill sets to keep up with industry changes, 
but the integration of these ubiquitous media have made work both more intensive and 
extensive for waged workers. Intensive because workers are now expected to accomplish 
more inside the “traditional time and space confines of their job.” Extensive both because 
UC technologies have made it “easier for individuals to work longer hours” outside of 
these confines (Middleton, 2007, pp. 169-170) and because there are growing 
expectations by employers that workers will always be available. 24 
 Innis’ (1964) concept of bias conceptualized as capacity here provides a tool for 
                                                
23 For a theoretical analysis of these capacities as they relate to information and communication theory see 
Hofkirchner, 2013. 
24 This is particularly true for workers in information-intensive industries (e.g., finance, media, technology), 
but also for “networked workers” across industries. See the Pew Internet & American Life Project study 
“Networked Workers” by Madden and Jones, 2008. http://pewinternet.org/Reports/2008/Networked-
Workers.aspx 
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analyzing the relationship between dominant media and the specific articulation of CCC 
in so far as the former influence the articulation of the latter through time and space.25 In 
this sense, the concept of capacity refers to an “index of potential” (Parker, 1985 p. 76) 
and maps a crucial intersection between ontological and political economic 
considerations as it entails, “analyses of the limitations and opportunities faced by people 
in their day-to-day lives and the factors that may influence them in any given place and at 
any particular time,” implying that “physical and intellectual limitations and 
opportunities are both influential and dialectically related” (Comor, 1994, p. 111). 
 The specific articulation of CCC reflect not only the social settings and various 
media that allow the social subject to act, but actually orient the individual to the world; 
that is, they open up a set of potentialities—actions, thoughts, concepts, and values—that 
reflect pre-existing ways of living, relating, and thinking by active agents. Thus while the 
myth of UC suggests a new era of limitless or infinite social connectivity, foregrounding 
the specific technical mediation of intellective capacities highlights the limits or 
constraints shaped by a specific political economic milieu (which includes the habits of 
thought and action that are continuously produced and reproduced; Parker, 1985, p. 88).26  
                                                
25 From the perspective of capital, CCC exist as intellective potential, as “a stand-in reserve of bits” 
(Barney, 2000, p. 207), which, through the expansion of networked devices in everyday life, also taps into 
unwaged time. Intellective capacities feed the acceleratory logic of informational capitalism by privileging 
(often contradictorily) the production and circulation of dead bits (Dyer-Witheford, 1999, p. 86) in order to 
render the living being more flexible and/or interchangeable. This mediation of intellective capacities is not 
neutral, nor unproblematic, but materially enabled and constrained by dominant media. 
26 Elaborating on the relationship between bias and capacity in bridging Innis’ early work on Canadian 
economic history and his later work on the history of communication media, Parker writes that,  
[if] “bias” as limitation and direction of life is taken as synonymous with “capacity,” then the 
whole of the economics of capacity and overhead costs become available as a means of analyzing 
the material preconditions of cultural production and institutional reproduction over time and 
space, and the foundation exists for the analysis of communications and empire and the “economic 
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Innis was concerned with how changes in communication—particularly its 
increasing technicity—changed the character of knowledge, and with it, psychic and 
social life. Thus insofar as communication technologies are linked directly to the 
articulation of human capacities, Innis’ research leads us to address how these 
developments are paralleled in the search by dominant interests for ways to produce and 
reproduce their power. To the extent that dominant interests are able to accomplish (and 
sustain) this requires the co-ordination of technical advancement and prevailing myths. I 
argue the concept of bias (as capacity) helps critically analyze this co-ordination because 
for Innis the concept highlights that “changes in communication technology affected 
culture by altering the structure of interests (the things thought about), by changing the 
character of symbols (the things thought with), and by changing the nature of community 
(the arena in which thought developed)” (Carey, 1992, p. 160). This includes the specific 
way by which socially produced knowledge becomes both a “productive force and a 
relation of production” (Comor, 1994, p. 111). As basic indices of human experience and 
social organization, spatial and temporal dimensions are among the most essential and 
constitutive in Innis’ critical history of communication media, though they do not exhaust 
the analytic utility of the concept of bias. 
As an analytic framework, the emphasis on technics—referring to the interaction 
between available (or accessible) technical knowledge, resources, and infrastructure—
                                                                                                                                            
 
history of knowledge,” and hence the development of a self-reflexive historical-materialist 
epistemology. (Parker, 1985, p. 91) 
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illustrates how biases shape the specific development and composition of dominant 
media.  
Gilbert Simondon, prominent French engineer and philosopher of technics, writes 
that an individual technical object “is not a particular thing, given hic et nunc, but that 
from which it is born,” its “technical being” can only become “the object of adequate 
knowledge only if that knowledge grasps the temporal sense of its evolution” (Simondon 
as quoted in Flichy, 2007, p. 111). The technical object has a genesis, a history. It exists 
as a specific unity, a historically contingent set of components drawn together. One task 
in this dissertation is to map how this process is constrained or catalyzed by political 
economic demands, technical advances, and myths.  “The unity, individuality, and 
specificity of a technical object are those of its characteristics which are consistent with 
its genesis. The genesis of the technical object is part of its being” (Simondon, 1980, p. 
18).  
The technical object is the result of the conscious assembly of independent parts 
and capabilities and as such it is “a product of the interplay of recurrent causality between 
life and thought in man” (emphasis added, Simondon, 1980, p. 53). The object firstly acts 
as “the physical translation of an intellectual system” (Simondon as quoted in Flichy, 
2007, p. 147) reflecting the incipient values, biases, and social relations of that system. 
As technical devices appear in commodity form, this process of translation is mediated by 
the (often contradictory) integration (or networking) of exploitable wage labour and 
markets. As such, the technical object highlights the limits within which political 
economic interests are able to act as a motive force in the development and mass 
adoption of a given technology.  
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It is from this perspective that we can understand how myth is implicated in the 
technical composition of a device since the design, user interface, and capabilities, 
already presuppose, and therefore project, an idealized user. Relative success or failure of 
a given commercial device might therefore be defined by how well technical features 
meet or mirror the existing expectations (and aspirations) of consumers.  
To return to Innis vis-a-vis Carey, media are the cultural substrate (“the things 
thought with”) that links the lived, everyday actions of individuals with broader social 
structures; dominant myths make readily available the symbolic glue (“the things thought 
about”) binding individuals and social structures (“the arena in which thought 
developed”). The analytic focus on myth that this dissertation offers resists the 
postmodernist tendency to suggest the collapse or disappearance of “grand narratives” as 
indicative of the modern condition. Instead, myths are part of the material culture that 
makes up everyday life, as it has throughout human history. As Joseph Campbell 
explains, “The material of myth is the material of our life, the material of our body, and 
the material of our environment, and a living, vital mythology deals with these in terms 
that are appropriate to the nature of knowledge of the time” (Campbell, 1990, p. 1). From 
a comparative historical perspective, what changes over time and across societies is the 
specific media in which myths can be articulated and/or reproduced by actual individuals 
within social structures. 
In the context of this dissertation, myth is also specifically important for 
understanding the popular conceptualizations of technological change (and capitalist 
political economy) beginning in the late 1960s resulting in a comparative explosion of 
fashionable “forecasts” about the future (Nye, 2007, p. 34); for example, the five volume 
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report produced by the Commission on the Year 2000 (on which post-industrial theorist 
Daniel Bell worked) was published in 1968 (Mattelart, 2003, p. 83). Similarly, a report to 
France’s then president Valery Giscard d’Estaing, “The Computerization of Society,” 
provided a national policy framework forecasting the needs of the fully computerized 
society of the future (Nora & Minc, 1980). Since the early 1970s, the evolution of global 
capitalism has been accompanied by an expansion of available forecasts about the future 
produced by think tanks, “experts,” politicians, and government institutions (Mattelart, 
2003, p. 83). Taken together, I consider these contributions to be an expanding 
“constellation” of myths associated with the economic, political, and technological 
changes beginning after 1945, of which UC, among others, is only one contemporary 
contribution.27  
The proliferation of myths during this period is not accidental, but rather 
expresses at a cultural level the structural dialectic of forces and relations of production 
that animate the networking of a global capitalist economic system. It is in this sense that, 
as Lewis Mumford asserts, with great transformations in technics comes “a change of 
mind” (Mumford, 2010, p. 3). He writes,  
To understand the dominating role played by technics in modern civilization, one 
must explore in detail the preliminary period of ideological and social preparation. 
                                                
27 Darin Barney (2004) notes that James Beniger’s Control Revolution (1986) identified “seventy-five 
appellations in scholarly and popular circulation between 1950 and 1985, each of which attempted to 
characterize what were perceived to be definitive transformative aspects of the period” (p. 4). As already 
noted, I chose to emphasize “post-industrial” as a genre in which subsequent names might be categorized 
(e.g., “Information Society” or “Network Society”). The pervasive competition to offer up names that 
effectively capture the “spirit of the age” has itself become a defining aspect of the decades after WWII, 
and thus what future historians might consider to be expressions of “the Age of Nomination” (Barney, 
2004, p. 4). 
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Not merely must one explain the existence of the new mechanical instruments: 
one must explain the culture that was ready to use them and profit by them so 
extensively…No matter how completely technics relies upon the objective 
procedures of the sciences, it does not form an independent system, like the 
universe: it exists as an element in human culture and it promises well or ill as the 
social groups that exploit it promise well or ill. (Mumford, 2010, pp. 4-6) 
In an era often characterized by proponents of one or another explanation for the 
rapid proliferation of ICT in everyday life, the relative success of a given myth in 
preparing a culture to accept (or adapt to) profound technological change is contingent, at 
least partly, on the conceptualization of users and capabilities that ground the myth in 
everyday life.  For example, the myth of UC, for those able to participate, offers a real 
technically enabled and mediated experience of the myth itself. Thus the commercial 
development of end-user devices involves their design as commodities readily slotted 
into the myth-making functions of marketing and advertising practices. Commercial 
interests must not only create useful new technologies, “but also compelling narratives 
about how these new devices will fit into everyday life” for the sake of appealing to 
consumers as well as to secure venture capital, return on investment, and profitability 
(Nye, 2007, p. 36). Indeed, as I argue in chapters 7 and 8, the conjoined rise of web 2.0 
and the ascent of the prosumer influenced the evolution of UC and IMDs. 
1.3 Overview of Chapters 
Using the story of the BlackBerry and RIM as a case study, this dissertation 
employs myth to analyze the technical and commercial development of UC in three 
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stages: 1) the commercialization of wireless data in North America, 2) the creation of 
mobile workforces and virtual enterprises as emblematic of a “new economy,” and 
finally, 3) the influence of web 2.0 and the rise of the prosumer (as an ideal user of 
IMDs). In this final pivot, IMDs become platforms for developing new revenue streams 
for content producers, software developers, advertisers, and telecommunications 
providers. I extend these considerations beyond the BlackBerry in the concluding 
chapter. 
In chapter 2, I situate my research within broader literature dealing with the 
political economy of media and technological change, and the utility of myth for 
analyzing the rise of both UC and IMDs. The purpose of this chapter is to highlight key 
considerations related to my use of myth and its application in this dissertation. This 
chapter develops my specific use of myth as it relates to a critical political economy of 
media framework. In this chapter I map this conceptual framework through which myth 
is related to other central analytic concepts that will be employed in later chapters. 
Chapter 3 outlines the antecedents for the development and initial success of the 
BlackBerry.  I historicize this development within a continuum of prior consumer 
devices, standardization, and patents, thereby framing the development of UC and IMDs 
in terms of key technical, political economic, and cultural barriers that shaped the early 
development of the BlackBerry. In this chapter, I use the concept of myth to frame the 
technical and commercial drive for wireless data services and devices. These failed 
commercial attempts created the condition by which the myth of UC was adopted and 
articulated through the BlackBerry brand. 
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In chapter 4, I focus specifically on the BlackBerry as a “solution” to the problem 
of commercializing wireless data and services faced by telecommunications providers in 
North America. I demonstrate how RIM’s development of the BlackBerry highlights an 
institutional embrace of UC—involving strategic partnerships, technical proficiencies, 
corporate and brand identity, and product design. To illustrate how RIM’s institutional 
development manifests the myth of UC, I offer a detailed description of the development 
of its brand of devices and services, linking this evolution to a wider shift in the 
conceptualization of dominant users, and the development of a global market for UC. 
Chapter 5 contextualizes both the BlackBerry and its organizational creator, RIM, 
within a broader policy environment adapting to a changing provincial and national 
economy. I demonstrate how this policy environment was built upon myths regarding the 
relationship between labour, technology, and investment within the “new economy” in 
both Ontario and Canada. I draw parallels between the policy myths associated with a 
rethinking of the productive place of CCC in the management of labour and RIM’s 
success in commercializing UC. 
In chapter 6, I describe the rise of “mobile workforces” and “virtual enterprises” 
as managerial responses to both the myths associated with UC, and ultimately, its 
commercial realization in the form of the BlackBerry. This chapter suggests that these 
developments laid the necessary foundation for the economies of scale that were essential 
to the early success of the BlackBerry as a technology for labour management. In this 
chapter, the myth of UC is manifested in management literature and organizational 
strategies emphasizing connected workforces. I trace the conceptualization of 
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connectivity in labour management literature and explain the incorporation of UC as a 
strategic goal that enabled the widespread adoption of BlackBerry devices and services. 
Chapter 7 situates the specific evolution of the BlackBerry within this 
consumerization of UC and IMDs. It highlights the influence of both web 2.0 and the 
prosumer (as a different type of user) in shaping the technical development and 
marketing of the devices beyond their adoption by commercial enterprises. In this chapter 
I examine how RIM attempted to leverage its successful commercialization of UC in 
order to appeal to a wider audience of potential consumers now socialized to engage in 
digital prosumption through UC as both a branded experience and lifestyle. 
In chapter 8, I conclude by offering reasons why the BlackBerry has been 
displaced by competing platforms, and what this means regarding the commercialization 
of UC. I close my discussion with some projections about UC and questions concerning 
the ethics and democratic politics of the future. 
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Chapter 2 – On Myth, Media, and Power: Situating the 
Research 
“What does ‘technology’ mean?...modern technology is a mystifying term which 
describes the ongoing capitalist system, nothing more. In fact, the idea appears to be 
nonpolitical although, in reality, it is one of capitalism’s most potent propaganda 
weapons in the struggle between the rich and the poor nations and the rich and the poor 
within nations.” (Smythe, 1981, p. 20) 
2 Situating the Research 
In this chapter I will situate my dissertation project within existing critical 
research literature. What I offer is not an exhaustive review, but a triangulation of 
concepts and theorists probing the interrelationship between myth, media, and power. In 
this chapter I not only want to situate my research, but also want to clarify key concepts, 
their utility, and complementarity.  First, I develop the concept of myth in relation to 
political economy; second, I discuss the conceptual similarities and differences between 
myth and ideology; third, I discuss the importance of myth and critical political economy 
for analyzing media; fourth, I articulate theories of post-industrial capitalism as myths 
that specifically highlight the role of ICTs; and in the final sections, I narrow my 
discussion to focus on the role of political economy and myth in the evolution of IMDs. I 
conclude with a brief summary of my overall approach. 
2.1 On Myth 
Arguably, it is because myth is such an essential component of human social 
organization that its utility as an analytic category is prospectively rich. Highlighting 
myth in an era of seemingly technological abundance foregrounds the continuity, indeed, 
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the homology, between so-called “advanced” and “primitive” cultures. Each culture has 
(and is constituted by) myths that organize collective values, shared institutions, 
traditions, and hierarchies. In general, the realm of mythos offers an “assertive discourse 
of power and authority that represents itself as something to be believed and obeyed” 
(Lincoln, 1999, p. 17). Myths encapsulate the symbolic resources that enable identities, 
models of community, patterns of agency, and explanations of social change that 
contribute to the stability (or instability) of a given community through time and space. 
Moreover, myths integrate the myriad of political economic forces and institutions into a 
shared vision of society. “Myths work by demonstrating order. They are true in the sense 
that they are satisfactory demonstrations or representations of a perceived order and are 
therefore often believed by a society to be more or less factual” (Ausband, 1983, p. 5). 
Myths are therefore an inseparable part of any community because they provide 
the symbolic glue that gives such communities a common purpose and destiny. To 
reference Nietzsche (1956, 1969), myths transmit a culture’s “table of values.” Like 
Nietzsche, I argue that dominant values are an expression of power structures. The utility 
of myth as an analytic tool therefore helps capture the “system of axioms and postulates 
defining the best possible code, capable of conferring a common significance on 
unconscious formulations which are the work of minds, societies, and civilizations 
chosen from among those most remote from each other” (Levi-Strauss, 1970, p.120).  
The analysis of myth, however, engenders methodological problems since its 
perceived unity is a product of the researcher’s imagination: it is both “tendential” and 
“projective” (Levi-Strauss, 1970, p. 5). Levi-Strauss asserts that it is best to consider the 
product of mythic analysis as “anaclastic,” based on the “etymological sense which 
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includes the study of both reflected rays and broken rays” (1970, p. 5). The study of myth 
therefore involves identifying both points of convergence and divergence of “sequences 
and themes” (p. 5), moments of synchronicity and/or collapse. Levi-Strauss’ approach to 
studying the influence of myths on a given culture is analogous to mapping the 
“irradiation” of refracted light. Building on this analogy, he writes that,  
by measuring the directions and angles of the rays, we are led to postulate their 
common origin, as an ideal point on which those deflected by the structure of the 
myth would have converged had they not started, precisely, from some other point 
and remained parallel throughout their entire course…this multiplicity is an 
essential characteristic, since it is connected with the dual nature of mythological 
thought, which coincides with its object by forming a homologous image of it but 
never succeeds in blending with it, since thought and object operate on different 
levels. The constant recurrence of the same themes expresses this mixture of 
powerlessness and persistence. Since it has no interest in definite beginnings or 
endings, mythological thought never develops any theme to completion: there is 
always something left unfinished. Myths, like rites, are “interminable.” (emphasis 
added, Levi-Strauss, 1970, p. 6) 
As a mode of thought and speech, myth, or mythos, can be contrasted with logos. 
Whereas logos often involves speech acts wherein individuals “observe the world and 
formulate ontological statements in theory, formulas, and definitions” thereby inviting 
rational analysis and seeking “situation-independent validity,” the realm of mythos 
emphasizes attempts to “interpret and explain human reality and human experiences” in 
the form of stories or narratives (myths) (Foerst, 2005, p. 489-490).  
31 
 
A mythos interpretation of reality, contrary to a logos interpretation, is presented 
in an authoritative fashion and cannot be a topic for rational analysis and 
discussion. The authority and the language a myth uses depends on the time and 
the culture in which it is told; the authority can be an official of a religion, a 
politician, one’s family, or even oneself. But whatever authority is accepted as the 
mythos provider, the act of acceptance is not a solely rational one but contains an 
element of commitment. (Foerst, 2005, p. 490)28 
There is, however, an element of contingency in how a given myth impacts the 
thoughts and actions of an individual: “Every mythos speech act is therefore always a 
result of a very concrete situation in which a person finds himself; it is a result of 
development, chance, and the interaction of the person and his environment (especially 
his culture) (Foerst, 2005, p. 490). In summary, Foerst writes, whereas the realm of logos 
answers questions of “how,” the realm of mythos provides answers to questions of “why” 
(Foerst, 2005, p. 491).  
More tangibly, myths offer a point at which to understand the “constraining 
structures of mind” and action (Levi-Strauss, 1970, p. 10). In this respect, myth can help 
understand the convergence (and divergence) between the behaviour of situated actors 
and wider social collectivities (for example, consumers and markets, or citizens and 
government).  
                                                
28 This conceptualization of mythos is similar to Francis Bacon’s “idols of the mind.” Bacon’s concept 
refers to the “prejudgments that humans make based on such things as cultural background, language, and 
theoretical commitments” (Sargent, 2012, p. 83) some of which are innate and “rooted in the very nature of 
the intellect” (Bacon, 1620, p. 35). As Bacon suggests, the unreflexive adherence to such idols throughout 
human history has acted as a powerful obstacle “to the advancement of knowledge and the implementation 
of objectivity in the sciences” (Zagorin, 2001, p. 386). 
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Although I am deeply sympathetic to Levi-Strauss’ conceptualization of myth, 
which emerged in the context of structural anthropology,29 my study uses the term 
specifically within the context of critical political economy. In this study, political 
economy is the prism through which the “rays” of myth are refracted into the realm of 
symbolism and culture, subsequently converging upon material artifacts. In this case 
these material artifacts (in this case IMDs) are with growing rapidity deemed—by 
technologists, corporations, governments, and consumers themselves—to be the 
communicative staples necessary for the reproduction of the social individual (and 
labourers). In fact this process of refraction and convergence captures the historical 
reflexivity between political economic interests and communication technology. It is 
perhaps for this reason that the analysis of myth remains both “elusive and protean” for 
theorists like Levi-Strauss and Mauss (Strenski, 1987, p. 152), theorists that do not 
directly engage in political economic analyses of media. 
2.2 Myth and Political Economy 
In his sweeping study of the cyclical waxing and waning of Western 
civilization(s), Innis has demonstrated (1964, 2007) that changes in information and 
communication media can realign the spatial and temporal biases that influence long-
term economic, political, and cultural stability. Neil asserts that, “In the Innisian scheme 
of things civilization is the organization of values” (1972, p. 95). I argue that bias (as 
                                                
29 Levi-Strauss’ theory of myth is by no means universally accepted and has engendered numerous critiques 
from fellow anthropologists and social scientists (see Bourdieu, 1990; Lizardo, 2010; Strenski, 1987). As a 
seminal figure in the study of myth, particularly from the perspective of media studies, his work is 
foundational to understanding later uses of myth in cultural studies, particularly in the work of Roland 
Barthes. 
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capacity) offers a concept suited to critically examining the contextual role of myths—
questions of “why”—as they animate social subjects and structures. Left unchecked, 
these biases contribute to the formation of monopolies of knowledge and thereby 
reinforce (or undermine) power asymmetries within and across empires. Innis developed 
the concept of bias to historically assess and compare the influence of values on the 
situated actors and their institutions from different epochs. Reflecting Innis’ central 
premise, Winner notes that the long-term evolution of ICTs demonstrates that “certain 
devices and systems are almost invariably linked to specific ways of organizing power 
and authority” (Winner, 1999, p. 34). Examining the path such technologies take in their 
colonization of everyday life offers valuable insight into one of one of Innis’ primary 
concerns—“why do we attend to the things to which we attend?” (Innis, 1964, p. xvii).  
Following Innis, it is important to always consider how broad transformations in 
the media of everyday life might influence how we conceptualize the most basic indices 
of human existence: time and space, self and society, past and future, actuality and 
potentiality. As the myth of connectivity and communicative empowerment through 
consumer technologies continues to take greater hold in everyday life (see Turkle, 2012), 
our decision-making capacities are increasingly tuned to the flows that constitute our 
expanding information ecology. The interplay between myth and technological change is 
materialized in an expanding bundle of ostensibly “necessary” consumer devices and 
services. From the perspective of media-centric research, this interplay is analytically 
interesting precisely because it clearly links the tools (media) and values (myth) that 
shape the actions of social subjects within given social structures. Importantly then, 
myths provide symbolic structures regulating the ideas and values surrounding 
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technology, thereby framing both their commercial and practical utility. Myths, as 
Mumford writes, shape “how we think about technology” (1970). This is significant 
because at the level of individual action, myths are participatory; they offer stories in 
which individuals assume a place. In framing social progress and technological change, 
myths offer a cosmic order providing “‘euphoric clarity’ by eliminating complexities and 
contradictions” (Mosco, 2004, p. 30).  
Given that technological innovation plays such a historically central role in 
sustaining the forces and relations necessary for the accumulation of capital, technology 
has become a highly mythologized part of capitalist culture. This mythologizing of 
technology is totalizing in scope, spanning not only the individual consumer, but also the 
“productive” consumption associated with the production of surplus value (Marx, 1976, 
pp. 716-724). This is largely due to the structural need for accelerating technological 
innovation stemming from market competition. Under conditions of generalized 
commodity production, concepts like those associated with post-industrial capitalism 
(e.g., “the creative class”), are products of a systemic capitalist tendency to mystify the 
relationship between fixed capital and variable capital.30 This mystification, for example 
through concepts (and related “keywords”) such as the “network” economy, conceals the 
real source of capital’s self-augmentation—i.e. the conversion of socially necessary 
                                                
30 In Marx’s terminology, “fixed” or “constant” capital refers to the costs associated with (and value 
accumulated in) the “instruments of labour” comprising tools, machines, and essential infrastructure, while 
“variable” capital refers to the costs associated with the purchase of labour power (which can vary 
historically). While the former only transfers value to the commodities produced, the latter is the source of 
value creation. See Marx, 1976, pp. 307-319; and Harvey, 2006, pp. 204-208. 
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labour time into accumulated surplus value—by valorizing technological change 
(Harvey, 2006, pp. 133-136).31  
Part of what defines capitalist myths is precisely their role in extending 
commodity fetishism to encompass culture itself. As Heirnrich (2012) explains, Marx’s 
development of commodity fetishism was used to describe how the real social relations 
of capitalist production are hidden (or kept “secret”) by what appears as autonomy 
amongst commodities exchanged in the market (pp. 70). What stands-in for the “truth” of 
exchange is a set of idealizations (which I will collectively refer to as myth) that 
naturalize the exchange value (thus price) of a given commodity without recourse to the 
labour and/or social relations of production. Furthermore, the concept of the fetish—
which Marx appropriates from Eurocentric ethnologists and economists seeking to 
understand the structures and social relations of “primitive” cultures (Marx, 1972) –
demonstrates that even in capitalist societies (so-called “advanced” European cultures) 
myth plays a key role (Taussig, 1980).  
Marx does not use the term “myth” in an explicitly systematic way, though he 
does implicitly deploy it in understanding the beliefs and values animating bourgeois 
political economists. For example, this is evident in Marx’s reference to the importance 
of Robinson Crusoe and the Robinsonades (Marx, 1973, pp. 83; Marx, 1976, p.169), his 
discussion of the “eternalization of historic relations of production” (Marx, 1973, p.85) as 
well as in a section entitled “The Method of Political Economy” from his Grundrisse 
                                                
31 Harvey (2006) writes that the technological dynamism is a “prime lever for furthering the accumulation 
of capital through perpetual increase in the value productivity of labour power” (p. 133). One of the key 
contradictions arising from this process is the substitution of value-creating labour by an excess of “fixed” 
capital (pp. 133-136). 
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(Marx, 1973, pp. 105-106, p.110).32 Marx also makes frequent reference to the “mystical” 
characteristics of bourgeois political economic categories (Marx, 1976, p. 164, p. 680; 
Marx, 1981, p. 966), as well as to the processes of “mystification” that conceal 
capitalism’s real social relations to both the bourgeoisie and workers (Marx, 1976, p. 
729-730, p. 1052; Marx, 1973, p. 640-641; Marx, 1981, p. 123-125, p. 267-269, p. 516, p. 
965).  
Processes of mystification—particularly those that exploit systemic inequalities, 
as captured in the concept of commodity fetishism—create fertile ground for myths to 
gestate or germinate. The fact that Marx introduces the concept of commodity fetishism 
in the first chapter of his most important work arguably signals the importance of myth to 
the critical analysis of bourgeois political economy and its economic categories. It also 
anticipates the “magical system of commodities” created by the marketing and 
advertising industries (Williams, 2000). Mystification is a prelude to mythic thinking.  
Consider Marx’s opening discussion in the chapter from Capital Volume 1 
entitled “The Secret of Primitive Accumulation.” The “secret” prehistory of capitalism, 
indeed, its very origin, is concealed by an “anecdote about the past” explaining that, 
“Long, long ago there were two sorts of people; one, the diligent, intelligent and above all 
                                                
32 Anticipating Innis, Marx likens the analysis of myth to the development of critical and reflexive 
capacities: “Likewise, bourgeois economics arrived at an understanding of feudal, ancient, oriental 
economics only after the self-criticism of bourgeois society had begun. In so far as the bourgeois economy 
did not mythologically identify itself altogether with the past, its critique of the previous economies, 
notably of feudalism, with which it was still engaged in direct struggle, resembled the critique which 
Christianity leveled against paganism, or also that of Protestantism against Catholicism” (Marx, 1973, p. 
106).  
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frugal elite; the other, lazy rascals, spending their substance, and more, in riotous living” 
(Marx, 1976, p. 873). Like “the legend of theological original sin,” 
the history of economic original sin reveals to us that there are people to whom 
this is by no means essential… 
Thus it came to pass that the former sort accumulated wealth, and the 
latter sort finally had nothing to sell except their own skins. And from this 
original sin dates the poverty of the great majority who, despite all their labour, 
have up to now nothing to sell but themselves, and the wealth of the few that 
increases constantly, although they have long ceased to work. Such insipid 
childishness is every day preached to us in the defence of property… 
In actual history, it is a notorious fact that conquest, enslavement, robbery, 
murder, in short, force, play the greatest part. (Marx, 1976, p. 873-874) 
As the commodity form comes to mediate both culture and economy, the fetish 
entails an explanatory void, which systemically challenges the possibilities for reflexivity 
about the material practices and social relations that define the reproduction of everyday 
life (e.g., wage labour). In relation to the fetish of commodity production, this void is 
filled by prevailing myths as both conceptual and lived reality, thereby obscuring the 
reality of the (exploitative) social relations that defines daily existence. As a symbolic 
framework enabling or constraining the actions of individuals, myths are lived and 
therefore are central to identifying the beliefs that animate, motivate, and sometimes 
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undermine, the vested interests of social groups (and open up opportunities for 
resistance).33  
The rise of mass communication technologies as popular entertainment media 
arguably has created greater homogeneity in the dissemination of available myths but it 
also has enhanced their malleability and utility on behalf of political economic interests. 
Capitalism therefore is especially dependent on the industrial production of explanatory 
myths (provided through some combination of think tanks, experts, pop culture 
intellectuals, and marketing and advertising firms; see Goldman et al., 2006), particularly 
those that emphasize the transformative power of technology. In this context, myths act 
as both the content and form of representing reality through the capitalist media system. 
As “a system of communication” or “mode of signification” (Barthes, 1957, p.109), 
capitalist myths are specifically “dependent on the representation which the bourgeoisie 
has and makes us have of the relations between man and the world” (Barthes, 1957, 
p.140).  
Myths thus are used to make sense of, for example, technological and corporate 
convergence by explaining such change in familiar terms like progress, efficiency, 
convenience, innovation, and consumer utility. As Babe explains,  
                                                
33 For this reason, massive investments in new technologies, particularly ICTs, by corporations seeking 
competitive advantage (whether under the auspices of enhancing the productivity of labour, enhancing the 
control and management of labour, or accelerating the distribution and consumption of commodities) can 
lead to waste, and often, failure (for example, see my discussion of Apple’s Newton in chapter 3 and my 
assessment of RIM’s market troubles in the concluding chapter). Corporate investment in new 
infrastructure (fixed capital) often involves a calculation of risk and uncertainty built upon a faith in the 
competitive advantage provided by new technologies.  
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Mythologizing ‘technology’ serves well the interests of both government and 
industry. Mythologizing ‘technology’ transforms conscious acts (frequently 
entailing billions of investment dollars, tax write-offs, and subsidies) into the 
mythically ‘inevitable’ and ‘natural’ order of things. Moreover, mythologizing 
‘technology’ obscures the locus of responsibility, no small advantage for those 
who deploy advanced techniques; after all, how can anyone be held responsible 
for the inevitable? Finally, mythologizing ‘technology’ sweeps aside debate 
concerning the distribution of power domestically and internationally and the 
utilization of communication media towards those ends. Myths of communication 
‘technology’ thus inform us that nothing is selected, nothing chosen. Rather, all 
one has to do is to possess these new devices from which all soiling trace of origin 
and choice has been effaced. (1990, p. 257) 
The rapid proliferation of mobile technologies in everyday life and their invisible 
or magical powers provides a particularly rich example of this process. Choices made by 
corporations and governments early in the development of a new technology are 
significant for the longer term development and potential of such technologies because, 
as Winner explains, “choices tend to become strongly fixed in material equipment, 
economic investment, and social habit, the original flexibility vanishes for all practical 
purposes once the initial commitments are made” (Winner, 1999, p. 32). Winner’s 
comments capture an important and oft cited concept in technology studies: path 
dependency (Fagerber et al., 2009; Fuchs and Shapira, 2005; Schienstock, 2011). This 
term refers to the fact that early strategic choices, investments, innovations, and decisions 
create a kind of momentum or dependency that makes deviating from these early 
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considerations, over time, often more difficult. The QWERTY keyboard offers a 
paradigmatic example of path dependency (David, 1985).34 Another example is the 
triumph of VHS over its rival, BETA, despite its inferior quality (Liebowitz and 
Margolis, 1995).  
Thus both the capitalist and worker/consumer can be caught up in the same myth, 
and as such, both be guided by the idealization of specific values and/or goals that 
misrepresent, distort, or conceal the real historical and material conditions. This is largely 
because myth naturalizes the social relations that underpin technological change and 
diffusion. The increasing technical composition of connectivity itself accelerates a 
tendency towards the reproduction of social relations through “telemediated” experiences 
(Tomlinson, 2007). As a commercial goal, ubiquitous connectivity is itself an expression 
and material manifestation of the general idealization of the forces and relations 
associated with the realization of any number of post-industrial futures (a topic more 
directly explored in Chapters 5 and 6).  
To reiterate, myths are an essential component of all human societies. They are 
pervasive in the meaning-making process that allows individuals to make sense of 
themselves, their place in society, their specific possibilities for social action. The 
question then becomes why some myths take root at particular historical moments and 
not others. In the context of the crisis prone tendencies of capitalism, myths flourish 
                                                
34 In the case of QWERTY, path dependency also captures a cognitive expression in the mental and muscle 
memory that enables effective use.  
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during periods where in widespread technological change coincide with re-organization 
of the social relations of production.  
Mattelart (2003) and others (as examples, see Babe, 1990; Mumford, 1970; 
Webster and Robins, 1999; Marx, 1964) have outlined in various contexts how myths 
have been associated with widespread technological change (and associated policy 
frameworks). These myths serve a political and economic role in privileging certain 
perspectives and interests over others—typically those of economic efficiency trump 
those of social progress. Commercially driven contemporary myths place value on 
constant connectivity, mobility, high quality video, and convenient information search 
and retrieval capabilities. In the process of determining these values, dominant 
technologies such as the Internet are weaved into broader cultural myths that convey 
more than just their instrumental uses. Such technologies also are imbued with 
transformative—and often transcendental—qualities that speak to both human (including 
community, autonomy, empowerment) and economic (productivity, efficiency, 
competition, profitability) needs.  
For some theorists, challenging (or not challenging) established myths hold dire 
consequences. For example, Mumford’s dystopian view (1970) of society and technology 
stemmed in part from a belief that Western society was largely unable to become 
reflexive about the myths that give technological systems seemingly a life of their own 
beyond human control or intervention.  Resisting this dystopian impulse, however, 
requires a rigorous program of historicizing and de-mystifying dominant myths.  
2.3 Myth and the Ideology 
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“Once the Saint-Simonian church had been dissolved and the grand visions of the 
militant period had ended, Saint-Simonism was content to express a managerial thinking 
before its time and symbolized the spirit of enterprise of the second half of the nineteenth 
century. The ideology of redemption through networks, seen as creators of a universal 
bond, legitimized managerial positivism. The new entrepreneurs of industrialism laid the 
foundations of international networked space by creating railway companies and 
shipping lines, founding credit institutions, and building canals between oceans.” 
(Matterlart, 2000, p. 17) 
“Behind the myth of the Information Society there is the reality of growing commercial 
and political exploitation of social knowledge and information.” (Webster & Robins, 
1999, p. 128) 
In discussing the transformation of French philosopher Claude-Henri de Saint-
Simon’s utopian and, indeed, religious, view of networks into a “legitimized managerial 
positivism,” Mattelart (2000) captures the interrelationship between myth and ideology. 
Saint-Simon’s model of a network society administered by “industrialists” where human 
beings were managed by “positive knowledge” was itself a product of the great social, 
political, and economic upheavals associated with the French Revolution (p. 15). The 
Saint-Simonian church, founded by devotees shortly after Saint-Simon’s death, 
advocated an idealized version of a network society, a “circulating civilization” (p. 16). 
Preceding the widespread use of steam engines for rail and sea, Saint-Simon’s follower 
Michel Chevalier advocated the view that networks of communication and commerce 
played an essential role in strengthening “cohesion in the social organism,” and that they 
“necessarily” promotes “equality and democracy” (p. 16-17). As Mattelart (1996) 
documents, Chevalier expressed these beliefs publicly by promoting (through books, 
newspaper articles, and policy recommendations) investments in road, rail, and other 
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“network” infrastructure by both the French government and French capitalists (pp. 100-
104).35 The end goal for Saint-Simonians like Chevalier was the creation of “Universal 
Association,” a global human society whose harmony was enabled by the networks of 
commerce and communication (pp. 100-104). These Saint-Simonian myths would not 
only later provide justifications for the internal spread of “managerial positivism” but 
also for the essential connection between the religious and economic goals associated 
with massive investments in transportation infrastructure.36  
The above example illustrates the essential relationship between myth and 
ideology as the former enables the latter to be enacted at specific historical moments. My 
distinction between myth and ideology is in their emphasis and scope as they relate to the 
actions of individuals or groups within specific political economic structures (and 
dynamics). Ideology concentrates on what we think about; the contents of consciousness, 
the ideas it contains, and how these ideas are or can be deployed politically. Thus, as 
Thompson succinctly explains, ideology refers to “meaning in the service of power” 
regularly serving to “establish and sustain relations of power which are systematically 
asymmetrical” (Thompson, 1990, p. 7).  
Though I do not employ the concept of ideology in this dissertation, it is worth 
addressing this conceptual distinction in order to further clarify my use of myth. As Terry 
                                                
35 Chevalier would later promote the creation of a “Mediterranean system” created through regional 
economic and cultural integration enabled by new communication and transportation technologies 
(Mattelart, 1996, pp. 104-105). 
36 In a 1832 article published in Le Globe, Chevalier writes: “If, as we are assured, the word religion comes 
from religiare [“to bind fast”], railways have more relation to the religious spirit than we think. Never has 
there existed an instrument of such power to link together scattered people” (quoted in Mattelart, 1996, p. 
103). 
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Eagleton (1991) notes there is a close connection between the critical use of myth and 
that of ideology, though it is not easily discerned (p. 188). “Both myth and ideology are 
worlds of symbolic meaning with social functions and effects; but myth is arguably the 
more capacious term, revolving as it does on the great ‘metaphysical’ questions of birth, 
sexuality and death, of sacred times, places and origins” (p. 188). Eagleton suggests that 
myth expresses “a particular register of ideology, which elevates certain meanings to 
numinous status” (p. 189). In Eagleton’s conceptualization, myth can offer metaphysical 
or idealist weight to those championing a particular ideology within a specific political 
economic milieu. In this respect, we can think of the post-industrial myths of “creativity,” 
“knowledge,” “information,” and “networks,” as expressing such numinous associations. 
When such keywords (and their mythic armature37) are, for example, mobilized in the 
service of justifying new labour policies associated with telework their articulation can be 
considered to be ideological, and thus directly express (and expose) the use of specific 
ideas in the service of power (as Thompson describes it). “Myths may not legitimate 
political power as directly as ideologies, but in the manner of Pierre Bourdieu’s doxa38 
they can be seen as naturalizing and universalizing a particular social structure, rendering 
any alternative to it unthinkable” (p. 188). As Eagleton writes, “A myth is not just any 
old falsehood: we would not describe as a myth the claim that Everest can be scaled in 
                                                
37 I use the term armature here as a dual metaphor referring to the symbolic armor associated with these 
terms, but also referring to the component of an electric machine activated when an “electromotive force is 
induced,” for example by way of a magnetic field (Webster’s Unabridged Dictionary, “armature”). In this 
second meaning, myths (and the values therein) are activated and propagated by individuals in specific 
contexts. To the extent that such individuals (and their respective institutions) have the power to 
substantively affect political and economic decisions, thereby disproportionately (or unilaterally) affecting 
the lives (and life chances) of other less privileged individuals, such myths become ideological.  
38 Bourdieu uses the term doxa to mean, “an adherence to relations of order which, because they structure 
inseparably both the real world and the thought world, are accepted as self-evident” (1984, p. 471).  
45 
 
forty minutes at a brisk trot. To qualify as mythical, the belief would have to be widely 
shared and reflect some significant psychological investment on the part of its adherents 
(p. 188-189). As process, mythologizing requires “the element of idealization” (Eagleton, 
1991, p. 189), a point that resonates with Marx’s critique of bourgeois political 
economists and their economic categories. “Mythical figures or events are those imbued 
with an aura of specialness: they are privileged, exemplary, larger-than-life phenomena 
which distil in peculiarly pure form some collective meaning or fantasy” (Eagleton, 1991, 
p. 189). 
Because of the necessity of ongoing technological innovation to capitalist 
accumulation, versions of techno-utopianism often present a future dependent on the 
persistence of capitalist social relations like private property ownership and free market 
competition (for example, in versions of the future depicted at the World’s Fair like 
GM’s “Futurama” exhibits in 1939 and 1964).39 As already noted above, the power of 
these utopian myths rests in their ability to continually marshal the entrenched 
enlightenment (or modernization) values of freedom, liberty, and democracy (Mattelart, 
2000, 2003).  
Reflecting upon the seemingly eternal recurrence of enlightenment values grafted 
onto each successive wave of new technologies in relation to their strengthening of 
bourgeois ideology, Mattelart writes: 
                                                
39 GM’s 1939 Futurama film: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1cRoaPLvQx0; GM’s 1964 Futurama 
film: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2-5aK0H05jk 
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Each new generation of technology revived the discourse of salvation, the 
promise of universal concord, decentralized democracy, social justice and general 
prosperity. Each time, the amnesia regarding earlier technology would be 
confirmed. All these methods—from the optical telegraph to underwater cable, 
the telephone, the radio, the television and the Internet—intended to transcend the 
spatial and temporal dimensions of the social fabric, brought back the myth of the 
recovery of the lost agora of Attic cities. (Mattelart, 2003, p. 23) 
While myths help project these sentiments onto new technologies they also often 
conceal vested interests embedded in the very development and application of such 
technologies. As such, myths can frame the organizational structure and identity of 
commercial entities—what du Gay et al. (1997) call the “culture of production”—
comprising the shared values, beliefs, patterns of work and innovation that constitute a 
coherent corporate vision. Such interests are manifested in product design, 
standardization, network architecture and relative neutrality, access points and coverage, 
coding, and technical specialization, skills and know-how. For example, the economic 
and social demands propelling consumers to willingly (and honestly) volunteer personal 
information has become an important new element shaping the development of consumer 
technologies and media content because of its purported commercial value (Gandy, 2003; 
Turow, 2006, 2011).  Of particular interest and relevance to this dissertation are myths 
that promote the valorization of consumer participation or empowerment, and more 
recently, what is called user-generated content (UGC).  
This project contextualizes a novel addition to an existing mythic tradition by 
focusing on the packaging and sale of mobile devices and services as a means of 
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accessing the benefits, whether economic or social, of ubiquitous connectivity. Mobility 
invokes the empowering and democratic rhetoric of web-related myths emphasizing 
individual agency over space and time (Ishii, 2006). In so doing, these devices expand the 
range of commodifiable social practices through their mediation by digital devices and 
services. Moreover, UC reflects the potential for new ways in which labour itself can be 
conceptualized as an abstract commodity, particularly in relationship to the growth of 
“flexible work arrangements” associate with an increasing number of labour contracts.40 
This includes the growth of self-employed part-time or short-term contractual 
arrangements associated with outsourcing associated with the “network” organization 
(Castells, 1996). The related rhetoric disguising these patterns emphasizes the cause of 
“progress” offered by introducing new ICTS to ameliorate social conditions. For 
example, world-wide-web creator Tim Berners-Lee’s “Mobile Web Initiative” was 
directed at the “digital divide” separating information rich from the information poor. 
Another related project is the “One Laptop Per Child” (laptop.org) initiative. It is still 
unclear if such approaches to “development” can truly deliver the lofty aims forwarded 
                                                
40 Georgetown University Law Center’s report on workplace flexibility, using U.S. Labor department 
statistics, notes that, “In 1985, 12.4% of the working population worked on a flexible schedule, compared 
to 27.5% in 2004” (2010, p. 1). They define “flexible work arrangements” as those which emphasize 
flexibility in scheduling of hours worked, in the amount of hours worked, and in flexibility in the place of 
work (p. 1). Though not conclusive, the report includes survey data indicating a growing interest (80%) on 
the part of workers for more “flexibility” in their working arrangements provided there were “no negative 
consequences” (p. 1). Indeed, global employee placement companies like Manpower thrive on the 
expansion of flexible arrangements of this sort (Manpower, 2010). The disparities between how employers 
and employees conceptualize “flexibility” and “negative consequences” seems a worthwhile area for 
studying how the myth of UC is made ideological, particularly since most “businesses provide flexible 
work arrangements on an informal or individual basis” (p. 5). Trends towards more “flexible,” that is, 
“precarious,” work are evident elsewhere. A recent report by the Poverty and Employment Precarity in 
Southern Ontario (PEPSO) research group indicates that “20% of those working are in precarious forms of 
employment” and that the “this type of employment has increased by nearly 50% in the last 20 years” 
(PEPSO, 2013, p. 5).  Moreover, the report states that, “Across Canada, the category of ‘self-employed 
without employees’ increased almost 45% between 1989 and 2007” (p. 6). Though not addressed in this 
dissertation, this trend suggests future research along these lines.  
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by Berners-Lee, Bill Gates, Al Gore, or by the corporate marketing campaigns that often 
appropriate such goals for commercial gain. 
 As inspiring or hopeful visions of the future, myths are particularly instrumental in 
times of economic or social uncertainty because they can act as powerful tools for 
mobilizing public and private support for a given cause.41 Linking the values of 
democracy, community, and individual autonomy to readily available consumer 
technologies, post-industrial myths offer the promise of personal and social 
transcendence. Thus myths play an important role in shaping public opinion in favour of 
some interest groups over others and thus can be deployed to contextualize ideological 
initiatives. They can aid in winning popular support for massive technical systems often 
by paying an “enormous price for their promises in lives and resources sacrificed to 
realize impossible dreams” (Mosco, 1998, p. 58). As such, artifacts produced under 
conditions of generalized commodity production not only become vehicles for the 
circulation of myths, but also their technical and material expression. This approach 
reflects Marx’s more general analysis of the commodity and commodity fetishism, and 
the demystification provided through the “logical mapping of the interrelations and 
movement of the categories that the object offers up as markers of its immediate 
intelligibility” (Best, 2010, p. 71). On this methodological point, Beverly Best elaborates, 
For example, an exchange economy offers up certain categories of intelligibility, 
which reflect its immediate appearance: freedom, equality, the individual, 
                                                
41 The centrality of technology to the representations of recent events including the Arab Spring, the 
Occupy Movement, and the 2011 London riots suggest the various, sometime contradictory, ways that 
myths can be articulated. 
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property, reciprocity, labour, capital, and so on. Marx's conceptual task is to 
reconstruct the systematic interrelatedness of these categories in such a way as to 
allow the theorist to transcend the objects' immediate appearance and reveal a 
more concrete, totalized (and, hence, mediated) rendering of that object….This 
ordering can be termed ‘the process in thought, or ‘the logical process.’ The goal 
is not to 'recreate' the world out of thought... but to reconstruct the intelligibility of 
the world, and this requires appropriating the fundamental categories that capture 
that intelligibly. (Best, 2010, p. 71) 
In relation to this dissertation, this more specifically entails unraveling the 
speculative investments in research and development (R&D) and infrastructure, the 
pursuit of new markets for consumer devices, management and organizational strategies, 
techno-utopian public policies, and celebratory marketing and advertising efforts 
associated with both UC and IMDs.  
Myths provide conceptual frameworks that enable the actions and choices of 
social actors within a given historical moment. Myths matter in part because they 
“sometimes inspire powerful people to strive for their realization whatever the cost” 
(Mosco, 2004, p. 24). Yet the asymmetrical benefits that stem from these undertakings 
often underscore hierarchies and deeper structural inequalities regarding differential 
access to important technical and scientific knowledge or social capital. These 
inequalities—including monopolies over important social, spiritual, and technical 
knowledge and their resulting material and spiritual rewards—create what Innis calls a 
monopoly of knowledge (Innis, 1964). Although Innis, like Marx, did not employ the 
concept of myth systematically, his concept of monopoly of knowledge highlights the 
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limitations and controls placed on the availability of knowledge in a narrow sense (e.g., 
technical knowledge, skills, training) as well as in a broader sense involving the 
circulation of explanatory myths that de-historicize social hierarchies and sustain (or 
challenge) these monopolies.42 
2.4 Myths of Post-Industrial Capitalism 
Myths offer symbolic resources that can be used for mobilizing public and private 
support for investments in expensive new technologies. Within these transformative 
myths are found a “body of beliefs that release symbolic forces, which not only enable 
action, but, in fact, trigger it and orient it in certain directions rather than others. These 
forces set the agenda for action and research programmes run by governments and 
supranational policymakers” (Mattelart, 2003, p. 2).  
As I will demonstrate using the case of the BlackBerry, the ongoing 
transformation of IMDs—from a tool of labour to one of leisure and consumption43—is 
mediated by important assumptions about a broader transformation in capitalist political 
economies associated with a variety of post-industrial myths. For instance, “knowledge” 
(Drucker, 1969) “information” (Porat, 1977), “network” (Castells, 1996), and “creativity” 
(Florida, 2004), constitute important keywords in defining the motor of social and 
economic change, yet they are all premised on the continuity of capitalist social relations 
                                                
42 For example, as in the technical knowledge possessed by religious authorities in Egypt and Sumeria, or 
the role of Homeric poems and the development of alphabetic literacy in Ancient Greece (Innis, 2007); or a 
more contemporary development what he called the “mechanization of knowledge” (Innis, 1995, pp. 350-
355). 
43 Culminating in their development into “remote controls for everyday life” (Chen, 2013). 
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and regimes of accumulation. They are therefore recurring myths about technological 
progress masking capital’s struggle to exploit and control labour (both paid and unpaid).  
In addition to the “mystifying” tendencies of capitalism’s vitality, a key dynamo 
accelerating the production of post-industrial myths was the struggle between Western 
capitalism and the Soviet Union. In this Cold War it was technology, specifically military 
technology, which held the key to victory. This is evidenced in the fact that in 1965 “88 
% of the research funds devoted to the aerospace industry and 60 % of electronics came 
from the government” (Mattelart, 2003, p. 48-49). It was this government subsidization 
of technological research that acted as a significant driver of the Cold War because 
technological superiority was seen as essential. The historical development of the 
American computer industry after World War II is bound up with government contracts 
established to retain computing power supremacy (Mowery & Langlois, 1996). Much of 
the basic R&D was subsidized by public funds through their integration with University 
computer science research (Mowery & Langlois, 1996).44 Culminating in the Strategic 
Defense Initiative (SDI, also known as the “Star Wars” program) research program, 
initiated under President Ronald Reagan,45 the end of the Cold War wrought widespread 
deregulation and liberalization in the North American technology sector. Creating a 
broader consumer market for computing technologies to absorb the resulting excess 
                                                
44 Mowery & Langlois (1996) note that in the U.S., federally funded computer science research in 
Universities increased from 25% in 1982 to 40% in 1987 (p. 955). The military also played a key role in 
supporting the development of the civilian software industry account for approximately 6 billion USD in 
sales (or 50% of sales) in 1982. By 1990 military purchases accounted for 25 billion USD in sales (p. 959). 
45 Indeed, the large public investment (approximately 15 billion USD between 1984-1988) in relatively 
esoteric areas of R&D, often through contracts with private companies like GE, Lockheed, and Boeing, was 
justified both in terms of a Cold War deterrent but also in the expectation of civilian “spin-offs” that would 
commercialize new technologies. For an analysis of the relationship between military and civilian R&D 
stemming from SDI see Lichthenberg, 1989. 
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capacity became a policy priority of the U.S. government (SDI, 1992) and the computer 
industry (with help from advertising and marketing firms) seeking to make up revenue 
lost due to the end of the Cold War (Sharpe, 2009). 
With the end of the Cold War, and with it a powerful justification for public 
subsidies for R&D in the high-technology sector, a re-orientation towards civilian 
markets engendered a new period of myth-making around both the computer industry and 
the Internet. As Boyer (2004) has demonstrated, myths (and Al Gore himself) played an 
important role in directing investment into ICT-related industries during the 1980s and 
1990s, contributing to the stock market bubble and its eventual collapse. Belief in the 
arrival of a post-industrial growth model was fueled by the rapid wealth accumulated in 
Silicon Valley, generated through the tech-industry centered NASDAQ and the multitude 
of neologisms generated to capture the essence of the “new economy” (e.g., Castells, 
1996).46 In this context, ICTs, particularly after the Cold War, have contributed 
significantly to the modernization of “information exchange networks that have been 
influencing corporate finance and management for at least a century now” (Boyer, 2004, 
p. 143). The real benefactors of the first dot-com boom and bust were institutions that 
used ICTs to create new financial commodities and mobile flows of transnational capital, 
or institutions that could use global ICT networks to capitalize on an expanding array of 
free trade agreements (e.g., NAFTA), thereby accessing new markets for resources, 
labour, and consumers. Indeed, stock markets, such as the Dow Jones Industrial and the 
                                                
46 The bursting of the technology bubble is far too complex an event to reduce to mere misconceptions or 
nefarious motivations of this or that investor or corporation.  One might assert that the bursting bubble 
expressed a realignment between the self-reinforcing myths of technology bubble and the reality of a global 
economy governed by neoliberal(izing) trade policies (Harvey, 2005). 
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NASDAQ are sensitive to myths circulating in the wider public consciousness at a 
particular historical moment; stock traders and corporate executives do not make 
decisions in a vacuum. Stock traders, for example, are required to make important 
decisions in relatively short timeframes and, in so doing, often draw from dominant 
myths for guidance (see Garnham, 2004, p. 173). 
There is still other research critiquing the relationship between myth and ICTs. 
Fransman (2002) has examined how myths—or what he calls shared “beliefs and 
visions”—shaped the response of the telecommunications industry to the rise of the 
Internet, resulting in the creation of an “infocommunications” industry. Brody and 
Dunstan (2003) have documented the role of myth in the spectacular rise and fall of 
telecommunications giant WorldCom. More tangibly, Lessig has detailed how values and 
beliefs can be embedded in the very software codes that provide the architecture of the 
Internet (Lessig, 2006). Babe (1990) has examined how myths have shaped the 
development of telecommunications policy in Canada. Myths pertaining to the economic 
and cultural significance of new ICTs share a much longer history dating back to at least 
the development of the telegraph (Carey, 1992; Mattelart, 2000). 
2.5 The Personal Data Economy: The Rise of the Prosumer and 
IMDs 
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A central area of contemporary capitalist accumulation is personal data (Elmer, 
2004; Lace, 2005; Manzerolle & Smeltzer, 2011).47 The Wall Street Journal has a regular 
series entitled “What They Know” which deals explicitly with legal, political, and 
economic aspects of the personal data economy.48 A report from the World Economic 
Forum (2012) entitled “Rethinking Personal Data: Strengthening Trust” suggests that 
personal data is the key economic resource of the 21st century. The report states that: 
The explosive growth in the quantity and quality of personal data has created a 
significant opportunity to generate new forms of economic and social value. Just 
as tradable assets like water and oil must flow to create value, so too must data. 
Instead of closing the taps or capping the wells, all actors can ensure that data 
flows in a measured way. (p. 5) 
 Historically, the strength of a major economy is tightly linked to its ability 
to move physical goods. The Silk Route, the Roman roads and the English fleet 
all served as the economic backbones connecting vast geographies. Even though it 
is a virtual good, data is no different. Data needs to move to create value. Data 
alone on a server is like money hidden under a mattress. It is safe and secure, but 
largely stagnant and underutilized. (p. 7) 
                                                
47 The personal data economy comprises companies that exploit consumer data for internal use, sale in a 
secondary market, or to provide specialized services and analysis. The World Economic Forum (2012) 
distinguishes three types of personal data that might be treated as an economic asset. Volunteered data, data 
offered voluntarily by users such as photos, blog posts, video, and so on. Observed data is data captured, 
controlled and owned by an organization often without the knowledge of the data-creating individual. 
Inferred data, “involves information computationally derived from all the data volunteered and observed” 
(p. 19). The secondary market for personal data is estimated at $2 billion USD in 2012, however this is a 
measure only of companies collecting data from third-parties (e.g., Azigo, Mydex) (Robin, 2012).  
48 See http://blogs.wsj.com/wtk/ 
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 This important sub-industry of the information economy helps support and 
circulate myths directly shaping the development and deployment of consumer ICTs as 
they accelerate the consumption and production of data.49 Specifically, the personal data 
economy, as a site for capital investment and accumulation, amplifies myths about the 
emancipatory and/or empowering nature of digital prosumption (e.g., Google, Facebook, 
and Apple). In so doing, prosumption supports the consumption of devices and services, 
while also enabling the creation of a secondary market of personal data.50 Because the 
Internet does not have an “identity layer” (meaning personal data is scattered and 
fragmented), Cavoukian (2012) estimates that a given user “releases over 700 items of 
personal data per day” (p. 3). This process has only accelerated with the proliferation of 
IMDs and the expansion of more contextual data about individual users. Thus myths that 
surround IMDs (and specifically UC and the BlackBerry) are promoted (by hardware 
vendors, network service providers, marketing and advertising firms) as more than just 
mere communication tools. Rather, they are multi-media lifestyle devices offering 
freedom and social connectivity by expanding the consumption of cultural commodities 
(e.g., ring-tones, applications, and television episodes) as well as the quality and quantity 
                                                
49 This marketing orthodoxy is usefully summarized by the following quote: “There is one overriding, 
simple, but powerful message for all twenty-first-century marketing, media, and advertising executives: 
insight about consumers is the currency that trumps all others” (Vollmer & Precourt, 2008, p. 29). As one 
response to the commercialization of personal data for marketing purposes, a recent proposal in France 
would tax Internet companies based on profits associated with data mining and the commercialization of 
user data, affecting companies like Google and Facebook (Pfanner, 2013).  
50 Personal data is seen as a particular area of growth for the telecommunications industry since they are 
privy to detailed data stemming from the usage of IMDs (see World Economic Forum, 2011). Identification 
and authentication services alone are projected to reach $52 billion USD by 2020 (World Economic Forum, 
2011). 
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of personal data available for commercial uses. 51 In conjunction with the increasing 
popularity of web 2.0 media, IMDs enable a steady stream of potentially valuable 
personal information to fund a lucrative sub-industry of data-merchants, aggregators, and 
marketing and management specialists (Zwick, 2009; Turow, 2006).  
The economic necessity of personal data to contemporary capitalism has 
contributed to the renewed popularity of a post-industrial archetype—the prosumer—a 
figure that, since its popularization by Toffler (1981), embodies the convergence of 
production and consumption within the purview of an empowered and autonomous user-
consumer of ICTs (see Comor, 2011). The prosumer, however, is in fact the techno-
utopian representation of the sovereign consumer championed by neoclassical economists 
(Gowdy & Walton, 2003). In accordance with neoliberal theory, this figure provides a 
digitalized version of human rationality premised on self-interest. Thus it is thus not 
surprising that web 2.0 reflects a kind of neoliberal form of individualism that posits 
consumer sovereignty in the creation of user-generated content—a symbol of the 
empowerment of rational individuals over networks.  
The enhanced communicative capacities of the prosumer are not only valorized 
by marketers, but also constitute the basis of Richard Florida’s highly influential (though 
widely critiqued) thesis of the creative class. Florida explains this concept as referring to 
a class of labourers defined by their skills in symbolic manipulation and creation and 
their ability to accumulate and mobilize social capital as a privileged elite (Florida, 
                                                
51 Both Google and Apple have recently faced scrutiny about their collection of precise locational data 
about individual users (Cheng, 2011); similar concerns have been directed at app makers (Bonnington, 
2012) and telecommunications providers (Eckersley, 2011). 
57 
 
2006). This class carries with it the post-industrial postulate of a white-collar workforce 
typified by the information or knowledge professional (Bell, 1973; Castells, 2000). 
Florida’s thesis, however, suggests a more thorough subordination of human creative 
energies and communicative capabilities to the search for a post-industrial economic 
model. This conceptualization is particularly important to this dissertation because of 
Florida’s recent influence over policymakers and because this influence revolves around 
the crucial role of ICT networks, including IMDs, in compelling people to acquire and 
mobilize their “social capital” through technologically mediated networks in accordance 
with to the logic of self-promotion and self-branding (Hearn, 2008).52  
Web 2.0, as myth (Scholz, 2008), for instance, helped ‘re-brand’ the Internet, 
serving as a direct response to the collapse of the first dot-com bubble; a process outlined 
in O’Reilly’s web 2.0 manifesto (O’Reilly, 2005). In this context, the web 2.0 brand can 
be understood as a renewed effort to fulfill both the commercial and democratic promises 
made in preceding decades regarding the wealth creating possibilities of the Internet—
promises often articulated by individuals and institutions profiting from inflated stock 
prices and the inflow of investment capital (see Boyer, 2004).  
The popularity of the prosumer as a contemporary archetype is reflected in a 
variety of recent texts describing the democratizing power of ICTs in light of web 2.0. 
Celebrating the fulfillment of Toffler’s prophecies, and echoing Florida’s optimism 
                                                
52 More generally, the emphasis on branding (and brand management) within the marketing and advertising 
industry (Arvidsson, 2006; Thompson, 2004; Klein, 2000), expresses capitalism’s own dependence on 
dedicated myth-makers—myth-makers who, consciously or not, propagate ways of thinking that obscure 
the systemic relations that are essential to capital’s reproduction.  
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regarding the power of creativity, Tapscott and Williams argue that creativity and 
collaboration in the web 2.0 era has changed everything (2008). In a similar vein, Henry 
Jenkins (2008) optimistically describes “convergence culture” and “transmedia” as 
examples of the democratizing power of collaboration and user-generated content. In his 
work, Jenkins assesses the relationship between fans and the owners of branded content 
like Time Warner as democratic rather than exploitative (pp. 169). By way of contrast, a 
political economy perspective of fan culture highlights the fact that the affective labour of 
fans facilitates the production and extraction of surplus value by expanding the impact 
and distribution of commercially controlled and branded media content (Scott, 2009). 
This process has only accelerated with the rise of digital prosumption technologies and 
services (Scott, 2009).  
Though users are actively generating content—whether in the form of text 
messages, email, file sharing, video uploads, blogs, or photojournals—the popularity of 
web-enabled devices is being touted as a platform for highly targeted commercial 
messages or for the purposes of collecting or data mining user information (Danna and 
Gandy, 2002; Lillie, 2008). The major challenge for telecommunications and media 
conglomerates is in properly channeling the user’s now-enhanced communicative agency 
into the expansion of the personal data economy in order to maximize return on 
investment (ROI) particularly in light of costly infrastructure, excess capacity, and 
expensive R&D projects (World Economic Forum, 2011).  
The search for ROI within the personal data economy (and specifically in relation 
to IMDs), brings surveillance deeper into everyday life, contributing to what David Lyon 
(2002) calls “the disappearing body” in social interactions. Interacting in digital networks 
59 
 
are “bodies” of personally identifiable information—relaying one’s identity to any 
number of entities—acting as proxies for the real embodied individual. The automation 
of interaction by these increasingly algorithmic data proxies (Cheney-Lippold, 2011) 
instrumentalizes communication by minimizing informal or tacit knowledge; that is, 
leading to what Innis might term “the mechanization of knowledge” (Innis, 1995, pp. 
350-355). Furthermore, the disappearing body of the social and economic actor 
undermines the supposed neutrality of the free market by creating asymmetrical 
knowledge about agents in a given exchange (Ruggles, 2005). As Ruggles explains, “in 
this new environment…it is our data shadows that speak to our transaction partners for 
us, and often they speak for us on topics selected by others, and without our knowledge 
or volition” (p. 11). Not only does communication become more automated and 
mechanical, attempting to approximate the needs of “friction free” market exchanges 
(Gates, 1995), it creates a new surveillance function embedded in its very operation; a 
condition where every communicative exchange can be intercepted and/or monitored by 
(often unknown) third parties (see O’Harrow, 2006).  
The designated purpose of the most popular social networking sites (for example, 
Facebook and MySpace) have largely been vehicles for the collection of marketing data 
and the dissemination of marketing messages. The drive to implement “mobile strategies” 
as key to future profitability on the part of many web 2.0 companies,53 signals how the 
                                                
53 Indeed, the recent commercial interest in both “big data” and “cloud computing” by established 
technology companies like IBM, Microsoft, Oracle, and others, suggests the widening appeal of UC as an 
all-encompassing commercial goal. Gartner research projects worldwide enterprise spending on cloud 
services to increase from $91 billion USD in 2011 to $109 billion USD in 2012, reaching $207 billion USD 
by 2016 (Gartner, 2012b). Though important, I will not address this broadening of the myth of UC. For 
further critical analysis see boyd & Crawford, 2012; Franklin, 2012. 
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myth of UC is now a dominant paradigm in the development of commercial digital media 
in the near term.  Though still speculative, the potential profitability of these proprietary 
networks (particularly as they are accessed using IMDs) lies in their ability to create 
highly segmented captive audience of technologically adept consumers. In this case, the 
personalization of consumer ICTs, including IMDs, creates scalable audiences with 
varying degrees of heterogeneity and segmentation (see Manzerolle & McGuigan, 2013). 
IMDs are used to further the ability, and thus the status, of constant polling and 
marketing surveillance under the guise of a democratizing of culture (particularly in the 
fashion celebrated by Shirky (2008) and Jenkins (2008)).  
The current popularity of IMDs suggests that they are more than just another 
simple communication technology; they now represent a potentially lucrative venue (or 
“platform” to use an industry term) for consuming billable data and reconstituting what 
has been called “the audience commodity” as a collection of discrete individuals and 
identities (see Fuchs, 2009). The implications are all the more important because IMDs 
increasingly are being treated as essential technologies by growing numbers of 
consumers and have thus become dominant mediators of personal communication and 
information production and consumption (McGuigan, 2005; Pertierra, 2005).54 
                                                
54 This dependency was acutely exposed during the service outages that followed in the wake of hurricane 
Sandy in 2012 (Wortham, 2012). By contrast, a chronic dependency is evidenced in the growing percentage 
of users that sleep next to their phones (44 of all mobile users, 66% of smartphone users; Smith, 2012), 
despite their tendency to disrupt sleeping patterns (Gaudin, 2012). A national survey of Americans revealed 
that a third of respondents would rather give up sex for a week than their smartphones (Jackson, 2011). 
This dependence has been associated with forms of obsession and/or addiction by some psychologists 
(Gibson, 2011; Gaudin, 2011). More profoundly, dependence on networked technologies like smartphones 
and Google have been associated with changes in the structure and function of the brain itself (Carr, 
2008)—changes revealed through the growing use of brain pattern imaging technologies (Davidow, 2012). 
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Importantly, IMDs serve roles other than just communication. By associating 
mobile communication access with fashion and status through, for example, the branding 
and design of the iPhone or BlackBerry, such devices reflect a form of agency central to 
capitalist hegemony – possessive individualism (MacPherson, 1964). Possessive 
individualism refers not only to the goods one possesses, but also to the capacity to sell 
one’s labour; it provides a basis for a labour market in which individuals sell their 
productive capacities as commodities. In so doing it creates a homology between the 
commodities one consumes and the labour one sells. Together with the doctrine of 
consumer sovereignty (McGuigan, 2000; Babe, 2006a), possessive individualism acts as 
an ideological lynchpin of neoliberal capitalism. These values are part of a deeper 
commodification of the self that links ICTs innovation to the search for exploitable 
labour, whether waged or unwaged. Thus by creating channels for personally identifiable 
data flows, IMDs are part of a commodification process that cuts across traditional 
distinctions between work and leisure. Thus the popularity of the prosumer and 
prosumption as terms celebrating the collapse of media production and consumption 
provides cover for the exploitation of free or unpaid labour by commercial interests 
(Comor, 2011).  
There has been much recent research on the political, economic, and social 
importance of mobile communication technologies and services. Most of these texts 
focus either on the contextual and regional factors influencing the development of 
markets and/or dominant uses. This includes far-reaching and comparative sociological 
analyses (Castells et al., 2007; Katz et al., 2008; Goggin, 2011), “cell phone culture” 
(Goggin, 2006, 2008), “thumb culture” (Glotz et al., 2005), a recent collection on the 
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iPhone (Snickers and Vonderau, 2012), and several journals dedicated to mobile media 
(e.g., Mobile Media & Communication, Wi: Journal of Mobile Media, and the 
International Journal of Mobile Communications). Fortunati (2002) has provided an 
opening volley linking the use of cell phones with a Marxist understanding of space and 
time insofar as these are essential to capitalist social relations.  
Many corporate biographies and industry retrospectives have been written about 
mobile devices and services (e.g., Hunter, 2002; Zygmont, 2003; Mock, 2005; Rogers, 
2008). Though often celebratory or uncritical in nature these texts offer valuable details, 
perspectives, and anecdotes that can be re-purposed for critical analyses. RIM and the 
BlackBerry have been the subject of two corporate biographies (Sweeny, 2009; 
McQueen, 2010), a third book dealing with early development of BlackBerry 
components (Tubbs & Gillett, 2011), and a whole host of celebratory, self-help, or 
business strategy texts that have emerged around the brand (e.g., Mittal et al., 2010; 
Michaluk, 2011). Some critical researchers have done key ethnographic and labour 
research on organizations that have equipped their workforce with BlackBerrys 
(Middleton, 2007).  
Similarly, there have been a number of recent attempts to grapple with the socio-
cultural implications of a society based on UC. For example, Sherry Turkle’s Alone 
Together  (2012), Jaron Lanier’s You Are Not A Gadget (2010), John Tomlinson’s The 
Culture of Speed (2007), Adrian Mackenzie’s Wirelessness (2010), and Hassan and 
Purser’s 24/7: Time and Temporality in the Network Society (2007), reflect a 
representative sample of this bourgeoning academic literature. This dissertation adds to 
this existing literature a case study that specifically focuses on the interaction between 
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political economy, technics, and myth. As case study, the BlackBerry is not only a rich 
object of study that touches upon the various themes found in past writings on mobile 
media, but foregrounds a prospectively important historical period in which UC has 
become an assumed necessity in the minds of both social actors and organizations.  
2.6 In Summary 
In this dissertation I employ both historical and materialist approaches to 
understanding the interaction between technological change, political economic interests, 
and myths as they are bound together in a specific technical artifact. I historicize how a 
particular conceptualization of connectedness attains a technical, political economic, and 
lived reality. This approach provides an opportunity to demonstrate how a particular 
technological artifact can be used to examine and critique the growth of a new condition 
of mediation, shaping the capacities for thought and action within a specific historical 
context. I employ the concept of myth to map this historical process, which comprises the 
interrelationship between commercial interests, the development of new technical 
capabilities, the investment in infrastructure, and the conceptualization of labour and 
leisure. 
As such, my approach incorporates elements of a descriptive history and of 
critical political economy. This approach emphasizes, on the one hand, that the 
development of new technologies cannot be separated from the pursuit of profit including 
the competitive expansion of available products and services as well as the 
conceptualization and management of labour; and on the other hand, that this same 
process cannot be fully understood outside of the constraints shaped by the specific 
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technical knowledge, strategic partnerships, policy frameworks, and competitive market 
dynamics in which commercial organizations compete. The integration of these 
approaches through the concept of myth helps to historicize what is now arguably, a 
taken-for-granted condition of mediation for those who have (consciously or not) adopted 
UC as a part of their everyday life. 
Thus my specific use of myth in relation to mapping the rise of UC includes 
examining how the characteristics associated with its technical and commercial 
development (e.g., personalization, ubiquity, immediacy, flexibility, efficiency, and 
productivity) have contributed to the development of the BlackBerry brand of devices 
and services. The BlackBerry is not only a focused expression of the myth of UC, but 
also the result of pre-existing commitments to it on the part of incumbent 
telecommunications and technology companies seeking new revenues by 
commercializing investments in infrastructure, research and development, and spectrum 
licenses. More generally, I use myth to understand the coordination of (sometimes 
disparate) commercial interests in the creation of a relatively new market. 
 My method for using myth to analytically map the rise of UC is framed by three 
separate stages through which the market for devices and related services has emerged. It 
begins with the speculative investment in infrastructure and capacity by 
telecommunications providers and technology manufacturers and marketers. Here the 
myth motivates and justifies the build-out of new infrastructure and the development of 
new devices in the belief that future work and workers, will require new tools and 
services previously unavailable. This belief is informed by the prevalence, multiplication, 
and pre-existence of post-industrial myths suggesting a future wherein work is defined by 
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the intellective capacities of a “professional” (“informational” or “knowledge-centric”) 
workforce.  This assertion is built on actual transformations in the workforce of so-called 
advanced capitalist economies typically associated with neoliberalism and the waning of 
worker protections, including the decline of unions and the opening up of cheap labour 
markets through new trade agreements. Chapters 3 and 4 deal with this articulation of the 
myth of UC as it relates to the pursuit of new services and devices suitable for this post-
industrial future. I situate the development of the BlackBerry out of this pursuit for new 
services and devices, wherein RIM provided a readily available “solution” to the 
anticipated needs of future of workers.  
 The second stage involves the conceptualization of a mobile workforce and 
virtual organization by corporate executives and management consultants. This was 
indicative of the power of UC to transform corporate governance and labour 
management. The result has been the creation of a larger market for BlackBerrys in 
keeping with the “demands” of a new professional class of networked workers adapted to 
the “new economy.” 
 The third stage depicts UC in relation to the rise of web 2.0 and the digital 
prosumer, and details how the BlackBerry was developed to incorporate and promote the 
new consumer-centric adoption of UC as a lifestyle. I suggest that the myth of UC, 
expressed through RIM’s success, becomes a de facto expectation of digital media in 
toto, as such making RIM’s branded experience of UC less competitive, and thereby 
allowing new entrants to redefine UC in ways involving an the emphasis on IMD 
applications (apps).  
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 In each of these stages the BlackBerry, as a technical artifact, constitutes a 
material base from which to map how the myth of UC occludes the more profound 
transformation in capitalist labour organization, typically associated with a post-Fordist 
shift towards flexible workforces. The keyword “flexibility” is used here as a signal 
indicating how new media artifacts can be linked to new conditions of mediation that 
reflect changing political economic dynamics. As such, the myth of UC, while trumpeted 
as a new era for both worker empowerment and corporate productivity, creates the basis 
for the growing precarity of workers in economies focusing on informational products, 
services, and technologies. 
While this project focuses on the production of commodities and services under 
the rubric of neoliberal policies and post-Fordist labour arrangements, the artifact is an 
analytical entry that maps onto a more ephemeral connection to an actual lived condition 
of mediation. Thus if RIM’s slogan “take life with you” is any indication, IMDs are 
increasingly crucial technologies for fulfilling the economic and democratic promises 
implicit in post-industrial myths, particularly those valorizing networks and UC. Internet-
enabled mobile devices are also important tools for managing the relationship between 
capital and labour in an era defined by the repetitive claims of a “new economy.”  
The myth of UC is a link to the social practices: ways of relating that are 
“preferred” or “adapted to” the re-organization of capitalist production and consumption 
in the context of global neoliberalism.  
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Chapter 3 – Wireless Data Standards, Devices, and Markets: 
Historical and Technical Foundations of Ubiquitous 
Connectivity 
“People want their damn e-mail. Everybody has seen Star Trek. It’s like everybody’s a 
starship captain and they’re fighting the Klingons and they want to be able to pull a 
communicator out of their pocket like that—boom” (Evans Corp. researcher Albert 
Daoust quoted in Chase, 2000). 
3 Introduction 
The discussion that follows outlines the necessary conditions for the rise of North 
America as the innovative core of UC.55 The focus of this chapter is on a few key 
moments, institutions, and technologies––including the competition for wireless data 
standards, patents, and portable computing devices––with the goal of setting the stage for 
the rise of RIM and the “BlackBerry solution.” Herein, I want to highlight the 
contingency of RIM’s relative success in commercializing wireless data. This success 
reflects the convergence of established political economic interests (IBM, Motorola, 
Intel, Rogers, Ericsson, Apple), technological innovations (patents, standards), and myths 
about the prospective economic and cultural importance of UC. In so doing, I will 
describe the technological antecedents of UC, including important political economic 
factors that allowed RIM and the BlackBerry to become prominent. Mapping these 
                                                
55 The focus of this chapter is the North American market—the primary birthplace of IMDs, including the 
smartphone and the tablet. Yet, the effective creation of this market is itself embedded in global ICT 
research, development, and supply chains. It is therefore important to first note that the pivot of global 
innovation in mobile technologies has shifted from Europe (using 2G GSM networks) to North America 
(under 3G). For the foreseeable future, American companies Apple and Google likely will continue to 
define the competitive dynamics of the IMD market, and thus the overall limitations (and potentials) of the 
era of ubiquitous connectivity. 
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antecedents will better contextualize why the BlackBerry was an essential component in 
the mass adoption of UC by both organizations and individual consumers.  
Like other widely adopted communications technologies, the early development 
of UC was fraught by a tension between a search for industry-wide standardization and 
the quest to secure lucrative patents. This tension was reflected not only in the 
development of network infrastructure, but also in the devices themselves. Perhaps not 
since the early battles over telephone and wireless telegraphy, has the competitive search 
for patents shaped the evolution of a technological system so directly (Wu, 2010; Duhigg 
& Lohr, 2012).  
This chapter is composed of three themes: the commercialization of wireless data 
and standards; the role of patents and intellectual property in structuring innovation in the 
technical development of ubiquitous connectivity; and the development of 
mobile/portable computing in the consumer marketplace. 
3.1 Wireless Data Networks: ARDIS (DataTAC) and Mobitex 
The development of a common standard for two-way wireless data transmission 
had been underway by incumbent telecommunications and hardware companies well 
before RIM began developing its devices in the late 1990s. In general, the development 
of these standards is often not only costly for a company but also very risky: by the time 
a satisfactory technical standard has been established the corporate entities developing it 
may not find partners within the supply chain to invest in the new technology particularly 
in the absence of an existing market demand. Although the technology was limited, by 
the early 1990s it was commonly accepted that wireless data networks (that is, wireless 
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networks using packet-switching technologies)56 would become commercially successful 
(Lindmark et al., 2004; Merrill, 1994; Meyers, 1998; Rogers, 2008). In 1993 analysts 
were projecting annual revenue from wireless data transmission services to reach $13 
billion USD by 2000 (Shaffer, 1993). At the time, the parcel delivery service UPS was 
pushing to create a wireless data network to remotely track and coordinate the movement 
of packages and transports. Despite high-cost, the UPS network served as a vehicle for 
promoting the wider adoption of such networks (Blake, 1993). The Internet boom 
catalyzed further interest and investment in wireless data networks culminating in the 
marketing of 3G as the grand arrival of the truly mobile Internet (Edwards, 1998). 
Arguably the earliest wireless data network, ARDIS (advanced radio data 
information service), emerged out of the cooperative effort of Motorola and IBM. 
Developed in 1983 for use by IBM’s service division, ARDIS was a private mobile radio 
                                                
56 RIM’s 1998 Annual Report positioned its own wireless device and services by differentiating between 
circuit-switched and packet-switched networks. Specifically, circuit-switched networks do “not integrate 
well with the packet-based environments of office computing and the Internet” (RIM, 1998, p. 9). With an 
eye to highlighting the superiority of their own IP based products, the report offers this distinction between 
circuit and packet switched networks:  
The Internet is an inexpensive communications backbone for two-way messaging because it 
eliminates the need for call centres and human operators to relay messages. It also eliminates 
airtime, long distance, and roaming charges usually associated with wireless voice 
communications. The Internet also allows content such as stock quotes, weather, and news items 
to be selectively downloaded and efficiently delivered to a two-way messaging device. With 
packet technology, users are always connected and therefore receive real-time messages. By 
contrast, circuit-switched solutions are session-based rather than on-line, requiring users to call in 
to download messages on a periodic basis. Packet-switched, two-way messaging solutions have 
many other features which cannot be matched by voice-centric solutions which attempt to meet all 
wireless communication needs with a single device. Within the two-way packet switched segment 
of the wireless industry, no single dominant technology has yet emerged. Consumers therefore 
want access to devices that limit exposure to technological obsolescence by offering a wide choice 
of networks employing alternative technologies (emphasis added Rim, 1998, p.9).  
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(PMR) network for communicating with engineers and other field agents.57 Though one 
of the first wireless data networks developed, it was privately used until 1990 when 
Motorola made this standard public. The release of ARDIS for commercial development 
was paralleled by the introduction of Mobitex in North America by telecommunications 
carriers seeking to develop wireless data services, specifically, Rogers Cantel (in Canada) 
and Ram Mobile DATA (later Bell South/Cingular) (in the U.S.).58 Marketed under the 
brand name DataTAC, the ARDIS standard was adopted by carriers in ten countries by 
the end of the 1990s. Although technically developed and used before Mobitex for 
organizational and labour management, ARDIS’ introduction as a commercially available 
wireless data network created competition between two main interests: device and 
networking manufacturers on the one hand, and telecommunications carriers on the other. 
Like the competition for 2G standards in the United States (that delayed the overall 
development of the mobile voice market by creating wasted investment in a fractured 
national infrastructure), wireless data standardization was an essential step in the 
generation of more advanced functions and devices (Cringley, 1993).  
The catalyst for the commercialization of ARDIS, Mobitex, was developed out of 
a partnership between Swedish Televerket (ST) and Ericsson as a potential global 
standard for wireless data in the mid-1980s and was, in fact, the first public mobile data 
                                                
57 Lindmark et al., explain the logistical and organizational importance of the ARDIS standard: “This 
system had the purpose of facilitating computer-aided dispatching, parts ordering and tracking, as well as 
service contract entitlement checking for IBM field service engineers. In 1986, some 12,000 IBM engineers 
used it, a figure that rose to 25,000 in 1990, when it was expanded to cover about 400 cities. ARDIS 
became an effective tool for improving IBM’s service, in spite of limitations in the functionality of 
terminals and in roaming” (Lindmark et al., 2004, p. 300). 
58 In the United States, ARDIS was bought by American Satellite Corporation in 1998, which later changed 
its name to Motient in 2000. 
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communications system standard in the world (Linkdmark et al., 2004, p. 345).59 
Initially, development of Mobitex was directed by ST—a Swedish government 
telecommunications agency later privatized in the 1990s and renamed TeliaSonera.  
The creation of Mobitex as a public wireless data standard involved significant 
costs in resources and labour. Lindmark notes that, at the time it was launched in 1986, 
the development of Mobitex entailed a considerable effort, absorbing in the range of “200 
man-years on the project” (Lindmark et al., 2004, p. 345). Despite the important technical 
innovations associated with Mobitex, the initial market interest in it was limited due to a 
lack of manufacturers for components of its infrastructure and software, the high upfront 
capital investments required by telecommunications carriers, the absence of a clear 
industry standard,60 and “low-computing competence,” meaning a relatively limited set 
of potential applications (Lindmark et al., 2004, p. 345). Developed specifically for 
commercial use (unlike ARDIS), by 1990 the Swedish Mobitex network was used 
internally and did not have any (external) paying customers.  
                                                
59 It is important to note that the Swedish ICT industry was undergoing a prolonged period liberalization 
with Ericsson aggressively moving into international markets. By 1995, the OECD ranked Sweden as the 
most liberalized telecommunications market (OECD, 1995). Swedish firms, Ericsson in particular, 
benefited from the widespread liberalization of telecommunications markets internationally (see Firth & 
Mellor, 1999). 
60 A standard first involves the development of technical specifications for production and use, often 
followed by the approval of an international standards organization (for example, the IEEE) or industry 
consortium (GSMA); second, the creation of a supply chain for components and infrastructure, and 
commercial adoption. Rapid and widespread adoption of a standard without formal approval by a 
governing organization creates a “de facto” standard often tied to a specific corporate brand. In this respect, 
standards also can be tied closely to proprietary patents and intellectual property; a process that creates a 
rentier system for the commercialization of new technologies. The generally antagonistic relationship 
between these two processes—standardization and the patent system—have been particularly pronounced 
in the evolution of IMDs. As of this writing, patent suits among the major corporate interests—Google, 
Samsung, Apple—are set to frame the evolution of IMDs and related networks for the near future. 
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Despite differing somewhat in their technical composition, “Mobitex and 
DataTAC addressed roughly the same applications and market segments” (Lindmark et 
al., 2004, p. 301), yet both were initially undersubscribed. In an effort to generate 
commercial interest, Televerket and Ericsson partnered as Eritel to promote Mobitex 
internationally to telecommunications carriers seeking a competitive edge in a potentially 
lucrative new market: wireless data services. Eritel’s marketing campaign targeted the 
North American market specifically, and convinced a few large incumbents of the 
commercial viability of Mobitex. Indeed, Mike Lazaridis, founder of RIM, had attended 
one of the many promotional events for Mobitex held in North America and recognized 
the possibility of wireless data as a future core area of business for his company 
(Lazaridis, 2008). Using the clout of its parent companies, ARDIS also was marketed 
heavily to carriers around the world (Edwards, 1992). Both ARDIS and Mobitex became 
fixtures of trade shows, conventions, and other gatherings of business interests seeking a 
technological edge over competition (Trowbridge, 1992; Loudermilk, 1993; Wilson & 
Mason, 1993).  
ARDIS and Mobitex are important in the genesis of UC not only because they 
ultimately dominated wireless data market when wireless email became technologically 
sophisticated and commercially lucrative but, also, because they both actively promoted 
UC to carriers, investors, and business consumers at the same time––planting the seeds 
for the future development of UC devices and infrastructure. In part, this initial push was 
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positioned to build on the popularity of paging services—a business that many carriers 
and component manufacturers were familiar with.61  
The rollout of both ARDIS and Mobitex, as well as the development of the 
Cellular Digital Packet Data (CDPD) consortium (Edwards, 1993),62 generated 
considerable business media coverage.63 Much of this centered on the mobile workforce. 
An article from Network World (a trade magazine focusing on “enterprise network 
strategies”) framed the importance of ARDIS and Mobitex for corporations in terms of 
creating flexible workflows that will “set workers free” (Eckerson, 1992). Email was 
identified early on as a potential driver in the uptake of enterprise wireless data services, 
with Mobitex specifically identified as a vehicle for wireless email since it used Internet 
protocol (IP) for routing data (Louderback, 1992; Trowbridge, 1993). As one author for 
                                                
61 Though important to the larger story of UC, paging services and devices are not directly addressed in this 
dissertation. For a detailed discussion see Lindmark et al., (2004, pp. 303). The marketing and technical 
parameters of most paging services limited the range of communication and curtailed the ability to develop 
more sophisticated platforms for two-way, packet-switched wireless data systems. Unfortunately, there are 
too few detailed academic treatise of pagers and paging services despite their global popularity before the 
growth of SMS texting. Revenue for paging services in the US reached $2.2 billion USD in 1993 
(Donaldson, 1993). As components shrank in size and increased in processing power, pagers were quickly 
displaced (McCall, 2001) though they are still used in some markets. Paging technology was important for 
creating efficiencies in spectrum usage and sharing, as well as in the areas of battery-life, energy efficiency, 
and portability (Freeman, 1992).  
62 The CDPD was a consortium comprising wireless carriers—including Ameritech Cellular, Bell Atlantic 
Corp., Contel Cellular, Inc., GTE MobilNet, Inc., Southwestern Bell Mobile Systems—that had developed 
their own technical standard for wireless data transmission using the existing cellular infrastructure.  CDPD 
reflected a combination of incumbent U.S. telecommunications carriers attempting to control the genesis of 
wireless data, as well as the public and commercial perception of the value of wireless data; however, 
because the standard was built on existing cellular infrastructure, the capacity was relatively limited in 
contrast to ARDIS and Motorola. In 1993, Motorola claimed patent infringement against the CDPD 
standard which stunted the adoption of their standard (Messmer, 1993). Nevertheless, the CDPD was used 
by carriers well into the 1990s in part due to its relatively low implementation costs (Edwards, 1998). 
63 There were several other minor wireless data standards being championed at this point, including CDI 
developed by Cellular Data Inc.; Apple Computer and French carrier Mtel were promoting a wireless data 
service known as Bebop in France and “personal communication service” in the U.S.; in addition to 
ARDIS, Motorola was developing a wireless data service using 66 orbiting satellites named Iridium 
(Cringley, 1993). 
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PC Week put it: “Wireless E-mail is not simply a replacement for beepers. Rather, it 
forms a messaging layer that gives a new immediacy to remote information exchange” 
(Louderback, 1992).64 
Convincing carriers to buy into a given standard (in this case either ARDIS or 
Mobitex) was only one barrier to the commercial adoption of wireless data networks and 
services. Portable devices were an essential area of research and development, and a 
substantial barrier to this adoption (Hengel, 1994; Sweeney, 1997).  
                                                
64 Mulling over the infinite possibilities offered by wireless email, Louderback’s considerations seem 
antiquated now: 
Imagine an all-day seminar or press conference. Right next to the water pitcher and the bowl of 
horribly sour candies is your E-mail appliance. Without disturbing anyone, and without getting up, 
you can let co-workers know just how bored you are. Or, if you're a reporter, you can file a story 
even before the press conference is over. 
Have you ever been on the floor of a stock exchange? It gets very loud out there. Now imagine 
outfitting brokers with untethered E-mail. How much would you pay to be on your broker's A-1 E-
mail list? 
Even more exciting than these examples is the potential of RAM's soon-to-be-published API. 
Simple E-mail is only the tip of the iceberg once application developers start using packet-based 
messaging. Imagine a personal program running on your office PC, connected to some type of 
messaging slot. While on the road, you can use your custom packet-based appliance to send 
commands -- a database query, for instance, or a schedule update -- to that digital assistant, and it 
can send responses back to you. Like Xe rox's Paper Works but without the fax machine. 
(Louderback, 1992) 
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Figure 1: Motorola Marco designed for use on the ARDIS wireless data network65 
In 1992, a year after Mobitex was deployed by RAM Mobile Data and Rogers 
(still with limited consumer interest), Rob J. Fraser, an engineer and Mobitex evangelist, 
outlined both the network specifications and potential uses of the Mobitex standard. His 
piece in the trade magazine Communications included this passage under the heading 
“The Personal Communicator”: 
To provide an illustration of a personal communicator application, most of which 
have yet to be imagined, let's assume that Mike wishes to book a meeting with 
Sue next Tuesday at 10:00 a.m. Mike pulls out his palm-top communicator from 
his jacket pocket and accesses Sue's appointment calendar, stored in her 
communicator. He sees “busy” or “open” on a calendar graphic, and sends a 
                                                
65 The ARDIS network spawned a few early handsets, including Marco, a personal communicator produced 
by Motorola and IBM “for in-house use.” Launched in 1984, “Marco had been turned into a broader-use 
wireless data network by 1990. General Magic offered Envoy, but the system required a stylus and tablet to 
enter messages and the machine’s ability to recognize handwriting was poor” (McQueen, 2010, p. 75). 
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request for Sue's open slot on Tuesday at 10:00 a.m. Sue has just completed a 
review of her stock portfolio-stored on her broker's computer-and is currently 
transferring funds from her brokerage account to her savings account. She now 
sees Mike's request and decides to cancel the request and book Mike's open slot 
for Thursday. Mike confirms, and the meeting is set. Both have access to a vast 
array of public and personal information, including weather, airline reservations, 
office mail, and fax communications through the Mobitex fax gateway (text 
messaging only). (Fraser, 1991, p. 2) 
Fraser’s comments anticipate the birth of the personal digital assistant (PDA), 
which was still being developed in the R&D departments of several companies including 
Apple, HP, and Dell. Initially conceived of as a relatively limited network for secure two-
way paging and mobile data to be used by police and firefighters (McQueen, 2010, p. 
60), improvements in the Mobitex network advanced by U.S. telecommunications giant 
BellSouth in 1998 provided better “coverage, longer battery lifetimes and faster radio 
access establishment, thus being more cost-effective and increasing the competitiveness 
with PMR and paging networks” (Lindmark et al., 2004, p. 349). The crucial contract for 
RIM’s forthcoming Mobitex pagers (worth $90 million USD) on the part of BellSouth 
enabled the commercial development of RIM’s BlackBerry because of BellSouth’s size 
and substantial market share (it would later become a central component of the 
reconstituted AT&T) (RIM, 1998, p. 2).66  
                                                
66 I discuss the context and implications of this contract in chapter 4. 
77 
 
The competition to develop a wireless data standard primarily was shaped by two 
industry consortiums. On the one hand, the ARDIS standard, which was jointly 
developed by IBM and Motorola and marketed under the brand name DataTAC and, on 
the other, Mobitex, created and promoted by Ericsson and North American 
telecommunications carriers including BellSouth and Rogers. Though both standards 
began to be commercially deployed shortly after 1990, their maturation took almost a 
decade, and relied almost exclusively on the development of end-user devices that could 
realize the potential of IP and packet-switched wireless data networks. Despite the long 
process of developing these standards, interest and investment was sustained by faith in 
their ultimate profitability (Anonymous, 1994), but also in a belief that this profitability 
required control over this new market by way of industry standardization. This long road 
to industry standardization illustrates the “buy-in” necessary on the part of established 
political economic interests in the process of commercializing UC.  
3.2 Monopolies of Knowledge in the Competition for Cellular 
Standards: GSM, CDMA, and the Qualcomm Paradigm 
Although the faith (reinforced by the scale of vested interests and investments) 
that sustained the protracted development and commercialization of wireless data 
networks was crucial, the competitive development of IMD and related network 
standards has been deeply affected by the U.S. patent system, a system that ultimately 
governs the rights to commercialize a given technology. The mass adoption of a given 
standard reflects more than just its prospective usefulness or profitability. It also 
incorporates the strategic importance of geopolitical agreements, supply chains, existing 
infrastructure, and commercial contracts (i.e. it constitutes a massive fixed capital 
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investment).  In this respect, the timing for the commercial release of both ARDIS and 
Mobitex could not have been worse. The early development of wireless data networks 
and standards paralleled the deployment of 2G digital cellular standards optimized for 
voice that drew the bulk of carrier investment and used the majority of commercially 
usable spectrum.  
Through the development of the European Union, mobile telecommunications 
investment focused on voice through the collective adoption of the global standard for 
mobile (GSM) which provided an expansive market for compatible handsets and network 
components (Lindmark et al., 2004). Investment and innovation therefore followed the 
lines of optimizing voice first, and later helped popularize short-message-services (SMS) 
or texting (which would ultimately make paging obsolete). Because mobile data networks 
required manufacturers to develop portable devices that used specific chips, frequency 
ranges, and standards, few existing handset manufacturers saw advantage in sinking yet 
more money into R&D to develop technologies without a clear path to profitability.  
To understand the innovation dynamics (and the dynamics retarding innovation) 
at play, it is worth going on a brief detour that elaborates the importance of second-
generation (2G) wireless standards (which demonstrates precisely how digital 
encoding—wireless data—emerged to optimize the transmission of voice). As a case 
study, it also demonstrates how the process of standardization involves important 
geopolitical and economic issues because the utility of such standards relies on their wide 
(if not international) acceptance. After all, what use would a technical standard be if it 
was only partially adopted? Moreover, in the case of wireless connectivity, standards 
offer different ways to make use of the electromagnetic spectrum—how they convert a 
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limited, shared, and natural phenomenon into a medium for transmitting information and 
facilitating communication.      
While the technical details of 2G network standards are complicated,67 the 
following discussion clarifies why the competition for network standards is so important 
for understanding the commercialization of UC-related technologies and, further, why the 
mobile industry is preoccupied with creating patents and litigating patent suits. It also 
provides an important historical and technical foundation for the rapid proliferation of 
smartphones and mobile data worldwide, in addition to shedding light on past (RIM vs. 
NTP Inc.) and current (the interest by RIM, Google, Apple, and Ericsson in Nortel’s 
patent portfolio) controversies in the mobile industry. More broadly, this discussion 
demonstrates how a post-industrial narrative highlighting a new era of progress driven by 
human creativity is realized within the accumulation strategies of informational 
capitalism. The monopolies of knowledge enabled by the commodification of technical 
knowledge reflect an imperative that is arguably antagonistic to the infrastructure 
demands required for a global information society.  
In response to the development and adoption of the GSM standard in Europe (and 
its former colonies), Qualcomm—a San Diego based technology company focusing on 
wireless standards, chips, and software—emerged to become a dominant force shaping 
the technical composition of mobile media by virtue of its expansive patent portfolio. 
This portfolio allowed Qualcomm to generate revenue by licensing or renting out its 
proprietary technical knowledge (including patents at the heart of emerging 4G 
                                                
67 See Cowhey et al. (2008) for a detailed explication.  
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networks). The United States Patent Office (USPO) in this context, is thus one of the 
most important organizations shaping technological innovation, particularly in mobile 
media,68 and may help to explain why the post-cold war era has allowed the United 
States to produce many of the world’s most important and powerful corporations 
(arguably with the exception of RIM).  
When modulating a digital signal onto a carrier wave, there are a number of 
different approaches to encoding and then transmitting digital information under 
conditions of spectrum scarcity or shared usage. In order to maximize spectrum usage by 
devices within a relatively close proximity, digital encoding “multiple access” standards 
allow spectrum to be shared by users within a specific geographic region or “cell.” The 
first and earliest multiple access standard developed was (and is) known as “frequency 
division multiple access” (FDMA) wherein a channel is created by transmitting only on a 
given frequency. It thereby can be decoded only through the use of a receiver tuned to the 
said frequency. As a fairly common and longstanding approach, FDMA suffers from two 
major problems. The first is its inefficient use of spectrum, particularly for its 
transmission of digital information, because it requires a specific frequency to only be 
used for a single communicative exchange. Second, FDMA has a tendency to be less 
secure and more prone to interference because it relies on just one frequency. Once that 
                                                
68 The reason why patents have been particularly important for mobile media stems largely from the 
competitive influence of market mechanisms in helping select devices and standards. It is worth reiterating 
that the commercial development of UC is unique as the most important and complex global technological 
system to develop primarily in the post-cold war era. The evolution of mobile media therefore is more 
characteristically shaped by neoliberal policies than previous telecommunications and computer 
technologies that benefited from priorities involving national security or the public good.  
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frequency has been determined it can be intercepted or monitored fairly easily (Mock, 
2005, pp. 43-44). 
The second multiple access approach is “time division multiple access” (TDMA). 
This approach currently is the most universal and is the basis of the GSM standard. It 
uses carrier waves within any number of frequency ranges and divides the wave 
according to time slots onto which a communicator modulates data. To decode the 
message, the receiver must be synchronized with the specific time slots corresponding to 
the initial transmission. This standard, while using limited spectrum more efficiently, has 
technical limits, as the division of the spectrum into finer and finer time slots requires 
greater technical precision. Requiring sophisticated software for synchronizing these finer 
‘slices,’ TDMA can be prone to synchronization problems (Mock, 2005, pp. 73-74). 
The third, and most recent approach, is known as “code division multiple access” 
(CDMA). Here, the initial transmission––a cell phone––encodes and transmits a message 
on all frequencies within a given bandwidth, while encoding the message in such a way 
that only the intended recipient (a base station, or another mobile device) will be able to 
decode it. There are many advantages to this approach. Perhaps the most significant is 
increased security of communication, since each communicative exchange involves 
personalized coding. There is a clear link between the development of CDMA and the 
work of Claude Shannon (1949), whose mathematical theory of communication would 
inspire the founders of Qualcomm, the principle commercial developers and advocates of 
CDMA based standards (Mock, 2005). Paradoxically, Shannon’s formula for ensuring 
the perfect communication (involving homologous content at the points of encoding and 
decoding) required the production of more “noise” within the spectrum since 
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sophisticated encryption technologies ensure security by transforming the signal into 
noise. In this respect, CDMA is an important standard ensuring the privatization of the 
spectrum. The strategic importance of CDMA for the military, however, restricted 
research until patents stemming as far back as 1941 were de-classified in the early 
1980s.69 
Another important benefit of CDMA is how it allows spectrum use to be 
maximized since transmission can occur using all frequencies. Despite requiring even 
more sophisticated software to encode and decode transmissions instantaneously as each 
is uniquely encoded, in theory enabling less problematic “handoffs”70 between relaying 
points (as it does not fall victim to minor delays in time synchronization). Relay points 
known as “base stations” take on an even greater level of technical sophistication, 
requiring higher capital outlays by telecoms to invest in the system, thus pricing out 
many local and regional telecommunications providers. As a result, the growing 
complexity of technical standards and the higher costs of the related infrastructure put 
greater power into the hands of patent holders (the recent demand for and auction of 
Nortel patents reflects this power; see Lewis, 2011). In addition to higher processing 
power (provided by Qualcomm’s patented CDMA chipsets and components), CDMA 
handsets require more energy to broadcast a similarly encoded message on all available 
frequencies (to which the base station would allocate one open channel). Greater power 
to transmit signals meant creating yet another level of costly sophistication for device 
                                                
69 See “Secret Communication System” U.S. patent # 2,292,387 
70 This term refers to the process by which different cells exchange data in order to maintain an open line of 
communication between two cell users. This is particularly important if one of the participants is moving 
between cells. 
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manufacturers (which is one reason why Qualcomm built its own CDMA-compatible 
handsets in the early stages of the standard’s adoption).71  
The case of Qualcomm offers important insight into how U.S. patent law and its 
global influence is shaping the development and deployment of mobile networks and 
devices worldwide, particularly in relation to 4G. Indeed, the rapid growth of Qualcomm 
is matched only by the emphasis the company places on its patent portfolio as its primary 
strategy, having eschewed most of its manufacturing operations. In the semiconductor 
industry this is known as a “fabless” company—maintaining only specialized chipset 
development and production facilities that allow a company to customize chips based on 
its patented CDMA based technologies. 
Qualcomm’s entry into the mobile standards competition is comparatively late 
given the rapid adoption of the GSM standard, reflecting the importance of patent 
systems in driving technological innovation, and the extent to which such innovation 
holds such geopolitical significance. For much of the 1990s and 2000s North American 
companies, with a few exceptions, were small agents in the mobile market, in large part 
because of the creation of the GSM standard for digital wireless transmission (Molisch, 
2011, p. 6).72 GSM provided a significant economy of scale for European companies, as 
well as first-mover advantage73 having developed the standard in conjunction with 
                                                
71 The worldwide dominance of Qualcomm creates clear problems for implementing cutting edge wireless 
infrastructure in developing countries, creating another qualitative dimension to the global digital divide. 
72 For a detailed history see: http://www.gsm-history.org/ 
73 Because of its mutual and synchronous adoption by multiple national markets, and because it relied 
primarily on components and infrastructure from within the EU, GSM offered a readily available standard 
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prominent continental telecom and ICT manufacturers. Even though the standard itself 
was “open” (non-proprietary), the European Commission’s agreement privileged its 
continental manufacturers who had the benefit of advance notice, preparation and public 
policy support––for example, national regulators agreed to provide incentives to users of 
GSM (as per the agreement there had to be at least one GSM provider in a given national 
market; see Cowhey et al., 2008).  
Arguably, it is the standardization and interoperability of a society’s 
communication infrastructure––particularly one as personalized as mobile 
communication––that enables its internal coherence at a functional and logistical level. 
The adoption of GSM as a regional and, ultimately, global open standard therefore had 
important geopolitical implications, especially as a precursor to the European Union 
developments more generally. GSM also was a specific expression of post-industrial 
mythologies that looked towards the complete networking of the world, requiring 
interoperability, shared standards and mutually beneficial infrastructural capabilities.74 
Indeed, the development and application of GSM arguably constitutes a tangible 
expression of the foundational myths of the information society. 
While GSM foreshadowed the regulatory and technological emergence of a post-
Cold war information society, the decision to adopt this standard by the European 
                                                                                                                                            
 
(complete with supply chain) that could be exported globally. This is in contrast to the U.S. approach that 
emphasized market competition in the selection of a 2G standard. 
74 Although he does not discuss GSM specifically, Mattelart addresses the implications of standards and 
standardization in Information Society: An Introduction (2003) and Networking the World: 1794-2000 
(2000). 
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community unsurprisingly avoided the competitive extremes experienced in the United 
States. In the market model, competition would either produce a dominant industry 
standard or it would generate a market with multiple standards (this, in fact, is what 
happened in North America). One of the disadvantages of the GSM process was that, 
from the outset, the standard was optimized largely for voice telephony. The primary 
reason for this was the fact that voice functionality was universally valued among 
member states (or, at least, the vested interests they represented) while SMS services 
were merely an afterthought (albeit one that would become a defining feature of the 
standard; see Goggin, 2006, pp. 64-77). 
Relative to the European approach, the development of mobile standards in the 
United States (and by extension Canada) followed the path of regulatory “neutrality” in 
which standards developed by different interests competed for market dominance. This, it 
was argued by policymakers under the Reagan administration (Gandal et al., 2003), 
would develop American capacity and incentivize constant innovation while also (it was 
hoped) maximize the monetary return for a given standard and related network 
technologies. It was in this regulatory context that Qualcomm developed the CDMA–
based mobile standard, chipsets, and devices.  
One adverse effect of this approach was its emphasis on patent portfolios as 
competing providers prepared for a future adoption of their proprietary standard. This 
entailed a modicum of security in that current R&D expenditures eventually could be 
recouped. This competition, however, generated a race to patent every possible (and even 
minor) technological achievement in the hopes of attaining future rents on this 
prospective form of intellectual capital. Since the U.S. offered a sufficiently large market 
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for multiple standards to co-exist and evolve, as opposed to the EU’s constellation of 
smaller national markets (constituting an incentive for regulatory intervention), this 
market-based approach was justifiable to American policymakers. Furthermore, it was 
believed that this was the only route that would generate a competitive, American–based 
standard, one that could compete with the global dominance of GSM (Mock, 2005).75 
The commercialization of 2G standards, primarily GSM and CDMA, created the 
basic infrastructure for the development of UC. As voice and data merged together in 
new services and devices, so too did wireless data and 2G technologies. Indeed, the 
earliest BlackBerrys incorporating both voice and data merged these two technologies. 
Focusing on the process of standardization also illustrates the geographic separation 
between the fruits of research and development and the production of the technologies 
themselves. Arguably, Qualcomm, in its pursuit of CDMA patents rather than tangible 
products, acted as a paradigmatic example of a post-industrial technology company 
                                                
75 U.S. policy under Ronald Reagan and Bill Clinton held that market competition would be more adaptive 
to consumer demand, including the telecommunications providers investing in infrastructure. Though short-
term competition between multiple standards would create some market “winners” and “losers,” the 
process would yield a more advanced and competitive standard, one able to compete with GSM (Gandal et 
al., 2003). CDMA was the most notable, and significant, product of this policy as it relates to contemporary 
wireless standards. Large investments in one particular standard, and its respective infrastructure, can 
create a “tipping” point that leads to long-term adoption. As Gandal et al. (2003), write,  
The economic theory of tipping would suggest that the early adoption of one standard or the 
decision to formally set one standard in the EC [European Community] can tip the whole world 
toward that standard. Then the adoption of a single standard by a few large firms will likely tip the 
entire market toward that standard.8 In market competition between wireless standards, 
interconnection may mean that the standard tipping results may apply only if one standard gets far 
out in front of a competing standard early on before the competing standard has a chance to get 
established. In the case of second-generation wireless systems, CDMA succeeded despite the 
initial lead of GSM. (p. 330) 
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representing the dialectic of forces (technical knowledge) and relations (global division 
of labour) of production readily enabled by neoliberal policies.76  
The development of fabless companies, though predominantly associated with the 
semiconductor (silicon chip) industry, is indicative of the overall post-industrial shift in 
most relatively developed capitalist economies. In this iteration of recent political 
economic history, companies began to outsource material production and emphasize, in 
their domestic operations, creative and knowledge intensive activities. RIM and its 
BlackBerry are both examples of this, outsourcing large portions of their device 
production to a factory in Mexico, away from its corporate headquarters in Waterloo, 
Ontario.77 The separation of R&D and production that came to define the wireless market 
mirrored the uptake of the resulting devices and services by professionals purporting to 
represent the vanguard of post-industrial myths, those emphasizing the intellective 
aspects of labour. The emphasis on knowledge, intellectual property, and patents over 
hardware or manufacturing is central to these myths.  
Even before Daniel Bell became famous for prophesizing the era of the 
knowledge economy, this post-industrial shift was identified by Marshall McLuhan in 
Take Today: The Executive as Dropout (1972) as a changing relation between hardware 
and software in the era of the computer. “Software is not just data but the organization of 
                                                
76 One could further argue that Apple’s success is premised on just such a separation. It is difficult imagine 
the mass production of iPhones and iPads in any place other than China, India, etc. due to the necessity of 
cheap labour to subsidize the high-cost components and technical sophistication. The planned replacement 
of Chinese workers by robots (Apple’s largest manufacturing contractor Foxconn plans to deploy 1 million 
robots by 2014; see Yee & Jim, 2011) signals that the dialectic between forces and relations of production 
may yet induce a North American manufacturing renaissance, albeit one lead by innovations in robotics 
and artificial intelligence. 
77 It is difficult to believe that the first generations of BlackBerrys bore the words “Made in Canada.” 
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information”; that is, data does not exist as such, but is always bound by a specific 
organizational and political economic context or environment (87). Later in the same text 
McLuhan describes the patent system as a “chastity belt” (103), knowingly or 
unknowingly echoing Thorstein Veblen’s argument that much of the technological 
innovation guided by corporations constitutes a form of “sabotage” (1921)—sabotage in 
the sense that the structuring of corporate profit-seeking impedes human emancipation 
through the progressive accumulation of technical and scientific knowledge. Taken 
together, these theorists suggest that shifting one’s commercial emphasis from 
manufacturing to knowledge does not necessarily mean that social and technological 
capacities have been unleashed for the betterment of humanity. Instead, these constitute 
developments that often are subsumed by the division of mental from manual labour.  
As already mentioned, post-industrial myths tend to conceal the production of 
powerful new monopolies of knowledge (Innis, 1950). Specifically, the centrality of 
patents to the evolution of highly complex technical systems, like those enabling UC, 
almost ensure that their evolution is consistent with particular commercial interests 
(Apple, Qualcomm, IBM). These monopolies over technical knowledge and the rights to 
commercially exploit them can be contrasted with the general absence of understanding 
how they work or the economic and other conditions of their production on the part of 
most consumers. Thus UC, and related devices, appear to work as if by magic.78  
                                                
78 The “black boxing” of technical knowledge adds to the fetishistic nature of the commodity form 
generally. In this case, the production of sophisticated consumer devices like IMD express the global 
division of labour in the context of neoliberal policies. The creation of advanced technical knowledge 
depends on readily available markets of cheap labour for the commercialization of this knowledge. This 
relationship is epitomized by the contractual arrangements between Apple and Foxconn, the manufacturer 
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Innis’ concept of monopolies of knowledge is therefore significant for 
understanding the importance of patents to UC for two reasons: it suggests the 
significance of technical expertise in the development of media in everyday life (thus the 
power of a technical elite), as well as the commercial exploitation of this knowledge 
through a system that generates revenue both directly through the commodification of 
knowledge (i.e. the sale of devices) and through rents on the rights to commercially 
exploit this technical knowledge. Yet for Innis, monopolies of knowledge gain a 
particularly important significance when they pertain to the means of communication. 
The right to develop and commercially exploit new technical and scientific knowledge 
constrains access by intertwining the technical foundations of communication media with 
the need to recuperate investment and generate profits for investors (usually as soon as 
possible.79 Monopolies of knowledge thus set into motion political economic forces 
                                                                                                                                            
 
of many of Apple’s most popular products (e.g., iPhone, iPad). For discussion of labour and Apple see 
Duhigg & Bradsher, 2012; Duhigg & Barboza, 2012;  
79 Between 1994 and 2001, ICT-related patents constituted the largest portion of patents granted by both the 
European Patent Office (EPO) and the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO), from 28% in1994 to 
35% in 2001 of patents granted (OECD, 2004a, p. 13). The OECD notes that this increase is part of a 
broader shift towards R&D as a central business strategy: “Between 1990 and 2001 industry-financed R&D 
in the OECD region rose 51% in real terms from USD 244 billion to USD 368 billion, or from 1.31% to 
1.48% of GDP. Much of this growth was driven by high-technology manufacturing and knowledge-
intensive service sectors, in particular ICT and pharmaceuticals – the same sectors that have seen the most 
rapid increases in patenting” (p. 15). Further, OECD estimates that during this period, licensing revenues 
for patents has increased from $10 billion USD in 1990 to $100 billion USD in 2000 (p. 16). For an 
extended analysis on this topic see Miller, 2007; OECD, 2004a; Seidenberg, 2012. Since late 2012, the 
International Telecommunications Union has convened a series of Round Table discussions on this topic 
and has assembled an Ad Hoc Research Group on Intellectual Property Rights under the 
Telecommunications Standards Bureau of the ITU. A detailed report from this research group is expected 
in 2013 (ITU, 2013). See http://www.itu.int/en/ITU-T/ipr/Pages/adhoc.aspx 
90 
 
seeking to incorporate both control over the means of communication as well as the 
content of communication.80 
Ideally, intellective capacities are either to be channeled into the structures and 
institutions of capital accumulation or to be subject to costs associated with their use 
outside of the wage relation (e.g., in everyday social life). Recently, Andre Gorz has 
summarized this tendency in contemporary capitalism: “The operatives of the network 
economy are actors in a form of organization that is ceaselessly self-organizing. Their 
product is not a tangible thing, but, first and foremost, the interactivity that fuels 
everyone’s activity” (Gorz, 2010, p. 13). But as Gorz goes on to note, it is not just 
knowledge that becomes a source of monopoly control: “The appropriation does not 
always need to be direct. It is enough for capital to appropriate the means of access to 
                                                
80 As Neill (1972) notes, Innis’ use of the term monopoly varied between two interrelated levels of analysis. 
At a more restricted and micro level, the term monopoly referred to the “control of scarce commodities, 
skills, political influence, or information” (p. 100). In this sense we can think of patents as a legal right to 
restrict, codify, and commercialize technical knowledge. Thus while the pursuit of standardization is a 
means of creating monopolies of knowledge that reflect specific vested interests, it is also an essential 
precursor to the widespread societal adoption of a new technology and related techniques. It is in this later 
process that Innis’ use of the term monopoly gains a broader scope signifying “the dominance of one 
medium of communication in a social system. In such a case the firms and industries involved may be 
perfectly competitive but the medium itself as the dominant channel of intercourse monopolizes 
information and, in consequence, the general climate of opinion, with the effect that one civilization 
(organization of values) and its vested interests are entrenched” (p. 100). In this more expanded application, 
we can think of UC as providing a “dominant channel of intercourse” influencing the general climate of 
opinion by emphasizing “present-mindedness” and immediacy as essential values in the commercial and 
cultural articulation of CCC. As such, these monopolies can act as a central means for dominant interests to 
maintain their power precisely because they constitute the basis through which CCC might be articulated. 
For example, the monopoly of communication enabled by the adoption of steam-powered presses in the 
newspaper industry “did not carry with it the seeds of a revolution against its directing class. Because it 
represented the mechanization of the vernacular, it could not become removed from the language of the 
masses. Moreover, because it carried the ability to amplify a centrally produced message in the vernacular, 
it had the capacity to mobilize and transform, with hitherto unheard of rapidity, the overall psychology of a 
society. It not only could deliver the message, it also could change the nature of the mind-frame 
interpreting the message” (Watson, 2006, p. 285). In this summary, Watson highlights how Innis’ concept 
of monopoly captures the interaction between technical, political economic, and cultural forces, and further, 
that new technologies need not be disruptive or destabilizing towards dominant power structures provided 
the “mind-frame” reproduces the values or biases (e.g., immediacy) of those power structures. 
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knowledge—particularly the means of access to the Internet—to retain control of 
knowledge and prevent it from becoming a plentiful collective good. Access—and the 
means of access—to knowledge thus become the major stakes in a central conflict” 
(Gorz, 2010, p. 55). Indeed, both Apple and Google, the largest and most powerful 
technology companies, might both be considered examples of fabless companies in their 
own right since they are primarily involved in creative elements—branding, product 
design, marketing, patents— while outsourcing actual production to mostly Chinese 
companies such as Foxconn. Huws et al. (2009) have extensively documented this global 
division of “mental” and “manual” labour, foregrounding how this division is predicated 
on the commodification of knowledge through “standardization and fragmentation” (p. 
27). The resulting transformation in the commercial production and exploitation of 
knowledge (as in the case of the preceding discussion on technical standards and the 
patent system) is itself a product of the restructuring of labour capacities and their 
management (p. 31).81 The central strategic role of patents within the mobile industry 
reflects the profitability of this coordinated control over knowledge. 
 The focused-pursuit of patents and intellectual property is a hallmark of post-
industrial strategies (though this compulsion has been a part of the U.S. patent system 
since its inception; see Noble, 1977, pp. 84). Indeed, the major technical developments 
that underpin the current condition of UC are as much a result of technical and economic 
factors as they are a product of legal maneuvering. Patents are particularly important 
during times of rapid technological change (as RIM has learned at considerable cost), 
                                                
81 In chapters 5 and 6 I look at how this compulsion became a crucial component of the success of the 
BlackBerry, and UC as a strategic goal for labour management more generally.  
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where new platforms are competing to become the de facto industry standard. Qualcomm 
is a paradigmatic expression of this drive to gear their business model towards the 
production of rents on codified forms of technical knowledge (see Huws & Dahlmann, 
2009). Its founders identified early on that the real objective for modern technology 
companies, if they want to remain competitive and/or innovative, is to offload most, if 
not all, manufacturing operations and emphasize R&D in addition to intellectual property 
and patents in their business models (Mock, 2005, pp. 152-161). Qualcomm was one of 
the first transnational corporations (TNC) to make this crucial transition, thus setting an 
example for others, particularly in the field of mobile technologies. Over the course of 
Qualcomm’s rise, mobile remained one of the most rapidly changing technological 
markets––reflecting the post-Cold war era of free trade and the global search for cheap 
labour. In most forms of technology manufacturing, margins are thin, labour and 
equipment costs high, and maintaining the requisite facilities absorbs a great deal of 
resources that could otherwise be directed towards innovation, research, and marketing 
and branding efforts.  
RIM itself has both benefited and suffered in this climate, offering an infamous 
example of some of the odd implications characterizing the American patent system. 
Specifically, RIM was the subject of a widely publicized patent dispute regarding a 
company called NTP (which asserted a patent infringement on RIM’s pushed-based 
wireless email). The case sheds light on a seedy area of the current American intellectual 
property regime  (to which other legal systems like Canada’s generally follow) that has 
spawned what are euphemistically called “patent trolls”—companies whose sole 
existence is predicated on filing and/or acquiring as many patents as possible and then 
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waiting for a successful company to inadvertently infringe upon said patent (Magliocca, 
2007). These companies take advantage of the basic post-industrial emphasis on the 
commercial exploitation of technical (patentable) knowledge. Their business model relies 
solely on the accumulation of technical knowledge with the hope that they will be 
(profitably) infringed upon.  
Patent-holding companies turn the monopolistic logic at the heart of the patent 
system into a predatory and parasitic influence upon corporate capital. The case between 
NTP and RIM stretched out over four years (2002-2006) and, in the end, cost RIM $650 
million USD plus future royalties (this constituted the world’s largest patent settlement 
up until that point). It was widely followed within the tech industry and set legal 
precedent. Moreover, it demonstrated how a patent system favouring exclusive ownership 
rights had fostered an arguably counter-productive system in which non-producers hold 
important intellectual property without actual making anything or using their patents 
productively.82  
                                                
82 The NTP-RIM case exposed the serious flaws in the U.S. patent system, as the USPO subsequently was 
inundated with review requests with a rising pressure for quick turnaround times. In an article on the RIM 
case, legal scholar and technology journalist Tim Wu cites a report by the patent examiner’s union 
describing the working conditions at the U.S. patent office as “sweatshop” like (Wu, 2006). It is perhaps for 
this reason that the patents in question, as RIM’s lawyers argued, were so incredibly vague regarding the 
actual technical application of wireless email that it could not be held to have violated the patents. As Wu’s 
Slate article points out, the sheer generality of some patents, and their legal enforcement, places a spotlight 
on the current IP regime, demonstrating that serious reforms in this regard must be taken (Wu, 2006). A 
fact that has recently become the subject of congressional action in the United States, but resulting in little 
change; for an overview, see http://www.aminn.org/patent-legislation What was represented in the patent 
was simply an idea of wireless email and not a schematic for its actual application, at least in so far as RIM 
was concerned. Yet the U.S. court ultimately sided with NTP (one might yet again speculate, as Wu (2006) 
does, as to the geopolitical biases involved since the case pits a market leading Canadian company against a 
small American “entrepreneurial” venture), setting off a flurry of patent suits that continue to this day and 
are particularly acute in mobile/wireless industry. Though important as a gatekeeper to the lucrative 
American market, the USPO’s authority is by no means universal. Major patent cases are often held in 
multiple jurisdictions, though verdicts in the U.S. are watched more closely and can hold more sway as 
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Perhaps one of the most costly setbacks in this respect for RIM was the inability 
to devote resources to pursuing a broader market share for its BlackBerry technology.83 
In the years between 2002-2006, the future of RIM and the BlackBerry was in question. 
As such, opening up a new marketing frontier with respect to the prosumer/consumer 
segment made little sense from the perspective of potential customers—particularly the 
telecom providers that would be supporting future BlackBerry devices. Clearly on display 
in this case is the important role that lawyers, intellectual property, and patents play in the 
overall systems of technological innovation that have given way to national and 
international intellectual property regimes. Indeed, by the mid-2000s, lawyers had 
become as important as engineers and marketers in determining the ebbs and flows of 
technology innovation.  
3.3 From Newton to PalmPilot to BlackBerry 
While the competition for wireless data standards pre-occupied many large 
incumbents in the telecommunications industry, a parallel search for a portable 
computing device approached the technical problem of UC from the perspective of 
interface design and usability. The development of a substantive consumer market for 
mobile computing devices illustrates technical stepping-stones in the progression of UC 
                                                                                                                                            
 
precedent for patent cases in other countries. In some cases, like Apple’s recent multi-jurisdiction patent 
suit against Samsung, verdicts can differ outside of the U.S.  (Tabouchi & Wingfield, 2012). 
83 This is reflected by a substantive drop in R&D costs from 13% of revenue in 2002 to 6% in 2006. By 
contrast, litigation costs went from 0% of revenue in 2002 to a high of 26% of revenue in 2005, then 
dropping to 10% in 2006. As percentage of net income, litigation costs consumed 62% in 2005 and 35% in 
2006 (Weston & Lim, 2007, p.17). 
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toward consumer adoption. Aside from the issues associated with the standardized 
transmission of wireless data, there was still the problem of making handheld devices 
portable, able to quickly process wireless data, and capable of offering a range of 
applications that would demonstrate their versatility and usefulness to a range of 
consumers. In the early 1990s, the mobile computing market was fragmented between 
consumers using “palmtop and electronic organizers” for both personal uses and as 
“corporate productivity tools” (Calem, 1992). 
Like in the case of wireless standardization, competition to develop a widely 
adopted mobile computing ecosystem primarily included large industry incumbents like 
IBM, Xerox, HP and, as I will discuss shortly, Apple. As addressed in this section, the 
sale and marketing of calculators using microchips constituted the first mass consumer 
market for mobile computing devices.84 The success of this area generated subsequent 
                                                
84 One of the central precursors was the development of the microchip in the early 1960s followed by the 
microprocessor in the 1970s—both reducing the component size required for computing to occur. Yet 
miniaturization of components was not the only obstacle. Battery power was a long-standing barrier to 
portable computing power. Between shrinking microprocessors and increasing battery power, a large 
consumer market has used mobile computing at least since the late 1960s, at which point the calculator 
became a focal point of popular interest (Zygmont, 2003).  The success of the calculator supported a belief 
that the types of portable computing depicted in, for example, the television series Star Trek could become 
a technical and commercial reality.  
Mini-computers of various kinds became available in the late 1980s, and a small niche market developed in 
the early to mid-1990s, with bulky, yet portable computers like the HP 95LX (1991) and 200LX palmtop 
computers (1994), and various Pocket PCs running a scaled-down various of Microsoft Windows (1996) 
(Zygmont, 2003). Processing power, battery life, and functionality were limited, yet this did not stop many 
of the largest corporations in personal computing from attempting to expand the market for mobile 
computing. HP, Dell, and Microsoft attempted to capitalize on the public’s interest in a mobile computer 
like the ones depicted in popular science fiction. Wireless connectivity aside, despite heavy investment on 
the part of these established companies, mobile computing of this sort never established a sustainable mass 
market in the 1990s. Typical consumers of these types of devices never moved beyond the ‘early-adopters’ 
and corporate employees who could afford costly gadgetry of this sort. 
Similarly, wireless data transmission was largely prefigured in the development of commercial paging 
services, which did not use packet-switching technologies, but from the average consumer’s perspective 
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investments in R&D, including the development of a supply chain for sophisticated 
components (like microchips) which would be essential for UC and the BlackBerry. This 
section furthermore contextualizes the contingency that framed the early successes of the 
BlackBerry and its material drawing together of wireless data connectivity with mobile 
computing. However, it is also important to highlight two “failures’ that preceded the 
BlackBerry. The first was Apple’s unsuccessful myth-making apparatus (in the example 
of the Newton), which constituted a failure that gave way to the entry of a relative 
newcomer, Palm. Second, Palm’s subsequent failure offers insights into why the 
BlackBerry offered a “solution” to the technical and commercial barriers facing UC. 
Furthermore, this discussion anticipates an analysis in chapter 5 regarding the role of 
myths in supporting the policy-frameworks that supported the early development of RIM 
and the BlackBerry. 
3.4 Apple’s Newton: Birth of the PDA 
                                                                                                                                            
 
offered wireless data transmission, albeit only one-way. By the mid-1980s paging services had spread 
worldwide and constituted an important market in their own right (Lindmark, 2004, p. 303). The 
possibilities for two-way paging were, however, similarly stymied by limitations in power supply, 
processing power, and inadequate network infrastructure (p. 303). Despite the rather restricted nature of 
paging services, they did allow for minimal information to be wirelessly communicated and demonstrated 
that consumers (whether for professional or social uses) recognized the usefulness of such connectivity. 
Paging services provided relatively high revenues since they required little spectrum to serve the needs of 
subscribers. Moreover, once primary infrastructure was in place, paging networks were relatively 
inexpensive to operate. Device battery and processing power could remain limited because paging 
primarily involved one-way communication and contained relatively little actual information. Yet two-way 
paging was of great interest to telecom providers because it was believed that such services could increase 
the average revenue per user (ARPU) because telecoms could institute pay-per-byte billing (or “usage 
based billing” to use a contemporary term).  
The proliferation of micro-computers and pagers created both a consumer base and a supply chain focusing 
on portable devices with the goal of consumerisation. Micro-computers emphasized the development of 
mobile or portable computing, while pagers offered a service for delivering small packets of information 
ubiquitously. Reconciling these two potential markets was a major goal of device manufacturers throughout 
the 1990s, but a few notable examples are worth addressing.  
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The difficulties of fusing together and then successfully commercializing wireless 
data and mobile computing can best be illustrated in the two most prominent precursors 
to the BlackBerry and, consequently, the smartphone: Apple’s Newton and the PalmPilot. 
This “personal digital assistant” (PDA) was the much-hyped forbearer of mobile and 
ubiquitous computing—a term initially conjured up to launch the Newton (Carlton, 1997, 
p. 197). Despite the fact that wireless connectivity had yet to be successfully featured as a 
core PDA capability, this category of consumer electronics became an important tool in 
both creating demand for mobile computing devices and demonstrating the value that 
such devices might hold for both work and leisure.  
Given Apple’s dominant position in the North American mobile market in 2012,85 
taking a mere four years to overtake even the most entrenched corporate brands (Nokia 
being notably effected, with RIM scrambling to adapt), it is often forgotten that the 
company made an earlier foray into mass mobile computing. Unlike the iPhone and iPad, 
Apple’s Newton was both a commercial and technological disaster. Despite the intentions 
of the original research team (Linzmayer, 2004, p.184), the Newton ultimately eschewed 
wireless connectivity for its initial release in order to minimize costs and appeal to a 
broad consumer base.86 As such, it succeeded, to a degree, in bringing mobile computing 
to the public consciousness in a way that played on popular science fiction depictions. 
                                                
85 By the fourth quarter of 2012, Apple controlled 34% of the U.S. mobile handset market, more than all 
other competitors (Strategy Analytics, 2013).  
86 The original Newton research team, lead by hardware engineer Steve Sakoman, designed a sophisticated 
device codenamed “Figaro” which “measured 8.5 by 11 inches, had a touch-sensitive active-matrix screen, 
a pen for handwriting recognition data input, a hard disk, plus infrared port for beaming data across vast 
distances” (Linzmayer, 2004, p.184). The consumer cost for the device was estimated at $6000 to $8000 
USD (p. 184). 
98 
 
Demonstrating this link is the fact that one of Apple’s operating system projects was 
named “Star Trek” (Carleton, 1997, p. 169).  
Apple marketed this PDA device with an ambitious advertising blitz,87 raising 
public expectations while suggesting that their supposed wishes for the technological 
sublime were coming true. The official announcement that introduced the Newton took 
place at the Consumer Electronics Show in Las Vegas (a central trade show for the 
industry). As Carlton recounts: 
Sculley’s keynote88 was one of the most highly anticipated ever for a trade show. 
The ballroom of the Las Vegas Hilton could hold only about 1,200 people, so the 
seats filled quickly as hundreds more show attendees were turned away. The 
lights lowered as Sculley, looking relaxed in his Apple attire of khakis and a 
casual shirt, ambled onstage, gripped the podium, and began drawing a world 
picture of his PDA as the center of a new digital universe, so immense that he 
predicted it would attain $3.5 trillion in annual revenues within a decade. Since 
everyone in the computer industry is watchful for the next new wave, lest they be 
left behind, word of a brand-new, multi-trillion dollar industry rocketed out of the 
cramped ballroom into news reports all over the world. Although other companies 
had handheld computers in the works, none contained the promised flair of the 
Newton. (Carlton, 1997, p. 197) 
                                                
87 Though specific costs are unavailable for this campaign, according to Apple’s Annual Report filled with 
the U.S. Security and Exchange Commission, advertising and marketing costs increased from $134 million 
USD in 1992 to $158 million USD in 1994 (Apple, 1994, p. S-5). Over the same period R&D expenses 
rose from $564 million USD in 1992, to $665 million USD in 1993, to $602 million USD in 1994 (p. 7). 
88 John Sculley was Apple CEO from 1983 to 1993. 
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By 1993, when Newton was launched as the “Newton MessagePad,” Apple had 
spent roughly $500 million USD developing it (Carlton, 1997, p. 233). Ads for Newton 
often were filled with text that enumerated its seemingly endless capabilities (see figure 
2). The device was meant to be a means of organizing, making efficient and convenient 
the daily information technology needs of its user (Linzmayer, 2004, p. 195).89 It was 
marketed as having the ability to recognize handwriting through a touch screen interface, 
as well as the ability to sync calendars, contacts, and documents with a personal 
computer, preferably a Mac (see figure 2).  
                                                
89 For example, Apple’s marketing emphasized the general “communications and organizational features” 
like calendar scheduling or daily task manager (Linzmayer, 2004, p. 195). 
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Figure 2: Ad for Apple's Newton 
Over the course of Newton’s advertising campaign Apple raised consumer 
expectations but in the end could not deliver on all that it had promised. Initial reviews 
were almost universally bad, with weak sales that got worse through word of mouth 
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(particularly damning were the negative opinions of devoted Apple users). What was 
supposed to be a new era in consumer electronics became a “PR nightmare” (Carlton, 
1997, p. 236). Gary Trudeau dedicated an entire week of his Doonesbury comic strip to 
mocking the device. In one particularly infamous strip, the central character writes, “I am 
writing a test sentence” only to have it erroneously translated into “egg freckles.”90 A 
Business Week article on the device noted that Silicon Valley pundits, in response, were 
redefining PDA as “probably disappointed again” (Carlton, 1997, p. 198). It is worth 
noting that this “disappointment” implies a popular aspiration in accordance with the 
myth that is unfolding. Newton’s continuing failure ultimately tainted consumer (and 
investor) demand for PDAs, strained to Apple’s ballooning R&D budget,91 and 
contributed to the departure of CEO John Sculley (Linzmayer, 2004, pp. 183-200). 
Apple’s failure also tainted the retail consumer segment for PDAs, making it harder for 
other companies to break into the market by first requiring extensive resources to alter 
soured consumer (and investor) sentiments (Butter and Pogue, 2002, p. 59). For example, 
the launch campaign for the PalmPilot in 1996 cost $5 million USD, a sum roughly equal 
to the budget allotted by Apple for its initial Newton launch (Khermouch, 1997).92  
The relative success of the PalmPilot campaign which, learning from the missteps 
of the Newton in that it was “underpromised and overdelivered,” allowed Palm to capture 
                                                
90 http://www.computerhistory.org/revolution/mobile-computing/18/319/1714 
91 In the quarter preceding the August 1993 launch of the Newton, Apple announced a loss of $188 million 
USD, its “largest quarterly loss ever” (Linzmayer, 2004, p. 194). Apple’s R&D budget peaked in 1993 at 
$665 million USD but dropped to $303 million in 1998, representing the fiscal year Newton was 
discontinued (Apple, 1998, p. 6). 
92 http://adage.com/article/adage-encyclopedia/apple-computer/98322/ 
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51% of the mobile computing market by selling 360,000 units at $299 USD each 
(Khermouch, 1997). Palm also benefited from Apple’s decision to close its Newton 
division in 1998, with many skilled employees leaving the division amid its prolonged 
decline (Linzmayer, 2004, p. 202). The PalmPilot’s market share rose to 63% in the 
following year (Horowitz, 1998). By contrast, the Newton sold 80,000 units in 1993 (the 
year of its launch) at the retail price range between $699 to $949 USD (Hallerman, 
1993).93 In the year leading up to its discontinuation, the Newton accounted for only 3% 
of the global handheld market, selling 54,000 units (Horowitz, 1998). 
Despite this failure, not only is the Newton the forefather of the IMD device 
category, it also reflects the failure of existing or emerging mythic expectations. Newton 
offered abysmal usability compounded by an inability for Apple (and other third parties) 
to design applications that could help augment the utility of the device. It is thus worth 
pausing for a moment to outline the reasons why, despite the support of Apple (already in 
1993 one of the world’s largest and most popular technology brands), Newton was a 
marketplace failure. This is a particularly worthwhile endeavour because it also 
highlights, by comparison, the reasons why the BlackBerry succeeded. 
 By far the most debilitating choice made in the design and marketing of the 
Newton was the strategic focus on selling it to a mass consumer market rather than 
emphasizing its business and enterprise uses and users. This had several implications. 
First, to reach most consumers costs had to be kept relatively low, and thus component 
                                                
93 These tepid sales numbers contributed to Apple’s decision to layoff 2,500 employees, constituting 15% 
of its total workforce in late-1993 (Anonymous, 1993). 
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parts costs minimized in order to ensure that the final product could be sold at a 
“reasonable” price (the PalmPilot unit cost was $299-350 USD). As a result, the Newton 
had relatively limited functionality and processing power, in contrast to the hype that had 
been built around it. Moreover, wireless connectivity had to be sacrificed in order to cut 
down on the size and cost of components, including its radio and battery. Second, it 
required substantive marketing and advertising costs because it was effectively a new 
device category. Such costs put more pressure on Apple to attain the revenues needed to 
re-pay these investments, resulting in a higher than ideal price tag. Despite these early 
failures, and a general unwillingness of the public—even among Mac users—to become 
part of the Newton stream of technologies, Apple continued manufacturing and 
promoting the device until its cancellation near the end of the decade (Carlton, 1997, p. 
235-239)  
The question of targeting either the mass consumer or the business market will be 
addressed in greater detail in subsequent chapters, but it is important to note at this point 
that Apple’s choice of pursuing a consumer market for its Newton was, from the outset, a 
difficult proposition. On the one hand, there was an already existing set of assumptions 
about what mobile computing should look like and offer based on popular 
representations. Expectations for the Newton, particularly in the business and technology 
press, were already set before Apple amplified them with its ad campaigns. On the other 
hand, the question of its use value in relation to the consumer market was itself unclear. 
Why should users carry around such a device, particularly in their leisure time? Apple 
had marketed it to the general but tech-savvy portion of the public under the auspices of 
creating a new mass market for PDA. Rather than following the traditional narrative of 
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technological diffusion—from an emphasis on business to social uses—Apple attempted 
to invert this often-repeated sequence. This turned out to be a fundamental flaw in the 
overall business model Apple developed around the Newton. Although the mass market 
offers an economy of scale, most consumers could not justify buying such a costly new 
device. Simply put, its use value (in relation to its exchange value)—whether utilitarian 
or fantastic—was not apparent.  
3.5 PalmPilot Redeems the PDA 
The Newton arguably had tainted the market for mobile computers. However 
resources dedicated to research, investment, and marketing continued to fuel commercial 
interest. A popular technology marketer and expert of the 1990s and 2000s, Geoffery 
Moore (who would later be deeply influential to the RIM executives and employees; see 
McQueen, 2010, p. 168),94 outlined a path he thought that technologies take from niche 
to mass market. For Moore, new technologies pass through several stages of acceptance 
before they reach “main street”: “early market”—“a time of great excitement” driven by 
early-adopter and gadget enthusiasts; “the chasm”—“a time of great despair” in which 
early-adopter enthusiasm wanes while the “market is still not comfortable with the 
immaturity of the solutions available”; “the bowling alley”—“a period of niche adoption 
in advance of the general marketplace, driven by compelling customer needs and the 
willingness of vendors to craft niche-specific whole products”; and lastly the “the 
tornado”—“a period of aftermarket development, when the base infrastructure has been 
                                                
94 Moore’s work was reference repeatedly in interviews with current RIM employees, particularly those 
employees involved in “platform strategy.” 
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deployed and the goal now is to flesh out its potential” (Moore, 1995, p. 25). The goal for 
consumer technology companies, according to Moore, is to convert specialized uses into 
general, all-purpose uses; that is, to make the “value propositions” (marketing speak for 
“utility” or “use value”) for the professional worker/user align with those of everyday 
life. Anticipating “the tornado” that precedes mass adoption, “the bowling alley” holds 
two important principles. First, a company must pick a niche market in which it can 
capture at least 40% of that particular niche market, creating a “beachhead,” so to speak; 
and second, it must “enlist the support of the economic buyer, the line executive or 
manager in the end-user organization who has profit-and-loss responsibility for the given 
function [the] product serves” (Moore, 1995, p. 46). Even though Apple targeted the 
general consumer by deploying associations with the technological sublime, Moore 
would have recommended targeting the CEOs and CIOs of large corporations first (Palm, 
in fact, adopted this strategy early-on; Khermouch, 1997).  
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Figure 3: PalmPilot 
By 1997, Moore’s marketing strategy became the “go-to” marketing text for 
Silicon Valley startup companies as it clearly laid out a straightforward life cycle of 
technological products in relation to prospective social acceptance (Saveri, 1997). The 
introduction of the PalmPilot as a “connected organizer” to the PDA market was partially 
due to the models and strategies outlined by Moore. However, Palm was unable to 
emerge from the “tornado” stage for reasons discussed below.  
Why did the PalmPilot succeed where the Newton failed? After all, the aesthetic 
and technical similarities between the two are clear (see figure 2 and figure 3). Their 
shapes reflected the idea of a digital notepad, both using a touch screen interface 
requiring a pen-like stylus. Both would recognize the handwriting of the user with the 
stylus also being used to navigate the device’s various applications (many of which were 
developed by third parties). What “pre-BlackBerry” success the PalmPilot attained in the 
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mid-late 1990s is due to its ability to meld functionality with a technological ideal that 
gave a technical and symbolic premium to increased productivity and competitiveness in 
the corporate world. This was something that Newton did not have as Palm’s popularity 
reflected a period in which PC usage was skyrocketing in conjunction with the uptake of 
Internet participation for business and other forms of production and consumption.95 
Palm’s strategy from the outset was not to fulfill the science fiction fantasies of average 
consumers. Instead, it targeted the professional and business user, highlighting pertinent 
functionalities such as a spreadsheet application that appealed to white collar workers 
(Butter and Pogue, 2002; 56). A review in the Wall Street Journal expressed relief at the 
successes of the Palm in redeeming the PDA: 
THE QUEST to develop a small, practical, affordable hand-held computer for 
average users has produced failure after failure. Either the products were aimed at 
a mass audience and just flopped, like Apple’s much-touted Newton, or they were 
limited to relatively small market niches, like Sharp’s Wizard organizer or 
Hewlett-Packard’s 200LX, which are favored largely by gadget-lovers willing to 
master their intricacies… Finally, however, somebody has come up with a much 
better idea. It’s a new $299 gizmo called the Pilot, from Palm Computing, an 
innovative Los Altos, Calif., company that has recently become a subsidiary of 
U.S. Robotics, the giant modem maker. After testing the Pilot daily for a couple 
                                                
95 According to the Computer Industry Almanac, PC desktop unit sales in the U.S. went from 8.4 million 
(generating revenue $24.5 billion USD) to 33.1 million in 2000 (generating revenue of $86.9 billion USD); 
worldwide sales figures were 21.7 million in 1990 and 97.8 million in 2000. Over the same period, mobile 
PC sales in the U.S. went from 1.1 million in 1990 to 10.4 million in 2000; worldwide sales went from 2.4 
million in 1990 to 28.5 million in 2000. Available at http://www.c-i-a.com/worldwideuseexec.htm 
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of months, I can say it is by far the best little computer I have ever seen and the 
only one I can imagine incorporating into my daily life. (Mossberg, 1996)  
The Palm quickly became a hit in the business community for its business-friendly 
features and relative usability. By 1999, the Palm’s devices constituted 74% of the U.S. 
PDA market (NPD Intellect, 2000). 
Anticipating Apple’s successful “app” based strategy, the PalmPilot also was 
crucial in demonstrating how a self-sustaining mobile computing ecosystem might be 
generated by developing a platform where third parties could develop and monetize 
applications, thus drawing more money, attention, and usability to the platform itself. 
Indeed, one of the reasons for Palm’s success in this period is that it cultivated a network 
of third party software developers who might individually profit from selling software 
compatible with the Palm OS (Butter and Pogue, 2002, p. 159). This distinguished the 
PalmPilot in important ways from the relatively more gated approach of Apple’s Newton 
and its application ecosystem that had discernable limitations in processing power and 
functionality while also lacking wireless connectivity. Nevertheless, the emphasis on 
applications as a platform would be central to the mobile strategies of Apple, Google and, 
later, RIM. 
Despite its success in redeeming the PDA as a viable consumer technology, the 
overall failure of the Palm to become the de facto progenitor of UC (and the success of 
the BlackBerry in this respect) stems from three interrelated issues. The first, as 
mentioned, is its rather late adoption of wireless capabilities. By not initially including 
wireless connectivity, Palm was able to design a relatively sleek, compact device that 
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focused on organization and processing, rather than connectivity. Palm did, however, 
have experience with radio technologies early on with the RadioMail platform, but due to 
a variety of political economic issues (see Butter and Pogue, 2002) it eschewed this area 
of development, looking instead to mobile computing rather than connectivity. Palm’s 
fixed investments thus were not aligned with the goal of enabling wireless capabilities. 
While working to design wireless gadgetry, Palm did not develop a competitive 
competency in this area most likely because the company was desperate for funding and, 
as a result, it played an often subordinate role to entrenched technology companies, 
including retailers like Radio Shack looking to fill shelves in their stores with new 
gadgets that had only limited sustainability––relying more on the sometimes passing 
fascinations of early-adopters than the practical needs of dedicated users (Butter & 
Pogue, 2002, p. 9). Moreover, Palm’s devices were linked to brands like Microsoft and 
Dell, brands that were not primarily known for their portability. Palm subsequently was 
unable to fully capitalize (or mobilize) the public’s imagination concerning wireless 
connectivity (e.g., the more fantastic aspects of its prospective use-value). Later, Palm 
developed its own wireless network––Palm.net––but was unable to generate sufficient 
consumer demand to establish itself in this area. RIM, on the other hand, had a distinct 
advantage in developing wireless data technologies from its very foundation (to be 
discussed in the next chapter). As a result, when rhetoric about the mobile Internet re-
emerged in the late 1990s (Cowhey et al., 2008), RIM was well positioned to capitalize 
on this burgeoning interest in wireless services and devices.  
The second issue that distinguished the PalmPilot from the BlackBerry was the 
choice of interface—touch screen vs. QWERTY—which allowed the BlackBerry to 
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emphasize email as its major functionality with peripheral PDA-like capabilities 
appended. Although emphasis on email fits into the pragmatic and personalized 
simplicity of wireless data, it was the divergent application of interface technologies that 
allowed for its core differentiation. The idea of wireless email had already been 
considered years previously (by Geoffrey S. Goodfellow in 1982; see Sweeny, 2011, p. 
87), but it was the peculiar timing of the rise of the Internet and the exponential growth of 
email as the “killer app” for “web 1.0” that made the PalmPilot seem outdated once the 
BlackBerry was released (Okin, 2005). Email was based on a common and widely used 
communication protocol (mail), and RIM redefined it for the Internet age. By the time 
commercial wireless email became possible, email already had become a staple of both 
business and social communication practices (Smith and Faley, 2001).  
To take full advantage of this essential communicative norm using wireless data 
systems, while making this practice mobile and portable, made the choice of the interface 
decisive. Following Newton, the Palm came to represent an entirely new media 
technology category (PDA) and likewise emphasized touch-screen technology that was 
navigable using a stylus (in part because the development of the Newton, though 
ultimately a commercial failure, entailed key R&D, manufacturing capacity, and a supply 
chain for touch screen components). Touch screens, however, were still a relatively new 
feature to which computer users were still becoming accustomed. The BlackBerry, on the 
other hand, featured a traditional QWERTY keyboard. The choice to use QWERTY was 
built on existing familiarities with then existing technology, protocol, competency, and 
other tacit forms of knowledge. Moreover, the choice of the full QWERTY keyboard 
made the parallels to stationary computers clearer to consumers. In this respect the 
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keyboard emphasizes the active and productive side of wireless communication. 
QWERTY is now the standard (though an anachronistic) keyboard interface—one that 
began as a pragmatic solution to a technical problem involving the specific arrangement 
of the typewriter keyboard in order to avoid keys “jamming” (David, 1985).  
In combination with the emphasis on email functionality, the choice of QWERTY 
is an important transitional precursor to the era of ubiquitous connectivity; an era in 
which users are both producers and consumers of mobile data. One can cite here 
McLuhan’s observation that the content of all new media is a previous medium 
(McLuhan, 1964, p. 23) as portable computing, and UC with it, required QWERTY as a 
bridge to acceptance. One might also apply this observation to questions of media 
interface in relation to human capacities—and here McLuhan’s perspective captures both 
the consumption and production of content. The importance of QWERTY as a 
transitional interface built on the existing competencies of users was central to enabling 
and equipping people to become accustomed to consuming and producing data 
ubiquitously. It therefore makes sense that the keyboard for RIM would be an important 
piece of intellectual property as well as a key component of the BlackBerry brand 
identity. 
The economic importance of both QWERTY and email can be seen in the patents 
held by RIM on QWERTY keyboards “optimizing” typing with thumbs.96 RIM has a 
specific patent on the organization of the keyboard in an oblong/oval fashion, reflecting 
the 40-degree angle at which a user’s thumbs interact with the device.  This keyboard still 
                                                
96 United States Patent #6,278,442 
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is an iconic aspect of the brand, giving the BlackBerry a distinctive, patent-protected look 
and design. In addition to these important features, the BlackBerry employed a scroll 
wheel that would allow navigation among the device’s various applications. Indeed, this 
feature became just as iconic for the BlackBerry brand as the QWERTY keyboard and its 
“always on” connectivity. Furthermore, this toggling feature fit well with the overall 
optimization of the device for input using thumbs. 
As the primary data entry point for mobile devices, BlackBerry’s QWERTY 
maximized communicative efficiency and ease of use through its optimization of thumb 
typing. Fortunati (2005) has pointed out how mobile devices represent artifacts of what 
she calls a “thumb culture” as a distinct set of cultural practices, forms, and relations 
stemming from the use of devices controlled by the thumbs (pp. 149-160). Although this 
characterization certainly reflects the prominence of text-based communication enabled 
by the QWERTY keyboard, “thumb culture” and “digital labour” are distinctive 
characteristics of the era of UC. Combined with the global popularity of texting in the 
wake of GSM standardization, the BlackBerry made such activity a basic element of the 
workday, but one whose use value was easily translatable to the social lives of users 
already familiar with desktop computer keyboards.  
The third reason why the BlackBerry overtook the PalmPilot and other 
competitors stems from the political economy of venture capital funding and the unique 
corporate strategies of the 1990s. Among the most important factors related to this are the 
roles of institutional financing and public subsidies in supporting (or not supporting) 
fledgling companies. The comparison between Palm and RIM are quite revealing in this 
regard. Both were small startups seeking to compete against entrenched corporations—
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corporations that outsized them in market capitalization and who were effectively trying 
to generate new mass markets for mobile computing platforms.  
The question of financing startup companies, particularly in emerging technology 
markets, has been the subject of much academic attention (Lerner, 2009; Bresnahan and 
Gambardella, 2004). The PDA market, as the example of Palm illustrates, was defined by 
initial uncertainty and the necessity of securing not only partnerships with established 
companies but also the capital of large-scale investors in order to conduct the needed 
research and development. RIM faced a similar struggle early on, one in which the 
autonomy of its executives would remain a paramount concern as the company sought 
financing in these formative years, particularly in the mid-1990s when banks, venture 
capitalists and established technology companies were looking to take advantage of the 
technology boom by acquiring startup firms. This approach is often sought by startups 
themselves as a means for technology entrepreneurs to quickly cash-in on their work 
(Wortham & Rusli, 2010). However, this usually entails a considerable tradeoff once a 
young company has been acquired by interests not directly involved in the process of 
innovation. The inability to remain relatively autonomous means the interests and needs 
of the owners (or creditors) reign supreme––a major contributing factor, it has been 
argued, to the development of technology investment bubbles (Wortham & Rusli, 2010). 
Conversely, RIM was able to secure grants and loans from the Ontario and federal 
governments, as well as venture capital investments that did not have the normal 
predatory bent associated with Silicon Valley companies (like Palm). These particular 
financial arrangements allowed RIM to remain more autonomous than most American 
firms and, for this reason, it was able to focus on building partnerships with 
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manufacturers and telecommunications companies rather than accepting the financial 
support of third parties with different priorities. I will return to this issue in detail in the 
next two chapters wherein I elaborate how RIM emerged out of the market conditions 
outlined in this chapter. 
After the failure of Newton, Palm faced the general apprehension of business 
users regarding the future of mobile computing, especially in 1993–1994 when it sought 
to bring the PalmPilot to market (Butter and Pogue, 2002, p. 59). Though the company 
had designed a working model that overcame many of Newton’s fatal errors largely 
related to its usability, it was unable to secure the financing to test and mass produce the 
device. Palm had just begun to reach profitability when its leadership decided to accept a 
purchase offer from a leading modem manufacturer called U.S. Robotics (USR). Partly 
fueled by necessity and partly by a mid-1990s tech-gold-rush mentality, Palm’s 
leadership and founders accepted the offer, making them instant millionaires. Yet the 
necessity of securing massive industry financing and support through an established 
global technology company (first USR and then, in 2010, Hewlett-Packard) soon turned 
into a liability and, arguably, contributed to its decline. Although the investment was 
necessary (Butter and Pogue, 2002, p. 100), the issue of organizational and creative 
autonomy subsequently deepened for the Palm division. As USR’s primary business of 
selling modems was yielding slimmer profits, the Palm division was treated by USR 
executives primarily as a revenue source, rather than as an active area of innovation and 
development (p. 100). When USR bought Palm the latter already was on its way to 
dominating the future of PDA but the buyout resulted in a drag on Palm’s ability to 
achieve this potential. This included its ability to respond to the rapid growing popularity 
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of the Internet and the rise of wireless email.97 By the time RIM introduced its 
BlackBerry smartphone, Palm was struggling to stay ahead of changing consumer 
demands, leading to a buyout by HP.98  
On June 11, 2011, The Wall Street Journal ran an article entitled “R.I.P., Palm.” 
The article opens as follows: “Break out your styluses and scribble out a tear. Palm – the 
Homo Erectus to today’s smartphones and tablet computers — is dead.” HP, the report 
said, is stripping “the Palm name from its unit that makes smart phones and tablet 
computers” literally and symbolically committing it to the high-tech graveyard (Ovide, 
2011). 
 
                                                
97 USR’s acquisition by 3Com in 1997 led to conflict between the interests of USR executives and Palm 
leadership resulting in the departure of Palm’s founding executives––who later went on to found rival 
company Handspring (Butter and Pogue, 2002, pp. 179). 
98 HP acquired palm for $1.2 billion USD in 2010: 
http://www.hp.com/hpinfo/newsroom/press/2010/100428xa.html 
116 
 
Chapter 4 – The BlackBerry “Solution”: Commercializing 
Wireless Data in North American and the Birth of the Global 
Smartphone Market 
 “Early on when we were coming up with the whole idea of the BlackBerry, one of the 
things that we realized was that a classic entrepreneurial mistake is to try and solve the 
double serial problem.  In other words, we were aware that for us to sell wireless 
BlackBerry email, we would first have to sell industry on email in general, and then we 
would have to sell them on the advantage of taking it wireless, taking it with you.  So we 
decided we were going to wait and keep perfecting the product until the email market had 
grown to a certain maturity, so we wouldn’t have to come and sell you on two things.  We 
would just have to sell you on wireless access to email.” (Mike Lazaridis, 2008, p. 10) 
4  Introduction 
As discussed in the previous chapter, the commercial and technical development 
of ubiquitous connectivity (UC) faced several important hurdles including the 
competition for wireless data standards and patents, the absence of a saleable end-user 
device, and a general lack of demand. While portable computing and wireless 
standardization evolved in parallel, their profitable integration (a key element of UC) 
eluded most industry incumbents. As early as 1992, a New York Times article reported 
that the “next goal” was “to merge those two technologies into one, to let someone sitting 
under a tree summon a 10-page document from a laptop computer and with a few 
keystrokes send those thousands of words through the air to a distant office” (Calem, 
1992). The inability of established organizations (e.g., Motorola, Apple, Ericsson) to 
commercialize UC, despite its perceived inevitability, left an opening for an “end-to-end” 
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solution that could overcome existing barriers.99 As the example of the BlackBerry 
demonstrates, this solution entailed a complete system involving hardware, software, and 
networking infrastructure that enabled the commercialization of UC. In so doing, RIM’s 
organizational identity embraced the myth of UC through the development of core 
capacities, technical knowledge, strategic partnerships, product development, and brand 
identity. 
In this chapter I provide a historical overview of RIM in relation to the 
development of the BlackBerry brand of devices and services as emblematic of the 
broader myth of UC. I map key technical advances, political economic interests, and 
symbolic changes that by 2006 made BlackBerry a global “brand ambassador” for UC. I 
position RIM as a (once) powerful organization articulating the convergence of these 
forces by demonstrating the particular aspects that allowed RIM to produce the 
BlackBerry brand as both a device and a service. While the business necessity and 
profitability of wireless data is today unquestionable, and without which the 
unprecedented global popularity of Internet-enabled mobile devices (IMD) would be 
impossible,100 the contemporary condition of UC emerged out of a historically specific 
confluence of technical changes, political economic interests, and symbolic shifts in the 
context of a widely perceived need for connectivity. 
                                                
99 As the same article concluded, “Thus there is no shortage of technology to allow portable computer users 
to send data wirelessly, but as is typical of the computer industry, which technology emerges as the 
standard has yet to be determined” (Calem, 1992). 
100 Globally, wireless data usage is surpassing voice usage (not including VOIP applications), and 
constitutes a growing percentage (roughly 39%) of revenues for telecom operators (Fitchard, 2012). Since 
2009, voice traffic has stabilized at roughly 150 petabyters per month while mobile data usage went from 
roughly 100 petabytes per month in 2009 to 700 petabyters per month in 2012  (Ericsson, 2012, p. 12). 
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One significant example helps contextualize the rise of the BlackBerry as a 
panacea for the problems faced by telecommunications companies seeking new revenue 
streams centered on wireless data. In July of 1993—the year Apple launched its ill-fated 
Newton and also the year in which RAM Mobile Data introduced a Mobitex network in 
the United States101—President Bill Clinton participated in a demonstration involving the 
wireless transmission of an email. Using AT&T’s EO Personal Communicator, the event 
served as a lead-in to a speech detailing Clinton’s new policy regarding the commercial 
use of wireless spectrum (Andrews, 1993). While AT&T’s device itself had little 
commercial success, the public relations stunt did allow the President to send an email 
wirelessly to Vice-President Al Gore directly before giving a speech in which Clinton 
offered 200MHz of prime spectrum—the equivalent of 33 TV stations—for auction.102 
The stated purpose was to “develop the most advanced commercial wireless 
                                                
101 At this point costs of use were relatively high with handset costs of approximately $1,300 USD each and 
services charging $5 USD for a “typical text-filled fax page” of roughly 25,000 transmitted characters 
(Calem, 1992). 
102 The Clinton administration’s decision to use auctions to re-allocate spectrum was controversial partly 
because it broke with existing United States policy for licensing spectrum (either through “luck of the draw 
lotteries” or “comparative hearings”; Andrews, 1993). Between 1993 and 1997 the FCC held a series of 
spectrum auctions for narrowband (to be used for advanced paging and messaging services) and 
broadband (for voice and data services), resulting in 4,300 licenses and $23 billion USD in revenue for the 
U.S. Treasury Department (FCC, 1997, p. 1). Clinton’s approach can broadly be defined as favouring 
competitive bidding for spectrum. Reflecting upon this policy shift in 1997, Clinton’s appointed FCC 
Chairman, Reed Hundt, claimed that, “for the first time ever the FCC truly follows a market-based 
approach to the allocation and use of spectrum” (Hundt, 1997). Hundt also claimed that as a result of this 
policy approach, “Wireless investment has increased more than 250% since 1993 and over the next ten 
years will total more than $50 billion. It is the largest single investment in a new, non-military technology 
in American history” (Hunt, 1997). Such inflated perception of profitability can drive up costs to unrealistic 
levels, as happened with the European 3G auctions where it resulted in $185 billion euros in corporate debt 
(Ure, 2002, p. 129).  Critics of the auction approach (Longford, 2008) have argued that it favours large 
private (often incumbent) interests while weakening overall commitments to public interest or oversight. A 
reporter for the industry trade publication Communications, warned that auctions would “prevent small 
entrepreneurs from entering the brave new world of the wireless revolution” (Baugh, 1993). Part of the 
rational for commercializing spectrum in this way depended on the myth of UC as both a desirable and 
inevitable future, one that would offer heretofore new areas of economic growth and technological 
innovation (Calem, 1993).  
119 
 
communication networks the world has ever known. It will allow an industry to grow by 
tens of billions of dollars by the end of the decade, producing hundreds of thousands of 
new high-skilled, high-wage jobs” (quoted in Campbell, 2012). Introducing the 
“Emerging Telecommunications Technology Act” as the “information equivalent of the 
Alaskan oil or the California gold rush,” Clinton explained to both the media and 
American citizens the significance of this decision by proclaiming, “We have entered a 
new era of human communications where wireless technologies become information 
skyways, a new avenue to send ideas and masses of information to remote locations in 
ways most of us would never have imagined” (GPO, 1993).103 Spectrum capacity now 
was readily available for commercial exploitation. This freeing up of spectrum, combined 
with existing interest from computer and telecommunications industries, strengthened the 
myth of UC and with it the search for saleable devices and services. 
Given this context, my argument is that RIM was not only the first and, at the 
time, most concentrated and tangible articulation of UC, but that its “BlackBerry 
Solution” overcame a significant economic problem: how to collectively monetize new 
wireless data capacity, spectrum, and devices. Indeed, RIM’s entire brand is intertwined 
with the symbolism of UC as producing, selling, and branding always on, always 
connected technologies and services constitute its core commercial identity. At the same 
time, the institutional culture at RIM, including its technical capacities, funding, and 
organizational structure, reflected this myth.  
                                                
103 The full speech is available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/WCPD-1993-07-26/html/WCPD-1993-07-
26-Pg1418.htm 
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This chapter provides background on the genesis of this institutional identity, the 
technical and political economic hurdles that shaped the development of the BlackBerry, 
and its evolution into a defining global brand bound up with a mythic articulation of UC.  
4.1 RIM’s Origin Myth: The Search for Efficiency in Wireless 
Communication  
Like many corporations in the ICT sector, RIM and its supporters (e.g., 
telecommunications carriers) have constructed a mythology that highlights the 
extraordinary conditions by which it came to prominence. While such mythologies reflect 
and are perpetrated through corporate branding, in this section I highlight a few notable 
elements of the official “story” (as captured in corporate biographies and the business 
press) and then contextualize them within the specific political economic conditions that 
give rise to seemingly exceptional institutions.104 Part of the corporate mythology 
associated with RIM is related to its founder and former co-CEO, Mike Lazaridis, who is 
often credited as the company’s chief visionary and de-facto head-engineer. This often 
told corporate story goes as follows:  
Mike Lazaridis, a child of Turkish immigrants, grew up in Windsor, Ontario, and 
demonstrated an interest and aptitude in electrical engineering and software design at an 
early age. Like many children of the 1960s and 1970s, Lazaridis had been a science-
                                                
104 Though some of the more important historical antecedents are addressed in the previous chapter, RIM 
and other prominent companies like Apple or Google are shrouded in self-produced myths regarding their 
purported exceptionalism, which obscures the political economic foundations of their success. Often times 
this can backfire. For example, the mythology of the exceptional nature of Nortel in the ICT industry 
contributed to high expectations that resulted in its ultimate collapse. See Macdonald (2000) and then 
Hunter (2002) for a telling contrast regarding how corporate myths can ultimately be self-defeating. 
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fiction fan, particularly of the original Star Trek television series and its futuristic 
technologies (Woyke, 2009).105 As Sweeny writes, “Star Trek’s futuristic tools inspired 
[Lazaridis and friends] to start some serious tech tinkering. Mike and [childhood friend] 
Ken Wood even decided to see whether it was possible to build force fields using wires, 
switches, and chemicals” (Sweeny, 2009, p. 32).106  
As the main visionary of RIM (as well as its founder and primary economic 
beneficiary), Lazaridis settled on the name of the company after hearing a sports 
announcer describe a football play as “poetry in motion.” The resulting name “Research 
In Motion” was meant to signal the company’s forward-looking emphasis on constant 
innovation (a resilient buzzword). Moreover, it was meant to reflect the chaotic pace of 
technological research as an evolving field where industrial needs and demands change 
rapidly—a condition for which RIM was prepared to ‘hit the ground running’ regardless 
of the problem (Howitt, 2013). Indeed, much of RIM’s early contract work reflected this 
dynamic problem-solving business model, one requiring a wide range of technical skills 
and competencies to survive.  
Founded in 1984, RIM quickly emerged as an early pioneer specializing in 
various forms of ICT-related problem solving. The first fifteen years of RIM’s existence, 
before the introduction and success of the BlackBerry, was comprised of primarily short-
                                                
105 In addition to all of the futuristic gadgetry depicted in the original Star Trek, the show regularly 
highlighted two portable and wireless communication tools: the communicator (a wireless device for voice 
communication) and the tricorder (a portable computer with wireless capabilities). Star Trek’s influence on 
engineers, scientists, and futurists has been documented elsewhere (Foresman, 2010). 
106 This early fascination with the future translated into an interest in cutting-edge developments in physics 
and high-tech; as a multi-millionaire executive Lazaridis became a philanthropist of scientific inquiry, 
notably donating millions to the foundation of the Perimetre Institute for the study of advanced physics 
attracting, Stephen Hawking as one of its distinguished research chairs (http://www.perimeterinstitute.ca/). 
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term contracts with a range of clients. Over the years, increasingly, RIM provided 
specialized expertise to corporations in response to logistical problems involving the 
commercial movement of goods and information.107 Consequently, in the years before 
the BlackBerry, RIM acted as a jack-of-all-trades when it came to finding logistical fixes 
for their clients. Yet despite the diversity of their contracts, including the DigiSync film 
synchronization technology for the National Film Board that won RIM two Academy 
Awards for technical achievement,108 it was wireless data that ultimately emerged as a 
unifying focus for the company.  
For the first fifteen years Lazaridis often worked as an engineer on many of 
RIM’s contracts. His early fascination with the futuristic possibilities of wireless 
transmission, like many other Canadian wireless pioneers (e.g., Reginald Fessenden and 
Alfred Gross), contributed to the development of core competencies in this area.109 
However, this interest in and aptitude for wireless transmission was not enough to 
translate into a successful commercial endeavour. As a student at the University of 
Waterloo (he would drop out in his third year), Lazaridis was directly exposed to 
                                                
107 This emphasis on logistics is also important within the context of post-industrial myths as the rapid 
explosion of ICTs after 1980 was in part due to the search for ways to save on the transportation costs 
associated with the movement of goods (especially given the dependence on oil controlled by OPEC). 
Similarly, the logistics of information flows also related to the management of an increasingly dispersed 
workforce. In some specialized cases, the product was knowledge or other creative goods and services—
intangible products that could either be inputs into the production process or finished goods suitable for a 
consumer market.  
108 www.blackberry.com/select/get_the_facts/pdfs/rim/rim_history.pdf 
109 In 2008, Lazaridis was inducted into the “Canadian Telecommunications Hall of Fame” in the inventors 
and innovators category alongside Alexander Graham Bell and Reginald Fessenden. Founded and funded 
largely by Canadian corporate interests and industry trade groups (Canadian Wireless Telecommunications 
Association, Information Technology Association of Canada, IEL Satellite Group, and RIM, among 
others), the CTHF appears to be a deliberate attempt to create a myth-making apparatus (under the veneer 
of “national pride”) operating specifically on behalf of Canada’s technology sector. See 
www.telecomhall.ca  
123 
 
ARPANET (the backbone upon which the Internet and the World Wide Web were built) 
due to a co-op placement at a branch of the supercomputer maker Control Data 
Corporation (CDC) (Lazaridis, 2008, p. 5). At the time, this type of network was 
incredibly rare with limited access for people outside of academia and the military 
(Mattelart, 2003, p. 54).  
In addition to his exposure to packet-switched networking technologies like 
ARPANET, Lazaridis also had an opportunity to observe the use of electronic mail (later 
known as email) at CDC. The use of email within this organizational context influenced 
Lazaridis’ thinking about the commercial prospects of email, which he came to see as a 
system that could be applicable to organizational communication more generally 
(Lazaridis, 2008, p. 10). From then on, he became a devoted email user, projecting that it 
would become a central business communication tool (p. 10). By the mid-1990s, email 
became a fundamental component of RIM’s own organizational culture (Sweeny, 2011, 
p. 36) and later of corporations globally (Dresner, 2008, p. 5).  
At this time, one major problem prevented the ubiquity of the Internet and email: 
no company had conclusively demonstrated the commercial viability of wireless data. 
What was still needed was a product (a device or service) whose utility could be clearly 
demonstrated to potential consumers. RIM’s response to this hurdle was several years in 
the making and stemmed from its narrowing focus on wireless that combined innovations 
in software, hardware, and service culled from its years of contract work.  
The first idea Lazaridis and RIM developed was a system for allowing text to be 
transmitted wirelessly to a video display. The intent was to provide a commercial system 
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for updating point-of-sale information in retail settings. Named “Budgie,” this early 
system was sold as a complete package that included both hardware and software 
components. Yet the Budgie system, although an important technical precursor, failed to 
gain any significant support from retailers (Simone, 2012). 
Although the Budgie system did not reach commercial success, it did lay the 
groundwork for RIM’s relationship with an important client: General Motors (GM) 
Canada. In 1984, GM was searching for an effective way to disseminate and display 
information on the factory floor—a space where verbal commands or audio prompts were 
often drowned out by industrial noise. Though Budgie was effectively a commercial 
failure it did provide the basic circuitry and set-up for GM’s purposes (Sorensen et al., 
2012). The application of this system in the industrial context foreshadowed a shift in 
how labour can be managed using wireless technologies. For example, wireless 
transmissions of data displayed on LED screens (like information about safety hazards or 
assembly line slowdown/stoppage) demonstrated the usefulness of these data flows in 
managing a dispersed workforce. In this context, wireless data was used to improve 
productive efficiency, flexibility, and the management of workers.110 
Though the wireless dissemination of data on the factory floor helped RIM 
develop its reputation in the industrial context, according to the “official” story, the seeds 
for what would later grow into “the BlackBerry Solution” were planted when Lazaridis 
                                                
110 As noted in chapter 3, the use of wireless communication for organizational communication and labour 
management was identified by other corporations like AT&T, IBM, and Motorola. These applications were 
primarily for internal uses, particularly for communicating with field engineers or other mobile workers, 
and were not developed to be sold commercially. Similarly, military applications of wireless technologies 
have long been used to coordinate troops and supplies. 
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attended a talk in 1987. The talk, given by an unnamed representative, was given by an 
official from Japan’s NTT DoCoMo—a national telecom operator and mobile innovator 
responsible for developing the i-Mode platform (hardware and software), a Japanese 
smartphone platform that foreshadowed the BlackBerry. The speaker speculated about 
the application of wireless data signaling between vending machines and suppliers. This 
logistical application suggested a push functionality that allowed vending machines to 
transmit information to suppliers when stocks were getting low (McQueen, 2010, p. 59).  
Push technology of this sort could reduce circulatory costs of commodities by 
facilitating the just-in-time (JIT) delivery of stock.111 This straightforward premise 
pertaining to the logistical or circulatory movement of goods helped identify the broader 
commercial application of wireless data in the context of electronic communication. 
Instead of vending machines sending messages to supply centers, the push-based 
approach could be used to develop a new wireless system using Internet Protocol to guide 
the flow of data to individual users. With the ability to push data wirelessly, individuals 
could, for the first time, be assigned IP addresses linking organizations to the Internet 
through wireless data connectivity. Users would become nodes or relay points in the 
coming ubiquity of the Internet enabled by a push-based wireless standard that could be 
adopted by existing telecommunications providers.  
                                                
111 JIT or kanban strategies were imported to North America from Japan and South Korea during the 1980s. 
This historical link foreshadows the way in which UC technologies, like the BlackBerry, extend the 
applicability of such techniques to the realm of communication, social relations, and cultural reproduction. 
Indeed, this influence has been noted in relation to the popularity of the i-mode smartphone platform in 
Japan (Buckley, 2010). 
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My treatment of this official story ends with Lazaridis and his team of engineers 
realizing that wireless data systems hold the potential to make communication more 
efficient, less-expensive, and ultimately profitable for both RIM and its strategic partners 
in the global telecommunications industry. However, developing a more context-neutral 
wireless data system required specialized knowledge that would subsequently enable the 
coordination of software, hardware, Internet protocol, and wireless signaling—skills that 
were relatively under-developed at the time. Perhaps more importantly, it would require 
partnerships with established companies operating in different niches within the global 
ICT market. 
4.2 Towards a “Solution” 
Despite the celebratory corporate narrative stemming from RIM’s founder Mike 
Lazaridis (Lazaridis, 2008), the development of the push-based wireless system that gave 
rise to the BlackBerry was not just about ‘visionary’ innovations or ‘eureka’ moments 
born from a singular individual or corporation. Rather, as outlined in the previous 
chapter, these developments are a function of increasingly global market dynamics, 
global consumer (particularly professional business-oriented users) expectations and, 
crucially, strategic partnerships with incumbent companies seeking new ventures that 
supported RIM. The company’s growing specialization came amidst the rollout of a 
wireless infrastructure across North America and a search by telecommunication carriers 
for a way to generate return on investment (ROI).  
In the following section I discuss how the pre-history of the BlackBerry brand of 
devices and services was defined by technical and commercial problems. What would 
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become “the BlackBerry Solution” developed out of partnerships with incumbent 
telecommunications providers, intra-firm co-operation and investment, and the creation 
and utilization (by RIM) of specialized technical knowledge. In this section, I address 
how the initial investment in Mobitex architecture by Rogers and Ericsson enabled RIM 
to develop its proprietary software and networking capabilities around the Mobitex 
standard. In the subsequent section, I focus on the role of Intel and Bell South in the 
development of an end-user device. In each case, the participation of these larger 
incumbents was animated by the technical and commercial realization of UC. 
Importantly, the section deals with the necessary investment in the myth of UC, as well 
as its technical and commercial realization, by a range of corporate interests.  
While cellular services focusing on voice telephony were spreading rapidly in 
markets within North America during the 1980s, wireless data services involving the 
digitization of content and the usage of packet-switched network protocols were still 
something of a novelty. Few companies in North America had expertise in this area 
(Motorola being an exception) and those that did relied on European companies like 
Ericsson and Nokia (Rogers, 2008).112 In the mid-1980s Rogers’ telecommunications 
division (Rogers Cantel) in Canada was beginning a costly and somewhat controversial 
(debt-financed) investment in wireless infrastructure113 that emphasized voice 
                                                
112 The European advantage in supplying 2G infrastructure stems from the decisions made in the early 
1980s  (beginning with the Conference des Administrations Europeenes des Postes et Telecommunications 
in 1982) by the European Commission to adopt a single digital standard (initially only thirteen nations 
signed). This resulted not only in the European adoption of the GSM, but also in the creation of a European 
supply chain for infrastructure and devices with enough excess capacity for export (see Gandal et al., 
2003).  
113 Under Ted Rogers (who, in 1994, controlled 90% of Class A voting stock and 32% of the equity in 
Rogers Communications), the company was averaging $300 million CDN in annual capital expenditures on 
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transmission, putting it into direct competition with existing dominant 
telecommunications companies like Bell Canada (Fierheller, 2010).114 As a condition of 
allowing Rogers to buy spectrum and develop a commercial wireless network, the 
company was required to purchase its infrastructure components largely from Canadian 
companies. The initial Canadian supplier, however, could not deliver the volume of 
needed components/infrastructure by the agreed upon date115 and, despite the wishes of 
the CRTC and federal government, Rogers sought a deal with Swedish firm Ericsson (a 
pioneer in wireless technology and an instrumental company in the development of the 
GSM standard). In exchange for contracts, Ericsson agreed to create research and 
development facilities in Canada (Fierheller, 2010).116  
Though voice telephony was the most important focus of Rogers’ partnership 
with Ericsson, this relationship also enabled the introduction of Mobitex to North 
America. As described in the previous chapter, Ericsson, in conjunction with Teliverket, 
at the time was developing and marketing the Mobitex wireless data standard for global 
                                                                                                                                            
 
cellular and cable infrastructure, creating $3.2 billion CDN in corporate debt (versus $445 million in 
equity) (Osterland, 1994). 
114 The Canadian regulatory approach to building a competitive wireless market did not give incumbent 
telecommunication providers a first mover advantage. By comparison, in the United States the “baby bells” 
were able to build their wireless networks before competitors could enter into their respective markets. 
While the former approach leveled the playing field for new entrants, it put pressure on Rogers to have 
infrastructure in-place simultaneously covered the twenty-three wireless markets outlined by the CRTC 
(Rogers, 2008). 
115 Rogers had purchased spectrum licenses to operate in 23 markets across Canada, but was required to 
launch services in each simultaneously (Rogers Cantel, 1991).  
116 The bulk of Rogers’ capital investment in mobile network capacity/infrastructure, particularly in the 
upgrade to 2G in the early 1990s, was acquired from Ericsson. The entire national cellular infrastructure 
was based around Ericsson’s CMS-8800 system technology (Rogers Cantel, 1991, p. 4). Between 1983 and 
1991 capital investments in cellular infrastructure totaled over $900 million CDN (p. 4).  
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customers (primarily telecommunications companies) in conjunction with its work on the 
GSM.  In addition to the hundreds of millions of dollars his company spent on a national 
wireless network, Ted Rogers, the CEO of Rogers, pushed for investment in a wireless 
data infrastructure based on the belief that it constituted the future of telecommunications 
profitability.117 In 1989, during a period of debt-financed investment across Rogers’ 
various telecommunications holdings,118 Rogers Wireless acquired the basic 
infrastructure to establish a Mobitex network in Canada.119 Though wireless voice 
telephony was still a growing industry and demonstrated clear profitability, wireless data 
was based on a vision regarding future needs, applications, and technologies that were yet 
to be determined. The network was built on a speculative ideal about what could be 
possible. When it first bought into the Mobitex standard, Rogers was one of only three 
telecommunication providers outside Sweden to invest in a wireless data network.120  
Before the commercialization of Mobitex could happen, however, Rogers and its 
American Mobitex counterpart, RAM Mobile Data, faced two significant barriers. The 
                                                
117 According to one account, the events surrounding Rogers’ acquisition of Mobitex proceeded as follows: 
“One day [in 1989], he [Ted Rogers] was visiting his system supplier LM Ericsson in Sweden and noticed a 
wireless data terminal in the cab that the taxi company was using to dispatch calls to their drivers. Ericsson 
[executives] told him that it was the next big step in Wireless services and showed him their new Mobitex 
network technology. Rogers decided to buy into the system, and in early 1989 he hired Tom Pirner to head 
up Cantel’s new Data Communication Division. Pirner set about installing what was to be North America’s 
first public wireless datacom network” (Sweeny, 2009, p. 41). 
118 Rogers Cantel, the mobile communication division of Rogers, invested heavily in new infrastructure 
under Ted Rogers’ leadership, particularly in the years (1988-1993) surrounding the acquisition of 
Mobitex. Much of this investment was enabled through debt; for example a line of credit expanded from 
$150 million CDN in 1987 grew to $1.1 billion CDN in 1991 (Rogers Cantel, 1991). Fixed capital assets in 
network and radio channel equipment increased substantially during this period from $400 million CDN in 
1989, $775 million CDN in 1990, to $900 million CDN in 1991. 
119 Mobitex investments totaled $24 million CDN by March of 1991 (Rogers Cantel, 1991, p. 7). 
120 RAM Mobile Data, a Mobitex provider in the U.S., acquired the standard from Ericsson in 1992 and 
built a Mobitex network in the fifty largest U.S. markets. 
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first was the high cost of terminals and receiver boxes (whose costs were between $8,000 
and $10,000 USD each). This limited its market to specialized emergency response and 
security uses. The second was a deficit of software applications for the network partly 
due to the general absence of an application programming interface (API) upon which 
developers could build the platform (Livingston, 2008, p. 147). In other words, the pool 
of developers for wireless data using Internet protocol specifications was extremely 
limited because the skills required were still highly specialized there was a limited the 
commercial incentive to support the research needed to develop them. This absence of 
suitable skills was, at the time, a general problem in developing wireless data networks, 
further narrowing the pool of developers for Mobitex as a specific standard (Livingston, 
2008, p. 147). These two barriers—the lack of affordable receivers (handsets) and 
relevant applications (e.g., calendar, contact manager, email) —were deeply interrelated. 
Expanding the range of available applications would broaden the appeal of wireless data. 
This in turn, would expand its commercial viability by drawing more investment into the 
development of software useful to a broadening range of consumers.  
It was at this juncture that RIM’s reputation in wireless data came to the attention 
of Rogers. Robert Fraser, a telecom consultant who wrote the “Mobitex terminal 
specifications” paper cited in the last chapter,121 was hired by Rogers to work with RIM 
to develop a portable device to run on the Mobitex network (Sweeny, 2009, p. 41). 
Before these devices could be built, however, RIM had to develop the basic software 
applications—particularly the API—through which other, more sophisticated uses could 
                                                
121 In the paper, Fraser outlined four possible terminals, including the “personal communicator” that could 
be built to use the Mobitex standard. 
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be developed for the Mobitex network.122 In short, there were still several missing links 
between hardware and software.123 To begin addressing these, RIM developed two 
important applications: a wireless chat program “MobiTalk” and an application that 
managed the radio modem while also allowing multiple applications to be run at the same 
time named “MobiLib” (McQueen, 2010, p. 62). MobiTalk would lay the foundation for 
the development of email transmission over the Mobitex network and the BlackBerry 
Messenger service that allowed BlackBerry handsets to communicate with each other. 
MobiLib also enabled different types of digital data to be transmitted and received 
wirelessly by controlling the radio transceiver. As Sweeny explains, “This was the 
world’s first wireless communication API (application programming interface). It led to 
all subsequent APOs [sic] for all types of smartphones, allowing for developers to create 
programs for online app stores on various operating systems” (Sweeny, 2009, p. 42).124  
                                                
122 McQueen explains the importance of this innovation: 
Previously, any programmer trying to create a new application for Mobitex had to reinvent the 
wheel every time by writing code for all the routines, right down to the initial handshake to 
acknowledge contact whenever a PC connected with a data radio modem made by Ericsson or 
Motorola. The other complicating factor was that a user could only run one Mobitex application at 
a time. After the call from Rogers, RIM set out to create an application programming interface 
(API) used to link hardware and software. (McQueen, 2010, pp. 61-62) 
123 As part of its spectrum licensing agreement, Rogers committed 2% of its cellular revenue to research 
and development activities. Though this period involved a rapid accumulation of debt through the 
investment in fixed capital, it was also a period of cellular revenue growth. In 1986 Rogers had 17,000 
subscribers, in May of 1991 Rogers had 294,000 subscribers. The average monthly subscriber revenue 
averaged $91 CDN at the end of 1991 (Rogers Cantel, 1991, p.3). Rogers Cantel investments in R&D were 
$1.4 million CDN in 1988, $23 million CDN in 1989, $5.6 million CDN in 1990, and 1.1 million CDN in 
1991 (Rogers Cantel, 1991). 
124 That the American Mobitex provider RAM Mobile Data would ultimately draw on these developments 
to commercialize its own massive network demonstrates the importance of RIM’s crucial early contribution 
(Weeny, 2009, p. 42). 
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Figure 4: Ad for RIM's MobiLib API (1990) 
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Figure 5: Ad for RIM's various Mobitex products and solutions (1992) 
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Figure 6: Product ad for RIM's Mobitex Protocol Converter (1990) 
At the same time that it was developing the basic APIs for the Mobitex network, 
RIM expanded its software and network engineering competencies to create 
interoperability with the existing global packet-switched network X.25—a network 
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supported by the International Telecommunications Union (ITU)125 and used more 
widely by telecommunications carriers (Mathison, et al., 2012; Rybczynski, 2009) to 
deliver wire-line data transmission services (e.g., Minitel; see Deprès, 2010). Before the 
Internet was widely adopted outside of the U.S., X.25 was the main standard by which 
computers could communicate with each other globally, but it had yet to be developed 
into an effective wireless application. What resulted from RIM’s efforts was a hybrid that 
linked the existing X.25 network with the emerging Mobitex infrastructure. Named 
MX25, this hybrid created a larger, more integrated network allowing data transmitted 
and received wirelessly to have access to a broader array of potential connections 
(McQueen, 2010, pp. 63-64).  
Out of this hybrid standard, RIM developed a commercial package named 
“RIMGate” that provided software allowing Mobitex users to link into existing 
commercial hosts such as Compuserve or AT&T EasyLink (p. 64). This innovation 
effectively made wireless Internet connections more than just possible. It also made them 
commercially profitable when RIM packaged them for use by existing Internet Service 
Providers (ISP). RIMGate thus became the central means of commercializing Mobitex, 
making RIM an important intermediary within the bourgeoning wireless data market 
because it was able to “solve” basic technical problems as well as synchronize them with 
existing commercial interests (i.e. telecommunications providers, ISP, component and 
infrastructure manufacturers). Moreover, the resulting Mobitex Gateway, an all in one 
package for organizations wanting to set up networks that included the wireless 
                                                
125 First approved by the ITU in 1976. See http://www.itu.int/en/ITU-
T/studygroups/com17/Pages/history.aspx 
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transmission of data, laid the foundation for the BlackBerry Enterprise Server—one of 
the most important and profitable products RIM would produce (RIM, 2010, p. 9).126  
Despite spending more than $30 million USD on its Mobitex network, Rogers 
merged its data and paging divisions in 1992 which put Mobitex on indefinite hiatus 
(Rogers Cantel, 1993).127 Even with Rogers’ unwillingness to develop the Mobitex 
network, RIM was able to leverage its niche understanding and experience to secure more 
lucrative contracts. In 1992 Ericsson released the world’s first wireless email device and 
service package named Viking Express. Relying on the software developed by RIM, the 
Viking Express system combined an HP-95 palmtop computer with a portable modem. As 
a result, in 1993 Ericsson contracted RIM to build complementary hardware components 
optimized for their Mobitex software.128 This was decisive for RIM as it allowed the 
company to develop the intra-firm capabilities, investments, and knowledge needed for 
designing and producing a device that integrated the software they had largely created.129 
                                                
126 The ability to create organization-specific wireless data networks allowing for the remote management 
of workers (as discussed in the next chapter) was crucial for the broader commercial acceptance of UC. 
127 Rogers was not the only company scrambling for a commercial application of the Mobitex standard. In 
response to RIM’s development of the Mobitex Gateway RAM Mobile Data “decided to issue a request for 
proposal (RFP) for a new two-way send-acknowledge Mobitex pager, that would behave like…instant 
messaging” (Sweeny, 2009, p. 45). Amidst the early press coverage around PDA with the launch of 
Apple’s Newton, the development of a Mobitex pager could build upon growing consumer awareness. 
However, the Newton was a failure, and due to still existing technical limitations nothing came from the 
RFP at the time. Setbacks notwithstanding, the exercise drew RIM deeper into overcoming the technical 
barriers preventing the commercialization of wireless data. 
128 The contract was for “2,500 Mobitex Protocol Converters (MPC), a modem that relays messages 
between corporate computers and Mobitex paging networks” (McQueen, 2010, p. 83). 
129 The production of wireless data modems for Ericsson exposed clear limitations in the existing 
component hardware. In the process of fulfilling its contract(s) with Ericsson, RIM discovered that the 
existing design of the modems was built from a patchwork of component standards. Rather than the 
components being integrated and optimized, they were layered on top of each other almost haphazardly, 
contributing to limitations in performance and power efficiency. The initial design handed down from 
Ericsson led to regular malfunctions because the hardware was not optimized to work with RIM’s more 
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It also involved a plan to make these data modems more energy efficient, thus making 
them potentially less bulky and more portable. However, because RIM was contracted as 
an original equipment manufacturer (OEM) supplier,130 the resulting modem would be 
sold and re-branded under Ericsson’s name.131  
4.3 Intel and Bell South—The Inter@ctive Pager 
The popularity of PDAs like Palm in the mid-1990s renewed industry hopes that 
Mobitex could be made profitable through the development of an end-user device. 
Increasingly telecommunications providers were becoming Internet service providers 
(ISPs) in order to adapt to a new global media system based on Internet Protocol (IP) and 
the World-Wide Web (Fransman, 2002). North American providers like Rogers and 
                                                                                                                                            
 
advanced software. Another element in the wireless modem—energy consumption—was grossly inefficient 
compared to what technologies like traditional cellular phones could offer; not coincidentally, a primary 
reason why in 1992, Intel’s CEO dismissed the idea of a viable two-way pager (Sweeny, 2009, p. 46). In 
theory, data transmission should be more efficient per bit than voice because of its asynchronous nature. 
Moreover, digitized wireless data has greater spectrum efficiency precisely because it can modulate data 
asynchronously. 
130 This emphasis on radio frequency lead to another OEM project for RIM developing a “Type II 
PCMCIA” card named “Freedom” that could be inserted into a laptop to enable travelers to check their 
email from anywhere (McQueen, 2010, p. 90).  
131 Interestingly, the first real device to allow RIM to fuse its expertise in software and hardware to make a 
mobile point-of-sale terminal built around Ericsson’s radios (McQueen, 2010, p. 85). The resulting device 
could be used in large sports arenas to sell concessions to consumers at their seats. Although not a huge 
seller, Toronto’s SkyDome (now Rogers Centre) was one of the first major purchasers to implement the 
system. The project was terminate in 1995, a year after it had begun, but the value of wireless payment and 
point-of-sale terminals foreshadowed the more recent interest in mobile payment systems. In particular, this 
project brought yet another area into the production and design mix: financial institutions. Building this 
mobile payment system required partnerships with financial institutions and emphasized the importance of 
data security and encryption as central features (a key reason why the BlackBerry would become so 
popular with governments and corporations). See 
http://docs.blackberry.com/en/admin/deliverables/12873/Standard_BlackBerry_message_encryption_1936
08_11.jsp 
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RAM Mobile Data recast Mobitex as a symbol of the next phase in the Internet’s 
evolution, one defined by both mobility and ubiquity (Fierheller, 2010). At the height of 
the dot-com boom in 1998, Rogers and Bellsouth Wireless Data132 had made investments 
building the trans-continental Mobitex network even though it had been relegated to 
internal or specialized uses like emergency services. This North American Mobitex 
network still lacked a marketable device. Because RIM had been integral in helping 
develop the North American Mobitex network protocols and hardware, the creation of a 
wireless data device fell to them once again.  
In 1996-1997, a series of discussions took place between RIM and three major 
telecommunications providers in North America: AT&T Wireless, Bell South, and 
Rogers (Tubbs & Gillett, 2011).133 These providers were interested in capitalizing on 
growing demand for a wireless Internet “solution” (Romero, 2000)—one that could both 
monetize existing investment and prospectively create a new category of wireless devices 
and services. Email had already become the “killer app” for the wired Internet and these 
early meetings returned to the idea of an email device that could be “worn” ubiquitously 
(Tubbs & Gillet, 2011, p. 26). Given its initial success, email thus demonstrated the 
“value proposition” of the Internet as a medium of communication for new users 
(Freeman, 2009).  
                                                
132 RAM Mobile Data, renamed when it was sold to Bell South in 1995. 
133 Bell South would later be merged into Cingular wireless, and ultimately become part of the reformed 
AT&T when Cingular merged with Southwestern Bell. Like Frankenstein’s monster, the resurrected AT&T 
would go well beyond its original namesake (the one dismantled by the original anti-trust suit) in its ability 
to dominate both domestic and international telecommunications markets often because of its size and 
market capitalization.  
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Before it could move beyond the prototype phase, RIM faced several obstacles 
that required partnerships based on an emerging confidence that the resulting device 
would be profitable. The first concerned the scale of production necessary to ensure 
profitability, which meant that the device had to be adopted by both major North 
American Mobitex carriers in order to secure a large enough market of potential 
consumers/subscribers. After demonstrating the usability of the initial prototype to 
executives at Bell South, as well as at the high-profile PCS tradeshow in 1996, a deal was 
struck to finally bring the device—renamed the Inter@ctive Pager—to market in 1997 
(Sweeny, 2009, p. 61).  
This decision was contingent, however, on reducing the high cost of producing 
the custom chip and to make it small enough to be mobile and energy efficient, yet 
sophisticated enough to run necessary applications. Bell South’s decision to adopt RIM’s 
device helped overcome this second barrier. For it to be portable, compact, and 
functional, the device required a specially designed chip matched to the technical 
specifications of RIM’s prototype. Because of its dominance of the semiconductor 
industry, only Intel could provide the requisite components. Intel’s primary business 
focus was on supplying chips for desktop PCs. Producing wireless chips to specifications 
set out by RIM meant company resources would be funneled towards an unproven 
market. With Bell South’s direct participation, RIM’s device would have access to a 
potentially massive subscriber base and, as such, Intel agreed to produce the necessary 
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chipset (Tubbs & Gillett, 2011, p. 64).134 Intel’s decision also was partly motivated by its 
own in-house application of RIM’s prototype within its workforce. In 1996, based on 
renewed interest from the major Mobitex operators, RIM developed a prototype two-way 
pager that could operate on the Mobitex network. It was known simply as RIM 900. 
These initial prototypes were bought by Intel for its employees, but the program itself 
was also designed by members of the “Embedded Microprocessor” division to persuade 
Intel executives to re-allocate research and development funds towards chipset RIM 
required to improve the functioning of its next generation of devices (Tubbs & Gillett, 
2011, p. 51).135  
A third problem was largely symbolic, involving product differentiation in a 
market filled with mobile devices ranging from pagers to PDAs—devices often 
associated with some form of wireless connectivity. Rather than competing with a high-
end PDA like Palm, RIM concentrated on branding and designing the wireless email 
device as an Internet-enabled two-way “super-pager.” The pager market was less 
competitive (Lindmark et al., 2004) and, as such, the introduction of an email-based 
pager featuring a full QWERTY keyboard could be positioned to stand out. While it 
featured some of the same applications offered by a typical PDA—personal information 
                                                
134 Commitments from Intel and Bell South were based on the belief that a wireless device was both 
possible and profitable. See Tubbs and Gillett, 2009. 
135 These prototypes also were used within RIM’s own workforce, yielding deeper insights into both the 
social and professional uses of their device. “It was given to employees to use at work, but Mike Lazaridis 
soon noticed that people loved to be able to stay in touch outside work hours, at the shopping mall, or as 
they picked up their kids from soccer games” (Sweeny, 2009, p. 60). 
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management (PIM) synchronization,136 for example—it differed, to repeat, in its market 
positioning as a two-way pager featuring email synchronization and crucially a 
QWERTY keyboard for the composition of messages. This was significant because few 
pagers allowed the users to produce relatively detailed text messages, even when they 
allowed two-way communication.  
 
Figure 7: RIM Inter@ctive Pager. 
Offered on Rogers and Cingular in 1997-1998, the Inter@ctive pager was 
successful enough to justify Intel’s research and development investments into the 
microchips required for the next generation of RIM’s device (Tubbs & Gillett, 2011, pp. 
                                                
136 PIM is a crucial component of the personalization of mobile and wireless devices involving the 
management of information specific to the user like schedule, calendar, contacts, phone numbers, 
documents, and other forms of information unique to the user. 
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94-102).137 As RIM touted in its 1998 annual report, the Inter@ctive pager was named 
Top Product for 1997 by Wireless for the Corporate User Magazine in the category 
“Innovative devices: voice and/or data,” and its initial success resulted in a larger order in 
1998 worth $70 million USD.138 In assembling the pager, RIM had developed what 
would be important strategic partnerships with some of the most influential companies in 
wireless telecommunications and mobile computing. Although the BlackBerry name and 
branding strategy had not been settled upon, the basic technical barriers had, by 1997, 
been overcome.  
4.4 Branding the BlackBerry “Solution” 
“As time went on we saw that this a la carte idea that you would buy technology from one 
and bolt it to another and tape it all up together, that wasn’t working either.  So we 
discovered that we really needed to integrate everything together seamlessly and provide 
a complete experience.  It wasn’t enough to just hand a device to somebody. It had to be 
hooked up and working out of the box.  We endeavored to make sure that the device 
worked out of the box and it was reliable.“ (Mike Lazaridis, 2008, p. 11)   
Having produced a working prototype, secured important partnerships with 
component manufacturers and telecommunications providers, and mass-produced the 
Inter@active Pager, RIM’s leadership proceded to create a brand identity with an 
accompanying narrative that would make its devices and services inseparable from the 
                                                
137 Intel’s R&D expenditures increased during this period from $1.3 billion USD in 1995 to $2.7 billion 
USD in 1998 (Intel, 1998). There was a specific increase of 14% between fiscal 1997 and 1998 associated 
with micro-processor product development and manufacturing (Intel, 1998, p. 30) partly associated with 
the development of mobile computing components (p. 30). By 2000, R&D investments in mobile 
computing chips and assets became a key part of Intel’s overall business strategy (Intel, 2000, pp. 36-41). 
138 http://web.archive.org/web/20070928101543/http://www.rim.net/news/press/1998/pr-07_01_1998.shtml 
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still new market for wireless data. One of the most important elements at this point was 
making a broader case that the BlackBerry brand would be profitable for 
telecommunications carriers, many of whom had made large investments in purchasing 
spectrum that had been opened up for new wireless services.139 An interview with David 
Smith, former Nortel employee and current Vice-President of Product Development at 
RIM offers insights on this early period where the BlackBerry brand developed in 
conjunction with the search by telecommunications companies for ways to monetize 
investments in spectrum, particularly in light of the auction-based approach initiated by 
the Clinton administration discussed at the beginning of this chapter. 
I started using the Blackberry in 1999, just after it came out. At the time I was at 
Nortel networks. I was in a research group that was looking at the future of 
wireless technologies; how wireless is going to evolve. At the time carriers were 
undergoing a transition from 2G voice-only to GPRS [2.5G], as well as 
investments in 3G, purchasing costly spectrum, as well as thinking about what 
features they would want, and what infrastructure they would need. At this point 
in time, in 1999, you’ll see the carriers, particularly in Europe spent billions in 
spectrum to allow them to buy 3G spectrum. 
While at Nortel, we were working with carriers to help them understand the value 
proposition that 3G networks would enable for them…looking at concepts and 
ideas about how carriers could use that spectrum once they had it. Picture 
                                                
139 For example, the first spectrum auctions held in the U.S. in 1994 were to be used for paging services and 
generated $1 billion USD. This was seen by policy-makers, both in the U.S. and globally, as a success for 
the auction approach (McMillan, 1995, pp. 198-199). 
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postcards, video conferencing, calendaring etc…Because in 1999 all there was 
was SMS, voice calls, and to some extent you could use your phone as a tether 
[mobile internet for laptops or PDA]. And then RIM came out with the 
Blackberry. At the time, this was very intriguing because on one single device it 
showed a glimpse of the future. I thought, “Ok now I don’t need another device.” 
You could use that device as a way to see the future. We [Nortel] did some joint 
marketing with RIM, because what it [the BlackBerry] did was allow us to paint a 
picture of the future for telecoms. When people saw it, when people saw 
BlackBerry, even in 1999, they instantly recognized that this will change how 
people work, how they connect with people, their ability to network, consume 
data, entertainment, news…enable all those things to happen and they will pay for 
that ability. 
The way you have to look at bandwidth and spectrum, is that it’s exactly 
the same as real-estate. The telecom companies own the spectrum, and they want 
to make sure they don’t become disenfranchised in the same way as ISPs [internet 
service providers] did. At one point, they [ISPs] felt they could play a much 
stronger role in the content, like AOL Time Warner, but failed and ultimately 
turned into bit pipes, or “dumb” pipes. The challenge for wireless telecoms is not 
to become bit pipes in the same way. We at RIM are very interested in helping 
them play a strong part in the value proposition for the end user. Different 
telecom companies have different ways of dealing and looking at it. We try to 
tread lightly on their network. We try to be very efficient with their network, so 
they can maximize the users on their networks, rather than turning the user’s 
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device into a full-fledged computer that has no bandwidth efficiency whatsoever 
that is just sucking down multi-MB data, with no compression, which is the 
opposite of treading lightly. The reality there is real physics at play, the 
bandwidth is limited. (personal communication, June 24, 2010)  
 As Smith highlights, one of the major constraints faced by handset developers like 
RIM is the amount of spectrum controlled by wireless telecommunications providers. 
Commercially exploiting this newly available spectrum required painting a picture of 
future possibilities regarding potential devices and services. Indeed, how these providers 
choose which handsets to allow on their networks is directly related to their ability to 
convert costly investments in spectrum into revenue. In North America, 
telecommunications providers play a significant role in choosing and promoting handsets 
to consumers because they subsidize the costs of handsets through multi-year contracts 
between carriers and consumers. For this reason, the fates of telecommunications 
providers, handset manufacturers, and mobile developers are intertwined though, given 
the high spectrum costs, the balance of power rests with the providers (see Kenney & 
Pon, 2011).  
The first annual report after RIM’s initial public offering (IPO) in 1997140 offered 
its corporate narrative of UC—a narrative crafted to reflect the company’s 
indispensability to consumers and the telecom providers that would profit from the 
devices monetizing their network capacities. The message was not overly complex, 
                                                
140 The 1997 IPO generated $115 million CDN and was listed on the Toronto Stock Exchange (TSE). RIM 
was listed on the NASDAQ in the January 1999 and generated $258 million USD through the sale of five 
million shares (RIM, 1998; RIM, 2000). 
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reflecting the influence of ICTs on the rhythms of everyday life. Communicating to 
investors, employees, and prospective consumers the company’s newly established 
corporate narrative, the report proclaims, “In a world where consumers increasingly 
demand to be ‘connected’ 24-hours-a-day for both business and personal purposes, the 
economical cost and benefits of RIM’s core two-way paging technology give it a 
significant competitive advantage over the limited applications of one-way products 
which cannot respond to or initiate messages” (emphasis added, RIM, 1998, p. 4). Not 
only was the device positioned as one designed for UC, it also was portrayed as a device 
for both consuming and producing wireless data.  
The next step was to develop a brand identity that reflected the unique “value 
proposition” (i.e., use value) offered by RIM’s new device—one meshed with the future 
needs of wireless telecommunications providers. After some consultation with branding 
experts and product designers (Colpatino, 2011), the name “BlackBerry” was adopted in 
1999 as a means of distinguishing the device from others existing in the market. The 
name, rigorously tested in focus groups by Lexicon Branding,141 was partly chosen as an 
ideographic reference to how the QWERTY keyboard of the device resembled the fruit, 
and partly chosen because linguistics research suggested the appeal of the double “B” 
sound to focus group participants (MacNamara, 2012). The BlackBerry brand was to be 
all encompassing: it was simultaneously a device, a complex technological system, and a 
service enabling individuals (whether as professionals, entrepreneurs, or as part of the 
larger workforce) to remain connected at all times. While the brand was associated to the 
                                                
141 Lexicon Branding also was responsible for coming up with Intel’s “Pentium” brand as well as Apple’s 
“PowerBook” line of laptop computers. See www.lexiconbranding.com 
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physical device, BlackBerry represented, symbolically, a service that provided and 
personified UC (RIM, 2001). Though the devices themselves were expected to evolve, 
growing in technical and functional sophistication over time, the basic service and its 
connotations could remain the same, indefinitely tied to the BlackBerry brand name. 
 No longer a pager per se, the newly branded BlackBerry 850/950142 was released 
in January of 1999 on multiple carrier networks in North America.143 One of the most 
important selling points, highlighted by David Smith, was the ability to push data to users 
so that there was not lag time between when users are notified about a new message and 
when they open that message. For this to happen, the BlackBerry device emitted a “heart 
beep” that would communicate its location to the nearest base station at regular intervals, 
allowing data to be transmitted to the handset as soon as it became available.144 The 
push-based system RIM had been working on for years became a central and defining 
feature of the “BlackBerry Solution,” allowing personal information to find its designated 
receiver regardless of where they are in space. Arguably, it is this particular technological 
                                                
142 The numerical distinction between the 850 and 950 referred only to the network standard upon which it 
operated. The 850 worked on the ARDIS network, while the 950 worked on Mobitex. The branding 
strategy, which involved close ties with the telecommunication carriers offering BlackBerry devices on 
their networks, was an essential part of appealing to “mobile professionals” as these prospective users are 
more “in tune” with brand “positioning” and “viral marketing campaigns” according to then Vice-President 
of Marketing at RIM, David Werezak (Young, 2000). 
143 As Sweeny explains, the package for the 850/950 included the device,  
with typical PDA organizer software (calendar, address book, task list), along with a docking 
cradle and synchronizing software to connect with a PC. E-mail was encrypted using Triple DES 
and remained encrypted at all points between the desktop PC and the handheld device…The 
BlackBerry was the first wireless device that synchronized with company mail systems so that 
users did not need a different e-mail address when traveling. This was a very big selling 
point….The 950 cost more than $500 (including activation fee). Cost for the service was an 
additional $50/month. (Sweeny, 2011, p. 71) 
144 The significance was that getting messages did not requiring dialing in to make a connection because, 
“As soon as you entered a coverage area, the 950 would start pulling or sending mail automatically” 
(Sweeny, 2009, p. 66). 
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innovation that made UC a question of perceived immediacy (since there was virtually no 
gap between getting the notification of new email and actually accessing that email). 
Indeed, the ability for the BlackBerry to be used almost anywhere in space, and then to 
use that location to push wireless data, set the stage not only for the mobile Internet but 
also for an existential condition in which bursts (and flows) of information can interrupt 
daily life virtually everywhere and at anytime.  
Email was still central to the BlackBerry’s design and ultimate appeal. RIM thus 
launched the device in conjunction with major email client services across North America 
(e.g., Microsoft Exchange), meaning users had options regarding which email services 
they could use and synchronize with their BlackBerry (RIM, 2001). For such email 
services, the BlackBerry service allowed the synchronization of one email inbox between 
handset and email client. In this way, an individual’s email became truly ubiquitous 
because a message received on the handset would be registered on the email client, and 
likewise with a message sent on the handset. Thus a user would not have a separate 
“mobile” email account for their wireless device (e.g., RadioMail) but, instead, use one 
email across devices (thus the same email could be synchronized on both on a desktop 
and a device). 
4.5 Searching For a Market: The BlackBerry Means Business  
Given that there was no clearly established market for the BlackBerry, building a 
market required identifying early adopters that would not only see the value in RIM’s 
device and service but also help grow its prospective market. RIM’s strategy was partly 
shaped by the failures and limitations of both Newton and Palm. Following the model 
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laid out by Geoffrey Moore (discussed in the previous chapter), the marketing strategy 
for the BlackBerry first focused on seeding the device with high profile executives, many 
coming from the financial industry or Silicon Valley—industries where timely messaging 
was deemed to be extraordinarily valuable. This strategy was intended to both build word 
of mouth among elite early adopters and, perhaps more importantly, lead elite users (like 
CIOs145 or IT Administrators) to pressure larger institutional clients into buying 
BlackBerrys in bulk to equip their workforce. As Carayannopoulos explains,  
RIM identified corporations and their employees, particularly those handling time 
sensitive information such as financial services, as its target market. Anyone who 
needed quickly to receive and react to new information was a likely customer for 
the product. Corporations were more likely both to find value in its product and to 
purchase it, whereas individual consumers would view it more as a luxury item. 
Furthermore, it would be easier to sell the BlackBerry to an organization given 
RIM’s limited resources for marketing, as acceptance by an organization meant 
that many more users would potentially be adopting it with each agreement. 
(2005, p.  224) 
RIM’s executives believed that these elite professionals would clearly see the 
value in UC as it helped them cope with the chaotic rhythms of the global financial and 
high-tech markets of the late 1990s. “RIM took a grassroots approach to building brand 
awareness for BlackBerry. Sales people were dispatched as wireless e-mail evangelists to 
                                                
145 In some institutional contexts this position is known as Chief Technology Officer. While there are some 
differences in these two titles, for my purposes there is enough similarity that I will only use CIO to 
encompass both. 
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educate Fortune 1,000 companies about the availability of an enterprise-class solution for 
wireless e-mail” (Elkin, 2001).146 An early review for the device describes the appeal: 
Made by Research In Motion–based in this city, which barely shows up on 
anyone's map of the tech industry—the BlackBerry is still nothing but a flea in the 
broad handheld computer market. There are fewer than 200,000 users—less than 
1% of handheld computer users. But it's whipping through the ranks of high-tech 
CEOs, venture capitalists and financial analysts. Rabid fans include Marimba 
founder Kim Polese, tech author Don Tapscott and tech investor Roger 
McNamee. Merrill Lynch gave BlackBerrys to its senior analysts. Former 
Baywatch babe Pamela Anderson has one. So does Toronto Blue Jays first 
baseman Carlos Delgado. Howard Stern has raved about his on his radio show. 
(Maney, 2001) 
Interestingly, this review categorizes RIM’s device in terms of the “handheld 
computer” market rather than the PDA or pager market, suggesting the uncertainty 
around the new market RIM was trying to cultivate. Industry specific applications like 
those in finance, law,147 or information technology led to the professionals in these 
                                                
146 VP of Brand Management Mark Guibert guided the targeting of the BlackBerry brand at professionals 
“who value their time and have discretionary budgets” (Wasserman, 2001, p. 46). Part of the brand 
strategy, however, involved convincing these potential consumers since, at the time, email was not 
intuitively considered a “time-sensitive method of communication” among focus group participants (p. 46). 
Taking a cue from Apple, Guibert “formed a team of about 75 ‘evangelists’ to target Wall Streeters” and 
sent BlackBerrys to “editors of IT pubs like Information Week, InfoWorld and others” (pp. 46-47).  As 
Guibert explains, “The idea was to tightly focus on [IT] decision makers, but also to create a supporting 
buzz behind it…Even if we’d been in The New York Times once as a product feature, we’d try to get in 
again as a lifestyle story” (p. 46). 
147 For example, in 1999 law firm Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP, adopted the use of BlackBerrys. Chair of 
the Technology Committee for the firm explained the choice:  
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industries becoming the fastest adopters of the BlackBerry (RIM, 2000); that is, sectors in 
which activities, decisions, and actions had to be made immediately for the sake of 
competitiveness and/or profitability. Some early applications for the 850/950 included 
stock monitoring and trading abilities (RIM, 2000). Thus the BlackBerry’s core 
functionality—“always on” connectivity, push email, and a QWERTY keyboard—
reflected the speed and urgency of timely, round-the-clock flows of information. These 
features came to express not only the needs of individuals, but also anticipated the needs 
of enterprises and their increasingly mobile or remote workforces and clients.  
 
Figure 8: BlackBerry 950 
                                                                                                                                            
 
Responsiveness is critical to our success. When clients retain an elite law firm like GD&C, they 
expect easy and constant access to our lawyers, particularly during a crisis. With BlackBerry, even 
when our lawyers are traveling or otherwise out of their offices, they can be in touch with their 
clients. We also use BlackBerry to stay in touch from depositions and court rooms where cell 
phones aren't an option.  (Anonymous, 1999f) 
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As elite business users began to adopt BlackBerrys in growing numbers, RIM 
poured more effort into developing and marketing its BlackBerry Enterprise Server 
(BES). While the BlackBerry was most visibly expressed as a singular handheld device, 
the BES was marketed as an integrated technological assemblage comprising end-user 
devices, network servers, back-end support, software and hardware; in sum, it was a 
“total package” that allowed any corporate client to implement a secure wireless strategy 
with relative ease and speed. The BlackBerry Enterprise Server enabled total data and 
network synchronization across a mobile workforce. It allowed for a level of 
customization according to the client organization’s information, security, and 
networking needs. BES therefore forged not only a large potential market for RIM to 
exploit, but also solidified the economic necessity of wireless strategies for competitive 
advantage (RIM, 2000). At the end of February 2001, 2,800 companies in North America 
were using BES (RIM, 2001, p. 10), and in 2003 the number of these servers that were 
installed by corporations globally exceeded 10,000 (RIM, 2003, p. 4). By 2005 the 
number reached 42,000 (RIM, 2005, p. 6). 
As a result, RIM tapped into a bourgeoning market segment known as business-
to-enterprise, or B2E.148 Emerging alongside the growth of the Internet and the tech 
boom of the 1990s, B2E comprised ICT makers and service providers looking to sell the 
                                                
148 The growth of B2E as a discernible market segment is tied to the growth of mobile ICTs and the 
creation of an increasingly mobile workforce. As Southworth summarizes,  
…the term B2E was first used in 1999 in a series of marketing campaigns for the Palm Pilot by 
3Com Corp….Providing employees with Palm Pilots so they can work according to their own 
hours is one B2E service…Others can include setting up company portals so employees can 
access news and information and even, in some cases, watch their children at a company daycare 
through the use of a Web cam…If mom isn’t worried about her kids getting good daycare, she’ll 
be more productive. That is the reasoning behind B2E. (Southworth, 2001) 
153 
 
values and virtues of their devices to businesses seeking competitive advantage. The 
growth of this market segment is also partly attributable to the growing role played by the 
Chief Information Officer (CIO) in developing and implementing ICT-based corporate 
strategies (Stenzel, 2011). B2E marketing was geared specifically to winning over this 
crucial figure given that he or she could make or break a product line. While word of 
mouth was important in advertising the value of the device to executives, targeted 
marketing to specific CIOs led to the adoption of these devices within organizations as 
tools for both professionals and, eventually, as tools to be used by their more general 
workforces. More specifically, such devices were pitched as means of coordinating the 
activities of employees separated by huge distances or tools for implementing labour 
management strategies that require constant connectivity and responses when prompted 
(Southworth, 2001). As examples, brokerage firm Credit Suisse First Boston, which 
agreed to buy hundreds of pagers in 2000, was followed by deals with Intel, and then 
Salomon Smith Barney, to equip their respective employees (Ingram, 2000). 
As RIM vice-president of product management David Smith explained, while 
RIM’s commercial success relied on its adoption by businesses and governments, this 
also allowed for the development of the device’s and service’s utility. Smith noted that 
what began as a device “designed for CEOs” also was being used by their families. The 
two most important technical characteristics, according to Smith, were security and 
network efficiency: 
The main reason why we have been successful with corporations and 
governments has been our level of security, and integration; for example, with 
Microsoft Exchange, Lotus Notes etc… that’s why we have been so successful. 
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That’s why you can get your corporate email, it’s really the security credentials 
that make the difference. The last thing a CIO wants is to have their device or 
email hacked or broken into. So we make sure we get all the appropriate 
certifications, certifications that are very strong, and globally recognized. So our 
devices are used by government offices and corporations all over the world. 
People don’t have to worry about their data, it’s encrypted end to end, and without 
the secret key there’s no way to break that. 
One of the reasons our devices are so popular with telecoms…is because 
the Blackberry was invented on a network that only has 9.6kbs shared, so there 
was very little bandwidth available. So when we designed the original system, it 
was designed with the concept of a network operation center (NOC) that would 
actually manage the encryption and transmission to the device, you could actually 
compress and encrypt the information to the device, and you could also very 
carefully manage the status of the device so that the network managers could 
actually be aware of the status of the device, and as long as it could accept it, the 
network center operation could push data to the device. With BlackBerry, because 
of the network operation center with the BlackBerry Enterprise Server that all 
knew the status of each other, it could be very efficient; it would know the status 
of the device. The BlackBerry Enterprise Server, if the device is available, would 
actually push the 2kb to the device and would not notify the user until the whole 
message is already on the device. It was all designed in a very efficient way to use 
a network that had almost no bandwidth. We’ve applied that same methodology 
to web browsing etc…to drive the efficiency of the Blackberry solution. So it is 
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very efficient today, it is a very “lightweight” device so the carrier can run a lot 
more devices on the same spectrum, something they’ve spent a lot of money 
acquiring. (personal communication, June 24, 2010) 
Security features, though essential to corporate clients, were also essential 
technical aspects in personalizing each device. The use of advanced encryption and 
unique device identifiers (e.g., PINs) were meant to ensure that messages sent and 
received reached only intended users.  
While large corporations were sought because of the substantial orders they could 
place, RIM also targeted entrepreneurs and small business professionals. In a feature 
article that appeared in both The Globe and Mail and the Boston Herald titled 
“Entrepreneur Grabs Latest Handheld Technology”, the popularity of the BlackBerry is 
explained in terms of how the device empowers such users (Healy, 2000). One 
businessperson is quoted as saying the BlackBerry was his “greatest freedom-provider 
ever”. Another interviewee notes how the device is perfect for venture capitalists because 
it mirrors their typical “attention deficit disorder” stating the BlackBerry “has totally 
influenced the way I get business done” (Healy, 2000). Indeed, the professional and 
small-to-medium business (SMB)149 market had been an important growth sector for the 
early development of IMD. An interviewee describes the importance of the BlackBerry to 
Entrepreneurs and SMB employers and employees: “The BlackBerry is now my watch, 
my alarm clock, my scheduler, my timetable, my to-do list, my contact list and my 
internet wireless communication device” (Wintrob, 2001). Perhaps more interestingly, 
                                                
149 Generally SMB refers to businesses with less than 100 employees.  
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the same person describes the wireless feature as “the closest thing to mental telepathy” 
(Wintrob, 2001).150  
The development of these two business markets, B2E and SMB, provided the 
BlackBerry with a solid consumer base upon which RIM could expand its service and 
product lines.151 The success of the BlackBerry in the business market reflects a 
continued transformation of both institutions and workforces in light of more powerful 
and portable ICTs. For example, according to a survey by Network Magazine conducted 
in 2001, “about 71% of 250 large U.S. enterprises said they planned to buy or support the 
purchase of PDAs for their employees” (Vermono, 2001).  In that same year nearly 8,000 
companies implemented BlackBerrys in their workplaces, including roughly 700 in 
Canada (RIM, 2002).  
The business market offered the clearest opportunity for the BlackBerry to 
become profitable and, more importantly in the development of UC, this success 
established its role as a core agent in the future development of devices and network 
services. Thus, paralleling its focus on business clientele, RIM began dedicating 
resources to creating a consumer market through a combination of strategic partnerships 
                                                
150 As John Durham Peters (1999) has lucidly documented, the mythology of unmediated communication 
has a long history. Radical changes in communication technologies, for example the telegraph, are often 
linked to a perceived supernatural augmentation of human faculties. For example, Harvard Physicist and 
Morse biographer, John Trowbridge wrote in 1899, “Wireless telegraphy is the nearest approach to 
telepathy that has been vouchsafed [“revealed”] to our intelligence” (quoted in Peters, 1999, p. 104). 
151 Industry research firm Gartner estimated in September of 2003 that there were 100 million SMBs 
worldwide, representing a “total IT market worth $350 billion [USD]” (Brown, 2003). By 2004, SMBs 
accounted for 26%, or $8.96 billion CDN, of IT spending in Canada (Tournemille, 2004). 
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and expanding the functional capabilities of the BlackBerry.152 Expanding RIM’s market 
to include younger, non-business consumers also was meant to maintain its growth 
despite the pending saturation of BlackBerrys in the business market. RIM also pursued 
the youth market in order to sell its surplus devices accumulating in its warehouses (Bell, 
2000; Chu 2000). Demonstrating the value of the BlackBerry to non-business consumers 
required RIM to pour more resources into branding, marketing, and advertising. 
According to Leitch (2000), greater expenditures in this area lowered overall profitability 
and contributed to the volatility in its stock price during the summer of 2000. This 
volatility reflected a declining profit rate due to greater funds being shifted away from 
research and development towards promoting the BlackBerry brand to a broader audience 
of consumers.153  
New products were developed to broaden the BlackBerry’s appeal. In April of 
2000 RIM introduced the 957, a device that bore a clear resemblance to existing PDAs, 
particularly the Palm Pilot. Unlike the Palm Pilot, however, the 957 offered a full 
QWERTY keyboard, wireless e-mail, scroll-wheel, and PIM-synchronization 
applications. The device retailing for almost $500 USD, enabled users to read larger 
emails and display more text on screen, including web-based content (Austen, 2000).154 
                                                
152 In 2000, RIM made several high-profile deals include one with AOL, then one of the most valuable 
companies in the world. The AOL deal was meant to bring the BlackBerry to a youth demographic, but 
notable problems related to AOL’s stock valuation delayed this effort (see Chu, 2000). 
153 By late 2000 some analysts were already characterizing the BlackBerry as a transitional device, rather 
than a genre defining one, and expecting a much larger competitor to displace it (Ingram, 2000). 
154 At the time of its release competitors included the Palm Pilot Vx , Compaq iPaq (running Pocket PC OS 
designed by Microsoft), and Handspring Visor (running Palm OS but produced by the rival faction of Palm 
founders that left after disagreements with owners, USR). 
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Consequently, the speculation about future BlackBerrys often highlighted the device’s 
expanding functionality in terms of the transformation of work itself:  
The next generation BlackBerry will run Java and can become essentially a 
remote control for everything on your office PC. You could use it, for instance, to 
tell your PC to find certain PowerPoint slides and e-mail them directly to a 
projector in the room where you're about to give a presentation. Operating on 
high-speed wireless networks now being built, the next BlackBerry can also be 
used to make voice calls. “I believe it has the power to be the catalyst to usher in 
the distributed workplace,” says Stephen Hall, general partner with Axalon 
Ventures in New York and a BlackBerry user. “Physically being in the office and 
plugged in is no longer necessary.” (Maney, 2000)155 
While early RIM devices like the 850/950 heavily relied on strategic-seeding and 
word of mouth to generate sales, the 957 was accompanied by a major advertising push 
that would articulate the ubiquitous developments that BlackBerry embodied—
developments primarily targeted at business users but also positioned to incorporate other 
potential markets.156 The slogan, “always on, always connected,” was part of an 
                                                
155 Later versions of the BlackBerry, beginning with the 5800 (discussed below), incorporated both voice 
and data networking features, but also a software architected specifically designed enable the expansion of 
applications (in this case, Sun Microsystem’s Java Micro Edition) (Sutton, 2001). 
156 The relative success of RIM’s pagers, particularly the 957, lead to the purchase of a new manufacturing 
plant in 2000 that would produce BlackBerrys five times faster when it began operating in the following 
year (Chu, 2000). Employee growth between 2000 and 2001 reflected the expansion of RIM’s BlackBerry 
brand. The number of R&D employees grew from 186 to 331; sales and marketing grew from 120 to 309; 
and manufacturing expanded from 136 to 403 employees (RIM, 2001, p. 3). R&D spending rose from 
$12.2 million CDN in 2000 to $25.7 million CDN in 2001 (p. 5). 
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extensive public discourse on UC that shaped RIM’s corporate identity as well as the 
bourgeoning PDA market (Wasserman, 2001). 
The marketing campaign for the BlackBerry 957 was the first concerted campaign 
led by RIM and not by carriers (RIM, 2001). The campaign captured the essence of the 
BlackBerry brand, reinforcing a narrative that not only valorized “always on” 
connectivity but also depicted the device as a necessary tool suited to the Internet-age of 
global ICT markets—a mythos in which the speed of information was a defining 
characteristic, requiring new tools of adaptation.157 A series of ads circulated in 2000 and 
2001 appearing in Canada’s The Globe and Mail are paradigmatic of this overall 
narrative. One advertisement depicts a man on a golf course checking his email, while 
another shows a woman lost at sea in a rubber dingy presumably sending a distress 
message with her 957 (figure 9). More telling still is an advertisement that depicts a man 
narrowly avoiding a knife thrown by some unknown assailant; the message on the 
BlackBerry screen simply reads “DUCK!” (figure 10).   
                                                
157 It is worth noting that a large portion of the advertising targeted at consumers was and is conducted by 
telecommunications providers rather than handset vendors since it is the former that stand to benefit 
directly from the use of a specific device within a given geographically defined market. In this case I am 
only focusing on the advertising in which RIM was involved directly. 
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Figure 9: Print ad for BlackBerry 957 in the Globe and Mail, August 4, 2000. 
 
 
 
Figure 10: Print ad for BlackBerry 957 in The Globe and Mail, September 19, 2000. 
Advertisements during this campaign often alluded to, and made light of, the 
addictive nature of wireless email. For example “It comes with an off button. No one uses 
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it, but it comes with one” (figure 11); “If you’re planning an intervention for someone 
addicted to one, may we suggest you use e-mail” (figure 12); “You shouldn’t use it in the 
shower. You’d think we wouldn’t have to say that.” Each of these ads describes the 
BlackBerry as a device with “highly addictive wireless e-mail.” 
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Figure 11: Print ad for BlackBerry 957 appearing in The Globe and Mail, April 5, 
2001. 
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Figure 12: Print ad for BlackBerry 957 appearing in The Globe and Mail, April 6, 
2001. 
Though developed for a broader market, the 957 also was designed to appeal to 
existing B2E clients, in part because its outward design was comparable to conventional 
PDA. A Forbes magazine reviewer of the RIM 957 provides anecdotal evidence of the 
BlackBerry’s popularity among financial firm executives: 
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A small handheld e-mail device is the hottest electronic gadget to hit corporate 
America in years. But can it survive against the big boys? There’s good reason 
Research In Motion’s handheld electronic organizer and e-mail device called 
BlackBerry is known as “crackberry.” People at the 5,000 companies that use the 
system act addicted, thumbing away on the wireless gadgets throughout meetings, 
at boring client dinners--even during visits to the rest room. That's why employees 
at one Wall Street firm are being cautioned not to take their BlackBerrys to the 
john. The IT folks fear they might accidentally drop the $500 gizmos in the toilet-
-mid-e-mail. (Gallagher, 2000) 
Another review in The New York Times made similar claims about the value of the 
BlackBerry to professionals and executives: 
The BlackBerry is the forerunner of a set of tools that offer constant contact 
without the need to actually talk to anyone. About a million Americans use a 
wireless e-mail service, with BlackBerry leading the pack, according to the 
Yankee Group, of Boston, a telecommunications consulting firm. In recent 
months, the BlackBerry has become much coveted by America's business 
professionals, who are increasingly judged by how accessible they are to 
colleagues and clients. A key draw: unlike cellular phone calls, which require a 
clear distraction of attention, BlackBerrys allow users to do two things at once. 
Internet executives rave about watching messages roll in while they conduct other 
business. Along with higher salaries and concierge service, BlackBerrys headed a 
list of demands submitted by junior analysts at Salomon Smith Barney to their 
superiors last spring. Even lawyers, notoriously slow to embrace e-mail in the 
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office, have become enthralled by the BlackBerry. (Harmon, 2000) 
From this early success, competition followed. Out of competition, however, the 
Blackberry was differentiated as a status symbol. By the beginning of 2001 BlackBerry 
was competing directly with Motorola’s two-way pager Talkabout (figure 12) which, by 
that time, had reached almost one million users. The competition between the two 
demonstrated how the market for such devices had become segmented according to the 
symbolic differences among user groups (Century, 2001). 158 Motorola became the brand 
of choice for hip-hop and NBA users (and their respective fans), while the BlackBerry 
was most used by executives, politicians, and gadget enthusiasts.  As testament to its 
success as an essential business tool, in 2000 Forbes magazine named the BlackBerry 
one of seven “cult brands” (a list that included Ben and Jerry’s and Nike) (RIM, 2001).159  
                                                
158 A reporter for The New York Times explains this segmentation in terms of two markets for the device:  
Two wireless systems, two passionate camps. The rectangular, rigid BlackBerry is the choice of a 
high-tech and financial elite, including Bill Gates, Michael Dell and the investment bankers at 
Goldman, Sachs. They would not be caught dead carrying a fire-engine-red or cobalt-blue 
Motorola Talkabout, which the company markets to young adults -- even teenagers passing e-
notes in class. You have to understand that white-collar workers and politicians don't want 
sexiness or cuteness -- they don't want fashion,” said James Balsillie, the chairman and a chief 
executive of Research in Motion, which makes the BlackBerry. Why does Al Gore live on his 
BlackBerry? He needs something that's reliable, and he needs something that's secure. BlackBerry 
devotees insist they go for substance over style. '”I use BlackBerry over Motorola for the 
functionality,'” said James Andrews, an Internet entrepreneur. “For a lot of people who have 
Motorola, it's their first entry to an e-mail address. But I'm a techie. Motorola sort of feels like a 
toy.” (Century, 2001) 
159 Because of the central role it played in Wall Street culture, I would be remiss to not mention role of the 
BlackBerry in the events surrounding 9/11. Because of the unique technical features offered by the 
BlackBerry, and its proliferation among professionals in and around the World Trade Center, it played an 
important role in the lives of victims and survivors. Indeed, BlackBerrys enabled communication during a 
crisis where traditional communication networks became congested or dysfunctional—in part due to its use 
of the Mobitex and DataTAC networks separate from the collapse/jammed cellular networks. As a result, 
the BlackBerry gained respect among government and emergency workers. This was in addition to regular 
users who were hearing stories communicated in the mass media about how the device helped rescue 
survivors, coordinate relief missions, or relay last words from victims trapped in burning buildings. Here’s 
how The New York Times covered the BlackBerry’s role shortly after September 11th:  
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Figure 13: Motorola Talkabout. 
4.6 Towards a Global Smartphone Market 
                                                                                                                                            
 
“BIG WTC explosion. I'm going to street. I'm scared.” 
That was Lynne Federman's frantic e-mail message to her husband a few seconds after the first 
hijacked plane crashed into the World Trade Center. Ms. Federman, a corporate lawyer, was in her 
office at J. P. Morgan Chase, three blocks from the trade center, punching the message into her 
BlackBerry pager. 
“What??” her husband, Joseph Korb, wrote back on his BlackBerry from Newark, where he was 
on jury duty. 
“Seems helicopter crashed into WTC,” Ms. Federman replied. “Going to street now. Very scary. 
End of world.” 
Like many people in the aftermath of that chaotic Tuesday morning, Ms. Federman and Mr. Korb 
found that telephones and cellphones worked only sporadically. So they communicated with each 
other in terse text messages for several hours as Ms. Federman, covered in ash, fled on foot from 
Lower Manhattan. 
“I had my cellphone in one hand, and it was useless, and my BlackBerry in the other, and it was 
my lifeline that day,” Ms. Federman recalled. (Romero, 2001) 
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In addition to the 2000 release of its BlackBerry 957 and concomitant marketing 
campaign, RIM also benefited from the growing tech bubble that was raising both stock 
prices and investor expectations. The interest generated by early versions of the 
BlackBerry pager, followed by the PDA, had made the brand itself almost ubiquitous 
among professionals and corporate executives as an iconic symbol of the so-called “new 
economy.” RIM’s stock valuation began a mercurial rise between April 1999 and 
February 2000, climbing from $9.25 to $175.75 USD. At the beginning of 2000 the 
valuation of the company was in the billions, making many of its founders and primary 
stockholders multi-millionaires. RIM, however, was not safe from collapse of the stock 
market tech bubble. Despite positive reviews for the 957, by mid-April 2000 RIM had 
lost almost $8 billion USD, or about 63% of its stock value (Morgenson, 2000).  
Increasing competition and a lowered stock valuation pressured RIM to expand its 
product line and seek new ways to stimulate greater demand.160 Consequently, the 
BlackBerry 5800 was released later in 2002 (figure 14). Although aesthetically no 
different than the 957, the device featured one significant improvement: it enabled voice 
telephony. This was a crucial development since the 5800 was, in effect, the first 
smartphone available for a global market. The ability to make voice calls was a 
                                                
160 As discussed in the previous chapter, it was during this period that RIM began its patent battle with 
NTP. It is difficult to assess to what extent the multi-year legal battle would influence RIM’s research and 
development priorities, but one could confidently assume that a more substantive and risky consumer-
centric strategy would have been retarded by legal threats and patent conflicts. The year the patent suit was 
settled, 2006, was also the year the consumer-targeted BlackBerry Pearl was released.   
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significant advancement for the BlackBerry platform, even though it required the use of 
an awkward headphone and microphone cord extension.161  
 Awkwardness aside, technology reviewers gushed over both the device’s 
expanded functionality and RIM’s prescience in anticipating the needs of BlackBerry 
users (and the telecommunications industry generally) by providing a single technology 
linking asynchronous (email) and synchronous (voice) communication. As Pogue 
commented, “You can't go two minutes without marveling at how the BlackBerry has, 
yet again, anticipated and crisply executed your desires” (Pogue, 2002). The 5800 also 
made important advances by offering software that made the thumb-based composition of 
email messages easier: “It capitalizes sentences, puts apostrophes into your contractions 
and @'s into your e-mail addresses, and auto-corrects thumb typos,” wrote reviewer 
David Pogue (2002).  
                                                
161 As already noted above, the BlackBerry 5800 was built around the Java Micro Edition (J2ME) software 
architecture in order to expand the range of potential applications that could run on the device 
(Anonymous, 2002b; Suppa, 2002). The incorporation of J2ME into wireless data devices like the 
BlackBerry also was strongly supported by wireless carriers because this not only expanded the range of 
data-intensive applications, but also the expansion of wireless applications would drive up the overall 
usage, and thus revenue, derived from wireless data networks and services (Suppa, 2002). 
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Figure 14: BlackBerry 5200 with earpiece and microphone. 
The 5800 took the BlackBerry brand beyond just being a device for email, 
integrating both voice (on GSM) and data transmission capabilities. With this integration 
the BlackBerry could appeal to both traditional voice users (primarily non-business 
consumers) as well as a growing base of consumers who regularly use emails and text 
messages. The integration of voice and wireless data entailed important technical 
advances like increased miniaturization of components, greater energy efficiency, and 
more sophisticated software applications. Arguably more significant is the fact that this 
integration also reflected the construction of a virtual global telecommunications network 
through which it was made possible. In so doing, RIM became the world’s first “mobile 
virtual network operator” (MVNO). MVNO describes the process by which a company 
cobbles together its own telecommunication network by buying bandwidth from a variety 
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of different providers. 162 Buying bandwidth in this fashion allowed RIM to route global 
data through its servers in Waterloo, enabling it to maintain the security of user 
information and its leadership position in push-based data transmission. However, when a 
voice call was made the device would connect to one of RIM’s partner network 
operators. As an MVNO, RIM could operate, and to a certain extent, control, its own 
network across a patchwork of standards and telecommunication networks around the 
globe.163  
The ability to create an MVNO directly involved accelerating global diffusion of 
wireless standards at the time RIM began designing the 5800. While RIM was still 
marketing its data-only BlackBerry devices, important innovations in the GSM standard 
began to enable data transmission. Known as 2.5G technologies, Global Packet Relay 
System (GPRS) was an add-on that GSM providers could deploy to enable the same data 
transmission possibilities as Mobitex and DataTAC.164 From RIM’s perspective, the 
                                                
162 As a result, RIM effectively became a telecommunications operator. International telecommunications 
providers such as Virgin Mobile would adopt this model later. 
163 The project of creating a MVNO was set in motion as early as 1998 when RIM made major deals with 
RAM Mobile Data and Rogers to provide a “total package” solution comprising hardware, software, and 
network services. The resulting arrangement allowed RIM to develop the BlackBerry brand identity as a 
total solution. It was the early appeal to corporate clientele that suggested the saliency of this project for 
RIM’s long-term corporate identity. As Lazaridis explains, “Selling the package ourselves was important 
because we believed in wireless corporate email. No one else really believed in it. Wireless corporate email 
required a lot more hand-holding and different marketing. We decided we were going to fund this 
ourselves, we were going to build our own sales force and support organization” (quoted in McQueen, 
2010, p. 159). RIM continues to act as an MVNO in different capacities. Its BlackBerry Messenger service 
is available almost anywhere in the world, allowing BlackBerry users to communicate with each other 
regardless of where they are located. This also allows users to share media, transfer documents, and chat in 
real time. Voice services are primarily facilitated by local telecommunications providers partnered with 
RIM.  
164 Another upgrade to this lineage known as EDGE qualified as an early 3G standard because it met the 
minimum technical specifications outlined by the ITU but only at peak rates and is often described in 
reference to other 2.5G standards (Lindmark et al., 2004, p.  309). 
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reason for creating its own MVNO stemmed from the uneven deployment of 2.5G 
technologies that slowed the development of the smartphone. With RIM in control of the 
flow of data to and from its BlackBerrys, however, it could coordinate the smartphone 
functionality based on what networks were available and allow consistent services across 
different markets. 
At the same time that the creation of an MVNO enabled RIM to create and 
manage a global network for its devices, it also afforded an opportunity to evolve 
functional capabilities. Specifically, because Mobitex and ARDIS were optimized for 
asynchronous wireless data transfer, MVNO RIM could build voice on top of its wireless 
capabilities. The design of the 5800 created a basic, albeit somewhat haphazard, 
integration of voice and data connectivity that was aesthetically similar to other existing 
PDAs including RIM’s own 957. While it allowed for important technical (convergence 
of voice and data) and political-economic (the creation of an MVNO) advancements, it 
still was not the market-defining device RIM was looking for as it drew too heavily on 
the design of existing devices.  
Released in 2003, the next BlackBerry iteration, the 7200 (figure 15), solidified 
the IMD aesthetic and function for the next four years (until the iPhone 3G began its 
major market push).165 With its growing corporate popularity,166 the 7200 became the 
                                                
165 In 2003 RIM released the 6200, beginning a design approach that would make the BlackBerry form 
factor (referring to its outward design characteristics) an iconic smartphone. It was also the first wireless 
device to be available with both voice and data anywhere in the world as it featured tri-band GSM 
functionality. Though it was an important advancement over the 5800, it maintained many of the latter’s 
software and components (and their limitations). It was replaced by the 7200. 
166 RIM’s subscriber base doubled between 2003 and 2004 from 534,000 to 1,069,000 (RIM, 2004, p. 17).  
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defining image of the smartphone for both professional users and, increasingly, “regular” 
consumers, as it was now designed to reflect the specific media needs of both individuals 
and institutions. The 7200 pushed the functionality of the BlackBerry with the inclusion 
of Bluetooth (7250) and wireless local access network (WLAN) capabilities (7270) 
geared toward voice over IP (VOIP). These innovations emphasized more expansive and 
diverse data usage as a key feature. Wireless data now could be produced by a 
BlackBerry handset in multiple standards to fit with the context of its use. As such, it 
allowed the networked integration of the device not only in the corporate space but also 
within a personal access network (PAN). Furthermore, the 7200 device also demonstrated 
the aesthetic growth of the BlackBerry from a boxy pager (850/950) to a 
QWERTY/email-enabled PDA encased in coarse plastic casing (957), to a smartphone 
(7200) featuring a smooth, rounded shape, suitable to be held in the palm of the hand. 
The 7200 also had a consumer friendly glossy plastic enclosure, larger buttons angled to 
maximize thumb-typing and, for the first time, a high-resolution colour screen. The 
broadening uses and aesthetic design of the BlackBerry reflected in the 7200 were a part 
of RIM’s strategic effort to expand its market to the mass consumer.  
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Figure 15: BlackBerry 7200, nicknamed “The BlueBerry.” 
Late in the following year (2004), RIM released the 7100 (figure 16), a device 
specifically designed to be RIM’s first “prosumer” device. From its marketing 
perspective, the prosumer segment comprises people purchasing the device for both 
professional and social uses (RIM, 2005). The central design strategy of the 7100 
involved a renewed emphasis on the individual by making the device slimmer to 
resemble the “candy bar” shape of most mobile phones.167 To accomplish this redesign, 
RIM had to compress the keyboard by making each button span two letters of the 
                                                
167 “The new 7100 opens them [RIM] up to an audience of individuals instead of just companies” (Bulik, 
2004). 
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QWERTY keyboard.168 Additionally, this hybrid design brought with it an enhanced 
software capability called “Suretype”: an algorithm RIM developed that learns to 
anticipate words with greater accuracy, making word suggestions when only a few letters 
have been typed. Building upon earlier software innovations, the algorithm also fills in 
important punctuation and spacing when necessary so as to speed up the composition of 
emails using this compressed keypad.169 The BlackBerry also became a platform for 
consuming and producing an expanding range of multimedia content as the 7100 offered 
several upgrades that reflected growing uses (for example the ability to see JPEG photos 
and other media files attached to emails).  
                                                
168 For example, on the 7100 keypad the number 1 would correlate to QW whereas on a standard phone 
keypad the number 1 is not assigned letters. This compressed QWERTY keyboard is still used in some 
newer BlackBerry models like the Style flip-phone.  
169 These added software features are now standard on all smartphones, with different variations, but here, 
in their infancy, they mark an important evolutionary pivot point for the role of software in enhancing the 
mobile typing experience. 
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Figure 16: BlackBerry 7100. 
With this new generation of BlackBerrys, RIM provided a device that could 
expand its highly profitable wireless data revenues on a per-user basis, increasing the 
profitability of each handset to the telecommunication provider as well. For example, an 
article in Adweek describes the specific profitability of the BlackBerry for the company 
Cingular Wireless, which could exact fees for both voice and data usage from BlackBerry 
subscribers. Adweek wrote:  
Cingular Wireless is voicing its support for data with its first major consumer 
campaign for its BlackBerry e-mail service. The out-of-home effort, breaking this 
month in the New York market, targets “prosumers” who are using their own 
money to purchase the devices and Cingular's Xpress Mail. “More traditionally 
with mobi-text [sic], business was paying for it,” said Glen Moyes, client director 
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of marketing for the New York City region. “But now there's a shift towards 
people paying for it themselves.” (Wasserman, 2004)  
Around the time of the launch of the 7100, “the prosumer” was becoming a 
discernible market segment. RIM also began to make an aggressive push into 
international markets. Though still growing, the primarily enterprise-level demand for 
BlackBerrys in North America was reaching a level of maturity that suggested slower 
growth. The prosumer push thus reflected, in part, a new global search for a broader 
market, not only for new devices, but also for wireless services in light of the spectrum 
auctions discussed at the outset of this chapter.  
RIM had developed enough experience dealing with telecommunication 
companies to capitalize on the fact that 2G and 2.5G mobile networks now covered most 
lucrative mobile markets in many parts of the world. The deployment of 2.5G 
international networks demanded more devices suited to the production and consumption 
of wireless data. Moreover, there was already a rapid competition to rollout 3G networks, 
which, in 2000, were subject of costly spectrum auctions in Europe (Ure, 2002). This 
meant telecom corporations, particularly in Europe, were looking to monetize their 
investments as quickly as possible. The astronomical price ($80 billion USD) paid by 
European telecommunications providers for the auctioned 3G spectrum is itself an 
indication of the inflated expectations associated with the development of the mobile 
Internet.170 3G constituted the coming of a data-intensive, Internet protocol (IP)-based 
                                                
170 As Ure (2002) explains, the main concern for European telecommunications providers, rendered debt-
ridden by the 3G auctions, was ultimately “consumer indifference” to wireless data, particularly in light of 
unimpressive Internet navigation using the wireless access protocol (WAP) applied by existing mobile 
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mobile network and, although RIM’s first official 3G BlackBerry would not be available 
for another four years, the BlackBerry represented a relatively popular device capable of 
monetizing wireless data.171 By 2006, 25% of RIM’s subscribers were outside North 
America reflecting the BlackBerry’s position as an international brand offering devices 
operating on all major international and domestic networks (RIM, 2006, p. 6).172 
BlackBerry users that year totaled five million worldwide. This figure constitutes a small 
part of the overall mobile market, but a doubling RIM’s user base from the previous year.  
From 1999-2005, RIM developed the BlackBerry into an international brand and, 
in so doing, a global ambassador for a new technological condition. With the integration 
of wireless voice and data capabilities, the global spread of the BlackBerry helped create 
a new market for telecommunications devices and services. As a technical expression of 
the myth of UC, the BlackBerry’s early history maps onto political economic changes 
associated with the rise of neoliberal policy-making and market competition. In this 
sense, the BlackBerry’s history offers a way of relating the variety of interests that made 
its early success possible. This involved the auctioning of spectrum and the need to 
provide telecommunications companies with means to redress investments related to it; 
                                                                                                                                            
 
phones (129). By 2004 the growing popularity of the BlackBerry for enterprise and increasingly consumer 
uses demonstrated a clear demand for premium wireless data services and devices. 
171 RIM launched the popular 8700, which operated on the proto-3G network EDGE and offered new 
features allowing for the broader use of wireless data including web-browsing and multimedia handling. It 
also featured a newly designed Intel chipset developed to exploit mobile broadband usage. The 8700 was 
launched in Europe in 2006. 
172 By 2010 RIM would have a presence in 175 countries across 550 carriers and distributors (RIM, 2010). 
Indeed, by this time international expansion constituted the bulk of RIM’s profit base as it faced growing 
competition from both Apple and Android-based phones in North America, eroding its consumer and 
enterprise base (Weinberg, 2011). 
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investment in R&D, wireless infrastructure, and component manufacturing; and branding 
and marketing initiatives targeted at elite or professional users. 
This chapter has traced the development of the BlackBerry as a specific 
“solution” to the problems associated with the commercialization of wireless data 
networks and devices outlined in the previous chapter. RIM’s success in this endeavour 
stemmed from a number of contingent factors including the concentration of skilled and 
experienced personnel, the development of strategic partnerships, the cultivation of 
consumer demand, and the resulting evolution of BlackBerry devices and services. 
Together, these factors provided the basis for the development of a global market for 
wireless data networks and devices.  
In the next chapter, I turn to on the policy environment that nurtured RIM’s 
development but one that also reflects a broader mythic framework implicating the 
condition of UC represented by the BlackBerry.  
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Chapter 5 – From  “New Economy” to “Creative Economy”: 
RIM in Policy Context 
5 Introduction 
In the last chapter, I focused primarily on commercial and technical forces 
shaping the development of the BlackBerry. As discussed, by 1999 ubiquitous 
connectivity (UC) was embraced by RIM and became an essential concept shaping the 
technical development of its devices and services, as well as its brand identity. In the last 
chapter, I historicized the development of the BlackBerry within the confluence of 
political economic interests seeking new devices and services consonant with a 
professional (elite) workforce, particularly in light of developments around spectrum 
auctions, wireless infrastructure, components, and the rising importance of email and the 
Internet for commercial organizations. Yet the myth of UC that underpins these 
developments, and to which RIM’s success (and failure) is intimately tied, is itself born 
out of the “new economy” rhetoric that came to define public policy initiatives in Canada 
(as well as in the United States)—rhetoric specifically dealing with labour and 
technology. Beginning in the 1980s, but accelerating during the 1990s, the new economy 
mantra reflected and extended theoretical and policy frameworks in which an economy 
emphasizing knowledge, communication, and services became increasingly central. Thus 
the seeds for the global expansion of the BlackBerry brand (and the myth of UC) as the 
“ambassador” not only of a new device category but of a purportedly new condition were 
planted by RIM but nurtured within the soil of public policies (both domestically and 
internationally) that emphasized the communicative and creative capacities of workers 
and consumers (and the purported efficiencies and cost savings associated with their 
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flexibility and mobility). Given this emphasis on post-industrial intangibles, such as 
information, knowledge, and creativity, the “value proposition” (to use an oft-deployed 
marketing term) forwarded by RIM involved its role in providing tangible tools for 
intangible products. RIM thus provided both public and private interests with the means 
to fully network, connect, and manage their workers regardless of time or location. 
Unsurprisingly, RIM’s success became a focal point of Canada’s technology 
sector and the country’s technology-related economic policies. Having described RIM’s 
growth in the previous chapter in relation to the commercialization of wireless devices 
and services, this chapter demonstrates how the company itself benefited from a specific 
policy “environment.” To be clear: this is not to make the shallow assertion that RIM’s 
success was caused directly by particular post-industrial policies but, rather, that its 
history (and thus the development of UC itself) is fundamentally intertwined with 
them.173  
In this short chapter, I will return to the role of post-industrial myths in 
coordinating both public and private innovation, and illustrate how RIM is but one 
example of this coordinated vision. I intend to examine how the rhetoric of the new 
economy in Canada had two important implications within the policy contexts that 
                                                
173 This section also relates to an earlier discussion regarding the failure of the Palm Pilot and the success of 
the BlackBerry in becoming an ambassador of the era of ubiquitous connectivity. In the US, the politics of 
funding for nascent technology companies associated with the rise of venture capital was incredibly 
volatile. Such volatility has lead to the demise or stagnation of many potentially lucrative enterprises, 
simply on the bargains, or trade-offs, between investors (banks, other corporations, venture capitalists) and 
finance starved entrepreneurs (Palm being one important example). RIM, however, had the distinct 
advantage of being within a policy environment that was trying to emulate the incredible successes and 
wealth generated by Silicon Valley companies. As a Canadian company, with a prospectively lucrative 
market niche, in the era of global competition for leadership/supremacy in technology markets guided by 
the Schumpeterian belief in “creative destruction,” RIM became a symbol of Canada’s technological 
future—particularly after the long and painful demise of Nortel. 
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shaped RIM’s early success in commercializing wireless data and devices. The first was 
in generating the policy frameworks geared toward stimulating Canada’s information and 
communication technology sector through strategies focusing on innovation. The second 
morphed the language of the new economy into policy frameworks aimed at harnessing 
intellective capacities (communication, co-operation, cognition) for economic growth. As 
I will address in chapter 6, this second context has facilitated the restructuring of public 
and (especially) private organizations in ways that have concentrated their activities 
towards increasing the management and efficiency of human capital using ICTs. It was 
when these policy contexts converged that the BlackBerry emerged as more than a 
successful product and brand. It also became an iconic tool of post-industrial myth-
making. 
Above all, this chapter is meant to illustrate, through its use of a specific example, 
that technological change, growth strategies, and policy environments are intimately 
connected as together they constitute expressions of deeper social-economic structures 
and conditions. As Melody explains, both technological innovation and related policy 
developments “have been shaped by market forces, the priorities of financial capital, the 
results of court decisions, and a variety of old and new social, cultural and political 
institutions. And all these developments have been informed, for good or ill, by the 
scholarly and other knowledge of the day” (Melody, 2007, p. 70). ). In other words, what 
appears in policy work is an expression of a variety of economic, political and cultural 
forces. Myth has played an important historical role in shaping Canadian policy and 
cultural identity (Babe, 1990, pp. 3), but myth has been particularly important in the 
application of Schumpeterian theories of innovation in liberalizing technology markets 
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(Babe, 1990, p. 19). With this in mind, I begin with an examination of new economy 
rhetoric in Canada as it has been employed by various actors, agencies, and organizations 
to create policies addressing rapid technological change, particularly around ICTs. I then 
outline how this rhetoric has framed both federal and provincial policies incorporating 
post-industrial strategies focusing on the intellective capacity of workers, the generation 
and commercialization of new knowledge (innovation), and the re-shaping of public and 
private institutions (e.g. public-private partnerships (PPP), patents as measure of 
innovation, tax credits/incentives for investment, private and public venture capital). In 
sum, this chapter links the specific policy context that supported RIM’s development 
with a more general policy climate (e.g., the new economy) that encouraged investment in 
new technologies (e.g., IMDs) in order to harness and exploit the intellective capacities of 
workers. 
5.1 Building Canada’s “New Economy” 
RIM’s founding in 1984 took place during a period of significant deregulation 
within the Canadian ICT sector. In particular, the 1983 restructuring of Bell 
Communications Enterprises (BCE) heralded a new era in which Canada would 
foreground the use of market forces to regulate the development of ICTs in the country 
(Babe, 1990). Similarly, the breakup of AT&T in 1984 by the US Federal Trade 
Commission (FTC) and US Department of Justice ignited a new period in which market 
competition would play a greater role in the development of telecommunications services 
in North America (Kenedy, 1989). Combined with the move towards the North American 
Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), Canada’s technology sector would be induced to 
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become more efficient and competitive or face a takeover by foreign, especially 
American, capital.  
In the decade (1984-1994) leading up to both NAFTA and the Internet boom,174 
rhetoric about the new economy was already beginning to influence policymakers across 
North America (Atkinson, 2000; Canadian Labour Congress, 1993). In the U.S., among 
the most enthusiastic, and arguably powerful, champions of the new economy was Alan 
Greenspan (Ball & Tchaidze, 2002; Editors, 2001; Foust, 1997; Ip & Schlesinger, 2001; 
Lundvall, 2004; Palley, 2005) who served as chairman of the U.S. Federal Reserve from 
1987-2006. A speech given to the National Governors’ Association in 2000 entitled 
“Structural Change in the New Economy” is indicative of Greenspan’s conceptualization 
of this economic order. In his speech Greenspan argued that it was “the proliferation of 
information technology through the economy that makes the current period appear so 
different from the preceding decades…One result of the more-rapid pace of IT innovation 
has been a visible acceleration of the process that noted economist Joseph Schumpeter 
many years ago term ‘creative destruction’” (quoted in Anonymous, 2001a). As a 
proponent of the new economy, and particularly the role of ICTs in driving the 
                                                
174 As another notable moment of synchronicity, in 1994 a July 25th edition of Time Magazine featured the 
cover story “The Strange New World of the Internet: Battles on the frontiers of cyberspace.” 
http://www.time.com/time/covers/0,16641,19940725,00.html. A month later Newt Gingrich’s Freedom and 
Progress Foundation published the first iteration of the highly influential piece “Cyberspace and the 
American Dream: A Magna Carta for the Knowledge Age” written by George Gilder, Alvin Toffler, Esther 
Dyson, and George Keyworth. The paper would go on to be published in the academic journal The 
Information Society in 1996 (See Webster et al., 2004). See http://www.pff.org/issues-
pubs/futureinsights/fi1.2magnacarta.html. In October 1994, Mosaic Communications Corporation released 
the Mosaic Netscape 0.9 web browser, or what would later be called Netscape Navigator, effectively 
opening up web browsing to the mass public and private sector interests. 
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productivity and stock market gains of the 1990s,175 Greenspan’s position as Chairman of 
the U.S. Federal Reserve legitimized costly investments in new technologies and their 
purported heightening of the intellective capacities of workers.176 The economic boom 
experienced in the U.S. during Greenspan’s tenure as head of the Federal Reserve, and 
his championing of the importance of ICTs to the new economy, furthered his influence 
among other national and supra-national policy makers (OECD, 2001).177 
In Canada, similar rhetoric helped foreground the role of entrepreneurialism, 
market competition, and R&D investment (both public and private) for stimulating 
indigenous Canadian innovations, as well as the drive to modernize industrial 
manufacturing towards information or knowledge-centered production activities 
(Canadian Labour Congress, 1993; Menzies, 1996, 1997). Market mechanisms came to 
                                                
175 In early 1994 the Dow Jones Industrial Average (DJIA) sat at a mere 3,600. By January of 2000, at the 
peak of the tech bubble, the DJIA stood at 11,700 (Steinbock, 2003, p. 114). According to economist Dan 
Steinbock, the “irrational exuberance” (a term used by Alan Greenspan himself in 1996) represented by this 
surge in stock valuation was driven by the perceived potential economic value of the Internet and mobile 
technologies. Between 1994 and 1999 the Internet expanded from a $34 billion USD industry to one worth 
$257 billion USD (p. 114). Valuation associated with mobile technologies was stimulated by the perceived 
future value of 3G spectrum licenses and the global adoption of GSM which inflated the stock valuation of 
many European vendors (particularly Nokia and Ericsson). At its peak in 2001 (before the bubble burst), 
Nokia had a market capitalization of $260 billion USD (p. 116), dropping to $74 billion USD in 2003 (p. 
116) (at the end of February 2013 it sits at $14 billion USD). Other companies associated with mobile 
technologies experienced similar extreme fluctuations during this period (p. 119). 
176 The link between ICTs and increased economic productivity has itself been hotly debated (see OECD, 
2001; Steinbock, 2003), partly because of the difficulty of measuring or quantifying productivity gains for 
“intangible” products like knowledge, information, and creativity. For a detailed Marxist critique see 
Garnham, 1998. 
177 Among the most central factors identified by the OECD (2001) for the rapid GDP growth in the U.S. 
during the 1990s were: 1) new capital investment in ICTs, 2) rising quality of labour related to rising 
educational attainment and skill level, 3) “greater efficiency in how capital and labour are combined,” what 
they refer to as “multi-factor productivity” (MFP) (pp. 6-7).  The report also suggests that,  
The growth of MFP also seems linked to the efficiency-enhancing benefits from the use of ICT, 
when combined with organizational change and better skills. Policies that engage ICT, human 
capital, innovation and entrepreneurship in the growth process, alongside policies to mobilize 
labour and increase investment, are likely to bear the most fruit over the longer term. (p. 8) 
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play a greater role both in guiding the R&D of new technologies as well as their adoption 
by consumers (primarily through the increase in marketing and advertising around new 
devices and services). In this regard, the passing of NAFTA removed export barriers for 
Canadian products, and telecommunications acts in both Canada (1993) and the U.S. 
(1996) legislated more liberalized export/import markets, ICT production activities, and 
economic conditions for service sector developments. In particular, the U.S. 
Telecommunications Act of 1996 enabled the creation of a relatively unregulated market 
(at least in terms of government regulation) for “information services” that did not carry 
the same public good and universal access mandates of previous pieces of legislation 
(Hendricks, 1999; Common Cause, 2005). The Act’s inclusion of “information services” 
as a new category—re-regulated to maximize the influence market dynamics—was 
particularly important for the commercial development of personalized wireless data 
services and devices (Zysman, 1995). Although the net neutrality and common carriage 
debates infused some considerations of public good into the regulation of wire-line 
Internet access, the wireless data sector was to be shaped almost exclusively by market 
forces and, thus, corporate interests.  
Two companies emerged to become emblematic of the “new economy” in 
Canada. The first was Nortel, a company born from the privatization of Bell Canada’s 
hardware and component division. 178 Nortel produced innovations that built the largely 
unseen infrastructure of the ubiquitous network society (focusing initially on optical 
                                                
178 At its height, Nortel had a market valuation of $350 billion CDN (Fogarty et al., 2007, p. 167). Its 
resulting decline culminated in the liquidation of its assets, including crucial 3G/4G patents, beginning in 
2009. 
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cables179 and later developing important patents for 3G, 4G, and WiMax wireless 
standards).180 Ultimately Nortel fell victim to the dot com crash of 2001, in large part due 
to massive debts incurred through a misplaced belief in continued demand for network 
infrastructure (Hunter, 2002). The second commercial enterprise was Research In 
Motion. As addressed in previous chapters, RIM went on to create a new consumer 
device market—the smartphone—and an iconic, household brand in the BlackBerry. The 
BlackBerry also played a central role in promoting and reproducing myths related to the 
power of networks, connectivity, and the Internet within the new economy. Thus the 
“always on” capabilities enabled by an experienced using the Blackberry served as a 
tangible expression of the vision articulated by Alan Greenspan, Bill Clinton, and 
others.181  
5.2 Ontario in the new economy182 
                                                
179 Significantly, Nortel actively promoted its own all-encompassing narratives about societal 
transcendence through ICTs. Beginning in 1976, Nortel underwent a variety of transformations from digital 
technologies, to optical cable, then wireless broadband. Each transformation carried its own mythic 
narrative. For example, the “fiber world” campaign launched in the 1990s helped push its product line of 
optical fiber cables (Cole, 2000). 
180 These patents were later acquired in 2011 by a consortium of wireless companies including Apple, 
Microsoft, and RIM for $4.5 billion USD (Arthur, 2011). 
181 As I described in the previous chapter, before RIM’s BlackBerry made the smartphone a household 
name, the possibility of creating a mobile Internet device, while highly anticipated, was still fraught by 
several regulatory and technical obstacles. As such, there was little indication of the profitability warranting 
the substantial investments in research and infrastructure required. The BlackBerry was the first real 
success story indicating the potential profitability of wireless data services and devices. 
182 This section is not meant as an exhaustive survey, but a representative sample. Invoking the “new 
economy,” and related conceptualizations, is still central to Ontario policy-making. The 2011-2015 Ontario 
Liberal Party platform (the party that has been in power since 2003-2013) uses the term extensively. For 
example, a typical usage goes as follows: “…the Liberal Plan is making our province a leader in the new 
economy” (Ontario Liberal Party, 2011, p. 14). 
187 
 
The Ontario government has played an important role in developing funding 
mechanisms for technological innovation. Ontario’s own approach to the “new economy” 
adopted a broader techno-nationalist narrative that made sense of the changing 
composition of the provincial economy (specifically, the erosion of the manufacturing 
sector).183 The Ontario Technology Fund (OTF) was set up to help fund emerging 
technology companies consonant with the policy shifts outlined above:  
The Ontario Technology Fund was established in 1986 with the goal of helping 
build a more innovative economy within the province by harnessing the ideas 
emerging from R&D groups in universities and throughout the private sector. By 
1992, the original fund was fully committed. In the six years that the Technology 
Fund has been in existence, it has become increasingly clear that we are in the 
midst of profound global economic changes. (Government of Ontario, 1993)  
In addition, the Ontario government widely promoted public-private partnerships 
(PPP) policies to leverage its substantive university assets into quantifiable economic 
gains by commercializing research. The University Research Incentive Fund, with an 
initial funding base of $6.7 million CDN, was established in 1991 “to encourage 
                                                
183 Once Canada’s industrial and manufacturing leader, Ontario has experienced systemic erosion of these 
industries. For example, between 1989 and 1995 manufacturing employment dropped by 260,000, a loss 
attributable to the adoption of NAFTA (Wolf & Gertler, 2001, p. 581). During this period, employment in 
manufacturing declined by 30%, roughly the same percentage decline as the number of 
employers/establishments in manufacturing (p. 583). Though manufacturing and other heavy industries are 
still a significant employer in the Ontario economy, labour statistics evidence protracted, though 
fluctuating, job losses, a trend that has accelerated in the last decade. Between 2004 and 2008 Ontario lost 
198,600 manufacturing jobs, the bulk of manufacturing jobs lost in Canada (322,000) during that period 
(Bernard, 2009, p. 9). Over the same period, GDP in goods producing industries declined from $138 
million CDN in 2005 to $129 million CDN in 2008. Thus while employment in goods producing sectors 
during this period declined by 18.1% (Bernard, 2009, p. 9), GDP in this sector declined by only 4.5% 
(Statistics Canada and Ontario Ministry of Finance, 2009). As of 2011, manufacturing accounts for 12.9% 
of Ontario GDP (Ontario Ministry of Finance, 2012). 
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universities and the private sector to enter into cooperative research ventures” 
(Government of Ontario, 1993). 
In the context of Ontario, reports related to these programs deployed a variety of 
new economy tropes. A 1993 task force assembled by the Ontario Premier’s council to 
review the OTF cast its assessment as a futuristic report to the Ontario premier of 2002. 
In this case, it projected the basic components of the new economy into a future that re-
envisioned Ontario as a utopia of post-industrial innovation. By projecting its evaluation 
into the future, the review strongly embraced both the rhetoric and vision of the OTF. 
The report emphasized the importance of “idea-based innovation” stemming from R&D, 
arguing that the source of economic growth in the new economy comes primarily from 
“the application of ideas, rather than the physical transformation of objects” (Task Force, 
1993). In the introductory remarks, the Task Force authors wrote that,  
wealth creation through innovation requires the development of a new framework 
of understanding about ideas and their relation to economic growth. Incorporating 
the role of ideas (technological innovations) into the neoclassical theory of 
economic growth results in major new insights, and forces a reconsideration of 
economic policy and regulations. We learn that a sustained investment in ideas to 
produce tradable goods and services can permanently raise a country’s economic 
growth rate. (Task Force, 1993, pp. 1-2)  
Though not particularly original in its analysis and recommendations, the timing 
of the report, in light of more profound changes in the Ontario economy gave these 
recommendations the “aura” of truth. 
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In a similar vein, a 1995 report to the Ontario Premier’s Council entitled 
“Performance Measurements in the New Economy” describes how the seeming necessity 
of policies related to technological innovation were a direct response to broad 
transformations in the global economy that emphasized the central importance of 
“intangibles”—knowledge, information, creativity—as primary generators of wealth 
(McLean, 1995). In this report, a number of post-industrial prophets and theorists are 
cited, including Paul Hawken, Stanley Davis, Chris Freeman, and Peter Drucker. While 
perhaps not as well known as other post-industrial theorists like Daniel Bell, it was 
Drucker who coined the term knowledge worker and who wrote influential management 
texts like The Concept of the Corporation and Innovation and Entrepreneurship. Drucker 
also frequently acted as a consultant for federal and provincial agencies in Canada 
(Drucker, 2010). In a section from the “Performance Measurements in the New 
Economy” report entitled “Tangible versus intangible assets,” Drucker is quoted 
approvingly: “[t]he industries that have moved into the center of the economy in the last 
40 years have as their business the production and distribution of knowledge and 
information, rather than the production and distribution of things” (quoted in McLean, 
1995). 
Joining Drucker as a recurring theorist cited in Ontario’s new economy policy 
framework is James Quinn, author of influential management text The Intelligent 
Enterprise, which figures prominently in the Ontario report. A typical quotation reads:  
[w]ith rare exceptions, the economic and producing power of a modern 
corporation lies more in its intellectual and service capabilities than in its hard 
assets—land, plant, and equipment. Similarly, the value of most products and 
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services depends primarily on the development of knowledge-based intangibles, 
like technological know-how, product design, marketing presentation, 
understanding of customers, personal creativity, and innovation. (McLean, 1995) 
What these examples illustrate is that the rhetoric of the “new economy” offered a 
post-industrial architecture for Ontario’s technology policies—policies that, as I will 
argue in the next section, underpinned the funding of RIM’s formative years.  
5.3 Funding RIM184 
Taken together, the national and provincial policy climate, and the resulting 
funding approach, served RIM well. The company’s initial founding involved a $15,000 
CDN loan from the Government of Ontario New Ventures loan program in 1984 and it 
was tax credits that provided RIM with the financial ability to survive its infancy as it 
sought out contracts to keep itself afloat. In 1994, the OTF provided $4.7 million CDN 
which, as Sweeny notes, was a huge sum “greater than RIM’s annual revenue at the time” 
(2009, p. 130). Fulfilling its new role in creating public-private partnerships, the 
University of Waterloo helped RIM secure $100,000 CDN in 1993–1994 from the 
Industrial Research Assistance Program.  
As a result of new initiatives that facilitated foreign investment, later in 1994 RIM 
secured a $300,000 CDN investment from Ericsson; a Swedish company that, as a result 
of its partnership with Rogers, had a growing presence in the Canadian 
telecommunications sector (Rogers, 2008). Ericsson’s investment was predicated on an 
                                                
184 Except where noted, all data about government funding are drawn from McQueen, 2010, pp. 41, 76-77. 
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initial grant from the Ontario Development Corporation (ODC) (Sweeny, 2009, p. 128). 
A crucial component of this early investment was that neither Rogers nor Ericsson would 
gain any ownership rights to RIM or its products, thus allowing it to remain autonomous. 
In 1998, RIM secured a $5.7 million CDN loan from Industry Canada’s “Technology 
Partnerships Canada” initiative. This provided crucial funding that allowed RIM to fulfill 
Bellsouth’s $70 million USD order of the first BlackBerry 850 pager. Similarly, 
government backing of this sort helped bring Intel a partnership with RIM to supply 
custom chips. As described in chapter 4, this was important because Intel had to invest in 
infrastructure to produce a specialized chipset that would accommodate the needs of the 
BlackBerry, but without some guarantee on funding it could not fully justify these 
investments. Intel is one of the semiconductor industry’s largest companies and by 
committing to build this new chipset, Intel and BellSouth/Cingular indicated that they 
intended to make a significant effort to commercialize wireless data.  
In 2000, RIM received $33.9 million CDN from Industry Canada, and another 
$12 million CDN in 2002 from the federal Scientific Research and Experimental 
Development (SR&ED) tax credit program. In this case, RIM’s competitive advantage, in 
part, rested on the financial support it received from public institutions, both provincial 
and federal.185  
                                                
185 Beginning in the mid-1980s the Canadian strategy involved both national and provincial level initiatives 
and comprised programs such as venture capital allocation, tax credits, government grants or loans, as well 
as loosening restrictions on foreign investment and trade (see Niosi et al., 2000 for an overview and history 
of Canada’s national strategy for innovation or NSI). In particular, the federal income tax system was used 
as a mechanism to foster private investment in R&D. Using “tax incentives” for scientific research and 
experimental development (SR & ED), the federal government of Canada implemented a combination of 
income tax deductions and investment tax credits to broadly promote R&D in the private sector 
(Department of Finance Canada, 1997). These tax incentives were designed to compensate for the extant 
“market failure” in R&D that had left Canada at a disadvantage with respect to the rigors of the ‘new 
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5.4 University of Waterloo and Canada’s Technology Triangle  
Canada’s new economy policy framework not only benefited RIM in its formative 
years, but it was also important for the Waterloo region as an economic cluster. Indeed, 
RIM and the Waterloo region became the success stories used to promote the “new 
economy” Canada and the effectiveness of Ontario’s new economy strategy focusing on 
R&D and the commercialization of knowledge. For many policy-makers, the success of 
the Waterloo region legitimated the symbiotic success of public-private partnerships 
(PPP),186 whether directly through joint-ventures and programs or through the creation of 
                                                                                                                                            
 
economy’ whose vitality relied on R&D as an essential lynchpin. This system of tax incentives was put into 
place during the period 1983–1985, and was mirrored or augmented by provincial tax policies, particularly 
in Ontario. 
186 The valorization of R&D in the private sector was mirrored in the public sector. Beginning in the mid-
1980s, the rhetoric of the new economy was increasingly used in policy directed at the public sector. In the 
midst of major declines in manufacturing capacity and employment, Ontario policy-makers increasingly 
focused on investments in post-secondary education as way to offset these losses (see Wolfe & Gertler, 
2001). According to the dictums of the new economy, public institutions––particularly universities––were 
to play an integrated and complimentary role in stimulating the commercialization of new knowledge. 
Fears of Canada’s inability to adapt to the rigors of the new economy also ushered in a restructuring of the 
role of universities and other publicly funded research institutions in the creation of private–public 
partnerships (PPP). The fetishistic use of the term innovation entailed a closer integration of University 
research into the commercialization of new knowledge through ICTs.  As an ancient institution supposedly 
dedicated to the dispassionate pursuit of knowledge as a good in-and-of itself, the definition of innovation 
deployed by policy-makers positioned the university as a knowledge factory (David, 1997; Aronowitz, 
2000; Bramwell & Wolfe, 2008). Beginning in the 1980s under Prime Minister Mulroney (1984-1993), but 
accelerating during the Chretien years (1993-2003), the federal government began to craft policies focused 
on “integrating market principles into higher education.” Public funding was a means of stimulating the 
production of exploitable knowledge, only to transfer the economic benefits to the private sector. 
Consequently, universities in Canada became a focus of “innovation policies…aimed at fostering the use of 
the best (science and technology) to produce new and competitive ‘first-to-market’ products and new 
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a proximate pool of skilled IT professionals and prospective entrepreneurs. Central to this 
narrative of success was the University of Waterloo as a model for the role universities in 
Canada could (and should) play in creating and commercializing new knowledge. 
Thus, in addition to grants, tax credits, and loans acquired through state funding, 
the university was another important public institution at the core of RIM’s relative 
success and autonomy. One of Waterloo’s differences in relation to other Canadian 
universities was its policy of allowing researchers to maintain control over the intellectual 
property, including the patents, created on campus. This fostered a university culture that 
melded science and technology research with entrepreneurialism. Founded in 1957 under 
the guidance of local businessmen Ira Needles and Gerry Hagey,187 the university was 
geared towards funneling academic research directly into the private sector, thereby 
preceding the recommendations that would make such motivations a federal and 
provincial policy goal. Dubbed the Waterloo Plan,188 they included two important 
policies for the new university: 1) a co-op placement component for university programs 
that would allow students to rotate between academia and the private sector; and 2) as 
stated above, researchers, rather than the university, would own the patents arising from 
                                                                                                                                            
 
production processes, and the innovative organizational approaches and management practices that support 
these activities” (Doern & Stoney, 2009, p. 9).  
187 Gerald Hagey was an advertising and public relations manager at B.F. Goodrich Canada, a tire and 
rubber manufacturer, before becoming the first chancellor of the University of Waterloo. Ira Needles was 
the president of B.F. Goodrich Canada before becoming the second chancellor of the University.  
188 For a history of the University of Waterloo, see Dmitrienko, 1999. 
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their research. Nelles et al. (2005), attribute the University’s “spin off success” to this 
second policy.  
The University of Waterloo, by the 1990s, constituted a publicly sponsored 
engine for commercializing academic research (particularly research related to science, 
technology, engineering, and math—or STEM), albeit by turning the researchers 
themselves into entrepreneurs by foregrounding their ownership of knowledge (and its 
exploitation). By 2007, at least 47 firms had been identified as offshoots of research 
originally generated at the University of Waterloo (Bathelt et al., 2010, p. 524). More 
generally, the University has contributed to local economic development “through its 
ability to generate and attract the talent that underpins academic and applied excellence in 
science, math and engineering, support for local firm-based R&D, and its explicit 
institutional support for entrepreneurial activity at the local level” (Bramwell & Wolf, 
2008, p. 1176). A 2001 study by PriceWaterhouseCoopers’ suggested that 22% (or 250) 
of all “spin-off companies” in Canada had emerged from the Waterloo region (Bramwell 
& Wolfe, 2008). 
Although RIM itself was not a direct offshoot of university research, as explained 
in the previous chapter, they benefited from the university and its pro-business 
orientation, as did many other interests in the surrounding area. Indeed, this is the local 
culture that spawned the institutional and intellectual foundations of RIM itself and 
continues to supply it with skilled labour as well as a regional economy of bourgeoning 
entrepreneurs (Bathelt et al., 2010, p. 530). This fact has been regularly mentioned by 
RIM’s executives and in local and regional business news coverage (Smith, 2004). RIM 
founder Mike Lazaridis has donated upwards of $130 million CDN to the University of 
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Waterloo, including $100 million CDN to establish the Perimeter Institute for Theoretical 
Physics (Smith, 2004). On the economic importance of Waterloo and other universities, 
according to Mike Lazaridis, 
The number one reason to fund basic research…is to attract the very best 
researchers from around the world. Once here, they can prepare Canada’s next 
generations of graduates, masters, PhD’s and post-doctorates, including the finest 
foreign students. All else flows from this…If you really want to understand 
commercialization [of knowledge], all you have to do is attend convocation of 
your local university. (Lazaridis, 2004, p. 8) 
The University of Waterloo, however, is only one, albeit very important, 
institution within the regional ICT cluster branded as Canada’s Technology Triangle 
(CTT).189 Established in 1987 through a consortium of regional governments and 
corporate stakeholders, CTT emerged as a regional strategy to enhance the 
competitiveness of the Waterloo/Kitchener/Guelph region in the new economy.190 Its 
mandate was to draw international investment into the region, it also served as a high-
tech lobby group seeking investments or low-cost loans for the region from the provincial 
and federal governments (Ziedenberg, 1995). The CTT has additionally served to 
                                                
189 For details see http://www.techtriangle.ca 
190 Journalist Jason Ziedenberg describes the organization’s founding as follows:  
The Triangle was conceived at a trade show in the U.S. in 1987, when the industrial 
commissioners of the four towns realized that high - tech multinationals didn't care to know 
Kitchener from Cambridge. As they schemed about how the region could pool its resources to 
attract high - tech companies to make up for the devastating loss of auto - industry jobs, someone 
pointed out that highways eight and 24 tie the towns into a triangle, and a PR pitch was born. 
(1995, p. 34) 
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promote the narrative of economic growth through high-technology in the national and 
international media—a narrative that served to mask the “creative destruction” that has 
taken place in a once bustling manufacturing hub. For example, the region lost a third 
(7,000) of its unionized jobs between 1988 and 1994 (Ziedenberg, 1995).191 The 
institutionalization of CTT combined with its branding and marketing initiatives mirrored 
closely the overall federal and national narratives surrounding technology, innovation, 
and public-private partnerships. In the hopes of replicating the successes of other regional 
clusters, the CTT furthered the consolidation of private and public resources in the 
region. Specifically, the CTT as an organization expresses the post-industrial logic of the 
new economy emphasizing the concentration of knowledge/information/creative workers 
in the hopes of producing a regional synergy to attract national and foreign capital 
investment.192 
5.5 Ontario in a Creative Age 
The spectacular collapse of the Internet economy in 2001 exposed the limitations 
of “knowledge” and “information” as policy keywords, opening up opportunities for new, 
more seductive, frameworks within which to cast Ontario’s economy. Richard Florida 
provided one such framework, and it is worth referencing as a means of returning to the 
myth of UC and the BlackBerry. Florida, whose concept of the creative class is 
                                                
191 While the high-tech sector created wealth for some in the CTT region, the number of unemployed was 
almost 40,000 in 1994, “Jobs for unskilled persons are vanishing as the economy progressively shifts to 
high - value - added, high - skilled opportunities” (Smith, 1993). 
192 According to its promotional materials, the CTT boasts a GDP of $20 billion CDN (2011), 244 foreign 
owned companies, and $800 million CDN in private R&D expenditures (2009). See 
http://www.techtriangle.ca/en/recoursestools/QuickFacts.asp 
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emblematic of the types of post-industrial myths that have been at the heart of Canadian 
technology policy for decades, is one of the most widely cited contemporary theorists of 
the new economy.193 His influence on the language, scope, and goals of public policy has 
been far reaching, though with mixed results (Peck, 2005; Kraftke, 2010). 
 Florida’s influence in Canada arguably peaked in 2009 when he was commissioned 
to produce a report for the Ontario Government related to his thesis regarding the creative 
class.  As noted in chapter 2, the concept of the creative class highlights the intersection 
of knowledge/information and technology as a primary structuring force in social change 
and economic growth. After being, in effect, given his own think tank at the University of 
Toronto in 2007––the Martin Prosperity Institute––Florida was commissioned by Ontario 
Premier Dalton McGuinty to “undertake a study of the changing composition of 
Ontario’s economy and workforce,” to “examine historical changes and projected future 
trends affecting Ontario,” and then to “provide recommendations to the Province on how 
to ensure Ontario’s economy and people remain globally competitive and prosperous” 
(Florida, 2009, p. iv). The resulting report, entitled Ontario in the Creative Age, is the 
most recent example of Ontario’s search for a new model for economic growth centering 
on the keyword “creativity” championed by Florida. Consider the following passage from 
the report:  
The current economic transformation is as big and as challenging as the 
                                                
193 According to Google Scholar, Florida’s seminal text Rise of the Creative Class (2002) has been cited 
8,612 times. For the purposes of contrast Daniel Bell’s The Coming Post-Industrial Society (1976) has 
11,615 citations, and Alvin Toffler’s The Third Wave received only 5,169 citations. Results accurate as of 
February 2013. 
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transformation from agriculture to industry. Our economy is shifting away from 
jobs based largely on physical skills or repetitive tasks to ones that require 
analytical skills and judgment. This shift is also evident in the long-term trend 
away from employment in goods-producing to service industries, from 
occupations that depended on physical work to produce goods to ones that 
provide service and rely on creativity. The change is inexorable. We cannot turn 
away from it; nor can we slow it. The clock of history is always ticking. 
Competitive advantage and prosperity will go to those jurisdictions that can best 
prepare themselves and adapt to this long-run trend. We must embrace it and act 
in ways that create a distinctive advantage for the province and ensure our long-
term prosperity. (Florida, 2009, p. 3) 
With only minor changes in language and emphasis, this passage mirrors the 
perspective of the Ontario 2002 report commissioned fifteen years earlier! 
Coincidentally, even before Florida’s position at the Martin Prosperity Institute, he 
helped produce a report in 2002 titled Competing on Creativity: Placing Ontario’s Cities 
in North American Context (Florida et al, 2002). Prepared for the Ontario Ministry of 
Enterprise, Opportunity and Innovation, it provided a framework for understanding the 
post-industrial economy:  
Creativity has replaced raw materials or natural harbours as the crucial wellspring 
of economic growth.  To be successful in this emerging creative age, regions must 
develop, attract and retain talented and creative people who generate innovations, 
develop technology intensive industries and power economic growth. Such 
talented people are not spread equally across nations or places, but tend to 
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concentrate within particular city-regions… For policy makers, this work 
confirms the importance of urban centres in the knowledge economy and the need 
to investigate further the importance of higher education in this knowledge 
economy.  At the municipal level, this work points to the importance of 
collaborative efforts between local governments, firms, and individuals to 
reinforce and strengthen the unique urban character of their city-regions. (Florida 
et al., 2002, p. ii) 
Florida’s rise to prominence coincides with a certain crisis moment in Western 
capitalism in which knowledge and information are seen yet again as remedies for 
waning economic growth, but also with the growth of the era of ubiquitous connectivity 
as a defining ontological and technological condition. In fact, the creative class is 
precisely the generalized prosumer market always sought by RIM. Florida’s thesis, and 
his appointment to a major research institution in Ontario, synthesizes two strands in the 
post-industrial rhetoric of the past 30 years: on the one hand, the importance of a class of 
knowledge/information/creative workers in fostering technological innovation and, 
perhaps more broadly, social wealth; on the other hand, the belief that these social 
benefits emerge out of a confluence of regional and municipal dynamics that synthesize 
the economic (and therefore universal) needs of private industry.194 Yet the construction 
                                                
194 In a report entitled “Ontario’s Entertainment & Creative Cluster: A Framework for Growth,” The 
Ontario Ministry of Tourism and Culture estimates that job growth between 1999 and 2007 in Ontario’s 
“Entertainment and Creative cluster” has been 38.3%, doubling the job growth in the overall provincial 
economy (Ministry of Tourism and Culture, 2010). In this definition, the “creative economy” constitutes 
“all activities directly involve din the development and production of creative products and services” 
including “the supporting industries which enable the production and distribution of creative content” (p. 
3). According to this report, the creative industries in Ontario are responsible for $12.2 billion CDN of 
provincial GDP, while manufacturing accounts for $84.8 billion CDN, and the financial sector accounts for 
200 
 
of regional clusters like CTT, which emphasize the development and employment of 
creative and knowledge workers, primarily serves the process of private wealth 
production and accumulation. In this regard, Florida’s explanation is revealing: “access to 
talented and creative people is to modern business what access to coal and iron ore was to 
steelmaking” (Florida, 2004, p. 6). One could add that under the condition of ubiquitous 
connectivity, “access” holds a highly technological, if not exploitative, implication. 
Indeed, the language of creativity suggests the growth of highly desirable and fulfilling 
jobs at the core of the new economy.195 In many ways, the triumph of “creativity” as a 
central category of labour policy obscures the predominance of alienating service jobs 
while it also suggests, if only tacitly, the disappearance of well-paid occupations 
associated with industrial manufacturing.196  
In sum, Florida’s writing resonates with the celebratory rhetoric of the web 2.0 
era, but he has widened it in ways that also serve the general euphoria regarding the 
economic, political, and cultural centrality of the Internet and social media.197 Moreover, 
the creative class is a particularly popular strain of literature related to the post-Fordist 
                                                                                                                                            
 
$101.9 billion CDN (p. 4). According to this same report the “Creative industry GDP is now larger than 
Ontario’s energy industry, is approaching 70% of the auto manufacturing sector and surpasses those of 
agriculture, forestry and mining sectors combined” (p. 4). 
195 In fact Florida has widely publicized his theory of the creative class (and his books) by proclaiming that 
“creativity is the new economy.” As example, see http://www.huffingtonpost.com/richard-
florida/creativity-is-the-new-eco_b_1608363.html 
196 For a quite different assessment of Ontario’s workforce see Cerevan, 2009. 
197 A recent report by the Poverty and Employment Precarity in Southern Ontario (2013) describes 20% of 
Ontario’s workforce as being “precarious” (short-term, part-time work), a figure that has increased by 50% 
in the last 20 years (p. 5).   
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reorganization of the economy focusing on “human capital,” something Caffentzis 
identifies as the thematic of “cognitive capitalism,” which has gained popularity in both 
mainstream economic analyses and some critiques of capitalism (2011). Moreover, 
Caffentzis notes that the emphasis on cognition as an economic resource, or dynamo, is 
nothing specifically new, but extends back to some of capitalism’s most notable 
proponents and critics: “for Weber, Simmel and Hayek (but not for Keynes) the phrase 
‘cognitive capitalism’ was redundant” (Caffentzis, 2011).  
Simply put, the purported technological innovations lending credibility to ideas of 
cognitive capitalism and the creative class, as well as their emancipatory rhetoric, assume 
the progressive emancipation of human creativity and communication. One might 
critique the growing chorus of post-industrial myth-makers proclaiming a human 
progress by drawing upon the Marxist distinction between essence and appearance. In 
other words, while it appears that we are entering a radically new era of human progress 
lead by new economic models, technological innovation, and human creativity, this is 
partly a reflection of the multiplying apparatuses (ICTs) that have colonized and now 
mediate everyday life. Thus post-industrial myths have a real, material, and thus common 
sense foundation. Yet the basic dynamics of capitalist exploitation—wage labour, private 
property, commodification, private accumulation of social wealth—persist, arguably 
involving complex implications related to what Innis called monopolies of knowledge.  
 Furthermore, myths purporting to unleash capacities enabling creativity and 
cognition link technological innovation to public policy. Indeed, Florida’s overall 
characterization of his creative class is highly techno-centric, making “always on” media 
a defining tool of this group since such media maximize such capabilities. Perhaps more 
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tangibly, mobile technologies are analogous to the mobility said to inhere in the creative 
class itself since it is this very characteristic that policy makers are tapping into when 
they deploy this concept. That is, the very mobility of the creative class is precisely why 
urban and regional centers compete for their attention (see Cerevan, 2009).  
5.6 BlackBerry Brand as Tool of the New Economy 
By 2006, BlackBerry had not only become a global ambassador for technologies 
of ubiquitous connectivity (targeting multiple markets, from enterprise/institutions, to 
small-to-medium businesses (SMB), to professional users), it articulated a particular 
brand identity mirroring and deepening the myths of the new economy.  In so doing, RIM 
had crafted a particular artifact that embraced and valorized this “new technological 
condition” (see Reeves (2007) for an extensive analysis of RIM’s promotional 
discourses). As Reeves writes,  
the discourse of the devices [the BlackBerry] is reflective of global shift toward a 
‘new economy’ ideology that promotes an ethic of productivity and a sense of 
borderless fluxes. The result for the promotions of the BlackBerry…is that the 
connectivity it enables is presented as a means of increasing productivity. As this 
new ideology––or ethos––has developed, boundaries [between work and social 
life] have become increasingly blurred. (Reeves, 2007)  
Promotional strategy and imagery congealed into a very specific identity for the 
BlackBerry involving the integration of work and social life. This had its virtuous and 
not-so virtuous implications (i.e., “crackberry”). For corporate and business customers, 
the BlackBerry represented a tool for making the communicative and creative capacities 
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of labour more productive and efficient (an argument to be elaborated in the next 
chapter). For the individual consumer, it was a tool of adaptation to a new technological 
condition—a condition in which the flows of work and leisure resembled the global flows 
of information and capital. 
 The BlackBerry’s brand identity stressed the device’s ability to remain connected 
at all times, and to link this ability to an economic and cultural necessity: that competitive 
advantage, efficiency, productivity, and even social life itself depended on the individual 
remaining connected and being able to articulate one’s communicative capacities in this 
way. BlackBerry’s brand was precisely about providing this increasingly important 
ability—constant connectivity—to individual users, organizations, and institutions. As 
such, the brand was a crucial predecessor to the coming age in which the prosumer was 
no longer a discrete market segment, but a functional social actor, “always on,”198 
performing the role of post-industrial archetype. Along with it, however, many began to 
see the BlackBerry as a tool of worker control, blurred boundaries between labour and 
leisure, and a non-stop work cycle that was as chaotic as it was precarious (Middleton, 
2007). In linking up with this transformation in the working world, BlackBerry 
represented the technical realization of themes that had become familiar in rhetoric of the 
post-industrial world. Florida’s creative class was only the most recent example of a 
popular and influential literature in which human creativity, knowledge, and capacity 
would be the wealth generation engine par excellence. This sentiment became 
                                                
198 Here I use the term “always-on” in a double sense: the first one already articulated as a technological 
condition, the second I reference a more theatrical and performative sense of being on meaning that one is 
in effect always performing, whether it be in service of work, or in the iterative project of the self so 
essential to the consumerist ethos; see Bauman (2007). 
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internalized in the psyches of individuals and in the labour management policies of 
institutions. RIM’s marketability was premised precisely on fulfilling the promises of a 
new economy animated by human creativity and communicative capacity.  
Thus the BlackBerry brand acts as a paradigmatic expression of the 
aforementioned post-industrial visions in three important ways: 1) its “value proposition” 
relates directly to the plausibility of an economy based on “human capital,” where it is 
creative and communicative capacity that drives social and technological change, creates 
general social wealth, and ameliorates the conditions of exploitation and oppression that 
marked the industrial era; 2) its institutional history embodies this trajectory both through 
its private and public funding, and the general euphoria surrounding the value of “always 
on” technologies; and 3) it provides––at a very practical and personal level––a consumer 
device, service, and infrastructure that makes technically real the visions of post-
industrial prophets like Bell et al. for everyday users. 
In the next chapter I will outline parallel developments in the re-composition of 
labour management strategies in light of the growth of ubiquitous connectivity (focusing 
on RIM and the BlackBerry), developing theories of a mobile workforce and virtual 
organizations. I will thus highlight how the post-industrial myths contextualized (and 
reflected) new forms of labour management. As a post-industrial brand, RIM’s symbolic 
world is tied into a mythology that has brought together the evolution of ICTs and the 
wide-scale transformation of work itself.  
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Chapter 6 – From Telework to Ubiquitous Connectivity: The 
Rise of Mobile Workforces and Virtual Organizations 
“In the digital economy, the firm as we know it will be transformed. Just as the 
organisation is changing, so are the job and the nature of work itself. As the world of 
work shifts from the hierarchical corporation to the new extended structures, there is a 
shift in the potential for work location. The office is no longer a place, it is a system. The 
roles of individuals within that system are no longer just jobs but fundamentally new 
working relationships.” (Tapscott, 1996, p. 183) 
“All along we realized that we were giving you access to something incredibly valuable, 
which was your data store, your IT department, your databases, your infrastructure.  
That information defines the organization, the financial system, the ERP system, the SAP 
system, whatever you’ve got installed defines the organization.  Having access to that 
increases value and makes your job easier.  It allows you to accomplish that job from 
wherever you are.  So the whole paradigm of BlackBerry was not to replace that system, 
but to give you access to that system in a meaningful way, regardless of where you are, 
and whether you’re actually connected into your corporation.  That’s really what defined 
the BlackBerry mobile experience.  We weren’t trying to replicate the desktop.  We 
weren’t trying to replace the email system.  We weren’t trying to replace the database.  
All we were trying to do was to securely move that information out to the mobile user, 
regardless of where they were, in a way that didn’t compromise economics and didn’t 
compromise physics.” (Mike Lazaridis, 2008, p.10) 
6 Introduction 
In the previous chapter I briefly outlined the policy environment that nurtured 
both RIM’s institutional development and its signature brand. The policy arc that began 
with the rhetoric of the new economy and evolved into Richard Florida’s theory of the 
creative class offered a concise summary of the nature of post-industrial mythologies in 
Canada and beyond. The key point identified in this policy literature is the shifting 
conceptualization of labour’s productive capacity centering on intangible or intellective 
products and services.  
As I argued in Chapter 5, RIM’s creation of the BlackBerry—a brand intimately 
tied to the economic advantages of ubiquitous connectivity (UC)—benefited from this 
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policy environment in two crucial ways. First, the company secured direct funding, tax-
credits, and grants that kept it solvent in its initial period of research and development 
and partnership building. Second, RIM’s subsequent line of devices and services 
benefited from a policy climate that increasingly valorized the intellective capacities 
(CCC) of workers and consumers. While securing funding was of immediate importance 
for the survival of the company in a highly competitive market filled with large 
international technology companies, this policy climate facilitated the progressive uptake 
of RIM’s devices globally, particularly by large private and public organizations. 
This chapter contextualizes the success of the BlackBerry in relation to changes in 
labour and organizational management literature—literature that emerged to specifically 
deal with the exploitation of intellective capacities through ICTs amidst the growing 
connectivity of workers. Herein I argue that the theme of UC has underpinned this 
management literature, though at times only implicitly, as an end goal—a final threshold 
that for mythmakers like Toffler (1980) would result in the empowerment of workers and 
an end to their alienation in the labour process.  
It is not the intention of what follows to produce an exhaustive survey of labour 
and organizational management theory and its various responses to new ICTs. Rather, I 
select a few key themes in this literature that have framed the rise of UC and, with them, 
the commercial development of the BlackBerry (and related technologies). To 
accomplish this, the chapter is divided into four sections. The first looks at the growth of 
telework as a unifying term to indicate the remote management of information and 
knowledge workers through ICTs, exacerbating the separation between workers and the 
traditional spaces of work. The second section examines how the discourses around 
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telework began incorporating themes of virtualization—virtual work, virtual teams, and 
virtual organizations—in relation to the growth of networking technologies like LANs 
and the Internet. The third section provides an overview of the development of the market 
for wireless enterprise technologies.199  
6.1 Telework and the Crisis of Fordism 
“Telecommunication networks are the freeways of telework.” (Nilles, 1998, p. 69) 
The roots of UC as a labour and organizational management strategy lie within 
the various discourses and policies associated with the term telework. Telework emerged 
out of a confluence of four historical factors. The first three stem directly from the crisis 
of Fordist capitalist accumulation strategies (Harvey, 1989), while the fourth is situated in 
the social and political upheavals of the 1960s that saw workers pushing back against the 
so-called “organization man” (Whyte, 1956).  
The first factor was rising transportation costs associated with the oil crisis of the 
early 1970s. Cheap oil was an essential part of the circulatory needs of Fordist 
capitalism.200 In the case of infrastructural investment, the discourses on telework 
described the substitution of transportation costs for investment in ICTs, thus the need to 
strategically re-conceptualize the spatial and temporal dimensions of labour management 
                                                
199 It is important to note that these sections are not historically linear, but rather demonstrate overlapping 
tendencies that develop and adapt in relation to changing technologies and market demands. So while I 
discuss how the discourses of telework incorporated themes of virtualization, as I note, the term telework 
on its own still carries some currency with policy-makers around the world. 
200 According to the U.S. Energy Information Administration, the price of oil in real costs rose from $20 
USD in 1973 to $45 USD in 1975 and peaking at $98 USD in 1980. See 
http://www.nrcan.gc.ca/energy/publications/sources/crude/issues-prices/1463 
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(Huws et al., 1990). As a term emerging out of a re-organization of productive forces 
according to new infrastructural investments, telework offered an important conceptual 
touchstone upon which the myth of UC could build. That work processes could be 
mediated and managed remotely was not in-and-of itself new, but the simultaneous 
spread of microprocessors (and other innovations linking computing and 
telecommunications) in conjunction with a moment of capitalist crisis and re-organization 
offered fertile soil in which myths might grow.  
The second was the growing conceptual interest in intellective products like 
knowledge, information, and creativity as sources of economic growth (e.g., Porat, 1977). 
Indeed, the increasing emphasis on “knowledge/information” became an important 
element in the conceptualization of telework, as Illegems and Verbeke (2003) writes: 
“Knowledge jobs are more conducive to telework than other kinds of jobs. Therefore, 
sectors with a higher proportion of knowledge jobs have a higher proportion of telework; 
the service and public sectors have a high proportion of teleworkers” (p. 38). 
Management experts and policy-makers began focusing on the economic centrality of 
intellective capacities (i.e. CCC) as commodities or vehicles for selling services (for 
example, like wireless data and connectivity). As part of divestment in North American 
manufacturing capacity, commercial enterprises increasingly focused on patents, brands, 
and licensing, shifting the source of corporate profits to the rents accrued from 
monopolies of knowledge and creativity associated with commercial exploitation of 
CCC.201 Consequently, these intellective capacities were perceived to be an increasing 
                                                
201 See my discussion in chapter 3 for elaboration on this point. 
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input into the production (or realization) of these monopoly rents, and consequently 
become the focus of managerial control. Declining costs of manufactured commodities 
lead to an emphasis on services exploiting so-called “human capital,” and thus “material 
products become ‘vehicles’ for selling services” (Gorz, 2010, p. 76). At the same time, 
telework offered an opportunity to reduce costs associated with the spaced in which work 
occurs (offices, buildings, infrastructure, etc.). In McLuhan’s terminology, the hardware 
of Industrialism (offices, infrastructure, infrastructure etc.) gives way to the software 
ideals of post-Industrialism (knowledge, information, creativity, services etc.) (see 
McLuhan & Nevitt, 1972). 
The third antecedent to the rise of telework was the rapid innovation that began in 
the early 1970s associated with ICTs—innovation specifically associated with 
components of PC computing like microprocessors and semiconductors (microchips). 
Innovations in this area, and the opening up of mass consumer and corporate markets, 
often followed key regulatory challenges to the monopolies held by IBM and AT&T over 
computing and telecommunications respectively (Schiller, 2000). Instead, ICTs were seen 
as an area for market competition, and thus potential innovation. The expansion of the 
ICTs market and the growing use of computerized numerical control (Noble, 1977) 
exacerbated the economic problems of the early 1970s. The oil crisis also created further 
interest in the perceived ability of ICTs to drive economic growth in accordance with the 
assumptions implicit in the myth of UC. Consequently what was privileged was the 
circulation of information, knowledge, data, and most importantly, money in ways that 
would overcome economic barriers or inefficiencies concerning time and space (Hobijn 
& Jovanovic, 2000). If industrial myths represented fixed, immobile, monolithic capital 
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structures (and with them a similarly monolithic and organized labourer), post-industrial 
myths envisioned capital, but especially labour, as mobile, flexible, interchangeable, and 
potentially ubiquitous. The myth of UC is a contemporary manifestation of these 
keywords. 
Finally, the rise of telework also was couched in a rhetorical veneer suggesting 
that workers stood to gain greater freedom, flexibility, and control of their work. The 
ideal of worker empowerment as a central part of corporate management had been 
championed by Peter Drucker and others (Mickelthwait & Wooldridge, 1996), but it was 
also part of a struggle for the consent of the workers themselves. The social and political 
transformations of the 1960s inculcated a deep resentment against the atomizing and 
stultifying effects experienced by the “organization man” (Chiapello & Boltanski, 2005).  
Catalyzed by the crisis facing Fordist capitalism in the 1970s, telework 
increasingly became a key component of a management philosophy offering a “vision of 
the future” centered on the connectivity of remote workers, (Jackson et al., 1998, p. 3). 
As figure 14 demonstrates, the usage of the term itself emerges in the early 1970s then 
peaks in 1999 but continues to be used widely throughout the 2000s. Regarding the 
resiliency of this vision of the future captured in the rhetoric of telework, Huws writes:  
The predictions in question concern the use of information technology to enable 
people to work at a distance from their employers, generally at home. This 
development occupies so central a place in forecasts about the future of work that 
it is difficult to escape the suspicion that it has acquired a symbolic importance 
quite out of proportion to its actual prevalence. (Huws, 2003, p. 87)  
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Huws’ suggestion that telework’s symbolic significance outweighs its actual 
prevalence is a salient example of how myths can offer disproportionate symbolic power 
to those in a position to shape (and implement) visions of the future. In so doing they give 
the myth a reality—in hiring practices, infrastructure or technology investments, and 
management strategies. As a conceptualization supported by a managerial and 
technological actuality, telework acted as a myth that concealed or explained away 
deeper changes in the forces (i.e. ICTs) and relations (i.e. flexible, increasingly 
casualized labour) of production that began in the 1970s. 
 
Figure 17: Google Ngram graph for the appearance of  “telework” in searchable 
texts between 1970 and 2009. 
Telework has been a recurring theme for futurists and forecasters crafting a vision 
of a techno-utopian future defined by the triumph of human intelligence. Most notable 
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among these futurists has been Alvin Toffler (1974, 1980), who has depicted the future of 
work as taking place in an “electronic cottage” in which the fusion of production and 
consumption (prosumption) enabled by ICTs will bring about a new era of individual 
empowerment, autonomy, and freedom. In this respect, the term ‘telework’ encapsulates 
a particular ideal about how new ICTs could enable a condition of non-alienated future 
work in addition to a new spatial and temporal independence of labour from capital and 
vice-versa.202  
As Huws et al. (1990) and others (Verbeke et al., 2008) have noted, telework does 
not have a singular definition, and seemingly applies to a wide range of potential 
activities. Upon examining a variety of articulations, Huws et al. offer this useful 
definition: 
We define telework as work the location of which is independent 
of the location of the employer or contractor and can be changed 
                                                
202 Perhaps because of this ideal, the term “telework” became the center of some national and international 
public policy discourses (see Jackson et al., 1998). Despite the overall ambiguity of the term, its saliency as 
a public policy hallmark continues with an estimated 10-30 million teleworkers in the United States 
(depending on the definition) (see Telework Research Network for detailed statistics: 
http://www.teleworkresearchnetwork.com/telecommuting-statistics). Indeed, telework has become an 
important term in the reorganization of government work, with the U.S. government passage of the 2010 
Telework Enhancement Act (H.R. 1722, 2010) that stipulates the increase of government teleworkers 
across all government agencies. The Act offers this definition: “The term ‘telework’ or ‘teleworking’ refers 
to a work flexibility arrangement under which an employee performs the duties and responsibilities of such 
employee’s position, and other authorized activities, from an approved worksite other than the location 
from which the employee would otherwise work.” The Act requires that each agency develop a telework 
strategy, including timelines for implementation, cost of implements, potential savings, and job creation all 
being, perhaps contradictory, goals of the Act. Similar, processes have followed in public sector jobs in 
most nations. According to a 2012 report to the U.S. Congress by the United States Office of Personnel 
Management, 684,589 employees were determined to be eligible for telework (or 32% of the 2.2 million 
employees across effected agencies). Of those, 144,851 employees had formally entered telework 
agreements with their managers (United States Office of Personnel Management, 2012, p. 7). While no 
national statistics are readily provided, Transport Canada offers a detailed overview of Telework policies 
and working conditions (http://www.tc.gc.ca/eng/programs/environment-utsp-teleworkcanada-1052.htm). 
Telework as a public policy term thus is still widely used. 
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according to the wishes of the individual teleworker and/or the 
organization for which he or she is working. It is work which relies 
primarily, or to a large extent, on the use of electronic equipment, 
the results of which are communicated remotely to the employer or 
contractor. (Huws et al., 1990, p. 10) 
More recently, Long et al. (2010) define telework as “an alternative work 
arrangement in which workers are allowed to perform their tasks elsewhere, usually 
outside conventional offices using communication technologies to interact with others” 
(p. 4).  
As an alternative working arrangement, telework can be divided into three broad 
sub-categories of work: electronic homework, telecommuting, and flexiwork (Jackson et 
al., 1998, p. 31). Illegems and Verbeke offer a more refined typology comprising six 
different types of telework (2003, p. 19): 
1. Employee who works at a satellite office: outside central and/or branch offices, 
includes offshore. 
2. Employee who works at a telework centre; generally owned by a third party. 
3. Electronic homeworker; spends substantial part of the regular working day at 
home; equipped with technology permitting “continuous interaction with the 
employer.”  
4. Traditional homeworker; works at home for a substantial part of the day and “uses 
telecommunication technology only to transmit the results of her/his work.” 
5. Nomadic worker; works at various sites in response to changing business needs, 
uses telecommunication devices to communicate with the office. 
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6. Professional networker; self-employed “and uses telecommunication technology 
to deliver her/his services to more than one customer.”  
Management literature aside, telework, as Huws writes, “exists more powerfully 
as an ideological construct than as reality …” (2003, p. 99). Thus for the most part, the 
rhetoric of telework dealt more with the remote management of workers and their 
prospective empowerment or disempowerment, rather than on the specific technical 
capabilities required by workers to remain connected to the structures of labour 
management.203 Management literature heralding the rise of the mobile workforce204 
extended the telework discourse to stress the connectivity of workers, whether by 
transportation or networked ICTs (Pratt, 1997).205 Indeed, the early proselytizing around 
wireless data networks and services emphasized the importance for mobile workforces 
                                                
203 Braverman (1976), Noble (1977), and Lasch (1987) have argued that one of the key forces advancing 
the commercial development of ICTs after WW2 has been struggle for control, rather than for greater 
productivity or efficiency, between management and workers. Lasch writes, “An examination of the impact 
of technology on the transformation of work and the changing class structure of industrial society dispels 
the illusion that technology is a neutral and impersonal force. It is misleading even to speak of the impact 
of technology on the work process, since this formulation implies that technology originates outside the 
work process—in the laboratory, presumably—and has an ‘impact’ designed or anticipated by no one in 
particular. In fact, much of modern industrial technology has been deliberately designed by managers for 
the express purpose of reducing their dependence on skilled labor” (1987, p. 79). 
204 A recent Globe and Mail article offered evidence that “mobile work is the new norm” due to both the 
proliferation of mobile devices and encouragement from employers (Immen, 2013). Based on statistics 
provided by the International Data Corporation, the article projects that, “The Canadian mobile worker 
population is set to increase from 12.1 million in 2012, accounting for 68.9 per cent of employed 
Canadians, to 13.3 million in 2016, or 73 per cent of the work force” (Immen, 2013). 
205 A 1991 Computerworld article predicted that, “The users’ telephone numbers will be their mobile work 
and leisure address, at which they will be able to be reached 24 hours per day via electronic mail. In the 
long run, says Paul Saffo, a research fellow at the institute for the Future in Menlo Park, Calif., “the 
workstation is going to become like a telephone, where the essential value is derived from what it is 
connected to” (Ryan, 1991). Similarly, a 1993 Infoworld article on wireless networking proclaimed: “The 
mobile workforce is demanding universal connectivity from wireless service providers” (Strom, 1993). 
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(Brodsky, 1990; Didner, 1991; Hengel, 1994; Ryan, 1991; Strom, 1993).206 The logical 
conclusion of the mobile workforce is to make them available ‘anywhere and anytime.’ A 
1994 article in Industry Week proclaimed the coming “anytime, anyplace workplace” 
encompassing “an ever more mobile workforce that is connected by technology” and 
“influencing the scope of work and how we get tasks done” (Verespej, 1994).207  
Other claims stressed the way in which mobile technologies could meet 
customers’ needs by using fewer employees: 
Corporations are starting to appreciate the importance of mobile computing and 
are looking at how to use it to improve the overall business process. Managers are 
seeking ways to meet the rising expectations of customers while using fewer staff 
                                                
206 An important aspect that underpins the ideals of the mobile workforce that is often erased or 
unaddressed in related management literature is the actual mobility of labour apart from ICTs. This means 
the movement of labour within and between nations, a key, if often neglected, aspect of globalization in the 
neoliberal era (Overbeek, 2002). In 2004, the OECD estimated that there existed 175 million international 
migrants, or approximately 3% of the world’s population (OECD, 2004, p. 12). For example, the growing 
reliance on migrant workers in some industries and regions depends on mobility whether legally sanctioned 
or not. For example, agricultural industry in North America is reliant on migrants, primarily from Latin 
America; the National Center for Farmworker Health estimates that 68% of all farmworkers in the U.S. 
were born in Mexico (NCFH, 2012); United Food and Commercial Workers estimates that 40,000 migrant 
workers were employed in the Canadian agricultural industry in 2010 (UFCW, 2011). Mobile devices, 
particularly those employing a pay-as-you go payment plan, are often essential tools of many migrant 
workers as they serve as key links to their respective communities (see Thompson, 2009; Yang, 2008; Uy-
Tioco, 2007). 
207 A recent managerial text offers the following summary:   
The mobile workforce may be located at home or on the road, or it may simply be moving within 
your own corporate settings. Mobile workers perform critical jobs for an organization, using 
secure Internet connections, collaborating from near to as far as anywhere on the globe you can 
imagine, using the most appropriate hardware and software needed to get the work done. The most 
effective mobile workforces have the support and leadership of management, who provide both 
the technological and organizational tools to assure success. (Clemons and Kroth, 2011, p. X)  
 
216 
 
to do it. One way to balance these seemingly conflicting requirements is to 
provide key workers with simpler and much quicker access to more information. 
… Mobile computing is still an under-utilised corporate resource, and will 
continue to be so unless centralised facilities and resources are extended to remote 
sites and mobile workers. But extending these systems is not merely a matter of 
replicating the wireline architecture. A well-synchronised flow of information is 
needed because the line-of-business processes involved now represent the very 
basis of the organisation's economic well-being.  
…In other words, organizations want to see the provision of, and have full access 
to, the ‘anywhere, anytime’ communications systems and applications that the 
industry has been evangelizing about for so long. (Emmerson, 1996) 
Flexibility is the watchword underlying both telework and the mobile workforce, 
and this is what makes each such a potent example of how post-industrial myths are 
materialized in technologies, practices and ways of thinking.208 Through the application 
                                                
208 Based on a survey of several S&P Global 100 companies, business supply company Knoll Inc. 
advocated mobile work as an essential corporate policy for “increasing organizational effectiveness and 
performance” as well as for retaining “top talent”: 
•  “Flexible policies attract and retain top talent through development and deployment, deliver 
measurable results that benefit the business and the employee, including annual savings on 
corporate health-care costs and absenteeism and turnover.” 
• “Mobile and flexible work arrangements are not simply ‘perks’; they increase organizational 
effectiveness, financial performance, and market valuation.” 
• “Knowledge-based work relies upon ‘time’ as the resource that drives productivity. ‘Time’ is 
shared between employees and the organization, replacing the traditional measurement of ‘time 
spent behind a desk.’” 
• “Mobile work strategies support knowledge-based work, enhancing productivity while reducing 
real estate costs, increasing worker productivity, and requiring less real estate and few physical 
systems to facilitate the workforce.”  (2011, p. 40) 
217 
 
of ICTs, flexibility comes to define both capital accumulation and labour management. 
Thus, in the myths of post-industrialism, flexibility is synonymous with connectivity. At 
the same time, such flexibility also conceals the pervasive managerial surveillance and 
control implicit in the application of telework (Fitzpatrick, 2002; Huws, et al., 1990; 
Lyon, 1994; Newitz, 2006; Webster & Robins, 1999). 
Indeed, the main driver for the adoption of telework was not transportation cost 
savings, but rather labour management decisions regarding the spatial organization of 
workers and workflows. While the rhetoric around telework tends to focus on the benefits 
for employees, as Long et al. note, “There was a high degree of consensus in the policy 
wording that telework was to be a management option rather than an employee choice, 
privilege or a universal benefit—although most policies simultaneously stressed that 
telework was to be voluntary for employees” (2010, p. 10). Telework policies often 
exhibited an implicit tension whereby it was “seen as voluntary for employees yet not up 
to them to decide” (2010, p. 10). Consequently, “Many remote workers perceive the 
choice they have made not as that between working remotely or traveling to a central 
office, but as that between working remotely or not working at all” (Huws, 1990, p. 3).  
In their detailed analysis of global telework policies and statistics from the 1970s 
and 1980s, Huws et al. conclude that the promise of telework has not only extended the 
hand of managerial control, but also disempowered workers and exacerbated their 
precarity: 
Telework is often associated with the growth of sub-contracting, of self-
employment and of various temporary or casual forms of work which are often 
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grouped together under the general heading ‘new ways of working’, and 
information technology has certainly been intimately involved in these 
developments. One reason for this is that office automation facilitates the 
‘unbundling’ or disaggregation of organizational structures by standardizing 
processes, formalizing decision making structures and increasing the potential for 
quantifying and monitoring the performance of individual parts of an organization 
(Brusco, 1981). The result has been a vertical disintegration of organizations and 
an increase in the sub-contracting of a wide range of services, often to companies 
started up by ex-employees of the contracting organization. (1990, p. 7) 
The growth of telework as a key theme in shaping post-Fordist labour 
management literature reflected a basic belief that work based on intellective capacities 
largely would be independent or untethered from traditional places/spaces of work, in 
addition to empowering both managers and workers. Nevertheless, as both a mythic 
discourse and a material reality, telework demonstrates the profound contradictions in the 
application of new ICTs to the management of workers. 
6.2 Virtualization: Groupware, Business Process Re-
Engineering, and Workflow Management 
“When we launched the first Blackberry, we fundamentally paid attention to what the 
CTO wanted, which was ease of installation, security, common standards and ease of 
integration. We wanted the CTO to be able to make a business case from a line of 
business perspective. This may all sound self-evident, but at the time we launched, this 
was not the prevailing approach in the industry. The more typical ethos was to try and 
bamboozle the CTO and as a result we saw a lot of mobile data projects undergo painful 
deaths.” (RIM ex-co-CEO Jim Balsillie quoted in Deloitte, 2006, p. 22) 
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As a dominant conceptual framework in post-Fordist labour management, 
discourses around telework’s scope expanded with the advent of the Internet and other 
networking technologies introduced in the early 1990s. Despite its ambiguous and 
controversial associations, as a discourse telework is still used in public policy worldwide 
(for a European perspective see Welz & Wolf, 2010) though its contemporary 
characterizations have adopted the myth of UC as a technical and cultural reality.  
At the organizational level, Castells (1996) declared the rise of the “network 
enterprise”209 as a key transformation in the overall mode of production of contemporary 
capitalism (p. 187). This rhetorical emphasis on networks was echoed in the business 
press and by management consultants (Baker, 1994; Tapscott, 1996), all suggesting a 
fundamentally altered corporate structure more properly aligned with the visions and 
values of other post-industrial discourses (like telework). For corporations this meant 
being able to utilize the ‘sunk’ investments represented in fixed capital, contributing to 
more ‘flexible’ and ‘decentralized’ networked information technologies as mediators of 
innovation and productive efficiency.  
The championing of networks has a long history predating the popularization of 
the Internet (e.g., Saint-Simonians). In the post-industrial era the evolution of ICTs has 
                                                
209 Castells (1996) defines the “network enterprise” as:  
[t]hat specific form of enterprise whose system of means is constituted by the intersection of 
segments of autonomous systems of goals. Thus, the components of the network are both 
autonomous and dependent vis-à-vis the network, and may be a part of other networks, and 
therefore of other systems of means aimed at other goals. The performance of a given network will 
then depend on two fundamental attributes of the network: its connectedness, that is, its structural 
ability to facilitate noise-free communication between its components; and its consistency, that is, 
the extent to which there is a sharing of interests between the network’s goals and the goals of its 
components. (p. 187) 
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been strongly associated with organizational transformation. First the spread of personal 
computing, then the Internet, and finally wireless data have all provided the technical 
apparatuses for the appearance of organizational entities (i.e. corporations) seemingly 
unencumbered by barriers of time and space. It is therefore not surprising that wireless 
data technologies (and with it, UC) coincided with the rhetoric of virtualization to 
describe the application of network technologies in reshaping the spatial and temporal 
organization of the business enterprise. Virtualization added to the existing discourses 
surrounding telework a more ephemeral, yet totalizing, description of organizational 
forms and labour processes. This emergent understanding of virtual as having “effect but 
not form” directly preceded the era of UC. It realized this definition by extending the 
power of management over workers through information flows to and from workers 
regardless, in theory at least, of the position of employees in time and space.  Perhaps 
more tangibly, virtualization can be used to describe new forms of commercial resources: 
assets (fixed costs are substituted for variable costs), employees (those that do not need to 
be physically located in a centralized office), and time (“resources of time seem to 
expand or shrink at will”) (Birchall & Lyons, 1995, p.  18). As Morgan (1993) described, 
in the early years of the Internet, virtualization was seen to constitute a major shift in 
management’s vision of both the organization of commercial activities generally and 
labour specifically: 
Organisations used to be places. They used to be things…But, as information 
technology catapults us into the reality of an Einsteinian world where old 
structures and forms of organization dissolve and at times become almost 
invisible, the old approach no longer works. Through the use of telephone, face, 
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electronic mail, computers, video, and other information technology, people and 
their organizations are becoming disembodied. They can act as if they are 
completely connected while remaining far apart. They can have an instantaneous 
global presence. They can transcend barriers of time and space, continually 
creating and re-creating themselves through changing networks of 
interconnection based on ‘real time’ communication…the reality of our 
Einsteinian world is that, often, organizations don’t have to be organizations any 
more! (emphasis added, Morgan, 1993, p. 5) 
The concepts of virtual work, virtual teams, and virtual organizations proved 
popular enough with business strategists and management experts to spawn numerous 
“how-to” manuals, guiding management professionals on how to implement virtual 
strategies in their own organizations. Consequently, theories of the “virtual organization” 
(Quinn, 1992; Davidow & Malone, 1992; Mowshowitz, 1994; Birchall & Lyons, 1995; 
Grenier & Metes, 1995; Fukuyama et al., 1997; Nilles, 1998; Jackson, 1998), “virtual 
work” (Jackson, 1999; Watson-Manheim et al., 2002), and “virtual teams” (Verbeke, 
2008; Ebrahim, 2009; Long et al., 2010) have become (and remain) popular in 
publications addressing the business impact of new ICTs. The proposed benefits are 
familiar truisms for business literature: efficiency and productivity gains benefit 
management, while increasing flexibility and empowerment benefit workers. Paul 
Drucker and his followers even alluded to the “virtues of virtuality” years before this 
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virtual thematic began to appear in management literature en masse in the 1990s (see 
Mickelwaith & Woolridge, 1996, pp. 112-114; Hesselbain, 1997, pp.  377-383).210  
Virtual work, much like telework, is “characterized by a technology-mediated and 
geographically dispersed structure” (Long et al., 2010, p. 73). In contrast to telework, 
however, virtual work is tied to a specific organizational form: the virtual organization. A 
typical definition of a ‘virtual organization’ is one that is “no longer tied to place and 
time” while carrying out its activities, resulting in time and space being “bridged more 
easily and at lower cost.” (Metselaar & van Dael, 1999, p. 200). Virtual work is 
associated with “flexible and adaptive business structures” that break down spatial 
barriers, leading to the “disembodiment” of the organization (Jackson, 1999).  
Echoing the rhetoric of telework, virtual work is understood to be “freeing up 
employees” in ways that make them “more mobile in that they can move their work to the 
place which best suits the client’s needs, the organization’s needs and their own personal 
needs. It also makes possible the effective transfer by organizations of low value labour-
                                                
210 Summarizing a popular management text on virtual organization, Metselaar and van Dael (1999) offer a 
litany of transformative characteristics associated with virtual organizations: 
hierarchies collapse and boundaries within and between organisations decline. Empowered teams 
are producing information-based virtual products. Conventional relationships between employers 
and employees disappear. The organisation continually changes, and work processes are organised 
on a project basis. Within these projects cooperation takes place between colleagues, with 
personnel employed by suppliers or with other organisations. A central building or a central office 
becomes less important because of increasing communication in cyberspace. Applications of ICTS 
that are mentioned in regard to virtual organisation are local and wide area networks, electronic 
data interchange (EDI), the Internet, intranets, workflow management systems, multimedia 
communication, groupware systems, knowledge-based technology and other applications of 
artificial intelligence, such as intelligent agents (McLoughlin & Jackson, 1997). (Metselaar & van 
Dael, 1999, p. 201)  
 
223 
 
intensive clerical work and more routine work to any location worldwide” (Birchall, 
1995, p. 102). Some business analysts have stated that the virtual team—a team whose 
members are dispersed in space and connected through ICTs—has become the “default” 
component of today’s corporate organizations (Pauleen, 2004). Several factors have 
contributed to the increasing use of such virtual teams, such as: the globalization of the 
economy, the advance of information technology, the rise of new organizational forms, 
and the precursory emergence and growth of telework as a labour management strategy 
(Long et al., 2010, p. 100). Each of these “factors” are themselves outcomes of deeper 
dynamics, but this removal from precise forces and processes facilitates the kind of de-
historicization required for myth-making. 
The growing prevalence of the term virtual in labour and organizational 
management literature in the 1990s is significant because of the connotations it has 
regarding prospectively ubiquitous and immersive opportunities offered by networked 
ICTs. The rhetoric of virtualization extends key elements of the telework literature as it 
stresses the importance of connectivity by which the articulation of intellective capacities 
is coordinated among spatially dispersed workers (Watson Fritz et al., 1998). “One 
important feature of virtual organizations…is the team work from people within the 
organization that may be distributed locally or globally” (Grimshaw & Kwok, 1998, p. 
49). Strategies of virtualization also are of competitive importance in order to adapt to the 
accelerating rate and novelty of change within the marketplace (Rollier & Liou, 1998, p. 
321):  
In order to have a rapid response to the market (customers), companies have to 
reorganize themselves around rapid response to customer demand, forging tight 
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relational and technological bonds with core suppliers and long-term customers. 
That is the shape of the corporation of the future, a virtual corporation. (Klein 
quoted in Grimshaw & Kwok, 1998, p. 49) 
 As it came to prominence in the mid-1990s, virtualization also offered an important 
narrative legitimizing the role of Chief Information Officers (CIOs) as “information 
visionaries” entrusted with adapting organizations to changing ICTs and developing the 
“strategic management of corporate information flows” (Haigh, 2003, pp. 795-820). The 
relatively recent development and growing ubiquity of CIOs in business organizations is 
related to a shift in corporate management thinking that conceptualized “information” 
(and “information technology”) as a strategic resource and competitive necessity (Kline, 
2006). CIOs were also influential in guiding the expansion of corporation IT budgets 
during the 1990s,211 searching for new information technologies that could generate 
measurable productivity gains and thereby confer executive legitimacy to this new 
corporate agent. Historian Thomas Haigh (2009) contextualizes the rise of the CIO as 
part of an “information revolution” within business organizations: 
                                                
211 On the topic of ballooning corporate IT budgets, Haigh writes:  
“Whereas corporate computer budgets had been quite small in 1980, by the end of the century they 
had risen to account for a very significant chunk of all corporate spending. North American 
businesses spent around six hundred billion dollars on computer hardware, software and services 
in 2001. According to the Gartner Group, one of the leading computer industry research groups, 
large corporations devoted an estimated 5 percent of their revenues to information technology, 
representing an expenditure of around eight thousand dollars per employee (up from three 
thousand in 1988). As well as an increased use of computers in areas established in the earlier 
decades, this reflected some fundamental shifts in the areas to which computers were applied.” 
(emphasis added, 2003, pp. 812-813) 
In 2002, AdWeek reported that Fortune 1000 companies accounted for 75% of all business IT spending, 
making roughly 100,000 people responsible for most IT spending choices (Laberis, 2002).  
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Just as the Chief Financial Officer was responsible for every aspect of the 
corporation’s relationship to money (from structuring financial strategies to 
overseeing accounting systems), so the Chief Information Officer would be 
responsible for every aspect of the corporation’s relationship with information. As 
well as overseeing the operation of centralized computer centers, this meant 
husbanding information itself, setting information technology standards, 
identifying strategic opportunities for the application of information technology 
and educating other top managers to see information as a resource. This 
conception of information as a resource represented a decisive moment in the 
construction of a new conception of information, quite different from anything 
present in business thought before the creation of the computer… 
CIOs struggled to gain the respect of other executives, and have never 
achieved the broad responsibilities they hoped for. They changed jobs more 
frequently than other top managers, and they earned less money. Few CIOs have 
gone on to lead major companies. Probably none has ever established an authority 
over information equal to that a CFO enjoys over finance. Yet, viewed in other 
ways, the CIO movement has been an enormous success. By the end of the 1990s 
almost every large corporation had created a CIO. Computer budgets continued to 
rise, and computer managers continued to ascend the organization chart.  (2009, 
pp. 3-4) 
In addition to promoting a new set of business platitudes embraced by corporate 
CIOs, the virtualization literature was expressed in and through two commercial 
products: the development of workflow management systems (WFMS) and the 
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popularization of groupware or computer-supported collaborative work (CSCW), such as 
Lotus Notes. Both became lucrative areas for commercial software developers as well as 
management consultants seeking to capitalize on the excitement around virtualization. 
Each also gave CIOs a clearer path to legitimacy within the executive branches of 
corporations. Both groupware and WFMS focused on exploiting the intellective 
capacities of workers by focusing management strategies on the flows of information 
increasingly unencumbered by spatial constraints. Growing connectivity among workers 
offered opportunity to re-engineer various dimensions of work processes involving 
remote forms of management. 
The re-organization of business processes and workers had long been of interest 
to managers grappling with the increased importance of information within the 
organization (Chandler & Cortada, 2000). In the early 1990s, as excitement was building 
around the business application of networking ICTs, Business Process Re-Engineering 
(BPR) emerged as a management concept centered on managing networks of connected 
workers (see Robson & Ullah, 1996).212 Its goal was to enable the most efficient 
organization of workflows among those employees primarily connected through ICTs.213 
                                                
212 On the significance of BPR, historian Thomas Haigh (2000) writes: “A boon for consulting companies, 
BPR was the single most important factor in transforming the management consulting industry from a 
relatively small sector focusing primarily on advice to a much bigger industry focused mostly on designing 
and building computer systems of various kinds” (p. 816). 
213 In a seminal Harvard Business Review article entitled “Reengineering work: don’t automate, obliterate,” 
Michael Hammer (1990) offers the essential blueprint for BPR. In the article, Hammer provides numerous 
case studies, each echoing a common refrain: “use computers to redesign—not just automate—existing 
business processes” (1990, p. 104).  Two prominent examples, Ford Motor Company and Mutual Benefit 
Life, illustrate the streamlining of information-intensive work through the application of new technologies, 
and resulting in an increase in productivity and a substantial reduction in “head count” (Hammer, 1990, pp. 
105-106). While Hammer’s examples illustrate the utility of rethinking workflow processes in order to 
maximize efficiency and timeliness, it is difficult to not associate BPR with “downsizing” (Pruijt, 1998). 
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Interest in BPR culminated in the founding of the journal Business Process Re-
Engineering & Management Journal in 1995, although it later changed its title to 
Business Process Management Journal in 1997 as BPR fell out of fashion (the journal 
continues to publish issues quarterly) in light of new network technologies that 
engendered even newer management terminology.  
 Emerging at roughly the same time, BPR shares considerable thematic overlap with 
the literature on virtualization—with emphasis on information flows, connectivity, and 
the coordination and management of variously located workers. Unlike virtualization, 
which existed as a loosely associated set of terms and rhetorical tropes, and telework, 
which existed both as a discourse and a policy framework, BPR emerged as a brand of 
management. Not surprisingly, some of the earliest and most popular proponents of BPR 
embraced the rhetoric of virtualization (Amberg & Zimmermann, 1998). Though related 
to virtualization, BPR was much broader and ambitious in scope as, “Re-engineering 
implies the metamorphoses of organizations into machines” (Homa, 1995, p. 14).214  
 As a management philosophy, BPR extended Taylorist management techniques into 
the realm of intellective work. Its primary object of management is the intellective 
capacities of workers. As such, Vanderburg (2004) characterizes BPR as providing the 
theoretical foundations for an “intellectual assembly line.” CIOs were quick to adopt 
BPR as it provided a language that meshed neo-Taylorist principles with new 
                                                
214 Homa’s sentiment here echoes Veblen’s “machinic processes” as a foundational component of the 
business enterprise (1904, pp. 5-19). Veblen’s machinic view of the business enterprise extended to more 
than just the industrial production of goods, but the overall management of business processes within and 
between organizations. 
228 
 
technologies and organizational theories, promising the ability to deliver quantifiable 
return on investment (ROI) (Canton, 1994; Miyamoto et al., 2011; Plewa & Pliskin, 
1995; Ross & Feeny, 1999). At the height of its popularity BPR “became the new secular 
gospel of salvation: Do it, and you will be saved, or leave it, and you will disappear 
because of global competition” (Vanderburg, 2004, p. 331). A 1994 survey of 400 
company CIOs by accounting firm Deloitte & Touche revealed that companies 
implemented roughly 4 BPR initiatives each; “The survey also concluded that technology 
efforts involving BPR are more successful than technology initiatives that do not involve 
BPR, and that networking and client/server architecture are the two most important 
technology components of a company’s BPR efforts” (Plewa & Pliskin, 1995, p. 34). 
 BPR enabled a kind of intellectual deskilling stemming from the extraction of tacit 
or experiential knowledge from workers and their activities, then integrated into the 
automation of a given business process (or as Huws et al. put it, the “codification of 
knowledge”; see Huws et al., 2009). This was accomplished through a combination of 
databases, software, and networked terminals and resulted in greater worker redundancy 
since information managed at a central location but accessed remotely reduced the 
amount of workers and increased their interchangeability (for examples see Chamberlain, 
1993).215  
                                                
215 According to Vanderburg, “…job security is all but eliminated in the process of reengineering. 
Significant reductions in skill levels are common, making workers more easily replaceable. Just-in-time 
labor becomes a reality as agencies supplying temporary workers thrive. It is not surprising that business 
process reengineering as a management fashion undermined good management-labor relations almost 
everywhere” (2004, p. 337). In an article for Chief Information Officer Journal titled “CIO, reengineer 
thyself,” Chamberlain (1993) offers examples of the flexible re-engineering work processes using 
information technologies at DuPont, Timberland, and Chase Manhattan. Though no specific numbers, the 
following passage is telling:  
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While BPR existed primarily as a growing body of management literature, its 
practical application was the development of workflow management systems, a term that 
fused both workflow design with new programs like groupware (Slater, 1997, p. 74). 
BPR and WFMS provide frameworks for deploying information technologies to enhance 
the productive application of employee capacities conceptualized as key resources within 
an enterprise.  Indeed, it is precisely the reconstruction of workflow that is the primary 
focus of BPR and, more broadly, of the management literature on telework and 
virtualization; “Control over workflows begins with the conceptualization of work 
processes” and, in this conceptualization, “[m]anagement encourages the most granular 
subdivision of tasks, as each minute task in the workflow can be assigned a deadline” 
(McNally, 2010, p. 366). Workflow management systems are crucial to the virtual 
workplace since they involve the breaking down of complex business tasks, the 
coordination of activities, and processing at workplaces distributed in space but linked by 
network technologies (Amberg & Zimmermann, 1998, p. 114). In this respect, they 
reflect the division of intellective labour according to the prerogatives of managers.216  
                                                                                                                                            
 
In fact, BPR decisions usually lead to job reshuffling--or even job loss. Business reengineering is 
all about change, so it's is essential that redesigned processes are understood, expectations are 
managed, and employees, suppliers, and customers are prepared for the different type of company 
they're going to see. Within the organization, employees must comprehend the changes to their 
jobs, relationships, products, services, and IS [information systems] environment. Because of the 
sweeping nature of reengineering, preparation is essential. (Chamberlain, 1993)  
216 Amberg and Zimmermann offer a concise summary of how Groupware, BPR, and WFMS relate to each 
other:  
BPR pursues the overall objectives to describe, analyze and design organizations and their 
parts….In contrast, workflow management is an implementation technology that primarily aims 
the execution of the business and of business processes…In comparison to WFMS, Groupware 
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WFMS are specifically designed around connectivity strategies for enterprises 
trying to coordinate their employees and make their collaborative work more efficient 
through the automation of workflow:217  
Workflow Management systems (WFMS) provide computerized support for 
modeling and executing workflows. For this purpose, workflow relevant 
knowledge is captured and managed: What is done, how, by whom and with what 
means. The knowledge of how work is performed serves as the basis for WFMS 
to enable virtual workplaces: A client must not know where, when, by whom and 
with what implementation a working unit is performed at a physical workspace. 
The abstraction of such physical properties helps enterprises to gain more 
autonomy and flexibility. (Amberg & Zimmermann, 1998, p. 108)  
Groupware is a form of collaborative software—also known as computer-
supported collaboration (CSC)—that has existed in some form since Douglas Englebart’s 
                                                                                                                                            
 
systems aim at the support of worker groups and teamwork on mostly unstructured (ad hoc) work, 
whereas WFMS aim at the support of individual workers and ordered (well structured) work 
processing. In the future the demarcation will become blurred, especially if work processing is 
done across time and space. Advanced communication technologies enable teamwork across 
space. (Amberg & Zimmermann, 1998, p. 113) 
217 Founded in 1993, the Workflow Management Coalition (WFMC) acts as a trade and standardization 
body for WFMS. It has developed and promoted several widely used WFMS standards including XPDL, 
WfXML, and BPAF. On the importance of WFMS standards, the WFMC states: “Organizations making an 
investment in workflow software want to be sure that their investment is going to be protected. With 
standards users can have confidence that essential criteria will be met, hence reducing the risk involved. 
This clearly becomes of paramount importance when workflow systems are required to interoperate with 
those of other organizations whenever business processes are conducted across organizational boundaries” 
(http://www.wfmc.org/wfmc-standards-framework.html). 
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pioneering work on time-sharing and interface design in the 1960s (Bardini, 2000), 
though its exact definition did not congeal until the late 1980s. Whereas WFMS focuses 
on the step-by-step process by which work is divided among connected workers, 
groupware offers the means to share information and collaborate on the creation of 
documents (Chaffey, 1998). Groupware thus offers the software that enables the 
implementation of new workflow processes. The business development of groupware in 
the 1980s initially centered on the use of email over PC LANs (Borghoff & Schlichter, 
2000), various forms of office automation (like peer-to-peer voice and data messaging, or 
document sharing) stemming from the introduction of smaller desktop microcomputers 
networked to a central server within a given organization (Hothman, 1994, p. 8-9). 
Indeed, virtual teams and organizations are created “through the use of groupware” 
(Grimshaw & Kwok, 1998, p. 50).218 The basic importance of groupware is to exploit the 
increased networking of workers through desktop computers to enhance remotely 
manageable forms of collaboration and communication among them. 
Groupware is typically identified with Lotus Notes—a Windows-based software 
suite launched in 1989 that epitomized how PC computing software could be used to 
enhance the efficiency and productivity among workers in an information-intensive 
workplace. Lotus Notes, a still popular groupware brand owned by IBM, has historically 
offered the following capabilities: email and attachments, computer conferencing, shared 
                                                
218 Hal Richman, president of Productivity Solutions Inc. writes, “Virtual organizations are project-focused, 
collaborative networks uninhibited by time and space. They are without the spatial territory and the cultural 
norms so important in traditional organizations…Cutting edge technology, like Lotus Notes and DEC 
Teamlinks, compensate for the absence of traditional workspaces” (quoted in Birchall & Lyons, 1995, p. 
19). 
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databases, application development environment, workflow automation, and document 
sharing (Hothman, 1994, p. 8-9).219 With the popular awareness of the Internet that 
emerged in the mid-1990s, groupware was the subject of intense interest because of the 
way it promised to re-organize institutions to maximize collaboration, and therefore 
efficiency in line with the principles of BPR and WFMS (Khoshafian, 1995; Santos, 
1995; Bock 1995; Chaffey, 1998; Igbaria, 1998; Beaudoin-Levon, 1999). Groupware was 
not only an expression of the declining cost of computing power and rising significance 
of commercial software for business, it was a technological system entailing the 
reorganization of business processes involving more intensive, though virtual, 
coordination and management of employees. 
Management theorists Watson Fritz et al. (1998) highlight the transformative 
nature of connecting workers using workflow management systems and groupware where 
they write that, “Coordination is the process of linking the work activities of employees. 
Work activities must be linked together in order for individuals to perform productively” 
(Watson Fritz, et al., 1998, p. 13). Ultimately, according to Ahmed & Simintras (1996), 
“productive” collaboration is premised on the effective organization of information flows 
between workers: 
                                                
219 Early in its history, before it was acquired by IBM, Lotus Notes proposed a wireless product, though the 
technology was too underdeveloped and costly to gain traction in the market (Rooney, 1993). In 2006 
Lotus Notes was used by approximately 120 million users around the globe, yet was highly disliked 
(Arthur, 2006). By 2009, it was used by more than half the Fortune 100 companies, and “80 percent of the 
largest banks, consumer product, electronics, insurance, pharmaceutical and telecommunications 
companies” (IBM, 2009) even though it has competition from Microsoft’s Sharepoint and Novell’s 
Groupwise software suites.  
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To begin with, if [business] processes are viewed as systems within which cross-
functional flows of resources (information, people, technology) create the 
transformation, then the transformation process itself can be defined as an ordered 
set of successive states of material which are being processed from inputs to 
outputs through the interaction of people, information, technology and so on. …. 
Interaction indicates the connectivity between otherwise separate activities and is 
itself characterized by the level of co-operation and sharing involved within each 
episode of interaction. We thus see that creating an organization in which 
activities come together to perform a given task requires synchronization and co-
ordinated interaction…Widespread availability of mechanisms facilitating co-
operative interaction plays a significant role in the effective enactment of tasks.  
(emphasis added, p. 78)  
The integration of groupware in order to re-engineer business processes to 
maximize CCC was, from 1995-2000, widely touted by business managers seeking 
competitive technological and organizational advantages that were both ubiquitous and 
invisible (Marshak, 1995, pp. 26-27). As Keen (1995) correctly predicted, the ubiquity of 
groupware within virtual organizations was accompanied by the promise of wireless 
email. In 1995, as discussed in chapter 3, two technical problems prevented this 
innovation: inability to guarantee a continuous connection and limited battery power (p. 
94). Anticipating the rise of UC through the BlackBerry, Keen wrote in 1995: “simple e-
mail will become the great groupware enabling technology” (p. 93). Inverting the 
previous norm that users sought the data they needed, in Keen’s mind, “the new culture is 
that the data follows the user” (p. 92).  
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Whereas groupware offered the software and technological fix for virtualization, 
workflow management systems developed the coordination of dispersed, though 
networked, workers, thereby inscribing the invisible, or virtual, hand of managerial 
control within an “enterprise workforce.” The influence of BPS and WFMS on theories 
of enterprise management today are reflected in the creation of enterprise content 
management systems (ECMS) or enterprise-wide systems (EWS). Vanderburg 
summarizes the influence of BPR and WFMS on the development of enterprise content 
management systems: 
The flow of information within computers had been carefully optimized, so the 
problem to be faced had to do with the flow of information outside the computer 
in the organization. The solution was evident: The organization needed to be 
reengineered (the term was well chosen) to ensure that the flow of information to 
and from the computer would be just as rational and optimal as the flow inside it. 
This shifted the focus away from the functions performed by human beings within 
the structure of a bureaucracy to the flows of information involved in any process. 
Computer engineering, in essence, furnished the model for reorganization. The 
fundamental principle was that data should be captured only once, which meant 
that all business processes should share their information, thus integrating them 
into what initially became known as enterprise systems or enterprise-wide 
systems and later, enterprise resource planning systems. These systems would 
assemble all of the information required to deliver the products or services, with 
human beings accomplishing the steps that were not yet automated.  (2004, p. 
332)  
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In addition to characterizing BPR as a new form of Taylorism created for 
intellective workers, Vanderburg’s critique of BPR rests on what he calls its emphasis on 
“technique-based connectedness.” This term captures how in contemporary societies 
connectedness itself is technologically mediated and it constitutes a technique 
implemented to serve broader political economic structures. As such, connectedness is 
itself a technique in which specific conceptions of and control over work, time, and space 
are realized. Vanderburg also stresses that this technique-based connectedness has 
broader implications for society as a whole: 
We are currently building the information infrastructure for the new technique-
based connectedness of contemporary societies. Technique-based connectedness 
refers to the activities of a way of life of a society being primarily connected by 
means of techniques (Ellul, 1954/1964) and only secondarily by means of 
experience and culture…. 
Everything within this technique-based connectedness evolves in relation 
to everything else for the purpose of increasing individual and collective 
performance. As a result, the system-like properties of this emerging technique-
based connectedness are reinforced. As large organizations help to evolve this 
new technique-based connectedness, they will have to adapt to it in several 
important ways. There will be an unprecedented reliance on information at the 
expense of experience. (Vanderburg, 2004, p. 334) 
 McNally (2010) likens this process to the “reification of the human process of 
content creation” (p. 367). He writes, “No more is the work process an exchange of ideas 
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and responsibilities between human agents, but instead it becomes a simple algorithm 
preprogrammed into a BPM module that is controlled and administered by management 
and the system administrator” (p. 367). The valorization of CCC as an object of labour 
management is countered by the intellectual deskilling epitomized by BPR.  
Both the growth of groupware and WFMS offered influential models of labour 
organization and management—models that specifically addressed the dispersion of 
workers, and the concurrent need to create new ways of managing their activities within 
increasingly virtual organizations.  
6.3 Creating and Managing the Ubiquitous Organization: 
Growing the Wireless Enterprise 
During the same period that the literature on virtualization, BPR, and WFMS 
were becoming staples of corporate management, the business and technology press 
speculated about how wireless-networking technologies could help transform both the 
nature of work and business activities. Most of the early predictions regarding the 
business application of wireless technologies suggested both the empowerment (or 
untethering) of workers and the increasing flexibility, indeed ubiquity, of business 
processes. Wireless connectivity could help reduce infrastructure costs, enhance 
managerial control, and exploit corporate information resources in a more timely fashion, 
while also maximizing the flexibility of workers.220 In terms of the most widely used 
                                                
220 Corporate interest in deploying wireless technologies within firms has been around since the late 1980s 
(Helliwell, 1989). This early interest rested primarily on the ability of wireless connectivity to cut costs and 
add flexibility for workers within a specific workplace. Even before the explosive growth of mobile 
computing devices like PDAs, wireless LANs were pitched as practical solutions to the high cost of cabling 
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concepts and keywords, the prospective business uses of wireless connectivity mirrored 
the more abstract rhetoric of virtualization, BPR, and WFMS (Georgakopoulos et al., 
1999).  
As I described in chapters 3 and 4, the commercialization of wireless data took 
over fifteen years to reach market and was realized both through the technical 
achievements of RIM as well as the commitments made by component manufacturers and 
telecommunications companies. Taken together, the push to commercialize wireless data 
was advanced using general myths about its perceived utility for the new economy. 
Despite the best intentions of RIM’s leadership, the widespread adoption of its devices 
and services was by no means certain. While RIM’s BlackBerry, and competing PDAs 
like Palm, claimed to appeal to a mass consumer market, their primary target was in fact 
corporate executives, managers, professional organizations, and business enterprises. It 
was this business-focused customer (the so-called “enterprise market”) that could afford 
the relatively high-cost of devices, service fees, and software applications—highly-priced 
as a means of subsidizing risky investments made, most apparently, by 
telecommunications companies that had to invest in new infrastructure.  
The management literature on virtualization, BPR, and WFMS provided an 
intellectual base for conceptualizing UC as a strategic management goal, thereby offering 
CIOs ways of conceptualizing technological and economic change so as to justify 
                                                                                                                                            
 
buildings, for connected “mobile in the building” employees, in creating temporary or consolidated 
installations, and in the generally “lower cost of maintenance” associated with wireless devices and 
networks (Goldberg, 1993). 
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investments in wireless data technologies and services. The keywords and concepts 
offered by management consultants and the business press enabled (and justified) the 
actions of these actors as they pursued new IT-centered strategies. With the rollout of 
packet switched wireless networks like Mobitex and Ardis in the early 1990s (discussed 
in chapter 3), and the proliferation of BPR and virtualization, attention shifted to the 
possibility of broadening the scope of wireless technologies to extend the enterprise 
beyond brick and mortar walls.221  
There has been a strong link between workflow management and groupware 
through networking, global area network, wide area network, and local area network 
developments (Birchall & Lyons, 1995, p. 181). The application of wireless enterprise 
connectivity was, from an early stage, developed to facilitate the usage of groupware like 
Lotus Notes. Significantly, RAM Mobile Data’s earliest attempts to commercialize the 
Mobitex network relied on partnerships with Lotus Development Corporation (maker of 
Lotus Notes) and Novell Inc. (proprietary owner of Word Perfect and Groupwise) 
(Loudermilk, 1992). As early as 1993, Lotus Development Corporation was interested in 
                                                
221 For example, as early as 1992 Soft-Switch Inc. proposed a wireless enterprise service using the ARDIS 
wireless data network. The service was initially pitched as a means of increasing the productivity and 
flexibility of enterprises requiring the management of a spatially dispersed workforce:  
Businesses and government agencies with large field operations will realize the greatest 
productivity improvements through extension of critical applications beyond the office. 
Pharmaceutical salespeople, for example, will be able to send orders at their point of origin 
directly from portable PCs through the enterprise electronic messaging network to a central 
application for processing. Long distance truckers in the petroleum industry will automatically 
send in messages containing delivery tickets, and receive dispatch orders. Environmental 
researchers in remote sites will be able to send in test results, and receive reports and analysis -- all 
without leaving the location being studied. (Wilson and Hoffman, 1992) 
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developing a wireless gateway through which it could commercialize wireless 
applications for its groupware (Rooney, 1993). 
With the growing popularity of groupware like Lotus, and in the mid-1990s the 
success of Palm’s PDAs, the anticipated profitability of the wireless enterprise market 
attracted several large and established technology companies to take part. Ericsson, for 
example, initially focused primarily on voice services (Solano, 1998). Perhaps the most 
significant foray into wireless enterprise services was Wireless Knowledge LLC, a joint 
venture between Microsoft and Qualcomm. Wireless Knowledge was established to offer 
a full range of business applications including email, scheduling, and sector-specific 
applications, all routed through a network-operations center located in San Diego. The 
service was marketed directly to wireless carriers that could offer a suite for enterprise 
connectivity to mobile workers (Johnston, 1998). In an effort to compete in the growing 
market for enterprise wireless services, Motorola marketed its GSM-based “Wireless 
Enterprise” as a “complete wireless-communications strategy for employee off-site 
mobility, designed specifically for corporate applications” (Anonymous, 1999a). 
Similarly, Palm’s corporate owner, 3Com, launched a joint partnership with Aether 
Technologies to provide a comprehensive wireless product for the Palm platform 
enabling “real-time wireless access to mission-critical enterprise data and Internet-based 
information” (Anonymous, 1999b). Siemens partnered with Omnipoint Technologies to 
develop wireless enterprise products by allowing workers to access corporate intranets 
and databases through their cellular handsets and PDAs (Anonymous, 1999d).  
An important area in which the wireless services played a key strategic role was 
in the creation of customer relationship management (CRM) applications (Breece, 1999; 
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Adrian et al., 1999). The basic principle of CRM revolves around giving both mobile 
workers and customers access to information available in corporate databases (including 
billing, scheduling, product, and other logistical information). CRM was widely viewed 
as a way of making the client enterprise more flexible and adaptive by leveraging detailed 
information about consumers, market prices, and supplies to create a “customer-centric” 
business model (Greenberg, 2001). As Breece explains: 
[CRM] tools combine real-time network data with billing and other data and 
organize it to represent the customer’s experience. The output enables customer-
adaptive decision making…A key element in the customer-centric business model 
is transforming customer data into a deeper understanding of customers and their 
service needs…In this model, raw data transforms into meaningful customer 
information. This transformation allows you to extract behavioral knowledge 
about your customers. (Breece, 1999) 
 In effect, the basic principle of CRM rests on the extension of the enterprise in 
order to envelope both workers and customers in a blanket of information flows fueled by 
networked databases, allowing real-time adaptability and responses that are 
synchronized. This was particularly important for clients focusing on logistics or those 
offering various forms of “field service” by employees (Goldman, 2000). The centrality 
of real-time access to customer information for CRM and database marketing strategies 
further pushed the development of wireless applications for business uses (Adrian et al., 
1999; Sharma, 2000).  
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The adoption of wireless technologies by corporations, combined with literature 
on virtualization, offered a vision of the “ubiquitous organization” as the final stage of 
customer relationship management (Kotorov, 2002, p. 225). As business analyst 
Radoslav Kotorov explained in 2002: 
The emerging ubiquitous organization has two properties: location and time 
independence; and immediacy. First, location- and time-independent access to 
services is offered through multiple channels and devices and, second, immediacy 
is ensured through the design of self-service processes and real-time exceptional 
request brokerage. The former obscures the organizational physical infrastructure, 
for a corporation may be reached regardless of its physical location, while the 
latter masks the operational structure, providing immediate access to its services 
and specialists…The evolution of business organization towards ubiquity is a 
logical process. (emphasis added, Kotorov, 2002, p. 219) 
A management consultant specializing in such technologies, Kotorov’s 
perspective is representative of views held by both corporate executives and management 
consultants responding to newly available wireless data services in the 2000s. With the 
expansion of the wireless data market, and an industry focus on the enterprise segment, a 
number of articles and management texts appeared that touted both the potential for great 
returns on investments as well as the competitive necessity of the ubiquitous enterprise 
(Faigen et al., 2002; Sbihli, 2002; Easton, 2002; Wheeler, 2004). Trade journals like 
Intelligent Enterprise wrote articles headlined “The Pervasive Invasion” (Stodder, 2000) 
citing the UC enabled by these wireless strategies as a defining feature of the next phase 
of the Internet age. UC allowed workers in the field to synchronize both with corporate 
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databases and workflow management systems, thereby maximizing the strategic value of 
time-sensitive information.  Software Magazine featured an article titled “The Business 
Case for Wireless Applications in the Enterprise.” Citing a survey of thirty-five 
companies, it noted that each had implemented a wireless strategy, incorporating it “into 
the total business planning process whether the implementation is for SFA [sales force 
automation], CRM or work force automation” (Gillot, 2002, p. 57).  
Within management literature and the business press, myths of UC (Sørensen & 
Gibson, 2003) became grounded in the development of ICTs-enabled business processes 
such as BPR, WFMS, and CRM, in part because it was this capability that allowed for the 
creation of applications for workers and professionals. The appeal of UC was particularly 
clear for professionals and executives increasingly conceptualized as “knowledge 
workers.” Sørenson and Gibson (2004),222 management theorists focusing on ubiquitous 
technologies in business settings, offer the following explanation: 
Modern professionals must, as members of teams in knowledge-intensive 
organizations, be able to flexibly make decisions, interact with a large number of 
people and often be highly geographically mobile. They must be able to work 
fluidly, buy and sell at real-time speeds, advice, approve, inquire, develop 
relationship, coordinate, collaborate, communicate and problem-solve on a daily 
basis. The adoption of new technologies, especially the widespread adoption of 
                                                
222 Carsten Sørensen is now a Senior Lecturer in Information Systems at the London School of Economics 
in the Management Department. David Gibson is a management consultant with Accenture Organisation 
and Change Management as well as Foresight Consulting (among other firms), and was formerly a 
manager at Nortel Networks. 
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mobile phones and networked information systems, has provided these 
professionals with the ability to work both away from the office and while 
traveling, transcending both space and time with respect to device and human 
action respectively.  
Technologies, including desktop video conferencing, mobile phones, 
collaborative software, PDAs and Internet/Intranet systems, converge to forge the 
foundation of providing the professional with the tools to respond to the threats of 
the business environment. This new workplace would be unrestrained by 
geography, time, and organizational boundaries; and it would be a virtual 
workplace, where productivity, flexibility, and collaboration will reach 
unprecedented levels. (Sørensen & Gibson, 2004, pp. 190-191). 
In this respect, email is universally seen as the most flexible and primary 
communication technology in the context of enterprise-wide information systems 
(Sørensen & Gibson, 2004, p. 192). As such, RIM’s BlackBerry was well positioned to 
capitalize on this specific market:  
The complete reliance on email, coupled with increased demands for flexible and 
mobile working, can be viewed as key explanations for several professionals 
voicing great interest in Blackberry technology supporting instant global access to 
email from small handheld terminals. It represents a simple client technology 
offering a highly flexible networking service of providing mobile access to email, 
but based on a highly complex underlying infrastructure. (Sørensen & Gibson, 
2003, p. 192) 
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From a marketing and consumption perspective, what made BlackBerry stand out 
as a central enterprise device was precisely the way in which it could implement UC as a 
broad corporate strategy. As explained in chapter 3 and 4, this was due partly to its 
portability, partly due to its keyboard allowing rapid real time communication, and partly 
due to its integration with enterprise email systems. Perhaps most importantly, however, 
it was due to its application of “push-based” communications which made it ready to 
receive time sensitive information at any time or in any location. As Mike Lazaridis 
explained, “The Blackberry is a synch engine because it synchronizes data across a 
mobile work force” (quoted in Sweeny, 2009, p. 73).  Moreover, as a complete system, 
the BlackBerry offered CIOs and other IT managers the ability to monitor the location 
and activities of their workers, assessing their movement, response time, information 
flow, and “down time” (Conforti, 2009). 
While application development was encouraged (although not at the scale seen in 
the wake of the iPhone), it was still e-mail and personal information management (PIM) 
synchronization that provided the most basic selling point. Among IT managers, wireless 
email was viewed as a core application with a strong majority of CIOs and CTOs by 2001 
having implemented or planning to implement wireless email (McAteer, 2001). CIOs 
were specifically targeted with repeated features in leading trade magazines like 
Infoworld and CIO Magazine to prepare for the industry-wide transformation wrought by 
the development of the wireless enterprise. While wireless technology offered CIOs a 
path to respect and legitimacy within the corporate hierarchy by advocating the 
importance of managing the flows of information between workers and corporate 
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databases, wireless technology was pitched as a necessity that could quickly penalize 
late-adopters.223  
Indeed, RIM focused early on into turning the BlackBerry both into a business 
necessity and a platform for developing industry or enterprise-specific applications.  For 
example, the emphasis on the programming language Java for its devices allowed the 
creation of customized software products for business, and industry specific CRM 
applications (e.g., logistics or finance). The success of Lotus Notes, and other groupware 
like Microsoft Sharepoint launched in 2001, was a central component of RIM’s push into 
the enterprise market as Lotus Notes and similar Microsoft offerings were integrated into 
the BlackBerry product line (RIM, 2001). 
The evolution of telework literature towards virtualization, and the growing 
importance of groupware and WFMS, provided a ready climate for the introduction of 
wireless devices for labour management. Indeed, this is precisely what RIM’s BlackBerry 
Enterprise Server (and related software applications) addressed. Management experts had 
provided a set of problems; RIM provided the technical fix for the drive to UC. More 
precisely, new productive relations implied a demand for new productive forces. Until its 
                                                
223 A typical provocation from an article entitled “Get out of denial: prepare for the wireless enterprise” 
reads:  
So what are you going to do about it? The answer is to start planning now, knowing that wireless 
access is entirely out of your hands. It's going to happen, and you're going to be held responsible 
for how well it works, so you might as well get started. The first thing to do is start learning as 
much as you can about how wireless access will affect your enterprise. This means you should be 
one of the first to sign up for whatever services seem viable in your area, and start testing them. 
Learn what they can and can't do, and where they will and won't work. That way, when your 
favorite VP comes to you wanting the latest wireless solution, you'll at least know something 
about it, and you'll be able to offer intelligent suggestions. (Rash, 1999) 
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introduction, the ideal of UC among teleworkers and/or virtual workers was only an 
ideal, not a technical reality. The Blackberry enterprise server was one of the first 
technological systems that directly facilitated the “virtual organization” by wirelessly 
tethering networked connectivity to the worker (Dewar, 2006; Labrosse, 2008). As it 
became an early “killer app” for the mobile Internet by, in effect, colonizing the 
enterprise (Marek, 2002; Harmon, 2000; Freeman, 2009), wireless e-mail, was, also in 
effect, a “Trojan horse” (Maney, 2001) socializing workers into accepting the “condition 
of immediacy” (Tomlinson, 2007) enabled by UC.  
Regardless of the terminology—telework, networked worker, mobile work, 
virtual work, and virtual organizations—they all describe the central significance of both 
UC and CCC to the composition and reproduction of flexible capital structures. In this 
chapter I have demonstrated this connection through popular management literature that 
culminated in the development of the wireless enterprise market. This literature suggests 
that the management of labour in the “ubiquitous enterprise” is more flexibly 
accomplished but also more totalizing in scope. Ilkka Arminen, professor and researcher 
at the University of Helsinki, makes a case echoing these issues in the era of UC; 
“Mobile communication anytime, anywhere, increases social accountability. The revival 
of ‘dead’ moments not only gives us extra time, but also makes us open to real-time 
monitoring and control. Mobile communication etiquette seems to involve the norms of 
“being always available” and “reciprocating messages/calls you get” (2011, p. 97). This 
engenders, he continues, “normative pressure for availability [while it] also allows [for] 
an increase in accountability, a continuing monitoring of communicative parties” (p. 97).  
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The question of mobile and ubiquitous media making downtime or “dead” 
moments communicatively productive is an important part of how ubiquitous 
connectivity enabled through IMDs makes digital labour (waged and unwaged) both 
more extensive and intensive. The overall effects of UC on labour can be unpredictable, 
and are often less than desirable for workers (Middleton, 2007; Wajcman & Bittman, 
2009). To quote Arminen, “The flexible, mobile coordination may smooth and soften 
some social affairs, but the shared mobile time-scapes are prone to accelerated, non-stop 
pressures and increased possibilities for control. The mobile network time may be 
unpredictable, volatile, chaotic, but not necessarily softer” (2009, p. 98).  
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Chapter 7 - BlackBerry 2.0: Ubiquitous Connectivity as 
Lifestyle 
“The BlackBerry freed us.  It freed me.  It freed others that used the product because it 
allowed us to leave the office, go home, spend time with the family, and not feel stressed 
out because you might miss an opportunity, or you might not be able to help out at work 
when there was a problem and people needed your help.  So in effect what it did was it 
allowed you to get something done very quickly.   It allowed you to get it done accurately, 
and get it done within a short period of time.  So you can spend more time with your 
family, more time with your personal pursuits.” (Mike Lazaridis, 2008, p. 8)  
7 Introduction 
In this chapter, I will outline a pivotal transition by which the myth of ubiquitous 
connectivity (UC), through the BlackBerry, takes on a much broader social existence in 
part guided by the rise of the prosumer as an archetype associated with the celebration of 
web 2.0 technologies and services. The layout of the chapter is as follows: I begin with a 
brief analysis of a watershed in the enthusiasm surrounding web 2.0, taking on Time 
magazine’s 2006 person of the year: YOU. I suggest that this is an important popular 
representation of the myth of UC, symbolically offering a “You-topian” ideal about 
digital media. This ideal supports, indeed celebrates, the role of prosumption as a form of 
empowerment and freedom for (largely unpaid) media users and creators. Next I 
examine, a related shift in the development of the BlackBerry and the myth of UC, 
broadening the myth to encompass social life itself. The shift here focuses on issues of 
individual empowerment, emotional satisfaction, and social connectivity specifically that 
crystallize the popularization of the prosumer around a new generation of BlackBerrys.  
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7.1 Resurrecting the Prosumer: Web 2.0 and You-topia 
With O’Reilly’s web 2.0 manifesto published in September of 2005 (O’Reilly, 
2005), the mythical, technological, and socio-cultural forces contributing to the rise of 
web 2.0 became widely embraced by media companies, media theorists, and popular 
culture generally.224 Arguably, it was at this moment that a renewed (and rebranded) 
mythology of a network society as emancipatory project became for many in North 
America a widely accepted characteristic of everyday life—a characteristic that resonated 
in everyday experience through the use of commonly available technologies. Web 2.0 
provided the symbolic resources normalizing and celebrating UC and related 
technologies as the next step in human progress. Consider that in 2006 several 
celebratory texts contributing to the intellectual development of web 2.0 were published 
including Jenkins’ Convergence Culture, Tapscott and Williams’ Wikinomics, Benkler’s 
Wealth of Networks, and perhaps most emblematic, Toffler’s Revolutionary Wealth— a 
follow-up to The Third Wave (1980) and a timely rehashing of his concept of the 
prosumer.  
By 2006, Toffler could point to economic and technological developments that 
had made this emancipatory figure into an everyday reality. For Toffler, the prosumer 
                                                
224 In a 2005 blog post O’Reilly offers this succinct distinction between web 1.0 and web 2.0 media: 
Web 2.0 is the network as platform, spanning all connected devices; web 2.0 applications are 
those that make the most of the intrinsic advantages of that platform; delivering software as a 
continually-updated service that gets better the more people use it, consuming and remixing data 
from multiple source, including individual users, while providing their own data and services in a 
form that allows remixing by others, creating network effects through an ‘architecture of 
participation,’ and going beyond the page metaphor of web 1.0  to deliver rich user experiences. 
(http://radar.oreilly.com/2005/10/web-20-compact-definition.html) 
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was more than just a step towards human emancipation: he/she was an economic dynamo 
essential to the creation of wealth itself. Consider, for example, this excerpt from 
Revolutionary Wealth: 
In The Third Wave (1980), we therefore invented the word prosumer for those of 
us who create goods, services or experiences for our own use or satisfaction, 
rather than for sale or exchange. When, as individuals or groups, we both produce 
and consume our own output, we are “prosuming.” 
Once we take our eyes off the money economy and mute all the econo-
babble, we discover surprising things. First, that this prosumer economy is huge; 
second, that it encompasses some of the most important things we do; and third, 
that even though it is given little attention by most economists, the $50 trillion 
money economy they monitor couldn’t survive for ten minutes without 
it…Prosumer output is the subsidy on which the entire money system 
depends…Prosumers are the unsung heroes of the economy to come. (p. 153) 
For Toffler, the prosumer economy is outside of, yet necessary to, the money 
economy—existing in symbiosis wherein the exploitation of free labour is of marginal 
consideration. In a section titled “The Coming Prosumer Explosion” he goes on to 
provide a variety of anecdotes demonstrating how the prosumer contributes freely to the 
money economy through their own self-fulfilling pursuits, concluding that the 
development of the world-wide web itself is one such example: “This ever-expanding 
Internet content results in part from one of the biggest volunteer projects in human 
history. Prosumers, through their contributions to its structure and content, accelerate 
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innovation in the visible marketplace. They are partly responsible for changes in how, 
when and where we work, how companies are linked to customers and suppliers and just 
about every other aspect of the visible economy” (Toffler, 2006, p. 178). From Toffler’s 
perspective, the Internet itself acts as a symbol of the virtues of the unpaid labour of users 
as well as a mechanism for expanding or redefining the accumulation of wealth with 
virtually no adverse effects for the labourers themselves. 
Later in the text, Toffler distills what he considers to be the twelve most important 
functions that prosumers carry out for the money economy, including “performing unpaid 
work through ‘third jobs’ and self-service,” “buy capital goods from the money 
economy,” “marketize products, service and skills,” “provide valuable free information to 
for-profit companies,” “accelerate innovation,” and “raise children and reproduce the 
labor force” (Toffler, 2006, p. 199-201). What Toffler unwittingly captures here, and 
what web 2.0 services and technologies make possible (according to proponents), is the 
mediation of cultural (re)production through ICTs directed to enhance the intellective 
(i.e., CCC) capacities of prosumers. As evidence of this, consider the centrality of the 
prosumer in Tapscott and Williams’ influential and popular business manifesto called 
Wikinomics.225  
Alongside the flood of intellectual and popular treatise fueling the web 2.0 
euphoria, 2006 offered a number of important technological and commercial milestones. 
                                                
225 Wikinomics is now in its third edition and spawned a sequel entitled MacroWikinomics (2010). Both 
Tapscott and Williams are highly sought speakers and consultants for both corporations and governments. 
Their appropriation of the prosumer is now widely integrated across a variety of global organizations, both 
public and private (see Tapscott & Williams, 2010). 
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It marked the year Google purchased YouTube for $1.65 billion USD and it was the year 
MySpace, one of the first major social networking site, reached 100 million users. 
Furthermore, 2006 was the year Twitter was founded; the year LinkedIn reached 
profitability; the year Facebook officially opened to the public (abandoning its 
requirements that users have some institutional affiliation); and it was also the year in 
which the three primary mobile advertising platforms—Quattro Wireless, Admob, and 
Millennial Media—were launched. As I will discuss later in this chapter, 2006 was the 
year that BlackBerry released its first truly global, consumer-based line of smartphones, 
marketed as lifestyle devices suited to the new web 2.0 era. It is also no coincidence that 
Apple unveiled the first iteration of the iPhone in January of 2007.  
The period 2005-2007 marked the convergence of intellectual treatise, popular 
myths, and consumer technologies. While each of these components has important 
historical antecedents—for example, Toffler’s prosumer was coined in 1980, the Internet 
was popularized in the middle of the 1990s, Apple and Palm offered personalized and 
portable devices in the early 1990s—these were updated and reconfigured during these 
three years, weaved together amidst the popularization of web 2.0 rhetoric and articulated 
in the development of new personalized devices and services. Indeed, the myth of UC 
was implicit in this process as the freedom and empowerment associated with web 2.0 
and prosumption entailed an expansion of new points and possibilities for connectivity 
(entailing, of course, new products and services). 
There is perhaps no better example of this techno-euphoric mood than Time 
magazine’s 2006 person of the year: YOU. While it did serve to briefly boost sagging 
magazine sales (Ives, 2006; Granatstein & Moses, 2006), it also concisely illustrates how 
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web 2.0 and UC converge from the perspective of “old media” (Time Warner) seeking to 
cash-in on the hype. Interestingly, the resulting issue serves almost as an ironic effigy for 
traditional mass media, now written off as both undemocratic and unnecessary by Time’s 
own editorial staff. Sadly, this irony seems to have been lost on them as the opening lines 
of the issue demonstrate: 
The ‘Great Man’ theory of history is usually attributed to the Scottish philosopher 
Thomas Carlyle, who wrote that ‘the history of the world is but the biography of 
great men.’ He believed that it is the few, the powerful and the famous who shape 
our collective destiny as a species. That theory took a serious beating this year. 
(Stengel, 2006, p. 9) 
So began Time magazine's 2006 “Person of the Year” issue—which, to repeat, 
appointed (or anointed) “You” the “Person of the Year.”  “Yes, you.  You control the 
Information Age,” Time exclaimed.  This singular message was re-phrased and reiterated 
throughout the issue as a way of celebrating the triumph of web 2.0 technologies and 
entrepreneurs over the economy and culture.  In the feature article, Lev Grossman 
declares that 2006 was “about the many wresting power from the few and helping one 
another for nothing and how that will not only change the world, but change the way the 
world changes” (p.16). The narrative outlined by Time suggested that humanity has been 
freed from entrenched political-economic authority, hierarchy and oppression—as a “new 
digital democracy” has arrived (while, presumably, undermining the influence of 
mainstream media companies like owner and media conglomerate Time-Warner).  
According to this depiction, web 2.0 Internet tools have empowered individuals over the 
forces of history. 
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 Time’s editor, Richard Stengel writes that “individuals are changing the nature of 
the information age”— “they are the engaged citizens of a new digital democracy.” “The 
creators and consumers of user-generated content are transforming art and politics and 
commerce,” he suggests. This rhetoric is conflated with more democratic and populist 
strands of American history, which Stengel characterizes as a tradition of “amateur 
politicians.”  “Thomas Paine,” he declares, “was in effect the first blogger, and Ben 
Franklin was essentially loading his persona into the MySpace of the 18th century, Poor 
Richard's Almanack.” As he draws these comparisons with aspects of the American 
Revolution, Stengel claims that YouTube and other web 2.0 technologies are overturning 
dominant power structures.  “The new media age,” he declares, “is threatening only if 
you believe that an excess of democracy is the road to [chaos]. I don't” (2006, p. 9).   
In keeping with such rhetoric, the cover features the trademark YouTube video 
interface framing a Mylar mirror acting as the monitor of an iMac desktop computer. 
These are important visual cues as to the content of the issue as they stress the 
(commercially and technologically-enabled) importance of “You.”  “We chose to put a 
mirror on the cover,” the editor explained, “because it literally reflects the idea that you, 
not we, are transforming the information age” (2006, p. 9). Statements like this one frame 
the “web 2.0 era” as an unrivaled wellspring of individual liberation and autonomy.   
The “end of” myths associating technological progress with some final state of 
human emancipation conceals a fundamental tension between technological change and 
the political economic structures of capitalism. As Vincent Mosco writes, “we need to 
understand political economic pressures within the cultural context of meaningful myths 
that lift us out of the day-to-day and designate us as a special, perhaps even a chosen, 
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people” (Mosco, 2004, p. 118). Specifically, “It is only when we see cyberspace as 
mutually constituted out of a culture that creates meaning and a political economy that 
empowers it that we can fully understand why it is that over and over again, people have 
encountered and believed in a genuinely living end” (p. 118).  
 Time’s version of a digital democracy—its “You-topia”—is built from the “work” 
that masses of “Yous” perform—invoking, symbolically, the rhetoric of the prosumer and 
prosumption. Lev Grossman writes, “And we didn't just watch, we also worked. Like 
crazy. We made Facebook profiles and Second Life avatars and reviewed books at 
Amazon and recorded podcasts. We blogged about our candidates losing and wrote songs 
about getting dumped. We camcorded bombing runs and built open-source software” 
(Grossman, 2006). Nowhere in this litany of activities are the identities or political 
economic contexts of the agents at issue. Like other myths that occlude their political 
economic precepts, Time ignores the fact that individuals are in any way connected to a 
broader material world beset by class, nationality, ethnic, and gender inequalities, often 
creating insurmountable barriers to full participation. These inequalities are summarized 
by the term “digital divide” (Norris, 2000). Instead, Grossman forwards the idea that 
everyone has the ability to contribute something substantive to Time’s version of an 
online digital democracy. 
 Finally, no triumphal myth would be complete without some token heroes. Time 
focuses on the creators of YouTube whose rags to riches story epitomizes the 
entrepreneurial opportunities made available by fusing the concepts of democracy and 
technology with the free market. Like many of the success stories emerging from Silicon 
Valley, this one presents the neoliberal view that “technological change relies upon the 
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coercive powers of competition to drive the search for new products, new production 
methods, and new organizational forms” (Harvey, 2005, p. 68). The story is particularly 
appropriate as the purchase of YouTube by Google (for, to repeat, $1.65 billion USD in 
2006) was yet another step in an acquisition frenzy that saw corporations buy social 
networks in their quest to develop online advertisement revenue streams (News 
Corporation’s ultimately ill fated acquisition of MySpace for $600 million in 2005 was a 
notable precursor).  
The tacit claim here is that private control of the means of communication, in the 
form of vertically and horizontally integrated corporations—whether it be Apple, Google, 
Time Warner, or even RIM—leads to both market efficiency and technological 
innovation and these, in turn, ultimately yield greater freedom and democracy. The 
democratizing impulse said to adhere in web 2.0 stands in stark contrast to unprecedented 
levels of media concentration (Noam, 2009; Winseck & Jin, 2011; Wu, 2010). It is 
therefore in the interest of media capital to propagate myths that enable commercial 
technologies to increasingly mediate society’s communicative capacities—a process now 
defining the development of IMDs as they become the primary Internet access point for 
users around the world (Smith, 2011; Wright, 2008). According to these myths, it is 
through the market that needs are most effectively registered and efficiently organized—
that is, it is through the mediation of atomic-vested interests that collective good is 
attained; creating a high-tech version of Adam Smith’s invisible hand perpetually 
summoned (and regularly caricatured) by free market economists (Friedman, 2007; 
Hayek et al., 1956; Von Mises, 1977).  
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Despite the rhetoric about individual freedom and economic prosperity, the era of 
UC entails greater competition by commercial media organizations for our attention. In 
so doing, commercial forces seek greater existential inseparability between users and 
commercial interests by assuming the role of key mediators in everyday life, particularly 
in their shaping of our sense of self and the norms of our social relations. Though such 
influence competes with many other powerful and important mediators—like the family, 
workplace, religion, and nation state—the commercial strategy is to colonize every aspect 
of daily existence. One of the most effective ways commercial interests have done this is 
through the dissemination of consumer technologies that have become communicative 
and cultural staples of everyday life. Thus the era of UC and IMDs offer up an ideal 
vehicle for the perhaps final and totalizing, process of colonization. So while 
communication is more ubiquitous it is also more highly concentrated by corporate 
power; while contemporary media appears more social, in fact the devices themselves are 
more personal and private, thereby making obsolete policies of universal access and 
considerations of communication as a public good. As substitution, we are left with the 
figure of the prosumer as a popular, yet thinly veiled, expression of the sovereign 
consumer (see Babe, 2006b, pp. 47-50; Manzerolle & Smeltzer, 2011).  
7.2 BlackBerry 2.0 
As I will outline in the remainder of this chapter, the popularization of web 2.0 
also framed a particularly important transformation for the BlackBerry brand of devices 
and services. What began largely as a narrative shift in the identity of the Internet became 
a key part of RIM’s brand messaging and product offerings embracing the prosumer as its 
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ideal user. RIM’s strategy involved re-conceptualizing UC—through its devices, services, 
marketing, and investor relations—into a fully connected lifestyle adapted to the new era 
of empowerment and freedom described by web 2.0 proponents. A central component of 
RIM’s strategy involved positioning its brand in experiential terms to demonstrate the 
benefits, and indeed the necessity, of a fully connected lifestyle. RIM’s specific goal was 
to generalize the significance of UC for all as a means of embracing and articulating the 
archetype of the prosumer (Hamblen, 2008). 
To accomplish this, RIM began leveraging the iconic aspects of the BlackBerry’s 
brand identity—captured by its first slogan “always on, always connected”—into a far-
reaching message about a radically new social milieu accessible through its devices and 
services. Yet RIM was engaged in not only appealing to an expanded audience of 
potential BlackBerry users, but also in transforming its existing users into a targeted 
audience to which it could sell apps, advertisements, and other products. To do this, RIM 
developed a new marketing strategy and new consumer-friendly products that tied its 
identity to the most important elements of web 2.0. Always on, always connected became 
as much a social necessity for the web 2.0 prosumers as it was a business necessity for 
the virtual organization.  
The intertwining of business and social necessity was a theme reiterated in a 
number of interviews with marketers and designers at RIM who repeatedly stressed that 
the BlackBerry no longer had a specific user type, but rather that it served a lifestyle in 
which virtually everyone was implicated. Consequently, RIM’s plea to consumers was 
precisely a valorization of both ubiquity and immediacy as the dominant forms of social 
mediation. RIM’s corporate narrative became one in which everyone and everything was 
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to be made available everywhere and always. While this narrative resonated with the 
wireless enterprise market for the reasons discussed in chapter 6, the voluntary adoption 
of this far-reaching media condition by consumers was specifically related to both 
technical advancements as well as the popular myths about the necessity of UC in web 
2.0. RIM hoped to communicate the belief that through the BlackBerry anyone could 
participate in this new lifestyle. In contrast to the bulk purchasing made by corporations 
(guided by their CIOs) seeking ever more efficient and productive ways of managing 
connected workers, the pitch to consumers rested on a narrative of “empowering” 
individual users in and over their social lives. In so doing, RIM was appealing to the 
You-topia consolidating around web 2.0. Indeed, web 2.0’s valorization of the prosumer 
provided a ready template within which the BlackBerry could be re-cast.  
To be sure, marketing to individual consumers was not entirely new for RIM; as 
described in chapter 4, individual users, particularly celebrities, high-profile 
entrepreneurs, politicians, corporate executives, and professionals like lawyers and stock 
traders were important to the early successes of the BlackBerry brand. What was new, 
however, was a broad strategy that connected the evolution of the BlackBerry brand with 
the changing nature of social mediation in everyday life in light of the growing 
importance of UC in both work and socialization. Consequently, the BlackBerry was to 
act as a general-purpose lifestyle device suited to this new world of social connectedness. 
While the BlackBerry may have altered the relations of production within enterprise and 
professional workforces in important ways, RIM’s new strategy reflected how social 
networks (both online and offline) were ubiquitously mediated by technology.   
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 To illustrate how web 2.0 influenced the evolution of the BlackBerry, and with it, 
the development and commercialization of UC, the remainder of this chapter is divided 
into four sections. The first examines the positioning of the BlackBerry in terms of a 
connected lifestyle focusing on the experiential and affective qualities of UC. The second 
outlines the marketing of new devices in which the prosumer was framed as a 
typical/ideal BlackBerry user. The third section looks at the specific incorporation of 
social media networks like Facebook and MySpace into the design and marketing of the 
BlackBerry. Fourth, it looks at the creation of the BlackBerry as a branded community 
and as a platform for creating targeted audiences of consumers for new products and 
services.  
7.3 BlackBerry as Experience 
At the height of the web 2.0 euphoria in 2006 RIM introduced what would 
become a multi-pronged strategy focusing on the affective qualities of the “BlackBerry 
experience.” This new focus offered an evolved brand narrative bridging work and social 
life, new devices developed expressly for web 2.0 prosumers (including added or 
enhanced media functions), and an emphasis on social networking as a core capability. 
While appeals to business users focused primarily on access to time-sensitive email, 
beginning in 2006 a new narrative stressed the affective dimensions of UC: “Love what 
you do,” “Take life with you,” “Master your everyday,” “Life on BlackBerry.” The 
theme of “love” and “everyday life” are repeatedly deployed in RIM’s marketing and 
advertising beginning at this time. On the scope of RIM’s affective turn, McGuigan 
(2010) writes,  
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Most striking about this campaign is its attempt to mobilize affect. The images 
characterize BlackBerry devices as an archive and conduit of ‘everything we love 
in life’. Ironically, the images remind us that what we really value – what gives 
meaning to our lives – are interactions with the people we love and care about. 
Perhaps this is meant to tap into guilt experienced by people forced to spend time 
apart from their families – as is common in the corporate world. In this sense, the 
products and their connective capabilities are reified, serving as proxies or 
facilitators for interactions that cannot occur in physical proximity, for whatever 
reason(s). (McGuigan, 2010, p. 20) 
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Figure 18: A typical ad for the BlackBerry Curve, highlighting both the emotional 
dimensions of UC, but also the native integration of web 2.0 apps like MySpace, 
Facebook, and Twitter (RIM, 2008). 226 
                                                
226 The caption reads:  
Meet the new BlackBerry Curve 8520 smartphone. How can you not love hanging out? Hanging 
out is for inside jokes, secrets, updates, BBM flirting and doing things you’ll reminisce about the 
next time you hang out. We thought hey, even if you can’t be in the same room, coffee shop or 
time zone, you can get together on Facebook, Twitter, BlackBerry Messenger or MySpace. That’s 
why we loved building the new BlackBerry Curve. Just because you’re not together, doesn’t mean 
you can’t hang out. 
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Figure 19: Print ad for BlackBerry featuring the “Love what you do” slogan. The 
image and text reinforces the experiential and affective dimensions of the brand 
(RIM, 2009).227 
 
                                                
227 The caption reads:  
LIKE is watered-down love. Like is mediocre. Like is the wishy-washy emotion of the content. 
Athletes don’t do it for the like of a sport. Artists don’t suffer for the like of art. There is no I like 
NY T-shirt. And Romeo didn’t just like Juliet. Love. Now that’s powerful stuff. Love changes 
things. Upsets things. Love is at the root of everything good that has ever happened and will never 
happen. 
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Figure 20: Web ad used on the New York Times website (www.nytimes.com). Text 
emphasizes the integration of business and personal uses (RIM, 2008). 
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Figure 21: Still from interactive web ad featured on the New York Times website 
(www.nytimes.com) (RIM, 2009). 
 
Figure 22: Web ad via Linkstrom.com (RIM, 2010). 
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This broadened narrative shift was also communicated to investors and business 
analysts in RIM’s annual reports, and these constituted what is perhaps the most concise 
expression of the BlackBerry’s expanded brand identity. For purposes of contrast, 
consider these relatively bland opening lines from the 2006 Annual Report (fiscal 2005), 
the year before the aforementioned transformation:  
A world of Information 
The flagship product of Research In Motion Limited, BlackBerry is a leading 
wireless connectivity solution, providing access to a wide range of applications on 
a variety of wireless devices around the world. It combines award winning 
devices, software and services to keep mobile professionals globally connected to 
the people, data and resources that drive their day. (RIM, 2006) 
These lines are highly descriptive, factual, and explain clearly the “value 
proposition” for potential users and customers looking to implement RIM’s devices and 
services as tools of productivity. The BlackBerry is described primarily as a practical 
wireless business “solution.”  
The 2007 annual report, however, opens with these telling lines:  
Wireless access to email and other information is no longer a luxury reserved for 
top executives. People everywhere are leading increasingly unwired lifestyles, 
dynamically balancing careers and rich personal lives. They need to be able to go 
where life takes them without losing touch with the people and information that 
matter most. They need a mobility solution that can blend innovation, usability 
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and style…Wireless connectivity is liberating and people who live busy lives want 
that freedom. (emphasis added, RIM, 2007)  
Extending the lifestyle narrative, the 2008 annual report emphasizes UC as a 
primary selling point to consumers, opening the report with the promise of connecting 
you to “everything you love in life” (RIM, 2009, p. 2) including social networks, 
entertainment, and leisure activities. The 2009 report goes on to innumerate the various 
ways the BlackBerry has intervened in everyday life as a necessity, delivering a crucial 
message to potential consumers and investors alike: RIM is not just about business users, 
but instead is about a radically new way of life premised on UC in which work life and 
social life are seamlessly interwoven. This is a particularly important component of the 
BlackBerry’s new expanded identity as it attempts to overcome the potential work-related 
stigma typically associated with the brand. The 2009 report detailed sections outlining the 
lifestyle characteristics of the new devices and features, proclaiming that the BlackBerry 
would “connect to your favorite entertainment,”228 “connect to your social networks,”229 
and “connect to your interests.”230 
                                                
228 Content under heading:  
“Your BlackBerry smartphone puts powerful audio, video and gaming capabilities at your 
fingertips. Listen to music or watch videos whenever you wish. Play mobile games when you have 
time on your hands. Take photos or shoot videos of friends. And use built-in GPS to ensure that 
you find that shop, restaurant or dinner party. Purchase a novel, order flowers, reserve concert 
tickets and book your next trip – all on your BlackBerry smartphone.” (RIM, 2009) 
229 Content under heading:  
Keep tabs on your social circles. Share recent baby photos and make sure friends see your 
vacation video clips. Wish Uncle Stu “Happy Birthday,” instant message Sophie about lunch, 
email the mechanic or call Grandma just to say hello. Stay linked to the office while in the field or 
traveling, send important files to your co-workers and edit documents on the spot. Plan a night out 
with the girls or a poker game with the guys. Connecting to your social networks has never been 
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For investors and consumers alike, RIM positioned the BlackBerry as an 
indispensable part of everyday life—a service significant not only for work but also for 
maintaining (if not enhancing) relationships with friends and families. Additionally, RIM 
pushed for the BlackBerry to be recognized as a device for consuming entertainment 
media. In sync with web 2.0, the overarching narrative was one of empowerment, of 
productive creativity, and of connectivity as freedom itself.  
It is important to note that this marketing focus on the experiential and affective 
dimensions of the BlackBerry also fits a more general industry shift away from selling 
devices (products with relatively low profit margins) to selling services.231 In this case, 
BlackBerry is offering its own branded connectivity, delivered through the handset, in 
                                                                                                                                            
 
easier. (RIM, 2009) 
230 Content under heading:  
Catch up on the latest news while waiting for your flight. Review last night’s sports scores. 
Review your stock portfolio’s performance. Find a great bistro for next Thursday’s business lunch. 
Check the weather before heading to the soccer game. Investigate the registry for gift ideas and get 
directions to the wedding. Make sure tomorrow’s meeting is still on and review the big 
presentation. Connecting to all of your important information while on the go has never been 
easier. (RIM, 2009) 
 
231 From the earliest days, the commercial development of UC has been framed by the goal of selling 
services, not devices. From a 1993 Forbes article on wireless data:  
The real pot of gold in [wireless] is not in selling the devices, but in selling communication and 
information services to be consumed by those devices," according to Bill Ablondi, principal 
analyst for IS Strategic Decisions, in Norwell, Mass. Ablondi estimates that 7.7 million wireless 
devices will be running in the U.S. by the end of the decade. This would be a $1.6 billion 
hardware market, but it would be accompanied by $4.4 billion in annual network services. It's the 
knowledge workers who will be paying for all these services, simply because they are there. 
(Cringley, 1993) 
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order to expand the profitability of its services. Thus the emphasis on “everyday life” is 
crucial in this regard because it massively increases the range of services that can be 
offered through RIM’s network. The goal was to expand the usability/applicability of the 
BlackBerry beyond the, albeit increasingly fluid, boundaries of the working day. RIM 
was seeking an audience with more than just CIOs; instead, RIM wanted to connect with 
everyday consumers, albeit those willing to pay for a premium device.232  
The focus on experiential and affective qualities is an essential part of 
contemporary marketing and advertising (Arvidsson, 2006) and has been a historically 
important part of wireless telecommunications marketing (Goggin, 2006). Focus on 
experience is arguably more important for wireless services in part because the key 
medium, the electro-magnetic spectrum, is itself experientially intangible. Branding 
mobile phones and devices as tools of everyday life requires a heavy dose of affect. As a 
basic human need, social connectedness is re-routed through personalized IMDs that 
allow us perpetual access to our specific network of friends and family. As Adam 
Arvidsson writes, “In the case of mobile phones, branding means first of all, the inclusion 
of customer’s everyday life” and in so doing “to construct various forms of branded 
communities” (Arvidsson, 2006, pp. 116, 118). The development of branded 
                                                
232 This shift also reflected the growing “bring your own device” (BYOD) trend in many workplaces, 
spurred by the rapid adoption of both iPhone and Android IMDs (Rockel, 2012). In this trend, consumers 
pay for devices themselves, though they are required to synchronize them with their workplace’s IT 
department in order to gain access to secure email and other sensitive information. For employers, this shift 
was mixed in part because on the one hand it offloaded handset costs onto workers, but it also required new 
solutions to make sure these new devices met the security standards once only available through a total 
system like the BES. RIM has been attempting to keep a foothold by offering secure virtualization services 
that route BYOD devices through their secure servers. The service is called “Mobile Fusion.” Similarly, 
RIM has developed software that creates easy partitions on devices (both BlackBerry and BYOD) that 
separate work functions from social functions (Albanesius, 2012). 
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communities has important implications for the long-term development of wireless 
services in relation to the mediation of social life itself. Thus the emotional dimension of 
marketing communication devices and services shifts within the mobile market towards 
the provision of software, services, and content—rather than hardware—as the most 
significant revenue source (this relates to issues raised in chapter 3 regarding the shift 
away from hardware manufacturing). What is on offer is a service that provides us 
ubiquitous access to our social lives, positioning it as a basic necessity akin to food and 
shelter. There is also a political economic necessity for the wireless industry itself; “As a 
source of revenue thus shifts from network and call charges to the provision of services 
and ‘content,’ the brand also comes to function for investors as a direct indicator of 
potential future Customer Lifetime Value” (Arvidsson, 2006, p. 116).233  
With this point in mind, RIM’s emphasis on the BlackBerry as a lifestyle 
necessity refocuses the brand not simply as a specific device but towards the entire 
BlackBerry brand as an essential service. For RIM, the BlackBerry brand becomes a 
locus for emotional and affective labour associated with social connectivity. 
Consequently, the participation (prosumption) of users—particularly younger 
consumers—becomes a means of adding value to the brand itself as a function of the 
network effects (Benkler, 2006)—or perhaps network “affects”—that see the value 
increase as more people are added to such communities. The more users that are 
committed to the connectivity offered by BlackBerry, the greater its social and economic 
                                                
233 Customer lifetime value (CLV) is an important part of corporate customer relationship management 
(CRM). It represents “the present value of all future profits obtained from a customer over his or her life of 
relationship with a firm” (Gupta et al., 2006, p. 141). CLV is particularly important for companies 
providing services, in this case wireless connectivity. 
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value. In this regard, the attraction of younger consumers becomes essential. As one 
marketer I interviewed explained, “the youth market fuels the coolness of the brand.” 
Indeed, it is this affective component (“coolness”) that is ultimately so important to the 
production of the mobile audience for BlackBerry. As people spend more time using their 
devices(s), the potential mobile audience becomes more valuable and, as a result, the 
BlackBerry brand becomes more valuable also.234  
What these sample transformations illustrate is how the idea of ubiquitous 
connectivity has been redefined through the BlackBerry brand in an effort to create and 
reflect a branded experience of mobility, identity, and sociality. As an interview with the 
head of RIM’s User Experience Research department revealed, the development of the 
BlackBerry platform in the post-web 2.0 period was precisely about cultivating affective 
                                                
234 In an effort to expand both its potential audience and the affective dimensions of the brand, RIM sought 
out high profile endorsements from major stars and musicians, the biggest was a partnership with the band 
U2 that saw extensive marketing campaigns linking one of the biggest rock bands in the world and their 
love of BlackBerry to new product rollouts. This endorsement was particularly significant because U2 
dropped its longstanding relationship with Apple in favour of BlackBerry (Spence, 2009). U2’s 2009 
360degree tour was sponsored exclusively by BlackBerry, reaching an estimated 7.2 million concert 
attendees (Reuters, 2009; Waddell, 2011). Later that year U2 released an exclusive “mobile album” 
available through the BlackBerry website (Zeis, 2009). These and other partnerships with musicians and 
celebrities for example, rapper Jermain Dupri and DJ Diplo) have focused on enriching the “coolness” 
factor in order to overcome the traditional identity of the BlackBerry in the youth market. The emphasis on 
music to enhance the coolness of mobile technologies has been well documented (Wang, 2005; Goggin, 
2006) and it is therefore not surprising that RIM has turned to music celebrities to enrich the coolness 
factor, but also to position the BlackBerry as an important platform for music consumption itself (most 
recently evidenced by its BBM music service, released in 2011). RIM also began sponsoring fashion 
shows, concerts, and other cultural events in order to raise brand awareness among those outside of the 
business enterprise market (Guth & Vascellaro, 2007). More recently, this logic was expressed in RIM’s 
choice of Alicia Keys as their “Global Creative Director,” as well as sponsoring her world tour, in 
conjunction with the launch of their BB 10 line of devices (Lederman, 2013). Additionally, RIM (now 
known simply as BlackBerry) employed a variety of celebrities in their “Keep Moving” initiatives, which 
featured these celebrities (including director Robert Rodriguez and author Neil Gaiman) using the BB 10 
platform to compose and create various media projects. See 
http://keepmoving.blackberry.com/desktop/en/us/home.html 
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and experiential attachments to the devices in ways that made the BlackBerry’s social 
networking function “stickier” or more closely integrated across moments in everyday 
life. He describes the recent evolution of the device as being a negotiation between 
satisfying common needs and efforts to create a “hot” product that mobilizes the sublime 
and affective connections between the user, their device, and social setting: 
For me, the distinction between business user and general consumer never really 
existed. Two thoughts: first, there’s been a natural trajectory from the smartphone 
as a tool to a necessity of everyday life. We’re seeing the natural progression into 
the consumer market; second, my philosophy is always that you’re not a 
businessman or a consumer, you’re a human. At the end of the day even if you’re 
60 years old, you probably have some social interaction or personal hobby, that’s 
not business, even though you’re a business person. Even if you’re a 20 
something, you’re probably going to load this up with movies or media, on your 
way to your first job. The lines are blurring, there are interesting places where you 
will have differentiation, like in industrial design, things like colors and 
aesthetics, but these are superficial. We think about the device as satisfying needs, 
not as a specific demographic, or consumer segment.  
Over and above those needs, consumers want a hot device, they don’t 
want a bland device, they want something that feels good in their hand, something 
had makes them feel good; they want a hot device. You pick up the device you 
should be able to rock and roll. There’s a certain level of efficiency around 
messaging, predictable, reliable, on time, certain element of that that is baseline, 
regardless if you are a business or a girl who sends hundreds/thousands of texts. 
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But at the end of the day it’s the emotional connection with the device that makes 
people want to have it, use it. (personal communication, February 9, 2011) 
This focus on affective and experiential dimensions involved more than just new 
marketing slogans and advertising images. Rather, he describes his experience in creating 
tools and techniques for measuring affective responses to a variety of stimuli (tactile, 
visual, iconographic), and then using those measurements to guide research and device 
design. Emotional responses were incorporated as a central design principle for the 
BlackBerry: 
I have a long history of looking at products from the perspective of emotion. It 
started with a project to measure fun at Microsoft. It started off as an academic 
activity, but was something that had to be applied to a practical setting. So we set 
off on that, then it grew into assessing things like iconography and aesthetics. I 
talk a lot about what bubbles to the top—top of mind—I rail against Likert scales. 
I wanted to find a way to get out of participants what they would say at the water 
cooler. So we started working on methodologies that would elicit their visceral 
response. Why did it make you feel that way, using words and then attach that to 
the product. You’ve grabbed the visceral off the top and bring it back to the 
product. We did facial analysis focusing on the Zygomatic muscle; so what are 
the qualities in software that cause that kind of muscular activity. Emotion is not 
just the obvious. Yet a certain set of people with iPhone think that’s awesome, 
and it will wear off, once the party is over. So what are the little things that will 
keep the pleasure going? And the people that never get excited, what are the 
things that bring them a connection? That’s what we’re interested in.  
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From a design perspective, it’s a challenge. How do you get the devices to 
feel natural? We get analyses of people doing it in different ways, but it’s about 
the need, and how do we design it to be intuitive and natural, to anticipate the 
things that people can’t articulate. How do you just get it to just make sense? 
(personal communication, February 9, 2011) 
The process of building this emotional experience also reconfigured the 
institutional components within RIM surrounding research, design, and engineering. As 
an employee at RIM’s user experience division stated:   
You need to build an experience around it. That’s what the user experience is 
about. It’s about building an emotional experience around something. You have to 
create a story about the object. User Design process: UX research activity and 
designers are partners through the process, designers are part of the research 
stage, and researchers are part of the design process.  
One element was the universal search function. Instead of bringing up a 
dedicated search tab, or app, it is built right into the OS so that you can just start 
typing right away. They had people keep a diary about what they were doing with 
the BlackBerry, about absolutely everything you search for on any device, and 
every tool that you use. They look at search as a holistic thing, what are the 
elements of design that we can take from the real world and inject into the design. 
Search has got to be front and centre, people don’t want to search and then 
commit, it brings back everything as you type in real time with a list of everything 
that starts with a letter, then adding another letter. Next, what is the most 
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important thing first? Need to design an ordering of importance that lists things in 
order of importance.  
Screen interface is becoming more aesthetic and experiential, it is an 
interactive experience that can be customized for the user. What do we want to 
achieve in redesigning the aesthetic? We need to craft our own identity, not 
through emulation, but something that feels and is experienced like a BlackBerry, 
if we didn’t go for this unique aesthetic and brand messaging we were going to 
lose.  
Make the tabs/icon have chrome, or chrome highlights, no chrome etc… 
how do we figure out what are the elements we need to craft an aesthetic? Took 
two designs and flashed them in alternating pattern for an audience, fast enough 
that they couldn’t really reflect on which they liked, but try to determine which 
one had an effect on them at an impulsive level, emotional level. We did 100 
something comparisons, and after going through these you get a picture of what 
people want from a BlackBerry experience at an emotional level. (personal 
communication, February 9, 2011) 
These considerations regarding creating the BlackBerry experience was a large 
part of the redesigned BlackBerry OS 6 released in 2010. OS 6 was the first operating 
system released from RIM’s integrated User Experience research department, launched 
specifically to evoke the experiential qualities alluded to earlier. Among its features were 
more lush graphics, icons with chrome highlights and shadows, giving the icons the 
appearance of three-dimensionality, a universal search for intuitive usage and access to 
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information and services. In conjunction with the release of OS 6 RIM also released its 
hybrid device called the BlackBerry Torch, a device that featured both a physical 
keyboard and touch screen as a slider (Baig, 2010). It was the first device designed 
entirely under the new emphasis on user experience as a defining and unifying strategy. 
OS 6.0 constituted a key moment for implementing a new “experiential,” “immersive,” 
and “sticky” experience around the BlackBerry device. 
While the practical use value elements of the BlackBerry had long been a defining 
component of its symbolic appreciation in the public eye, it was now crucial to turn 
BlackBerry into an experience in and of itself: a unique way to package ubiquitous 
connectivity and link it emotionally to a specific device and user experience.  
7.4 New Devices 
“One of the things we found was that the closer that these devices get to you physically, if 
it’s something that you wear, like a watch or something you put in your pocket or hold in 
your hand, it takes on a whole different meaning.  It becomes something that becomes a 
part of you.  It reflects your character, your personality, and you take certain attributes 
from that device.  There’s a status involved.  So what we found was that there’s going to 
be a large amount of customization going forward.  There are going to be different styles, 
different models.” (Mike Lazaridis, 2008, p. 12) 
The BlackBerry Pearl was RIM’s most concerted attempt to cultivate a large-scale 
prosumer market through the development and sale of a new device. While it was 
preceded by the release of the 7100 in 2004 (the first candy bar shaped BlackBerry), the 
Pearl differed in its direct appeal to consumers. The Pearl was available in multiple colors 
and included a high quality glossy plastic casing. It featured smooth, rounded lines, rather 
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than the bland and bulky enclosures of previous BlackBerrys. The Pearl offered GSM and 
GPSR/EDGE [2.5G] connectivity that allowed it to access wireless data and the Internet 
access on most national and international networks.235  
Aside from the aesthetics of the device’s outer design, it also featured a crucial 
upgrade to its thumb-based navigation—while the Pearl incorporated the compressed 
keyboard of the 7100 with RIM’s patented SureType algorithm (an algorithm that learned 
to anticipate typed words before they were completed)—the Pearl offered something 
new: a scroll ball positioned in the middle of the device between the screen and keyboard. 
This new feature provided a clear link to the name of the device as it lit up and glowed 
white. Replacing the right-side scroll wheel of previous BlackBerrys (favouring the right-
handed), the scroll ball was meant to emphasize fluid new ways to navigate the 
BlackBerry OS by emulating the function of a mouse on a desktop PC. This new thumb 
based interface enabled more dynamic interaction with social networks, websites, and 
applications in line with the expanding uses of IMDs for more than just communication 
(Austen, 2007). The scroll ball was positioned on the device, squarely in the middle, to 
reflect the increasing use and portability of such devices, particularly as they are held 
with one hand, rather than two, as most previous BlackBerrys had been.236 
                                                
235 The Pearl was also designed as a multi-media device, enabling the user an expanded range of content 
production. The Pearl offered several upgrades in screen resolution (240 x 260 pixels), processing power, 
and multi-media features, consonant with the new expectations of a prosumer market spurred on to unleash 
their creativity through these devices. A 1.3 megapixel camera, Bluetooth connectivity, voice dialing, 
music and movie playback, flash memory card slot, and came with several instant messaging and social 
networking features (AOL, Yahoo, MSN, ICQ) built directly into the device (RIM, 2007b). 
236 On this note the press release for the Pearl reads:  
Images appear incredibly vivid and crisp on the BlackBerry Pearl’s large, ultra-bright, high-
resolution (240x260) display. Built-in light sensing technology automatically adjusts the screen 
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The Pearl was constructed and marketed as an object of fashion, much like 
Nokia’s popular mid-1990s offerings (2100, 8200, 8800) that redefined cell phones for a 
mass consumer market (Goggin, 2006, p. 47). Nokia’s products targeted younger 
consumers in the late 1990s and, in properly Sloanist fashion, offered different colors and 
changeable faceplates to personalize devices (p. 46).237 Indeed, Nokia’s strategy provided 
an important template for RIM’s own expanded ambitions. Wall Street Journal 
technology reviewer Walt Mossberg described it as “All shiny black and silver, the 
slender Pearl looks more like a fashion phone than a keyboard-equipped smartphone” 
(Mossberg, 2006). The Pearl was meant to be seen in social settings, and be an object of 
conversation. In this regard, the Pearl offered RIM an opportunity to attract younger 
consumers and thus it contributed a crucial component of RIM’s new strategy (Goggin, 
2006, p. 47). As a RIM marketer explained in an interview, younger consumers are 
essential for the BlackBerry brand in part because they tend to be more brand aware and, 
as a result, brand loyal. Similarly, younger consumers are more prone to demonstrate and 
share their devices with friends and to talk about the brand in social settings. A 
fashionable, cutting-edge device is an important status symbol. It also fits into the 
                                                                                                                                            
 
and keypad brightness for optimum viewing of emails and attachments, pictures, web pages, 
business applications and games in indoor, outdoor and dark environments. The BlackBerry Pearl 
also introduces an incredibly intuitive user interface with a supple, responsive trackball that makes 
vertical and lateral scrolling fast and easy. Dedicated 'menu' and 'escape' keys on either side of the 
trackball along with context sensitive menus make navigation instinctive, smooth, and true to the 
BlackBerry experience. (RIM, 2007b) 
237 Later RIM offered a modified Pearl named “Style” (released in 2008), also known as the Pearl flip 
phone, a device that included all of the functionality of the Pearl but mirrored the flip-phone style popular 
in North America following the success of Motorola’s Razr line (Biggs, 2008).  
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broader experiential frame RIM sought to cultivate in its marketing and advertising 
initiatives.  
The release of the Pearl in 2006 was accompanied by an extensive marketing 
campaign, the most extensive and, until that point, arguably the most important that RIM 
had undertaken. As several authors have noted (Reeves, 2007; Hamblen, 2008), the Pearl 
was conceived and positioned as a tool for the prosumer—not the prosumer of the 
business enterprise world, but of the web 2.0 era (an individual that needed to be 
connected at all times, that was producing and consuming data ubiquitously).  
An early commercial for the Pearl, jointly produced with Virgin Mobile (a major 
telecom supporter of RIM’s new strategy), sums up the new identity RIM was trying to 
cultivate. The commercial238 is constructed as a day in the life of one of an ideal user. 
Following a young, female, urban professional, it begins in the morning and concludes in 
the evening. Over the course of two minutes the commercial illustrates the seamless 
integration of the Pearl device in work and social life and highlights the importance of 
ubiquitous connectivity in structuring the rhythms of the day. Equally on display are the 
new multi-media features that construct her as both a producer and consumer of 
content—she listens to music, communicates with friends using messaging and voice, 
finds a restaurant through GPS mapping, takes pictures of friends and quickly uploads 
them to Facebook, and so on. What is clear in this example is that the value of UC is 
intimately related to its role in mediating a desirable, if not essential, lifestyle. The device 
                                                
238 Available at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fi5q_clYfIo&list=PL3DA10E41CB94324C 
280 
 
itself is prominent in moments of work productivity, socialization, and “unproductive” 
downtime.  
A more recent commercial for the Pearl 3G mirrors a similar day in the life 
narrative, but tellingly ends with the tag: “Carry friends in your pocket.” All pauses in 
daily life are eliminated by the BlackBerry’s capability for UC in that every moment is an 
opportunity for communicative production where boredom loneliness, isolation, and 
seclusion are abolished. The message is clear: everyone is now part of the ubiquitous 
network. 
 The Pearl marketing campaign extended to other areas as well, including a 
dedicated website that provided important profiles of different types of Pearl users in the 
hopes of demonstrating the versatility of BlackBerry devices beyond business and 
corporate users. These profiles “offer the richest example of the prescriptive nature of the 
promotional materials for the BlackBerry and Pearl, as the profiles serve as scripts to 
viewers, notifying them of the potential uses and image that BlackBerry use signals to 
others” (Reeves, 2007).239 Perhaps most tellingly, Reeves notes the astonishing claims 
made by unofficial Gen-X spokesman Douglas Coupland, who is quoted saying, “[The 
                                                
239 While the original website has now since been changed, Reeves describes the range of profiles offered 
on the website when it launched in late 2006:  
Explore the lives of extraordinary people by looking inside their BlackBerry Pearl smartphones." 
The profiles include the following public figures: Martin Eberhard, the man who invented the 
world's first production electric sports car in Silicon Valley; Gretchen Bueiller, the 2006 Winter 
Olympics silver medal winner in snowboarding for Canada; Mariska Hargitay, an actress in the 
television show Law & Order: SUV; Richard Wright, an owner of a modern art auction house in 
Chicago; and Douglas Coupland, a Canadian writer and artist particularly known for his book 
Generation X…the combination of the personalities selected to profile represents an 
entrepreneurial, pseudo-celebrity, creative class. The stories presented purport to be tales of 
success that anyone could achieve with the right dedication, work ethic, and of course - 
technology product. (Reeves, 2007) 
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Pearl] is a transformer, it's a lens. It allows you to exercise your free will and your sense 
of time more creatively. And somehow humanize you and make you more humane. I 
mean that's a lot of thing(s) for a little guy to do.”  
The Pearl was designed to be used primarily by those outside of business and 
other such organizations. Reeves concludes her analysis of RIM’s online promotional 
discourse concerning the Pearl noting that, 
The Pearl is pitched as an enrichment device that enables maximum pleasure and 
benefit in all areas of life, while projecting a persona of cool style through the 
sleek design, which is one of the primary features highlighted on the Pearl 
website. RIM has applied the business-originated productivity prerogative to 
concepts of family and leisure which have been included in the consumer 
messaging to create the context and need for its device in everyday life. (Reeves, 
2007) 
Overall, the reviews of the device were highly favourable and it was quickly 
deemed to be a success, demonstrating not only a new era for RIM but for the 
smartphone itself as a mass consumer device. New York Times reviewer David Pogue 
gave it a gushing review (Pogue, 2006) and the Wall Street Journal called it “a beautiful 
piece of work” and “a very nice combination of hard-core email capability and fun 
features” (Mossberg, 2006).  
Following closely on the release of the Pearl, RIM released another smartphone 
called the Curve in early 2007. Unlike the Pearl, which was shaped like conventional cell 
phones, this new BlackBerry maintained the full QWERTY keyboard and it had a larger 
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screen with more features including a better camera, faster processor, and high-resolution 
capabilities (RIM, 2007c).240  
                                                
240 The press release for the Curve outlines in detail its multi-media functionality to be a primary selling 
point: “The BlackBerry Curve features a liquid silver finish, chrome highlights, smooth edges and soft 
curves. It is a full-featured smartphone with a full QWERTY keyboard and large display and yet it boasts 
an impressively small and lightweight design at 4.2'' x 2.4'' x 0.6'' and approximately 3.9 oz. The ultra-
bright 320x240 display brings images and video to life and includes RIM's light sensing technology that 
automatically adjusts backlighting levels for indoor, outdoor and dark environments. The handset also 
features RIM's innovative trackball navigation system that makes scrolling and selecting fast and easy. The 
BlackBerry Curve comes with a 2 megapixel camera, complete with 5x digital zoom, built-in flash, self-
portrait mirror and full screen viewfinder. The camera can capture images in up to three picture quality and 
size resolutions that can be shared instantly by email, MMS or BlackBerry Messenger and transferred over 
Bluetooth or USB cable. Photos can also be immediately set as a unique caller ID or Home Screen image. 
The audio system is crisp and clear, playing music and videos through the handset's integrated speaker or 
through the 3.5 mm stereo jack. The Bluetooth stereo audio profile (A2DP/AVRCP) is supported, and 
dedicated volume controls are conveniently located on the side of the handset. A powerful new desktop 
media manager is also included with the BlackBerry Curve. The Roxio Media Manager for BlackBerry, 
which was developed with Sonic and based on the award-winning Roxio Easy Media Creator 9, introduces 
a new level of simplicity, allowing users to easily search for media files on their computer, view and 
organize them, create MP3 music files from CDs, add audio tags, create playlists and automatically copy or 
convert pictures, music and videos for optimal playback on the BlackBerry Curve. The media manager also 
includes Roxio Photosuite 9 LE, a comprehensive tool that makes it easy to edit pictures and create photo 
albums. With PhotoSuite, pictures can be cropped, rotated and straightened, and flaws can be fixed by 
removing redeye or changing the brightness, contrast and saturation levels. Pictures can even be enhanced 
with color filters and special effects. The media player on the BlackBerry Curve has been refined, allowing 
users to search for music by simply typing the title, genre, artist or album name. Videos can also be played 
in full screen mode” (RIM, 2007c). 
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Figure 23: Print ad: “Your Connection to Everything that Matters.” (RIM, 2007) 
 
Figure 24: Interactive web ad for the Pearl featuring Douglas Coupland (RIM, 
2006). 
RIM’s new devices were also priced slightly lower than previous ones. In 
comparison to other BlackBerrys, the Pearl and Curve had a relatively lower price point 
(starting at around $399 USD in 2007, or $200 with a three year contract with T-Mobile) 
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that would appeal not only to a mass domestic market but also to consumers overseas 
(Long, 2010). For Europeans this was particularly important because unlike in North 
America, where the cost of devices is largely subsidized by wireless providers through 
multi-year contracts, users directly absorbed the bulk of handset costs. The Pearl bridged 
the divide between conventional cell phones (with the typical candy bar shape that 
emphasized voice) and smartphones (by offering an operating system and wireless data 
networking supporting mobile internet uses). Because of the full QWERTY keyboard, 
combined with general BlackBerry functionality, the Curve became one of the most 
popular smartphones in North America (Reuters, 2009). It also became a popular phone 
in non-North American markets like Europe and South-East Asia where texting was more 
commonplace and where various deals with local telecom providers made the device and 
data plans (because of RIM’s integrated mobile virtual network capabilities) widely 
available even for customers with in lower incomes (Silver, 2009b).  
Perhaps most significantly, RIM’s prosumer devices brought smartphones to a 
mass international market, and with this expansion the marketing and advertising 
language valorized BlackBerry as a lifestyle device rather than one that primarily serves 
employees and business-related activities (Anonymous, 2007; Blakely, 2007; Malykhina, 
2007; Moses, 2006). In so doing, the symbolic world created therein countered the 
perception of the BlackBerry as an invasive tool of labour control, or as a device for 
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blurring the lines between work and leisure.241 Instead, BlackBerry was re-designed and 
re-conceptualized as a brand embracing a lifestyle consonant with web 2.0. 
RIM’s prosumer strategy was successful in another sense. On a global level, RIM 
helped carriers make wireless data something everyday consumers were willing to pay 
for. Then co-CEO Jim Balsillie echoed the importance of constructing a consumer base 
for wireless data as a key selling point to wireless providers, as they were the crucial 
gatekeepers in making the device available to consumers.  “‘To sell data services to a 
consumer is far, far more difficult than selling enterprise data. It has been 
overwhelmingly difficult for the carriers,’ confessed Mr. Balsillie. ‘Carriers said, “If you 
can crack this code for us, we can push you into the bigger market.” BlackBerry has 
proven that it is enormously profitable [for carriers]’” (quoted in Austen, 2006).242 
While the Pearl and the Curve represented the vanguard of RIM’s new mass 
market strategy, RIM also began harmonizing features across its smartphone products 
thus minimizing the differences between what constituted an enterprise level versus a 
“consumer” device. Indeed, all of RIM’s BlackBerrys still maintained strong ties to the 
sphere of corporate/enterprise uses since all could easily be integrated using a BlackBerry 
Enterprise Server.  
                                                
241 The term “crackberry” perhaps best captures the complicated relationship many users have with their 
BlackBerry. The term quickly passed from colloquialism to official terminology when in 2006 Webster’s 
dictionary publisher John Wiley & Sons deemed “crackberry” winner of the “Word of the Year” contest 
(Wheaton, 2006). 
242 By the end of 2010 BlackBerry OS was responsible for most Internet usage among smartphones, 
accounting for 34.3% of the traffic, beating both Apple and Google (Anonymous, 2010). This advantage 
was short lived. 
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7.5 Going Social 
A year after the launch of the Pearl, in October of 2007, RIM released an 
integrated Facebook app for its new generation of smartphones. Until this point if 
someone wanted to access Facebook on their smartphone they had to use a clumsy 
mobile web browser to log in. As such, social networks like Facebook and MySpace were 
not optimized for mobile use. Given the explosive growth of web 2.0 services, RIM 
began incorporating social networking as a core capacity of their new prosumer 
BlackBerrys in 2007. News reports alluded to a crucial evolutionary step for both the 
smartphone and social networks: “The Facebook-BlackBerry announcement is the latest 
evolution of smartphones into an all-in-one device for anyone, not just harried business 
execs addicted—if not tethered—to the office” (Cuneo, 2007). At the time of its launch 
Facebook was already one of the most popular web destinations for mobile users. What 
BlackBerry offered in partnering with Facebook the incorporation of push-based 
notifications into the mobile app. “The application leverages the push-based BlackBerry 
system architecture and Facebook Platform to create an unparalleled mobile experience 
for Facebook users” (RIM, 2007).243   
                                                
243 RIM’s full press release explained how the BlackBerry/Facebook partnership would work:  
Research In Motion today launched Facebook for BlackBerry Smartphones, an exciting new 
BlackBerry software application that enables fast, streamlined and optimized mobile access to the 
popular Facebook social utility using a BlackBerry smartphone. The application leverages the 
push-based BlackBerry system architecture and Facebook Platform to create an unparalleled 
mobile experience for Facebook users. 
With the Facebook for BlackBerry Smartphones application, Facebook users can wirelessly send 
and view messages, photos, pokes and Wall posts. The rich, native application goes beyond 
browser-based access, automatically pushing notifications to the user’s BlackBerry smartphone as 
friends and colleagues send notes, Wall posts or pokes. The application allows users to take a 
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Figure 25: Web ad for Facebook for BlackBerry (RIM, 2007). 
RIM’s incorporation of Facebook into their devices also meant that the social 
network could become an integral part of the mobile workforce. By April of 2008, 
downloads of the Facebook for BlackBerry application exceeded 1 million (Gillin, 2007). 
                                                                                                                                            
 
photo, upload it to the site with captions and tags; quickly and easily invite friends; manage 
events; manage photo albums; and manage their status while on the go. 
Facebook is one of the fastest growing web destinations among BlackBerry smartphone users and 
it has become an important element in the evolving fabric of personal communications,” said Mike 
Lazaridis, President and Co-CEO at Research In Motion. “Facebook and RIM share a vision for 
enhanced mobile communications and social networking based on open, standards-based 
platforms and this has allowed us to produce a rich mobile application for Facebook users that 
leverages the push-based architecture, multimedia features and industry-leading usability of the 
BlackBerry solution.” (RIM 2007) 
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In September of 2008 RIM announced a strategic partnership with MySpace (at the time 
a leading social network). In addition to mobilizing all of the networking and multi-media 
functions associated with social media sites, RIM’s major emphasis was on the push-
based qualities incorporated into MySpace’s functionality.  
MySpace for BlackBerry smartphones integrates MySpace’s main social 
networking components with the BlackBerry platform to provide instant, push-
based messaging to BlackBerry and MySpace users. As part of this collaboration, 
RIM is also creating a BlackBerry community page on MySpace for users to 
access the latest BlackBerry smartphone news, content, videos, games, ringtones, 
skins and other unique and engaging features. (RIM, 2008b)244 
In the week following the release of the MySpace integrated application it was 
downloaded more than 400,000 times, a record for both companies (RIM, 2008b). Jim 
Balsillie explained the success as follows: “This rapid adoption is a reflection of an 
evolving consumer lifestyle where social connectivity and information access are more 
                                                
244 The full press release reads:  
MySpace, the world’s premier social network, and Research In Motion (RIM) a global leader in 
wireless innovation, today announced they are joining forces to develop an integrated MySpace 
Mobile experience customized for BlackBerry smartphones. The new MySpace for BlackBerry 
smartphones application is fully optimized to deliver rich content and data to users on the go. 
MySpace for BlackBerry smartphones integrates MySpace’s main social networking components 
with the BlackBerry platform to provide instant, push-based messaging to BlackBerry and 
MySpace users. As part of this collaboration, RIM is also creating a BlackBerry community page 
on MySpace for users to access the latest BlackBerry smartphone news, content, videos, games, 
ringtones, skins and other unique and engaging features. 
“MySpace and RIM are at the forefront of the mobile social networking evolution,: said Chris 
DeWolfe, chief executive officer of MySpace. “Our partnership enables millions of BlackBerry 
smartphone users to leverage MySpace on the go and access content, friend networks, and status 
and mood updates anywhere at any time.” (RIM, 2008b) 
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important than ever. This powerful new mobile application combines social networking 
and mobility in a highly personalized and empowering manner and we are very excited to 
see such a positive response in the first week” (RIM, 2008b). RIM partnered with 
MySpace and Facebook early on as yet another component of their new strategy—later 
extending to social networks such as Twitter and LinkedIn (among others). These 
partnerships reflect and further the integration of hardware, software, and social networks 
directly in the devices themselves (and this took place before other smartphone providers 
had fully recognized web 2.0 as a mobile strategy (Facebook was not released as an app 
for the iPhone until July 2008, almost a year after the BlackBerry version). Central to 
each of these partnerships was the integration of the BlackBerry’s always on, always 
connected, push-based technical capabilities. What once was limited to emails and instant 
messaging, now became an integrated part of so-called “social media” itself. 
Partnerships did not end there. As marketers working for RIM explained in 
interviews, such partnerships helped to create brand awareness for non-BlackBerry users 
of MySpace and Facebook; that is, these partnerships allowed for the extensive cross 
promotion of both devices and social networks.  
For us it was that we build products and we have partnerships with all these big 
brands, Yahoo, Google, Facebook, Microsoft, MySpace, Twitter, Youtube. We’re 
not just paying them to advertise, we’re not just paying for online marketing, or 
whatever, we’re actually partnering with these companies using their marketing 
engine to get the BlackBerry brand out. One example is the MySpace application, 
Tom, the MySpace creator, sent a blast to advertise the BB app to every MySpace 
user. You can’t even pay for that. If you want to have a product page you need to 
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pay 350k. We don’t pay for advertising because we have a partnership. With 
Facebook we can share information with them, to get site information on the back 
end to see how our page is doing and leverage that because of our partnership. Or 
Microsoft who’s got a product partnership, they own 80% or Facebook’s 
advertising, so we can use that channel. So it’s this whole integrated thing that we 
can leverage that is different from typical media buying. (personal 
communication, June 23, 2010) 
Released with the BlackBerry OS 6.0 in 2010, one of the important applications 
developed by RIM for its web 2.0 devices is called a “social feed” which functions as an 
aggregator of streaming data across social networks and news sites. Someone who uses 
Twitter, Facebook, LinkedIn, MySpace, or who subscribes to RSS feeds would find all of 
the relevant updates aggregated together in one application that sits on the BlackBerry 
home screen. 
 The importance of building these partnerships was not lost on the 
telecommunications carriers who recognized that these would generate more revenues 
through the use of wireless data. Social networking features were key ways of building 
audiences for their services. Furthermore, it was assumed that social networks would be a 
means of growing revenues generated through “premium” services.  
Content creation was but one element of the overall political economy of web 2.0 
as it linked the exploitation of unpaid user-generated content (UGC) (like that on Flickr, 
or Youtube) with marketing imperatives seeking to exploit the personalized data flows 
(both active and passive) of the new prosumers. Because of the nature of digital 
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mediation, content also constitutes seemingly mundane activities like text messaging, 
multi-media messaging, emails, tweeting, or mobile-blogging (“mobloging”). In addition, 
the digital labour involved in producing this content (defined broadly) through the use of 
networked, personalized technologies like the BlackBerry exponentially heightened the 
profitability of wireless data services as socializing and content sharing required greater 
wireless data rates and bandwidth.245 As elaborated in chapter 3, the commercialization 
of wireless data was a long process, taking decades for technology and consumer demand 
to reach profitability. In this process, wireless data itself became enthusiastically 
promoted by national and international telecommunications providers (see Foggin, 2005), 
culminating in the web 2.0 euphoria that not only valorized UGC but also positioned 
IMDs as the paradigmatic expression of individual empowerment since these devices 
incorporated the specific identity, social networks, and intellective capacities of users.  
Moreover, it was believed that such networks would facilitate the sharing of 
pictures, songs, and video, thus converting such social functions into profitable wireless 
data capabilities. For RIM, the audience for smartphones was a combination of individual 
users and telecommunications carriers, both embracing the web 2.0 view of sociality as a 
highly technical endeavour, mediated not only by devices, but also by wireless data 
services hooked directly into popular social networking sites. Even though social 
networking sites may change with the times (as the failure of MySpace evidenced) the 
basic infrastructure, comprising handsets and networks, would remain profitable since it 
                                                
245 To illustrate the rapid growth of global mobile data usage, consider that Cisco estimates that the global 
mobile data usage in 2011 was eight times greater than the total global Internet traffic in 2000. Based on 
current trends, Cisco estimates global mobile data usage will increase 18-fold by 2016, for traffic of 
roughly 11 exabytes per month (Cisco, 2012).  
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was only through its development and use that the sociality of web 2.0 could be 
maintained. This is the key point: social networks, which have existed as long as human 
society has, are becoming increasingly dependent on a complex chain of private 
companies whose infrastructure and commodities are being (or have become) integrated 
into everyday life.  
In addition to partnerships with social media, RIM began cultivating relationships 
with game developers to make the BlackBerry more desirable to consumers, and to 
highlight the capability of their devices as multi-media platforms (Guth and Vascellaro, 
2007). One such partnership was with French video game maker Gameloft, creator of 
such as popular console-based games as Prince of Persia and Assassin’s Creed. This 
early partnership, initiated in 2007, was one of the first to merge new smartphones with 
video game culture in the quest to expand the audience for both.246 
Canadian game developer Magmic focused on bringing connected games to the 
BlackBerry platform. Games like Tetris, Scrabble, and Texas Hold’em poker became 
networked through the mobile device thus making them part of a community of gamers 
                                                
246 Gameloft’s justification for developing on a mobile platform is directly related to RIM’s inclusion of 
technical features that support more advanced gaming: 
Gameloft, a leading maker of games for cellphones, plans to announce today that it is bringing its 
line of mobile games to the BlackBerry in hopes of grabbing a chunk of the device’s expanding 
market. To date, Gameloft’s titles have been available for download onto hundreds of models of 
cellphones, but the company did not see much point in bringing them to the boxy, drab devices 
used almost exclusively by business professionals. But with BlackBerry models now equipped 
with better graphics and multimedia features, and the sleek new Pearl available for about $200 
with a service plan, the market is changing, and software companies like Gameloft and Magmic 
see an opportunity. (Flynn, 2007) 
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and friends that could compete, share scores, and generally interact through their mobile 
gaming platform. This “gamification” (see Bogost, 2011) of smartphones is now an 
important force driving mobile innovation (and exploitation), particularly with the 
introduction of the iPhone and iPad as gaming platforms. For RIM, games also were an 
important way of attracting a new consumer-base for the BlackBerry. In addition, the use 
of the BlackBerry as a means for consuming games anticipated the much broader app 
economy that would develop in the wake of the iPhone and this ultimately, would help 
transform of the BlackBerry from a primarily communication based device to one that 
became a platform for virtual consumption.  
As part of expanding the entertainment usage of the BlackBerry, music 
consumption also was an important component of this development with RIM building 
partnership with Slacker radio which became its first music application designed 
specifically for BlackBerry that allowed personalized music streaming. “Slacker lets 
music fans ‘create’ their own stations by typing in the names of artists they like. Slacker's 
twist: It also offers DJ-programmed "genre" stations (rock, country, jazz, blues, etc.) and 
a bigger music library (nearly 3 million songs vs. 700,000 for Pandora [a rival music 
streaming service])” (Graham, 2009).  
RIM’s embrace of social networks and networking offered a means to expand the 
audience for other services available on the BlackBerry platform. RIM brought UC to 
social networks in order to build new revenue streams beyond the simple utility of voice 
and email communication. 
7.6 BBM and Apps 
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In 2009, RIM released what would be its most important post-web 2.0 innovation: 
its own social network fully integrated into each BlackBerry device (operating over 
RIM’s global wireless network). In this move, the devices themselves were integrated 
into a RIM-hosted social network thus creating a BlackBerry branded community. The 
early development of the BlackBerry Messenger (or simply BBM) system was 
BlackBerry-specific instant messaging service that used the unique PINs assigned to each 
BlackBerry device to enable text communication between users. BBM was an Internet-
based text messaging service that superseded traditional SMS/Text services which used 
the protocols of a specific network carrier and its wireless standard. In 2009, RIM 
released a crucial upgrade to this service with its release of BBM 5.0. This new iteration 
of BBM reflected the important role of social networking as a narrative defining the mass 
consumer market—it was social uses that people wanted and they wanted to remain 
connected to their respective social networks not only through voice, but text messaging, 
email, and instant messaging (like BBM). BBM 5.0 was a makeover that made the built-
in messaging service more like a social network, with user profiles, avatars, friend lists, 
and multi-media functionality.  
The “5.0” designation was primarily a marketing tool to synchronize this service 
with the rollout of its OS 5.0 rather than an actual generational descriptor. It allowed 
customers to add other BBM users and to add friends using quick-response (QR) codes or 
simply by touching the devices together.  Indeed, one of the important innovations that 
BBM offered was that it was a network through which any BlackBerry user could belong, 
literally integrated both into the devices and the BlackBerry wireless network that 
spanned the world. BBM offered users an easy way to build social networks through their 
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devices, swapping PINs or, increasingly, barcodes simply by bring individual devices 
together. Moreover, BBM could be integrated into working environments because it 
allowed scalable messaging groups and a feedback loop that informed messengers if a 
message had been delivered and whether it was read or not. This feedback loop put 
pressure on BBM users to make quick responses and, particularly in a work context, 
allowed managers to see how long response times would take between reading and 
responding to messages. BBM became a crucial selling point in international markets as a 
way of overcoming often-costly text messaging tariffs imposed by regional/local 
telecoms because BBM operated over the network that RIM created and that was routed 
through its specific servers. It made global and ubiquitous the messaging capabilities that 
had previously only been available through the BlackBerry Enterprise Server (BES), or 
by subscribing to telecommunications providers. This social function was one of the main 
reasons that BlackBerry became an international success, and continues to be one of the 
primary reasons why it is still being adopted in the face of direct competition from Apple 
and Google. Although both now offer similar services, neither one can offer the end-to-
end integrated network that defines BBM.  
BBM effectively created the world’s largest dedicated mobile social network 
because it automatically linked any BlackBerry user together and allowed them to create 
groups, profiles, and share media in a similar fashion to Facebook but optimized for the 
BlackBerry platform. Moreover, it acted in concert with the BES because it allowed 
enterprise-wide, or institutional, text messaging that was often more convenient or faster 
than email. BBM became one of the most important selling points for BlackBerrys 
internationally, particularly among younger users and users in developing countries 
296 
 
where texting costs were prohibitively high. It encouraged a mass uptake of BlackBerrys 
because each device was immediately integrated into a social network (Kiladze, 2010).  
 
Figure 26: Print ad (RIM, 2010) 
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Figure 27: Print ad (RIM, 2010) 
 
 
Figure 28: Print ad  (RIM, 2010) 
 
Figure 29: Print ad (RIM, 2010) 
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In 2010 RIM released a more “social” platform that allowed the direct integration 
of applications into BBM (RIM, 2010). This created an incentive for app developers 
because it offered them a massive and connected audience to create applications for—
effectively opening up the BBM platform for an expansion of virtual consumption 
overlaid onto its social function.  
By the end of 2010, BBM had roughly 30 million users globally and was hailed as 
one of the most important components of the BlackBerry’s international success 
(Kiladze, 2010). By mid-2012 the number of worldwide BBM users stood at 
approximately 55 million (Connors, 2012). But this success also generated controversy. 
In 2010 there was a protracted dispute amongst a variety of countries regarding the 
encryption of BBM services, which were routed through Waterloo. Countries like India, 
Saudi Arabia, and others demanded that they be able to monitor or gain access of the data 
now flowing into and out of their country by BlackBerry users (Associated Press, 2010; 
Bajaj, 2010). Questions of national sovereignty were raised because BBM allowed data to 
be encrypted and decrypted only by RIM itself, leading many to make arguments about 
national security and surveillance since the devices could be used by terrorists or 
criminals to coordinate attacks or other illegal or politically threatening activities. Though 
resolved, the nature of the resolution has been highly secretive (Bajaj, 2010).247  
                                                
247 More recently, the unexpected rioting in London, England was largely attributed in the media to the 
popularity of the BBM messaging service which is the most popular smartphone platform in the UK, in part 
because of its built-in nature and the relatively cheap and/or subsidized costs of BlackBerry handsets. It 
was argued that the combination of the social networking, instant messaging, and encrypted data 
capabilities allowed BBM to act as a force multiplier, giving the rioting and rioters the ability to coordinate 
looting and violence ahead of police intervention (Butcher, 2011). The term “flash mob” was often applied 
to this process, but the London rioting evidences a much more rational and sustained mob mentality, in part 
enabled by the mobility and ubiquity of BBM. While BBM may have played a role in intensifying rioting 
in London, the media narrative centered on the role of technology as a catalyst, and not on the growing 
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BBM was conceived as a central component of RIM’s overall app strategy. 
Though RIM has long focused on turning its BlackBerry platform into an application 
ecosystem, the development of apps primarily focused on industry or specific 
organizational applications, thus limiting the range of potential applications available to 
consumers. BBM became a mechanism upon which to build the social dimensions of the 
BlackBerry’s application ecosystem. BBM focused this strategy by offering an 
opportunity to leverage its branded community to seamlessly integrate more diverse 
“social” applications (Connors, 2011; RIM, 2012). BBM was crafted and used to make 
UC social in ways that were linked to the BlackBerry brand, but also providing the 
secondary goal of expanding the range of consumable applications for a diverse customer 
base (Cheng, 2009; RIM, 2012). With the launch of App World and the central focus on 
BBM, RIM used its UC capabilities to develop its own social networking platform.  
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                            
 
disparity amongst Londoner’s, particularly the youth, in the wake of severe austerity measures of the past 
few years (Halliday, 2011).  
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Chapter 8 – Conclusion: Ubiquitous Connectivity as Media 
Environment 
8 Postscript on the BlackBerry: From Ubiquity to Decline 
Over the course of this dissertation I have mapped and historicized the rise of 
ubiquitous connectivity (UC) by looking specifically at the BlackBerry as a technological 
artifact. In doing so, I have demonstrated how the relative success of the BlackBerry in 
commercializing UC for both organizations and consumers has been the result of the 
convergence of political economic imperatives, technological innovations, and cultural 
myths. Throughout I have referenced the significance of ubiquity, immediacy, and 
personalization as key elements, not only of IMDs, but also for the study of contemporary 
digital media generally. I have focused on the BlackBerry precisely because its brand 
identity, political economic significance, and functional characteristics articulate these 
themes through the prism of UC as myth.  
 In 2009, the relative success of the BlackBerry as a global brand “ambassador” 
for UC was demonstrable, not only in RIM’s devices, services, and marketing campaigns, 
but in the economic data summarized at the end of chapter 7. Indeed, 2009 was the 
tipping point for RIM and the BlackBerry as the IMD market came to be increasingly 
dominated by Apple’s iPhone and the various Android-based handsets. This tipping 
point, however, is indicative of the broader maturation of UC as a basic staple of 
everyday life, even in places (like on the African continent) where traditional consumer 
technologies had been ignored due to insufficient demand, high cost, or lack of 
infrastructure (Arnquist, 2009; Evans, 2012; Wright, 2008).   
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RIM’s prospective decline has fueled intense speculation since the launch of the 
iPhone. Rarely a day goes by without another obituary for RIM and the BlackBerry. The 
resignation of co-CEOs Mike Lazaridis and Jim Balsillie in 2012 further signalled the 
dramatic changes both in the company and its specific claim to a branded experience of 
UC. Whether these assessments are based on sound economic analysis, hysteria born 
from the “animal spirits” of a chaotic marketplace, or the need to provide regular content 
for business and technology blogs is debatable. Regardless of the reason, the signs of 
decline are palpable, though champions of the BlackBerry brand persist, and sales 
continue to grow in many developing markets (Africa, Latin America, and South-East 
Asia are still areas of growth for the BlackBerry). RIM, now rebranded as BlackBerry to 
create consistency between its product lines and corporate operations, is in the midst of 
re-booting its brand of devices by launching an entirely new operating system and app 
development platform. Whether it will be a success is still unclear.248 
The question of RIM’s decline is intimately tied its own role in the reification of 
UC as a now taken-for-granted expectation. Indeed, the success of the BlackBerry as a 
unique branded arguably has been occluded by its experiential universalization (at least in 
relatively “developed” political economies). Declining handset costs, increased 
processing power, and expanded mobile bandwidth capacity all have enabled IMDs to 
develop into ubiquitous platforms for the consumption of software and services. In this 
context the myth of UC, now “naturalized” through the forces and processes addressed in 
this dissertation, has become the context for a consumption-focused app economy. Thus 
                                                
248 Jim Balsillie’s recent sale of his remaining stock has been interpreted as a profound lack of confidence 
in this possibility (Hartley, 2013).  
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UC is no longer a selling point for RIM. Instead, its success has contributed to its demise 
as UC itself has become an expected technical and experiential characteristic of mobile 
media.  
One way to think about the advantages that Google and Apple now have over 
RIM is to consider Moore’s Law249 regarding the exponential growth of micro-
processing power; in this sense, it is much easier for the Google and Apple to scale down 
their software to mobile computing platforms than it is for RIM to scale up their software 
to fully take advantage of now more plentiful, cheaper and more powerful processing 
power. In part this is because the basic architecture for the BlackBerry was founded at a 
point in which wireless data capacity and spectrum efficiency was low and/or scarce. 
Given that such capacities have undergone significant developments, the growing 
infrastructure and transmission capabilities of wireless data networks (and their 
associated fixed capital expenditures) now constitute an economic incentive for telecoms 
to promote the data intensive applications of Google and Apple. In other words, the 
efficiencies that RIM’s earlier products provided are no longer as important to 
telecommunications companies in relation to their current interest in maximizing the use 
of their wireless infrastructures. Support from telecommunications providers is crucially 
important because wireless carriers remain the so-called kingmakers for the success or 
failure of handsets (especially in North America where, to repeat, they subsidize the costs 
of handsets in exchange for multi-year contracts from consumers).  
                                                
249 Moore’s Law, named after Intel co-founder Gordon E. Moore, states that the processing power, of the 
microchip including the number of integrated transistors, doubles at least every 18 to 24 months. See 
ftp://download.intel.com/museum/Moores_Law/Video-
Transcripts/Excepts_A_Conversation_with_Gordon_Moore.pdf 
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Although the ascent of Google and Apple took several years, the signs of this shift 
were imminent in Apple’s initial iPhone release in 2007. While RIM was responding to 
and extending the fervor surrounding the development of web 2.0 by releasing new 
devices, Apple unveiled what would ultimately constitute a market-changing device that 
transformed the expectations of both consumers and telecommunications providers.250 
Assessing the iPhone’s success offers an important postscript for understanding the 
transformation of UC and suggests a few reasons its ascent over the BlackBerry as a 
perceived market leader. Though not exhaustive I offer the following reasons: 
1. The iPhone featured a sensitive touch screen (with a relatively intuitive user-
interface) that increased the overall screen size of the device, thus allowing for 
greater visual graphics and a more interactive interface.251 
2. The iPhone focused on high-end consumers, leaving Android-based phones 
(which mirrored the iPhone’s aesthetics and functionality) to target more cost-
conscious consumers, making it more difficult for the BlackBerry brand to retain 
its relatively high device and service costs. 
                                                
250 By 2012 RIM’s BlackBerry’s had been relegated to a distant fourth place in global IMD market 
according to operating system (Gartner, 2012). 
251 Although somewhat delayed, RIM defensively responded to the new expectations of consumers and 
commercial interests within the mobile ecosystem. The first was the development of the Storm, including 
RIM’s first all touch-screen based interface. Released in 2009, the Storm was somewhat disappointing, 
with several bad reviews and limited demand. It attempted to compete directly with the iPhone, and the 
multiplicity of other touch-screen based Android phones that were now emerging in the wake of the 
iPhone’s popularity, and the profitability of the app ecosystem that had developed alongside the iPhone. 
More recent iterations of the BlackBerry Bold/Curve feature touchscreens, though they do not change the 
basic shape of the device.  Commentators and analysts have argued that such adaptations to existing 
designs are too little too late, but they do illustrate RIM’s desire to monopolize on changing user 
preferences and expectations; indeed, the touch screen is an important part of stimulating the app 
ecosystem because many of the most popular apps now are based around touch functionality. 
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3. Apple’s iPhone was built on the success and familiarity of its iPod portable music 
devices that provided a wide range of consumers an introduction to the Apple 
device and software ecosystem.  
4. The iPhone was fully integrated into iTunes, which provided an instant and 
straightforward way of selling iPhone-specific software or apps among other 
digital content like video and songs. 
5. Through iTunes, Apple created an app ecosystem that allowed software 
developers a direct channel to monetize their software. This generated a virtuous 
cycle for the iPhone platform because it offered a clear monetary incentive to 
develop software. As a virtual storefront, iTunes was already familiar with many 
users who entrusted Apple with their credit card information thus for the easy 
purchase of applications. In so doing, iTunes helped rapidly expand the range of 
things the iPhone could do—from location-based services to video gaming— 
thereby increasing the appeal of the device and its ecosystem to consumers.  
Among these reasons, perhaps the most important is the role of iTunes in 
stimulating what can be termed an app economy. A 2010 estimate projected that this 
“economy” will generate an estimated 77 billion downloads and $35 Billion USD in 
revenue by 2014 (Miller, 2010). This was an important step, as already noted, in creating 
a large audience of digital prosumers primarily because apps offered clear tools for the 
production of marketing data by offering a so-called “free lunch” (Smythe, 1981)—that 
is, free applications delivered in exchange for user data. The app economy, seemingly 
overnight, fundamentally changed the relationship between handset manufacturers, 
software developers, telecommunication providers, and users. As virtual storefront, 
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iTunes offered a means of transforming mobile users into an active audience of potential 
consumers of devices, applications, and other virtual goods, while at the same time 
creating a highly personalized channel for generating marketing data and targeting 
advertising. This was a level of personalization that had never before been possible.  
At present, RIM’s future, and that of the BlackBerry brand, rests solely on the 
success of its BlackBerry 10 set of devices and software. This re-introduction of the 
BlackBerry brand is meant to rebuild the entire franchise involving new software and 
hardware crafted to compete directly with the IMDs offered by Google and Apple. 
Released in early 2013, RIM focused on enlisting app developers to ensure a suitable 
range of applications that would be available as soon as the devices are released. Despite 
RIM’s promotional rhetoric, many analysts remain skeptical concerning the company’s 
ability to salvage its brand, and many are predicting a buyout, either in part or whole, by 
a much larger company seeking to secure RIM’s software, patents, and networking 
business.  
8.1 Democracy in the Age of Personalized Media and “Present-
Mindedness” 
Arguably, to repeat, the Blackberry’s rapid decline reflects, paradoxically, its 
successful mediation and actualization of the myth of ubiquitous connectivity. This 
success has indicated the pervasiveness of UC as an almost common sense way of life for 
a growing number of people around the world.  
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I close this dissertation with some relatively speculative observations regarding 
UC and questions concerning the ethics and democratic politics of the future. As 
suggested at the outset, one of the central obstacles facing conventional democratic 
institutions is precisely the condition of immediacy (Tomlinson, 2007) that increasingly 
defines daily life under UC. This is a condition working against the time-demanding 
nature of citizenship, the long-term and communal visions of a public good, and the 
shared investments that enable people to participate in civic and democratic processes. 
Sense of self and community now, however, are increasingly embedded in digital media, 
reproducing an existential entanglement with the general speed up of capitalist 
production perhaps epitomized by the seemingly ephemeral and speculative global flows 
of finance capital which seemingly are not hindered by time or space. As I have noted, 
mobile and ubiquitous media are increasingly tangible expressions of these phenomena. 
At the individual level, the rise of marketing as a social mode of production in which 
consumers participate in their own self-commodification and objectification as consumer 
identities is a central part of contemporary developments involving mobile media.  
The appearance of empowerment and transcendence reinforced by the 
personalized nature of this media environment is totalizing and thus difficult to resist. 
While being immersed in the highly personalized condition of UC makes it appear as 
though “our nervous system” is extended into “a global embrace, abolishing both space 
and time as far as our planet is concerned” (McLuhan, 1964, p. 19), as Kittler (1999) 
notes, this condition is merely a surface effect (1)—the appearance that masks a deeper, 
ontological and political economic essence. It appears as though we are extending 
ourselves, just as it appears as though our media is more social. In reality our media 
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becomes more intentional, more intensive, more personalized, anticipating our 
communicative needs and behaviors (mostly as consumers instead of citizens) within a 
continuous flow of self-commodification.  
Thus, if McLuhan’s extensions of man thesis suggests a theory of media similar to 
that of the optics of classical Greece, modelled on the projection of human senses—like 
the idea that vision itself produced light; “Were our eyes not like the sun, they could 
never see it” (Goethe quoted in Kittler, 2010, p. 50)—an inverse theory is modeled on the 
camera obscura. Like it, this personalized media ecology promulgates alienated or 
detached reflections much like the auto-amputated selves produced by the narcissistic 
gaze of McLuhan’s “Gadget Lover” (McLuhan, 1964, p. 51-56). Despite their differing 
emphases, both McLuhan and Kittler have highlighted how dominant media become not 
only the reflecting pools of the self or soul, but also their constitutive articulation.252 
Might not the technologies of UC, like IMDs, offer a similar phenomena, albeit one 
consonant with the You-topian world of web 2.0 and the prosumer—both contributing to 
self-commodification as a general social practice? 
                                                
252 Kittler (2010) offers two historically significant examples in this respect: 1) the wax tablet of the ancient 
Greeks, “All that remained for Socrates and his enthusiastic interlocutors was to explain what the soul itself 
was. And lo and behold: a definition of the soul was immediately offered by the wax slate, that tabula rasa 
upon which the Greeks etched their notes and correspondence with their slate pencils” (p. 34); and 2) the 
invention of film which reconfigured how people described near death experiences, “Instead, at the 
moment of imminent death a rapid time-lapse film of an entire former life is projected once again in the 
mind’s eye...in 1900, the soul suddenly stopped being a memory in the form of wax slates or books, as 
Plato describes it; rather, it was technically advanced and transformed into a motion picture” (p. 35).  
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Perhaps in partial validation of McLuhan’s thesis that we become what we behold 
(see McLuhan, 1962, p. 265-264),253 the so-called “attention economy” (Davenport & 
Beck, 2001; Terranova, 2012) works bi-directionally by compelling individuals to 
become vigorous self-promoters, competing for jobs, status, and popularity through 
increasing forms of self-commodification. Commodity fetishism, as Zygmunt Bauman 
argues, is now subjectivity fetishism (Bauman, 2007, p. 14). This condition has real 
significance for constitution of the labour market. As Marwick (2011) explains, “The 
ability to position oneself successfully in a competitive attention economy becomes a 
marker of reputation and standing.” Instead of an abstract category, the labour 
commodity becomes more personal, unique, and spectacular as it competes for a 
diminishing number of well paying or paid jobs. Thus, as noted above, the attention 
economy under web 2.0 is as much about production as it is consumption—as much 
about the personal brand as it is about the commercial brand. The relative market value of 
both personal and corporate brands is fundamentally tied to the transformation of 
attention (which comprises both social communication and affect) into money. In both 
cases, today, the most effective way of doing this is to use personalized media as 
channels for capturing and monetizing attention.  
Although IMDs are the most clear and tangible representations of personalized 
media, they are dialectically linked to the evolution of the World Wide Web as it 
becomes a hybrid environment comprising human and non-human communication in a 
seamless and ubiquitous flow of data. Without getting into the seriousness of the title, 
                                                
253 A sentiment that echoes something Nietzsche wrote almost a century before: “Our writing tools are also 
working on our thoughts” (quoted in Kittler, 1999, p. 200). 
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recent speculation about “web 3.0” has highlighted the technological foundations of a 
new era of personalization to take hold. With respect to the digital economy, the 
productive necessity of personalization (and the forms of paid and unpaid digital labour 
enabled by IMD) was recently raised in a TechCrunch interview with Tim O’Reilly (web 
2.0 proponent) and Reid Hoffman (founder of LinkedIn). In it they were asked to theorize 
what web 3.0 might entail. While acknowledging the problems behind the 
characterization “3.0,” they both claimed that the World Wide Web will be primarily 
powered by the explosion of personal data generated by IMDs. Reid Hoffman explains 
that web 3.0 comprises “a torrent of innovation that’s going to be unleashed by all of this 
personal data being collected.”254 Moreover, they both note how web 3.0, in effect, does 
away with anonymity as a basic characteristic of the Web, once and for all, as online and 
offline identities are fused together. This is perhaps one of the most significant yet least 
understood transformations involving modern digital media. Unlike in previous years, in 
which personal data was segregated in silos by organization-specific databases, the era of 
UC not only provides exponential growth in the quality and quantity of personal data, it 
also allows that data to be automatically indexed by user and location through the 
universal use of mobile technologies.  
The Web is already increasingly defined by user preferences and filtering 
services. Hunch, StumbleUpon, and Reddit are examples of services that filter content 
based on user preferences, employing an algorithm that “learns” over time and that will 
be able to anticipate or predict what might be interesting to the user. In doing so, they all 
                                                
254 Available at http://techcrunch.com/2011/04/18/so-is-web-3-0-already-here-tctv/ 
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harness the activities and free labour of users to rate, rank, and tag content in order to 
make personalization more commercially useful. As artificial intelligence becomes more 
sophisticated, this process will become increasingly automated (triggered through 
machine-to-machine communication).  
Web 2.0 already has given rise to services like Klout or Empire Avenue that act as 
means of measuring online influence, creating markets of self-branded prosumers. Social 
networks therefore begin to resemble distribution networks—markets for exchanging 
status points. The growth of participatory marketing (Honea, 2010) likely will harness the 
filtering and targeting mechanisms of the web, enabling individual users to collaborate in 
the process of marketing to themselves (Zwick et al., 2009) and rewarding individuals 
who build their personal brands online—fulfilling ever more explicitly the qualities 
outlined by Smythe in his description of audience work (1981). 
In the realm of the social, this commodified personalization contributes to a 
closed symbolic world; one in which the control and preferences of the user are 
embedded in the very software and algorithms themselves. In contrast to the embodied 
flesh and blood individual, the digital self becomes a self-propelling algorithm that, if left 
uncontrolled, will work to personalize the symbolic and communicative landscape. While 
our dominant technological milieu adapts to, and reinforces, the creation of small 
“monadic communication clusters” (Gergen, 2008), individuals are tacitly encouraged (or 
enabled) to disengage from the human beings around them, as they are committed to their 
respective social networks, rather than civil society.  
 Indeed, this is precisely what Huxley feared, and is the crux of his argument in 
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Brave New World, thus making regular references by journalists “covering” technology 
all the more ironic. In distinguishing between George Orwell’s 1984 and Aldous 
Huxley’s Brave New World, Neil Postman writes:  
Orwell warns that we will be overcome by an externally imposed oppression.  But 
in Huxley's vision, no Big Brother is required to deprive people of their 
autonomy, maturity and history.  As he saw it, people will come to love their 
oppression, to adore the technologies that undo their capacities to think. What 
Orwell feared were those who would ban books. What Huxley feared was that 
there would be no reason to ban a book, for there would be no one who wanted to 
read one. Orwell feared those who would deprive us of information. Huxley 
feared the truth would be drowned in a sea of irrelevance. (emphasis added, 1985, 
p.xix). 
In this case, “irrelevance” is a highly iterative process, one generating an 
increasingly opaque “telecocoon” (Crawford & Goggin, 2008) that increasingly short-
circuits the possibilities for the socially accepted practices and measures of truth 
necessary for democracy to survive.  
The prospective degradation of democratic institutions in an era of personalized 
media is mirrored at the physiological level. Indeed, Nicholas Carr (2010), and others 
(Stiegler, 2012; Terranova, 2012), have suggested that this media condition may be 
altering the structures of the brain, thereby foreclosing the capacity to think in particular 
ways (i.e., “deep attention”). As Terranova argues, in a media environment defined by the 
personalization, information—conceptualized as the process of being informed—
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describes the various techniques and technologies for “consuming attention” (Terranova, 
2012, p. 4). Thus the perceived abundance of information—conceptualized as a non-
scarce, non-depletable resource—is countered by a growing scarcity and fragmentation of 
attention itself. Terranova writes that, “By consuming attention and making it scarce, the 
wealth of information creates poverty that in its turn produces conditions for a new 
market to emerge. This new market requires specific techniques of evaluation and units 
of measurement (algorithms, clicks, impressions, tags, etc)” (2012, p. 4). As such, 
attention is made more scarce but is also “degraded” (p. 4). The personalization of our 
media environment epitomized by IMDs enables the regular intervention of a 
ubiquitously enabled siren’s song competing for smaller and smaller slices of our 
attention.255 
Similarly, the implications of personalization on politics and culture seems to 
reinforce a tendency towards fragmentation, the creation of parallel communicative 
universes defined by closed symbolic structures of circular affirmation and group 
polarization. This is the un-reflexive tendency Innis tried to warn us against, for it is in 
society’s ability to self-reflect, self-critique, that it is able to self-correct. At the level of 
political economy, we might consider the processes of personalization as one of symbolic 
enclosures in which the structure of wealth and privilege are reproduced in separate 
social and financial networks in ways that exclude non-participants (creating the 
equivalent of online gated communities). Overall, personalization is merely a cover for 
                                                
255 In this sense, Google’s massive market capitalization ($271 billion USD as of March 2013), indeed its 
entire business model, can be related to the various ways by which it monopolizes and monetizes attention 
(Lee, 2011; Pasquinelli, 2009). 
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privatization, which in a post-Fordist neoliberal era means a growing precarity of labour, 
increasingly made replaceable or disposable by the automation enabled by personalized 
media.  
We can think of the growth of personalization in the era of ubiquitous 
connectivity as a feedback mechanism that flows through our personalized media. 
Historian of technology Otto Mayr (1971a, 1971b) wrote two articles about Adam Smith 
and the debatable influence of feedback technologies (the steam engine in particular) on 
the intellectual genesis of liberal economic theory. According to Mayr, the concept of a 
self-correcting, self-regulating system was the paradigm, the chief metaphor of the free 
market, in which the flows of goods, money and prices would create a self-correcting 
system that could maximize social welfare for the most number of people. We are now 
seeing that personalization of this sort falls closely in line with the beliefs and values of 
typical liberal market theories, using personalization and ubiquitous connectivity as a 
means of efficiently and instantaneously matching services and products with consumers 
(Manzerolle & Kjosen, 2013).  
In this, capitalism’s cybernetic imagination (Webster and Robbins, 1999), we can 
find buried Shannon’s mathematical formula of communication, described as a noise-
reducing feedback system (1949). This cybernetic imagination is preoccupied with the 
search for perfect information—the elimination of noise—that constitutes a 
mathematically perfect communication system; yet one subservient to the expanding 
algorithm of capital circulation and accumulation (Manzerolle & Kjosen, 2012). It is no 
surprise then that our means of communication and our means of exchange, of payment, 
are converging together. While personalization creates nearly perfect information about 
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users commodified or commodity-defined, in the context of technologically mediated 
“social networks,” noise will increasingly constitute those voices, opinions, and messages 
which do not already conform to our personally cultivated algorithm—voices, opinions, 
and messages that are outside of our preference schema thereby reinforcing a present-
mindedness (Innis, 1964, p. 76) suitable to the impulses and work routines mediated by a 
state of ubiquitous connectivity. 
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Appendix A: Letter of Information and Consent  
[Name of participant] 
[Position, Division, Company] 
[City, Country] 
Re: Academic research project, “A political economy of ubiquitous connectivity: myths, 
markets, and the Blackberry” 
Dear [name of interview participant]: 
Please accept this letter of information about our upcoming interview, as per our previous 
conversation(s).  As previously noted, your participation will contribute to PhD 
dissertation research on recent changes in the mobile communication industry, and on 
changing conceptualizations of the end-user as they are reflected in the technical design 
and marketing of the Blackberry.  Specifically, this research will explore how the 
convergence of work and leisure are reshaping the market for mobile communication 
devices and will focus on smartphones as they are being adapted for seamless and 
ubiquitous Internet connectivity. It will involve interviews with you and other individuals 
who work for Research In Motion (RIM) and are involved in the technical design and 
marketing of the Blackberry.  
Our interview will be a private, one-on-one conversation at your office or another 
location at [date and time].  An audio-recorder will be used to record the discussion for 
my later consultation.  Tapes and written transcripts of our conversation—transcribed by 
me—will be securely stored within a locked filing cabinet during the writing and analysis 
of this study, and will be destroyed within five years of this research project’s 
completion, if you so request.   
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Throughout the interview process, your participation remains entirely voluntary.  Be 
assured that you have the right to refuse to participate, to refuse to answer any questions, 
and to withdraw from the study at any time with no consequences.  The results of my 
interview with you will be kept confidential and your identity will be kept anonymous, 
unless you offer written permission to disclose your identity via a separate waiver/letter, 
which I will make available to you.  The nature of your comments, however, may reveal 
your identity or the identity of your organization—a matter I will work with you to 
address if you express concern or hesitation.  If you would like to change or amend your 
responses prior to project finalization, this can be arranged.  If you choose to grant 
permission to disclose your identity, you will retain the authority to indicate which (if 
any) information you would feel more comfortable keeping off the record.  
There are no known risks involved with participating in this research.  In fact, research 
participants may find gratification in being involved in a project that is anticipated to be 
of interest to both an academic and professional/industry readership..  If you have any 
questions about your rights as a research participant or the conduct of the study you may 
contact the Office of Research Ethics by telephone at 519.661.3036 or by email at 
ethics@uwo.ca. 
By signing this document, you consent to the conditions and outcomes of the interview as 
described above. I appreciate your participation in this research and would be happy to 
provide you with further information.  I look forward to our meeting. 
__________________________                    ________     
Researcher’s Signature                                                      Date               
Vincent Manzerolle                  
PhD Candidate, Media Studies               
University of Western Ontario 
__________________________________                _________ 
Participant’s Signature                                                          Date 
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